Access to Benefits from Community Based Tourism

A discursive ethnography of conflict over benefits in Anabeb Conservancy, Namibia

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“Learn from yesterday,
Live for today,
Hope for tomorrow.

The important thing
is not to stop questioning.”

- Albert Einstein-
Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
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<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>CBT</td>
<td>Community Based Tourism</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Common Pool Resources</td>
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<td>DI</td>
<td>Discursive Institutionalism</td>
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<td>IRDNC</td>
<td>Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation</td>
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<td>MET</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment and Tourism</td>
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<td>NACSO</td>
<td>Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organizations</td>
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<td>PAA</td>
<td>Policy Arrangements Approach</td>
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<td>SRT</td>
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Foreword

It is bizarre to dedicate some words about a lengthy process that has come with mixed emotions and many experiences. One day you start with some concepts within a particular context, and now I am writing what I hope to be the last words for this thesis. Academic norms prescribe how I ought to deal with this situation: it is expected that I thank some people related to this process which, don’t be afraid, I will certainly do. But in the end; the process is part of the results that are related to who I am, to whom I have met in this study, to whom I feel connected or sometimes less connected. This study has made me even more aware how people are related to each other in terms of each other, of ideas, or of material things.

I travelled to Namibia exactly a year ago without knowing where I would do a case study on Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in relation to property rights, access mechanisms and Community Based Tourism (CBT). All I knew was based on some academic concepts and discussion with my supervisors. After a few weeks in Windhoek I came across some interesting conflict situations brought up during conversations with officers of national support organizations to nature conservation that have directed me into the interesting context of Anabeb Conservancy. Anabeb is one of Namibia’s ‘conservancies’ in the Northwest, in one of the most arid places one can imagine. Only recently have I become aware of the unique socio-historic position that this case study represents within the whole legacy of Namibia’s conservancy policies that has found its basis in exactly this region since the 1980s.

More and more have I started to enjoy also working on this thesis that has brought me incredible insights of how local politics are produced in larger contexts across both place and time. It has convinced me that who we are is connected to who we relate to, to whom we work with, what we see around us, etcetera. Even I feel related to the conservancy of Anabeb now. If I think about this thesis, I often dream about my little adventure as a naive ethnographer – I had never done an ethnography before – who travelled 700 km northwest of Windhoek to camp in the middle of a hot sandy desert mountain range, all alone except from those people that I talked to for my daily interviews. I enjoyed being alone for those weeks, but always felt connected to friends in Windhoek, to family and friends in the Netherlands, and increasingly to the livelihoods that I have studied then.

Now that I wrap up this thesis, I need to think most of those people that I have experienced being with in July/August 2010. Every day, people in Anabeb would get up early to start milking cows to eventually bring them back from a local river in the evening. In between there is very little to do, except from watching passing by 4WD vehicles full with either NGO officers or international tourists. The past few years have brought a novelty of communal usufruct property rights over wildlife resources that people legally can benefit from in Anabeb. This however sounds better than what it really has brought to most people. And I was eager to explore the difference between popular success stories expressed in Windhoek and why this place in the Northwest of Namibia would tell an unusual story.

I would like to thank all people in Anabeb, especially those that have made their time available for my occasionally long interviews. I have been amazed with the openness that people are willing to share their side of the story in relation to studied mechanisms of access. I enjoyed the hospitality and moments where food and thoughts were being exchanged during community
meetings or after interviews at the local shop. I felt like I was accepted as a temporary member and thereby felt less alone in a place very far from Wageningen.

Upon return in the Netherlands it has taken quite a while to finish this thesis what I thought would have been finished six months ago. And still, it feels unfinished since I can continue forever by adding some lines here and there, read one more article, etcetera. But after having presented the thesis during a lecture for the course on sustainable development in tourism at Wageningen University, I started to make new connections and collected enough energy to wrap things up. In this process, I would like to thank my supervisors Rene en Dik who have given me the interdisciplinary challenge that I was longing for to get the best out of two critical worlds in international tourism development and legal anthropology. I am glad to have had quite a level of independency, since I wanted to do this last piece of work in my own way, and I think I had many ways that this study could have been performed. Thank you for reminding me that I need to focus upon one particular field of study and that I do not need to incorporate too many things at the same time. I still think that I used many theories, but I kept falling in love with a new theory every week.

Moreover, I would like to point out that I have enjoyed the last three years as a master student. I had graduated before in 2006 at the Erasmus University, but after having tasted working life at different private companies, I felt that I needed to follow my passions and go for more intellectual challenges that involved culture and politics in tourism development. I can say that the decision to re-enter the world of university has been a healthy decision in hindsight. I have met many great people and had a good deal of personal development – in and outside of the classroom - that I was longing for. I can understand that it must have felt like a strange career change from the perspective of my family and friends three years ago, but I think they have seen the passion I have for academic work.

Finally, I would like to thank my girlfriend in particular. She has been a great support all along, especially in these last weeks when personal circumstances haven’t been as they were planned to be. The life that we were preparing was bound to be born in September but didn’t make it in the end. What is most important now; is that the process continues and that current outcomes, as terrible as they sometimes might seem, do not determine the future.

The same can be told about the story of this thesis.
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The following describes an ethnographic study of a local community conflict over wildlife benefits from communal management in the conservancy of Anabeb. The study represents an alternative story of ever successful conservancy policies framed by CBNRM policy makers in independent Namibia. Whereas the general story represents growing statistics of wildlife populations and income generating opportunities from communal usufruct rights to wildlife populations in Namibia; it is shown here how people within one legally defined community – out of currently 60 conservancies - have the ability to benefit from national rights in relation to socially embedded forms of tradition.

On basis of primarily theories of access in combination with a policy arrangement approach (PAA), people’s access to resources has politically been mapped in terms of community coalitions with shared ideas about how to deal with natural resources and possible benefits hereof. In total 38 interviews have been performed with primarily community members (and some external actors) next to participant observations of three community meetings around the theme of conservancy elections. The conservancy elections were at the order of the day during data accumulation since different coalitions had been in conflict over the right procedure to deal with elections: do we need to have conservancy reporting before elections or otherwise? The discussion of this simple question has a strong contextual background that is argued to involve both discursive and strategic action of actors within the conservancy.

The conservancy committee is the most powerful local decision making body that democratically represents members of the community. Ideas about proper procedures are argued to be based upon different discursive interactions amongst people within, and outside the conservancy. In fact, the whole discussion illustrates an underlying local policy arrangement of people, resources, ideas and rules. The study of these interrelated concepts has foregrounded how some members of the community are related to regional and national policy making, structured in levels of knowledge, nepotism and personal relationships. Moreover, a strong national political preference is shown to be an interesting decisive factor for communal decision making that is officially claimed - by national policy makers - to be apolitical.

Such an idea is brushed off in this thesis since the introduction of conservancy policy in locally established norms can be seen as a political act in many ways. First of all, the idea of local authority is being weakened to make place for democracy and a new legal-political authority of a conservancy that ought to represent all people in local decision making for wildlife management since independence. Secondly, a conservancy represents connected values from external actors to the local; i.e. conservation to save the planet and its species, or possible cooperation between private tourism organizations and the local community to access local wildlife populations for tourists’ consumption. One particular group within the Anabeb conservancy has been known throughout history to be able to strategically shift alliances in response to new developments coming from the west and has thereby arranged a well off position within the region and its conservancies.

Nevertheless, other traditional groups are united in their resistance against local dominance of one group and related organizations. In their struggle for access to benefits (primarily jobs),
these coalitions of resistance – and non-concerned coalitions – partake in an open battle for control over the conservancy’s territory and its wildlife benefits. People herein (un-) consciously partake in certain discourses and legal overlapping institutions. This study shows how access to natural resources can be both structurally and actively arranged through agency where actors strategically make use of available discourses or institutionalized rules.

The study of community access to natural resources by means of a policy arrangements approach is concluded to be helpful and necessary to understand how policy processes in the local are related to external structural developments. It must be stressed also that the found arrangements are temporal and subject to continuous change. It is considered as a process that involves different levels of actors in different places in the struggle for access to scarce resources. The findings show that the connected concept of a community in Community Based Natural Resource Management is contested if we speak of homogeneous sets of people in a locality, whereas strong heterogeneity of different traditional clans and corresponding local traditional authorities are found to remain having legitimacy next to national unifying laws that favor democratic participation.

Finally, some limitations of the approach here congregate in its local ethnographic scope that are difficult to generalize to other conservancy contexts in Namibia or neighboring countries in Southern Africa. More ethnographic studies are called for to broaden our understanding of interrelated communities and its individuals that are either constrained through structure or agency in their access to natural resources that supporting organizations well-intentionally aim to change in order to safeguard communal nature conservation for future generations.

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1 Concerned and non-concerned coalitions are two different groups of community members in Anabeb that are literally framed in these names by members of Anabeb conservancy. For more details, see chapter five.
‘Merely having rights over resources does not automatically mean that one is capable to benefit from these rights to resources’
1. INTRODUCTION

This study takes place in Namibia, an extremely dry place\(^2\) in the South West of Africa and “known for its contrasting landscapes” that cater for spectacular flora and fauna, as well as a cultural diversity of eleven ethnic groups (NTB, 2010). In 2005 an estimate of 777,890 tourists visited Namibia (Hinaunye & Jordaan, 2007) generating incoming receipts of about 279 million euro (UNWTO, 2006). The tourism industry represents 18% of total employment and 16% of Namibia’s GDP (WTTC, 2006) thereby representing the third largest contributor to its national GDP (Libanda & Blignaut, 2008). The tourism sector is recognized by the Namibian government and made a priority development within its Vision 2030 targeting long-term improvement of living standards for Namibia’s 2.1 million civilians (Hinaunye & Jordaan, 2007).

Namibia’s contrasting landscape is however more than lush and attractive. One particular contrast is income inequality. In 2005 the UNDP estimated that 35% of the Namibian population lives on less than 1 $ a day, and 56% on less than 2 $ a day (CIA, 2005). Although monetary values cannot fully represent poverty, these figures indicate inequalities in relation to either wealthier countrymen predominantly living in Windhoek or tourists visiting Namibia. Moreover, Namibia’s natural beauties have been put to the test over the last few decades since wildlife populations neared levels of near extinction due to a drought in the 1980s and continued poaching practices of both wealthy trophy hunters and communal Namibians living amongst wildlife.

In response to rural poverty and threatened wildlife populations, the Namibian government has initiated a community based cooperative approach to foster sustainable resource use in communal areas by means of profitable tourism opportunities that theoretically can offset conservation costs. Scanning the yearly published community tourism progress in Namibia (Conservation and the Environment in Namibia, 2009; NACSO, 2009, 2010b) it becomes comprehensible that a Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) policy is represented as a successful approach in conserving nature by providing rural residents on communal lands increased common property resource rights to secure development and environmental conservation. Before we further discuss Namibia’s CBNRM policy, a short theoretical discussion of CBNRM is useful to allow for a critical understanding of what CBNRM stands for, particularly within common property theory.

1.1 CBNRM IN THEORY

With the idea of having more equal opportunities for the poor, countless poverty elimination models have been implemented by state and non state actors throughout the developing world. One contemporary strategy of Community Based Natural Resource Management is related to self-regulation and autonomy of communities to manage development and nature conservation. CBNRM is in essence an aim to return ‘local stewardship’ over natural resources through the use of popular concepts like participation, empowerment and decentralization to create material wellbeing (for economic sustainability) for those living with the resources for ages, to create social justice (for social sustainability) and to care for environmental conservation (for environmental sustainability) (Dressler, et al., 2010). In short, the idea is a working concept of the much valued people, planet and profit in contemporary discourses of sustainable development.

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\(^2\) Namibia is the driest country south of the Sahara (B. Jones & Murphree, 2001).
Even though the concept of CBNRM has been practiced for some time now, it has been framed by policy makers and scientists as a popular concept where rural communities are given incentives to actively partake in the sustainable management of scarce natural resources via local decision making since the 1980s (Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Blaikie, 2006; S. Jones, 2006).

The idea of devolved decision making is not completely new to rural communities in Southern Africa. Devolved decision making has some parallels with practices often initiated during colonial occupation when ‘natives’ were habitually governed through indirect rule into ethnic divisions such as the system of homeland administration in colonial Southern Africa; see further section 4.1.3. The care for nature had no priority in the colonial past even though colonial hunters desired having the sole access to natural resources like wildlife to safeguard hunting sport. Such interest led to protectionist discourses that found parallel refuge with the emerging national park model in the United States to which many parts of Africa have materialized for purposes of ‘recreation’ and ‘preservation’ (S. Jones, 2006).

Before CBNRM came to the surface as a dominant strategy, conservation primarily used – and in some places still uses - to be based on protectionist ‘fortress conservation’. The transition from protection to participatory conservation can be explained in twofold. Firstly, protectionist techniques regularly failed to control local resource use from a distance (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Decentralization was therefore brought to life as an idea that would overcome problems of controlled conservation outreach and assumed that ‘local custodians’ are willing enough to care for resources. Wildlife is however not a typical resource that normally is provided for by ‘willing local custodians’ since wildlife often forms a threat to crop farming, human lives and cattle herding. Secondly, community conservation is further explained as a part of Western imaginations of ‘the Other’ that has a whole history in native conservation. Past - and occasionally contemporary - images prescribed that rural peasants in Africa are primitive and incapable of sustainable self-management. Fortress conservation used to be a perceived panacea to such ways of thinking. Nevertheless, as top-down practices seemed ineffective, expensive and conflicting with rural resistance, a new image of active local harmonious custodians within their natural environments is embraced in the present (Neumann, 1997).

Ever since CBNRM gained popularity, growing number of scholars have also indicated the limited practices community conservation bring forward (Agrawal, 2003; Rodary, 2009). Like with many blueprint models in development, rigid and vague descriptions of CBNRM bring forward some critical aspects that will be discussed below; ideal communal property, diverse property relations in communal property configurations, and socio-political factors influencing the distribution of wealth. To critically observe CBNRM, it is necessary to commence discussing its origins in common property thinking.

Commonly held resources/property are characterized by two important traits, namely: non-excludability and subtractability (Feeny, Berkes, Mccay, & Acheson, 1990). To illustrate, common property resources can be thought of in terms of the ocean and its fishes, clean drinking water supplies, forests or wildlife populations. All beings have access to these resources in theory (one cannot be excluded from air for example), but all beings can subtract resources that are finite and therefore are created scarce (by breathing clean air, one breathes out used air that is consi-
dered less clean for re-consumption). To analyze common-property resources, Feeny et al. (1990) refer to four different ideal types of property-rights regimes; open access (if a resource does not have a well regulated form of property rights and thus represents a free and open space for behavior), private property (if rights to make use of and exclude others from resources are regulated by an individual), communal property (if a resource is managed by a specific and inter-dependent group of people) and state property (rights are with the government who can make decisions in relation to inclusion and subtractability of the resource). Especially communal property is an important concept for the management of shared resources, yet its management can be related to other property rights regimes; i.e. Namibian conservancies provide for common usufruct property of wildlife for communities whereas the strict property of communal land remains with the State. The typology must therefore be used with care since it can lead to confusion where resource and property regime(s) can be related in overlapping constructions (Barrow & Murphree, 2001).

The management of common resources is commonly debated as either catastrophic or hopeful for sustainable resource management. One dominant but pessimistic perspective is structured within Hardin’s (1968) famous essay on *The Tragedy of the Commons* that fluently fed into the discourse of fortress conservation. Hardin explains that the use of the commons - resources such as land, air, etc. - cannot be managed in a responsible manner since too many accessible users would have to take advantage of the same finite amount of resources. Hardin underlines his argument by making an important reference to the driving idea of Adam Smith’s *invisible hand* – as discussed in the Wealth of Nations (1776) – that allows people to think that decisions and behavior on basis of good intent are beneficial for the welfare of society. Such a standpoint is however problematic in terms of levels of freedom for individuals. Individualism is appreciated in Western society since it allows for the production of freedom. But the more people are coming to this world, the more we pressurize the capacities of our environment, and thus our available levels of freedom and individualism (Hardin, 1998). Education, Hardin argues, can work against natural tendencies of people that create negative outcomes for the environment and can create necessity to care for the commons, creating subsequent new levels of individual freedom to act.

But as there are many supporters of Hardin’s thesis, there are just as many who question it. Fee-ny et al. (1990) i.e. assure that many hopeful cases exist where users of a common resource have been able to restrict access and create rules independently to foster ‘sustainable’ use of common property resources. Many believers of the Hardin thesis do, at least according to Feeny et al., wrongly interpret common property with the regime of open access where no property relations would exist. Common property is however not just problematized by endless population growth as Hardin argued; it is also depending upon socio-political factors represented in i.e. powerful elites or disorder in traditional communal management systems. Different communities have proven to be able to restrict the access of resources within their boundaries of a community, and people in such communities are not alleged to be helpless in organizing themselves or being isolated as they have been in the past. Appell (1993) agrees with this antithesis by claiming that Hardin’s arguments have been influential but ‘historically uninformed’ and ‘sociologically naïve’ (p.3). What is lacking mostly, is the importance of looking at different property relations that can inform us about who are holding and who are being responsible for managing rights over the commons.
One other important aspect of CBNRM is the economic incentive mechanism claimed necessary for rural participants of a community to partake in the proper care of the environment. “Through obtaining a high degree of exclusive power over things [like obtaining rights over resource use], it is postulated that agents will exercise greater care over them, invest appropriately, and generally act such that the promotion of their selfish interests will be fully consistent with the collective welfare function of their society” (Hann, 2007, p. 296). Whereas Adam Smith would have rejoiced such logic, critics of such liberal mechanisms point at the relative ignorance of unequal power relations obscured by property rights that have serious consequences for the distribution of wealth. While CBNRM partly aims at poverty alleviation, it can just as well worsen poverty situations for the poor due to wealth accumulation of the wealthier and well informed elite forces (Gauster & Isakson, 2007; Lahiff, 2007; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2009). This development is possibly due to continued tendencies by policy makers to see institutional frameworks as apolitical, forgetting about past positions of enforced socio-institutional frameworks (Agrawal, 2003).

(common) Property is in fact not just a thing that people can own, but rather a social and changeable arrangement that individuals can have in relation to objects. Property “cannot be reduced to ‘the economic’” alone (von Benda-Beckmann, 2006, p. 2). And if we understand that property is relational, then ownership of property is related to others. Such an understanding makes the notion of individuality – in contrast to what the tragedy of the commons tells us – immediately limited. Communal ownership seems to make property a more complicated and interrelated concept where societal rules and norms become part of the economic deal to make the arrangement of other – i.e. social, environmental, political, cultural, ethnic, class - dimensions for the proper management of the commons possible (Appell, 1993; Hann, 2007; Lahif, Borras, & Kay, 2007; Mansfield, 2007; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2009; von Benda-Beckmann, 2006).

The above discussions have highlighted some important shortcomings of communal conservation ideas. These discussions help policy makers to reflect upon contemporary practices where the discourse on CBNRM continues to bloom. This is striking but argued to lie with positive ideas about participation, the role of communities, sustainable natural resource management and the hope that CBNRM can provide to rural development (Blaikie, 2006; Dressler, et al., 2010). This hope lies partly in the abilities of common property holders to organize themselves to overcome tragedies of the common. Nevertheless, the polical-economic organization of a common property arrangement can just as well lead to tragic despair if little attention is given to other than economic dimensions.

1.2 CBNRM IN NAMIBIA

The Namibian government has embraced a nation-wide strategy of sustainable development through community participation for conservation since its independence in 1990. CBNRM is argued by aid organizations to have contributed to successful community conservation and development over the past 15 years (NACSO, 2009, 2010b).

The Namibian framework of CBNRM support organization known as NACSO - a collaborative body of 15 governmental and nongovernmental organizations – is closely cooperating with communities and the national government to “…promote and coordinate community-based natural resource management as a national and locally-based empowerment, conservation, and economic development programme” (NACSO, 2011a, p. 3). The focus on collaboration, including that
with local traditional authorities, is part of NACSO’s philosophy: “... to harness the wide range of skills available in Government, NGOs and the University into a complementary nation-wide CBNRM support service” (NACSO, 2011b). Interestingly, the collaboration of skills does not mention local people but must be brought to people on communal lands.

Next to NACSO, several legal interventions have made the institutionalization of a conservancy possible. A conservancy is “a group of farms on which neighboring landowners have pooled their resources for the purpose of conserving and utilizing wildlife on their combined properties. The Conservancy concept does not have to be restricted to the commercial farming areas, but can be extended to communal land as well” (MET, 1995, p. 4). In return for sustainable custodianship, conservancies are entitled to all wildlife related benefits, including tourism and trophy hunting. This right to wildlife benefits used to be common practice already since 1968 for commercial farmers.

All related Conservancy legislation and policy documents have been introduced by the Namibian Ministry of Environment & Tourism (MET) since 1996 through several policy strategies and legal changes that accept communal property rights over natural resources on former Bantustan homelands. The MET is of opinion that people on communal land need to be given incentives in community conservation by putting a value to wildlife, otherwise “people see little point in looking after resources” (MET, 1995, p. 3). Prior to conservancy policies on a national scale, community conservation is argued to be initiated by local leaders and a regional NGO called Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) in the Kunene region since the 1980s. The programme of this NGO has – in short - been to pioneer in “linking wildlife conservation to rural development and to democracy” (IRDNC, 2011).

Since conservancy policy introductions have been implemented, wildlife numbers have been measured to grow noticeably and rural development is argued to be effective for many local livelihoods according to nation-wide statistics. By now, already 60+ communal conservancies have been registered; and these numbers are expected to grow beyond the boundaries of the Namibian state. Conservancies by now cover more than 12 million hectares of communal land where roughly 224,000 Namibians live (NASCO, 2009).

There are many success stories on CBNRM that are popularly brought by those agencies that have initiated the concept (Blaikie, 2006). The same can be said about the strong representation of the Namibian CBNRM narrative that is not being told by communities themselves but rather by governmental and non-governmental agencies primarily related to tourism development and conservation in Namibia. By means of common socio-economic evaluations of CBNRM practices, little attention is paid to qualitative differences between or within communities partaking in the nation-wide program. This, Blaikie (2006) and Mosse (2004) argue, is related to a general need for such agencies to produce successful stories in the upward direction of multi-layered organizations and international audiences to prevail of criticism, secure reputations and funding. There is little concern about equity of policy outcomes in common pool resource management since the main emphasis put on the “sustainable management” of the natural resource (F. Cleaver, 2009, p. 128). The story of success is bound to be replicated as a blueprint model for other similar projects in different countries within Southern Africa or even in other continents, and thereby potentially overseeing complexities of conservancy practices in a multitude of rural locales where communities are universally idealized by policy makers working in urban areas.
CBNRM is playing a leading role in conservation strategies around the world but is facing critical challenges due to unsatisfactory outcomes in practice that undermine the strength of hope that these policies can bring to ‘empowered’ communities. This, Dressler et al. (2010) argue, is due to false beliefs and practices that are embedded in the concept of CBNRM. One central concept is that of community itself. Community, and community participation or conservation, have become magic words for contemporary conservationists or international non-governmental organizations; i.e. the WorldBank, WWF, IUCN, Conservation International, etcetera (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). A community in Namibia is framed within its constitution as a homogeneous unit, see further section 4.3. Such a representation stands in contrast to the paradox of CBNRM that is represented as community based, whereas (inter-) national intermediating actors united in NACSO and the Namibian government aid communal decision making through continuous efforts to capacitate communal actors into the proper ‘custodian’ management of natural resources (Büscher, 2010; Jim Igoe & Brockington, 2007; J. Igoe & Fortwangler, 2007; Wearing & McDonald, 2002). Wildlife populations may increase and large sums of money may arrive at conservancy bank accounts due to vast income from trophy hunting and tourism (NACSO, 2009), the alleviation of poverty is not automatically taken care of by conservancy members. Members may have an equal right to benefit from conservancy revenues according to constitutional custodian/national law, but most benefits are argued not to reach out to the very local poor as numerous case studies imply that the more powerful in communities are able to arrange income distributions to their benefits (Shackleton, Campell, Wollenberg, & Edmunds, 2002). Besides, it is insufficiently proven whether community based tourism can provide enough net benefits to eliminate costs in human-wildlife conflict (Walpole & Thouless, 2005). Many Namibian living on communal land are depending on their livestock that are threatened by many predators protected by legal conservancy mechanisms.

The legal translation of CBNRM into conservancy law, and especially how different people deal with new legal mechanisms in legal and non-legal ways within socially embedded local systems, brings forward interesting elements for discussion of how access to resources can be contested within conservancy communities. There are various customary norms, national laws, or other day to day institutionalized relationships that simultaneously provide opportunities for people to deal with benefit distributions and the management of natural resources. Giving communities the right over wildlife resources on their land - which formally remains to be state property – creates new forms of resource management that theoretically can provide opportunities for the rural poor. But merely having rights over resources does not automatically mean that one is capable to benefit from these rights to resources.

In summary; little attention is given to structural dynamics between and in communities that cater for access to natural resources. The concept of the community in CBNRM seems to be left to various interpretations by Namibian CBNRM policy makers but serves as a myth in discourses of participation, sustainable development, democracy and nature conservation by ‘the local’. This ambiguity leaves us with little understanding of who is having access to local benefits from community based tourism in Namibia’s conservancies. This problematizes the overall veil of success that takes little account of structural micro processes but rather focuses on the accumulation of wildlife population growth and income from community based tourism, which as a success model/story can market itself to other nation states that closely follow the positive developments of Namibia.
1.3 Research Aim & Question
It is decisive to provide for alternative – more ethnographic - evaluations of community access to resources that move beyond the notion of communal property relations into more socio-political dimensions of people’s access to resources. Since policy governance networks in development become ever more ‘orchestrated’ and ‘concealed’, Lewis and Mosse (2006) call for more critical ethnography of development policies and practices. It is interesting in this respect to see how structural developments function not only through bureaucratic top-down or bottom up processes, but rather through nuanced discourses of success stories where Namibians are framed as free custodians and enjoying ‘national and locally-based empowerment’ (NACSO, 2011a, p. 3). In the development of community conservation policies, ethnographic research needs to unravel in what ways communities are functioning in newly created and maintained networks (J. Igoe & Fortwangler, 2007) that produce access to natural resources that cannot be seen within isolated localities alone. Communities must therefore be studied within the context of multiple interests and actors within communities, how decision making is influenced, and what role internal and external institutions have on shaping decision making in CBNRM (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). It is expected that access over resources is being exercised throughout socio/historical events and amongst people throughout webs of relationships and related discourses. Elite capturing is assumed to be too much of a simplification of local complexity that tends to continuously drive common understanding of why certain conflicts rest in individuals, in agency. Such understanding already stipulates who is responsible for problems in a community, overshadowing a larger picture of other participants in the arrangement around poverty alleviation and nature conservation.

It is aimed here to present an understanding of a current conflict over resources in a community in Namibia that is far greater than mere local complexity. By means of a single case study it is aimed to unpack perceived complexities in conflict over access to benefits from a specific conservancy in Namibia. The conservancy of Anabeb, northwestern Namibia in the Kunene region, was unanimously indicated as a challenging community by several key Namibian policymakers during preparatory interviews in Windhoek. A great deal of local politics was said to be the cause of problems in recent Anabeb conservancy conflict. In general, responses of NACSO related policymakers illustrated that different traditional authorities have been battling for control over conservancy management, creating unfavorable outcomes for marginalized groups in Anabeb.

This study does not aim to challenge the well intentioned actions of the collaborative framework of different governmental and nongovernmental actors in Namibia, but rather aims to create more understanding of how people deal with plural rule systems to manage resource use and access to benefits important for targeted livelihoods in a conservancy. Community actors are related to one another in different ways and form different groups that inexplicitly are connected to ideas made within rural villages as well as on a distance. These ideas can influence how people differently deal with the introduction of conservancy law, possibly explaining contemporary conflict in a community.

It seems that what happens in a place is inexplicitly connected to what is happening somewhere else. And access over tourism related resources is connected to how power is being exercised throughout a community. To analyze micro processes of power in Anabeb Conservancy, this thesis aims to provide an exemplary ethnographic account of historical events and observations.
made during fieldwork in the winter of 2010 to provide for an alternative evaluation of conservancy practices with regards to universalizing NACSO publications. The following general research aim can be described;

_To understand complexities and the production of power over proper resource management within the community based tourism enterprise of Anabeb Conservancy, through an ethnography of Anabeb’s legal pluralist practices of access framed within national and local socio-historical conditions of conservancy policy, as an alternative story to popular and universalizing success oriented publications of the nationwide policy program of conservancies in Namibia._

The legal pluralist practices refer to the plurality of different rule systems that actors within a conservancy such as Anabeb can make use of to arrange how natural resources need to be managed in a customary fashion. The introduction of conservancy policies and national law can either change or maintain former traditional set ups of a community that is represented in Anabeb Conservancy. Such a set-up is expected to eventually co-determine how people of a conservancy, and their interconnectedness to different institutions, have access to natural resources next to their formal usufruct rights to these resources. The following research question is formulated in this respect:

_Whether and How the introduction of conservancy law/policies within earlier established socially embedded institutions has changed Community members’ relational access to benefits from wildlife related resources in the Anabeb Conservancy of Namibia?_

1.4 Outlook

There are still many questions around this particular research set up; i.e can we talk of community benefits? Are mechanisms of access better investigated on more individual levels or in between people’s relations? What is a community exactly? And is it the institutional framework of national/local rules that enact people’s behavior? These questions will be dealt with in the theoretical framework in chapter two where we look into the contested concept of community in CBNRM and how we can study access to natural resources in a more socio-political manner. From the perspective of mechanisms of access an in-between approach to agency and structure is proposed as a technique to study changing political arrangements. This approach and connected theories are discussed in chapter two, including the deduction of relevant research questions.

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4 In Namibia, seasons develop in a contradicting manner in relation to the Northern hemisphere. Where it is winter in Namibia, it is summer in the Netherlands.
On basis of a proposed conceptual model of a Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA), chapter three dives into an explanation of ethnographic methods used in this study next to a declaration of the author’s positionality. Before any results are framed within the PAA in chapter five, chapter four describes some critical socio-historic conditions that have played a role in how particular discourses have been framed around local and national histories of conservancies in Namibia, in particular to regional developments of the Kunene region where Anabeb Conservancy is situated. Chapter six discusses how different theoretical interact with contextual and empirical findings to answer the different research questions posed in section 2.4.

Chapter seven concludes this thesis in general and discuss limitations to the approach and findings that ask for further ethnographic research. The appendixes of this study are documented on a separate CD-ROM since: firstly, many respondents have indicated to remain anonymous and will therefore not be named in this study nor the representation of empirical data. Secondly, the analytical database of primarily interview responses is too large to be included in this report on paper format. And thirdly, the digital appendixes can be re-used for further studies related to this approach.
‘...Participatory conservation will always produce “winners and losers” in access to natural resource management.’

-Neuman, 1997
2. Theoretical Framework

Whereas the introduction has highlighted the origins, hopes and critiques to CBNRM within the context of Namibia, this chapter approaches several discussions that can further help understanding some important aspects of access mechanisms in relation to natural resource management. The centrality of ‘community’ in participatory practices of CBNRM is challenged before we look at how actors in CBNRM projects theoretically are thought to influence the configuration of access to benefits from wildlife management. The reader ought to ask him or herself: does an actor have the abilities to purposefully change his or her access to resources and/or are actors influenced by their institutional milieu? And what does this categorization in structure/agency mean for the use of different rule systems that constitute who – in or outside of a ‘community’- is having access to what benefits from local natural resource management and why? And how can actors themselves have an influence on the constitution of rules?

2.1 Contested Concept of Community

“We do not see things as they are, we see things as we are” – Anais Nin

“Local Communities are just words, they are lyrics” – quoted in Ribot (2008)

The idea of community is central for the functioning of CBNRM. It is however a challenging concept that is just as idealized as former examples of ‘harmonious custodianship’ (see chapter 1). Communities are identified as those with responsibilities and rights over the management of common resources in the context of common property regimes. Communities are in this sense the ones who are targeted centrally as those – ideally - in control of conservation (Barrow & Murphree, 2001). Such a claim of control is however often based on vague notions of custodian management5 (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; J. C. Ribot, 1998). Sikora and Lund (2009) explain that such notions are socially established as conceptualizations actively formed by different actors and institutions connected to programs, like the Namibian CBNRM policy framework of actors, policies and law. These different groups of actors and institutions come from different origins (from i.e. development aid, nature conservation, and/or government institutions) but enter the same local arena where concepts are ‘idiomatized’ through ongoing processes of redefining truths (p. 7). Truths in this regard are often taken from European legal systems, causing false comparisons to the property systems that are developed in (post-) colonial societies. Some see this glocal process as the purposeful development of local community resources through “legal distortions” in political-economic interest of outsiders (von Benda-Beckmann, 2006, p. 13). The formalization of ‘the communal’ can lead to false comparisons and ethnocentric categorizations of so-called self-invented custom that in fact just as well reflect ‘custom’ of those requesting formalization of the common.

Poor conservation outcomes in CBNRM have put growing question marks behind the role of communities. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) challenge the not often defined but ideal myth of a community as an isolated entity, namely: “community as a small spatial unit, as a homogeneous social structure, and as shared norms” (p. 629). Leach et al. (1999) acknowledge this uniform image of communities practiced in diverging CBNRM initiatives. Communities are most often seen as relatively homogeneous groups where its members have “shared characteristics distinguishing them from outsiders” (p.228). Communities are seen as the righteous caretakers of the

5 Management according to local tradition, customs.
environment to create an 'harmonious equilibrium' with nature that is organic and with little problems to self-regulate (Barrow & Murphree, 2001). Such perspectives make an important assumption as if communities are isolated from external influences. An idea that is hard to imagine for most communities around the world where scholars are widely and increasingly accepting that communities are in fact connected and – in some occasions – even very global (J. Igoe & Fortwangler, 2007; Rodary, 2009). And if we understand that local communities are not homogeneous groups, also with regards to their interests, participatory conservation will always produce “winners and losers” in access to natural resource management (Neumann, 1997, p. 577).

Rodary (2009) agrees with the problematic concept of the local as a too simplistic idea of communities. Through the mobilization of local people in development projects where participation is key, clear distinctions between the local and the global seem to become vaguer and in need for a better understanding than simple binary distinction. According to Rodary it is therefore better to study local communities in combination to their local arenas as part of globalization if we study participatory policy configurations. The local arena is in point of fact made up of many actors who are related to different places beyond ‘the local’ where different regimes of rule are made available. This can mean that some actors prefer rules from translocal relationships and levels of authority, whereas others can favor legal-political configurations that are more proximate.

Neumann (1997) adds a particular role for locally based NGOs who have taken up important positions under the patronage of international donor/development agencies and above local communities. These local NGOs can very well emerge from past patron-client relationships within rural societies that are being enforced through new participatory conservation policies. The new local NGOs thereby form a new bureaucratic layer in between local people and their rights to resources. It is unsure however what rule systems these local NGOs partake in as they can operate in different institutional environments.

Whatever the arrangement of local versus non-local rule systems, Fitzpatrick (2005) explains that any community policy aiming at formal recognition of customary rules and norms in rural development should consider that new possible forms of competition ought to be taken care of by legal measures of the state. A vacuum between different institutional spaces can create greater uncertainty of conduct and thus possibilities to shop for legal institutions. Such uncertainties are possibly increased by individualized interests as i.e. the re-affirmation of traditional authorities after colonization. In fact, there is no best way in dealing with customary local rules, but there are different scenarios that call for specific strategies to help solving differences between systems of conduct. Fitzpatrick mentions four different approaches that can be used by policy makers in working with communities: a minimalist approach, the agency method, group incorporation or land boards.

The minimalist approach would ideally best fit for communities with little internal conflict and relative exclusion from market mechanisms, allowing a community to settle institutions in near complete customary ways. The agency method allows for the identification of some representatives of a community, as was performed regularly in colonial times and can allow the abuse of rights by these agents. The incorporation of a community into a formal group or corporation allows for secure legal relations between ‘the community as a corporation’ and other legally ac-
cepted bodies such as private investors. Although this approach reduces the recognized risk of agency in the former example, it is questionable whether this method can enforce customs in the long run due to interference of non-custodian values in exchanges with third parties. Very often, incorporation has led to polarization of community groups due to different levels of wealth and political influence of actors. The final example of Fitzpatrick, land boards, allows for a decentralized district board that allocates rural land, resolves conflicts, takes care of rural planning, etc; and is democratically elected by chiefs and tribes that are being represented in the board. One particular advantage of this community scheme is the possibility to allocate tenure security to both insiders and outsiders of the community. This option can nevertheless lead to elite capture and may not provide enough responsibility from and benefits to people at the very 'local' sphere.

These four community corporation categories merely illustrate how policy makers can make choices in their approach to best possibly connect (inter)national policies with local customary management. This formalization process, as Sjaastad and Cousins (2009) argue, is on the other hand not only a top-down adjustment process but rather also needs to be complemented from below. Such a process is happening yet in different African states where national governments aim to mimic some of its custodian traditions into national policy formulations. The policies that become legitimate national laws are consequently shaped by power relations throughout society (cf Oomen, 2005 in Sjaastad & Cousins, 2009, p. 7) where continuous processes of state formation take place (Anderson, 2006; Neumann, 1997). Once certain forms of state formations have taken place, actors search to maintain what has been created as possibly resilient states of community organizations. According to Barrow and Murphree (2001), resilient communities can only remain intact if there is: community cohesion (through shared histories and culture), community demarcation (the configuration of legal-spatial boundaries for a collective regime), and community legitimacy (a strong relation between power and authority to enable legitimate local action).

It becomes evident that the concept of community is used in many ways in policy creation or in simple political conduct. But how to study community? Husain (2009) calls for a study of communities in terms of community coalitions since individuals in communities differ in endless properties such as gender, kinship, levels of education, etcetera. Coalitions can be formed however where different individuals share common properties or have a sense of belonging. Agrawal and Gibson propose to focus on institutions in conceptualizing communities. Such an approach reveals multiple actors – such as previous global and local interactions – and their interests on decision making. They also make us understand that it is difficult to delineate the inside and outside of a community (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; D. Lewis, 2008). Both approaches are paradoxical though for the study of communities: An approach focusing on institutions (structure) is said to bring diversity and multiplicity; a focus on agency is claimed to bring more simplification (coalition patterning).

If it is hard to make delineations in this regard, how can we differentiate institutions then from communities? According to Igoe and Fortwrangler (2007), it is – in a poststructuralist sense – important to draw a line ‘somewhere’. North explains that one must see institutions as “the rules of the game” while communities or community coalitions, like organizations, are the players of that game who are bound together through “purposive activity” to achieve objectives (1993, p. 36). In the analysis of communities it is interesting to investigate whether different objectives differ within the same society of the local where the same game is played by means of different
objective related rules. If we follow the underlying objectives, we might have to transcend from spatial community categories into more abstract communities of objectives. And, just as interesting, if we come closer to an understanding of how communities are defined in terms of different external institutions designed by external actors, the local responses to these interventions and the continuations of these interactions into the present become more visible (J. Igoe & Fortwangler, 2007).

2.2 MECHANISMS OF ACCESS

“...it is all about distinctions and divisions, about who is to be included and who is to be excluded” - Jeremy Rifkin (2000)

“local participation and local benefit sharing [...] are not the same as local power to control use and access, which, in the end is what many communities seek” (Neumann, 1997, p. 576)

Now that we are more familiar with the hope and adversity of community in conservation practices, it must be concluded that CBNRM is more than a story of economic and ecological prosperity alone. The use of community in participatory policy designs must be seen also as a political conduct that has consequences for people’s access to natural resources. If we understand that communities are more than local, more than homogeneous with many actors and related institutional backgrounds, we can expect the concept to have consequences for access relationships that are fundamentally more complex than property relations alone. Allowing a community to manage common resources by means of property rights does not automatically mean that all members of a community are able to benefit from these rights. Critical for our understanding here; an explanation of how so-called bundles of rights and bundles of powers differ from one another is required. The following will explain the difference and how the study of access mechanisms can be made useful for this study.

Von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) explain that if we want to learn more from complex relationships being prescribed in property, three essential analytical elements need to be taken into account into what covers a so-called descriptive account of property in the concept of bundle of rights: “[1] the social units ... that can hold property rights and obligations; ... [2] the construction of valuables as property objects; ... [and 3] the different sets of rights and obligations social units can have with respect to such objects” (von Benda-Beckmann, 2006, p. 15). Empirically, these ingredients make up different layers of social organization where property has different meanings and practices, namely: a. an ideological layer (how things should be arranged), b. a legal-institutional layer (categorical property layers that formally act as rules), and c. concretized social relationships/practices (actual relationships that people have in relation to property objects). Having an understanding of such property relationships as sets of rights and obligations, one is capable of mapping different uses and benefits,...its management,...possibilities of transfer and inheritance, and the political or religious authority to regulate and to distribute property objects (von Benda-Beckmann, 2006, p. 17). By means of such analytical descriptions we become more familiar with complexities of property set-ups amongst diverse time-space dimensions. What Benda-Beckman et al. aim to clear here; is that we need to include different forms of property relations and study the interdependencies amongst them. To do so, we need an improved understanding of socio-historical conditions that contextualize different systems of property and explain changes within them.
Like observing bundles of rights, one can take a slightly different step in exploring bundles of powers. Such bundles refer more specifically to “the ability to derive benefits from things including material objects, persons, institutions and symbols” (J. Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 153) and encompass a more socio-political and encompassing approach towards access relations where property relations are embedded in. It can for example happen that someone legitimately benefits from resources through legal rights, while someone else is benefitting from these resources through different mechanisms (Sikor & Lund, 2009). A method to analyze such situations is a so-called commodity-chain analysis proposed by Ribot (2007, 2008; 2003; 1998). Such an analysis can highlight who is having access to what resources in order to ask yourself: why? Why do some have (more) access to resources? To answer this question, Ribot and Peluso (2003) speak of mechanisms of access. These mechanisms are described as rights based (i.e. laws or customs), illicit (illegal mechanisms) or structural/relational (political-economic and cultural frameworks). The latter form of mechanisms incorporates factors such as; “access to technology, capital, markets, labor, knowledge, authority, identity and social relations”(p. 173). Whereas the former two legal/non-legal mechanisms describe direct property related access to resources, structural/relational factors have a more indirect relationship to how people can obtain access within the configurations of rightful and non-rightful access. One could i.e. have access to resources through legal claims vested in national law, whereas others could have access to the same resources through non-formal claims based on local norms legitimized in local authority.

There exist different arrays of contextual factors influencing structural access that are particular for a certain situation where conditions are continuously changing. Ribot and Peluso (2003) claim that in fact access relations change repeatedly due to individual and/or group positioning in social relationships and that these relations are always depending to discursive practices of these agents. Within these practices, agents are part of legal systems that constitute different available legitimizations to resource claims that are strictly legal or custodian (Bavinck, 2005; J. Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Such practices are argued to be constitutive to conscious agency and better known as processes of legal pluralism. One important aspect here is that of the interconnected notion of authority to base claims upon. Different authorities – as in individuals or groups within institutions - namely represent nodes of bundles of powers that can provide direct or indirect control over resources (J. Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Sikor and Lund (2009) confirm this argument by claiming that access and property are politically related to how power and authority are performed. Within the institutional arena there exists a constant competition for authority over the control of natural resources. Property is seen as the legitimized claims that people make over objects of value when some political–legal authority can recognize such claims. It is interesting to investigate the contestants and their social actions that aim at legitimizing their actions through different politico-legal institutions that in turn are effected by claims over land. In legal pluralist contexts, such as often found in African states, local leaders can aim at local control whereas nation states aim at national compliance and control over national resources. Different contestants to resources hereby have opportunities to seek support from different authorities to make claims whereas these authorities need claimants to be authoritative. These claims are however not always successful as different authorities can provide for different structural opportunities to enforce these claims.

If we follow the exact methodology of Ribot, the study of access in a commodity chain analysis will produce two different maps: a. distribution of benefits (who is having what benefits?) and b. mechanisms of access (in terms of legal, illegal or structural patterns) that explain the distribu-
tion of benefits within a resource chain (J. Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Two different kinds of actors can be identified in this approach: those who control access and those who maintain access over benefits. These roles are similar to Marx’s view of relations between capital and labor where actors’ interactions define the division of benefits; “to maintain access, subordinate actors often transfer some benefits to those who control it” (J. Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 159). And those in control of labor can benefit from resources where labor is needed (enhancing the value of that resource) or of the commodities that are resultant of that labor (Appadurai, 1986).

In practical terms this methodology can be translated into how certain actors control resource use in Namibian conservancies that are maintained by other actors in return for some benefits. Certain customary and common forms of rules are strategically being used by those controlling and maintaining natural resource management but also by those not having access. However, one can ponder whether: these actors conscientiously control and maintain access, and how dynamic this status is? Moreover; it is interesting to see how benefits from resources are distributed, but it is just as interesting to see how certain political formations are being made where actors are included or excluded from access. To study such political formations within a changing institutional environment, a discursive approach can provide an understanding of how actors within a political arena interact on basis of different underlying ideas about the proper management of natural resources. Such an approach is necessary according to Ribot and Peluso (2003) who argue that discourses “deeply influence” access. Their argument illustrates that by talking i.e. of the commons globally, powerful international organizations frame their policies behind “environmental protection” and thereby produce certain knowledge that justifies their intervention and control over resource use (2003, p. 169). Similar discursive patterns can be expected in the study of the commons locally too. Ribot and Peluso’s argument takes a perspective that holds upon the idea that actors themselves are conscientiously responsible for the production of power as ‘framers’, while a more structural approach would imply that it is not agency but rather the structure of things that decide upon how things (or access to benefits) are ordered.

2.3 DISCURSIVE ACCESS

Rifkin (2000) refers to the rise of the new era of access that the global society is changing to. In this idea, it is no longer only important to measure oneself in relation to property or to imagine human affairs into the marketplace, but rather to how one can have access to things. The most important things in life are not the things themselves, but rather what we tend to value in terms of “concepts, ideas, and images” in contemporary market economies (p.5). Although it is beyond the scope of this study to criticize the role of ‘the market’ in conservancy management, it is interesting to acknowledge the value of concepts, ideas and imagery.

The previous sections have explained the contested and imagined idea of community in CBNRM. The use of the concept can be understood as a specific cultural framework established by policy makers in their aim to control sustainable resource use on communal land. Actors who accept such an idea are in fact maintaining the idea parallel to other ideas of traditional customary beliefs to proper resource management in local rural livelihoods. This interaction of ideas by actors in different spheres exemplifies what we can call discourse. Ideas can be seen here as the ‘substantive content’ of discourse that are frequently represented in policies, programs or philosophies (Schmidt, 2008). In discourse analysis, one looks at the narrative wherein a problem is discussed. The language used can be approached as a ‘medium’, as “a system of signification
through which actors not simply describe but create the world” (Hajer, 1993, p. 44). Discourse is thereby more than ideas alone as it refers to context; in terms of agency and/or structure.

Within neo-institutionalism⁶, a scientific paradigm that reintroduced the study of institutions in resistance to overly simplistic behavioralist studies of political life (March & Olsen, 1984), the study of discourses has emerged as a dynamic and complementary approach to other neo-institutional approaches. Discursive Institutionalism (DI) distinguishes itself as a particular study of political life by comparatively analyzing how the interaction of ideas influences human agency and vice versa amongst different time-space configurations (Schmidt, 2008). This comparative approach is important since DI acknowledges the processes of change in institutions that other neo-institutionalisms – sociological, historical and rational choice institutionalism – lack to explain due to their over-tendency to structural preferences or norms to explain agency. DI is similar to sociological institutionalism yet taking account of a more dynamic construction of culture that is not ‘all-defining’ but rather changing within context. Actors are engaged with ideational backgrounds that can either make for changes or maintenance of current institutions.

Arts & Buizer (2009) support the value of discursive analyses by mentioning that “…history and humans are not so much ‘driven’ by objective interests, rational calculations, social norms or overt power struggles, but by knowledge production and (collective) interpretations of the world” (p. 340). We can refer to such worldviews as discursive patterns that can be analyzed from four different perspectives: as communication (i.e. discussions or debates), as text (in what is written or said), as frame (human agency is considered constitutive), or as social practice (discourse produces agency). Whereas the first two forms of discourses are very much focused on content, the latter two differentiate an important debate between the role of agency and structure once set out by Giddens (1984). According to the latter, human agency is strongly routinized in patterns as part of institutional structures.

The following sections will continue our understanding of access mechanisms through a discussion of interactions between structure and agency. Such a distinction is necessary to clarify: to what extent discursive structures influence conscious agency and vice versa? This question is important for the further discussion of the role of communal and other actors’ agency to access communal resources within the conceptual framework of CBNRM.

2.3.1 Structure
If we speak of discourse, critical and structuralist scholars regularly refer to Foucault’s work on the production of power. Incarcerated disciplinary power exemplifies how people would act through internalized control, where power produces reality. Discourse hereby informs people on how to see the world and ‘voluntarily’ act upon it without the use of force (1977). Discourse and the production of knowledge define what is considered normal (M. Foucault, 1976) allowing for certain patterns of agency. Such a perspective also relates to how power over resources has in this regard to do as much with official power people hold through formal authority as the socio-historic position of men in relation to things. Foucault hereby comments that formal authority - like government - has structurally transformed into more nuanced performances of power in what he calls governmentality, or the conduct of conduct (2000). Governmentality is not merely embodied in government, law or consensus; but rather about how juridical models - such as

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⁶ Traditional institutionalism used to focus primarily on formal laws, whereas neo institutionalism incorporates more levels of rule systems important to the structure of political life (Lowdnes, 2002; March & Olsen, 1984).
conservancy law - are negated through "constraint and war" – or in dominance and resistance - that are not necessarily found on a macro level but rather in "micro-physics and autonomous strategies" (Lemke, 2000, p. 3).

Such a Foucauldian explanation of micro physics and autonomous strategies might still seem vague though. Foucault explains this vital process through the origins of the political economy. The political economy used to be based upon the model of a family where the father – like the Machiavellian prince over his kingdom - traditionally embodied knowledge of how family life ought to be ordered. In the new art of government, the conduct of conduct, the family was no longer seen as the model of government, but rather as an instrument of governing and learning about interest. Interest that is increasingly seen present within the masses of the population. In other words, Foucault describes a shift from family to population as the model for government. The family, as an incorporated element of population, needs to be encompassed up to the level of the state through means of the economy. What we know as the political economy comes forward from this trend and the perceived idea of “new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory, and wealth” (M. Foucault, 2000, p. 217). Traditional territory is no longer seen as the single geographical demarcation of land under the control of the sovereign, but rather that of the masses of population. And if people in these masses are getting resorted with economic knowledge, then Foucault speaks of a society that is being “controlled by apparatuses of security” (ibid, p. 221). Apparatuses of security are a technique of governmentality to provide members of society with a feeling of wellbeing in the economic, political and cultural sphere. Interestingly, in the development of governmentality it is no longer the traditional state, king, or chief that is in charge for these technologies; there is also room for other movements that can organize themselves as a ‘new power’ influencing others throughout their networks.

We can conclude from this argumentation that the analysis of access (as bundles of powers) should – from a Foucauldian perspective - not rest in conventional sovereign agency (i.e. studied in impacts of top-down state law and/or policies) alone, but rather through a multiplicity of force relations where far reaching domination is being established at different levels and throughout socio-historic conditions. Foucault adds that these productions of domination are never really stable and depending upon changing objectives and viewpoints of actors within the political economy (1976). According to Rossi (2004), the aim of Foucault’s work in this regard has been helpful to see which conditions have made certain forms of agency acceptable at a specific time throughout history.

2.3.2 Agency

Even though the structural study of Foucauldian discourses are beneficial to better understanding of development policies, there are some serious limitations to such approaches: a. bureaucratic government would be a simple path dependent and static organization, b. actors in policy projects would not be able to have conscious agency, c. there is a chance that there is too much emphasis upon the external as an influencer of local meaning (Leach & Fairhead, 2000), and d. relationships between different actors and their influence upon the development of a particular discourse is not well explained (Rossi, 2004).

The idea of discourse as a frame comes close to an understanding of discourse as a mediation and creation of the world, made by actors through the use of language that mediates the interaction of ideas (Fischer, 2003, p. 47). Foucault would probably have doubted this idea of active
agency since such strategic action could be socially constructed through mediation of underlying objectives. There is something to say about both perspectives, and we must consequently be careful in making clear distinctions between structure and agency. They seem to be strongly connected concepts as argued by many scholars. Bourdieu (1984) would claim nonetheless that agency is shaped by a cultural milieu – a ‘habitus’ – as an arrangement of dispositions that are framed by hegemonic elites. Elites that are able to construct dominant discourses over other discourses.

Where discourses refer to the interaction of ideas, the study of political life is just as well an interaction between framing and structural conditioning. For example, discourses can be seen as the ‘mobilization of bias’ (cf Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; in Hajer, 1993, p. 45) and subject to social-historical conditions wherein discourses are produced. Put differently; the discourse of one group can differ from another discourse of another group due to past and dispositional conditions that people in groups are depending upon. These conditions – i.e. discourses or institutions - structure the interaction of ideas amongst individuals in a group, whereas the interactions of ideas also structure these conditions of the group (Arts & Tatenhoven, 2004; F. Cleaver, 2009).

Rhodes argues that the everyday practices of agents are related to their beliefs that are informed by “traditions and expressed in stories” (2007, p. 1259). The social construction of traditions is based upon historical discursive frameworks of knowledge that contain information for actors to how one ought to deal with current situations (Hajer, 1993). Factually, if we talk about political order, one could assume that an external environment imposes order in the political. However, there are just as many reasons to believe that internal institutional processes affect such an order too (March & Olsen, 1984). These orders are socially constructed and connected to both agents and their institutions on the ground, and cannot just ‘float in the world’ (Hajer, 1993). Some actors in community conservation, at least according to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), seem able to find strategic new ways to bypass existing constraints of institutions and create new ones for their own interests. This would infer that there is some level of agency possible. According to De Koning (2011) we therefore can speak of a phenomenon called post-institutionalism as a criticism to the overly structural mechanisms explained in neo-institutionalism. Neo-institutionalism does not incorporate much of local histories and continues to see communities as homogeneous groups instead of individuals. Post-institutionalism continuous to value structural arrangements, but acknowledges a strategic role for the individual in these arrangements.

Legal pluralism or institutional bricolage are examples of post-institutional approaches. Institutional bricolage is a tool to understand "how mechanisms for resource management and collective action are borrowed and constructed from existing institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned relationships"(F. Cleaver, 2002, p. 16). Bricolage, Cleaver explains, happens when i.e. a new ‘bureaucratic’ institution is introduced in previous existing practices with ‘socially embedded’ institutions. For Cleaver there is no middle way in the debate between agency and structure where he rather expresses the processes of decision making over natural resources as both ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ for agency. Actors can act unconsciously through their deeply embedded social milieus. On the other hand, actors are able to analyze and react to what is happening around them and thereby can act consciously upon different institutional constraints too.

If we understand these bricolage processes, we must also understand that even though local institution building can provide local representations; these authorities and corresponding local
norms are not created within a local vacuum but often generated beyond the local (Agrawal, 2003; Arts, Leroy, & Tatenhove, 2006; F. Cleaver, 2002; Hajer, 1993). This production in different places can create what Hajer (1993) calls **discursive affinity** (argumentative diversity that similarly explain the world around us). An interesting consequence of discursive affinity is an understanding that discourses are not necessarily belonging to spatial specific locales only but are rather parallel productions within different places that are somehow connected. Consequently we can speak of conscious or unconscious constructions of ‘discourse coalitions’ as groups of people that share certain ideas/beliefs. What is believed to be the proper way of doing things is often deeply embedded in discursive practices and beliefs that people take from different organizations (from i.e. the state, local norms, or nature) to create and stabilize institutional arrangements.

### 2.3.3 Policy Arrangements

Different (f) actors can thus have an influence on community access to natural resources through different productions of power. Barnett and Duval (2005) have developed a useful conceptual framework for the study of international politics that can similarly help understand how different actors – locally and non-locally - are constrained or enabled in their abilities to gain benefits. Two different factors – kind of social relations and the specificity of these relations – create a taxonomy of power as illustrated in figure one. Four different forms of power can be exercised within a social situation from this matrix, namely: 1. compulsory (where certain actors impose power over others due to their resourcefulness), 2. structural (where certain actors have power over others due to their performed position in society), 3. institutional (through the mediation of institutional frameworks actor relationships are structured), and 4. productive (a rhetoric power that transcends through dynamic ideas amongst actors in society). To illustrate, political situations can be explained from all four factors consecutively if we take this study’s CBNRM framework: 1. Local NGOs can be compulsory structured to international donor agencies’ wishes (i.e. focus on participatory approaches) due to donor aid income; 2. Local leaders would possibly claim their rights to resources due to their traditional position in rural areas; 3. The creation of conservancy law encompasses local communities within the nation state of Namibia; 4. Self-management can be embraced after experiences with state centric policies of apartheid in Southern Africa.

A somewhat affiliated perspective of a ‘Policy Arrangement Approach’ (PAA) (Arts, et al., 2006; Arts & Tatenhoven, 2004; Tatenhoven, Arts, & Leroy, 2000) makes use of the different productions of power from figure one in the analysis of policy arrangements, by taking into account two important assumptions; a. to purposefully distinguish between agency and structure to enable the study of political life7, to b. get an improved understanding of the relationship between these seemingly undistinguishable concepts in terms of: actors (policy coalitions), resources (mobilisation of resources and influence of actors), ideas (policy discourses), and rules of the game. In this

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7 Also known as analytical dualism (cf Archer, 1996; in Arts & Buizer, 2009).
approach, actors are distinguished in groups that share certain ideas that can develop into the temporarily institutionalization of rules over the management of resources valuable to these actors. The approach emphasizes how institutions are embedded in policy processes amongst a network of actors, how policy developments have been structured, the different roles of power, and the relevance of content, organization and change to environmental policy arrangements. Typical policy arrangements are said to come forward from two central processes: political modernization and political innovation (Arts & Tatenhoven, 2004). Political modernization stands for socio-political structures that embody social changes in a policy context (Arts, et al., 2006). These changes can bring forward new power relationships between different subsystems, between agency and structure. Political innovation represents the active regeneration of policy by actors themselves. Such processes happen, like with institutional bricolage, when new concepts/new solutions are being brought to an existing arrangement.

A similar process can be found within the Namibian context of this case study where different actors of a ‘community’ vie over benefits from resource management on basis of expected discursive patterns and structurized institutions that constrain and/or enable actors to benefit. The PAA hereby incorporates the discursive and institutional influence that Ribot and Peluso mention in their theory of access, allowing a simultaneous analysis of changing arrangement of both agency and structure.

2.4 Conceptual Model and Questions
On basis of the different contributions in theory, it can be concluded here that the concept of a community is idealized in CBNRM by policy makers with very vague interpretations. A community is understood in this study as: an institutionalized group of many different actors that are heterogeneous by definition, but potentially connected in terms of (dis-)unifying social-historic processes; as a group of people that ought to be studied within their local and non-local spatiality; who are both dependent and constitutive for different levels of legitimate rules over natural resource management; who are not passive objects of development policies but rather also function as groups of people who purposefully act to achieve institutionalized objectives. In relation to practical analyses of community access mechanisms, this study uses the idea of community coalitions (Husain, 2009) that parallel with ideas of discourse coalitions (Arts, et al., 2006; Hajer, 1993). Within the context of Anabeb Conservancy we can ask ourselves a first explorative question to unravel the myth of ‘the community’:

1. What and how can community/discourse coalitions be identified in Anabeb Conservancy?

Whereas the community of Anabeb are assumed to have the same property rights over their communal conservancy benefits, it is expected that different coalitions politically engage in their struggles for access to benefits. These struggles can highlight different people-resource relationships that are considered structural/cultural and dependent upon discursive dynamics. It is expected that access – as bundles of powers – are not simply vested in actors over others and things, but rather in their nuanced interactions with others, the available resources, discourses and rule systems as the policy arrangements approach proposes. Different coalitions partake in certain discussions over how benefits from the conservancy ought to be managed, making use of both bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions that make for conscious and unconscious discursive behavior. This leads to three related questions:

2. How are resources distributed in Anabeb Conservancy?
3. **According to what rules are these resources distributed in Anabeb Conservancy?**

4. **And to which discursive backgrounds are these rules, resources and actors embedded in Anabeb Conservancy?**

Since we are interested in how access to resources has *changed* since the introduction of 'bureaucratic' conservancy law in Namibia, we need to ask:

5. **How are coalitions, discourses, rules and resource distributions formed through social-historic conditions in Anabeb Conservancy?**

And if we follow the socio-historic conditions of community access relations, we are able to see – within individual or group positioning - who is maintaining and controlling access to resources.

6. **What role do actors within Anabeb Conservancy have upon the formation and purposeful selection of different rule systems in their quest for resource accumulation?**

The latter question is necessary to ask in order to find out to what extent agency is possible. The theoretical discussion furthermore highlighted a particular role for legal-political authorities that are part of rule systems upon which actors can base their claims. Simultaneously, these authorities need their claimants to become accepted as legitimate. Therefore:

7. **To what authorities do individuals/coalitions belong to, and how does this influence their access to natural resource distributions in Anabeb Conservancy?**

Finally, the following conceptual model can be depicted to help understand how this case study can be approached from a policy arrangements approach (PAA):

![Conceptual model: PAA to study mechanisms of access](image)

The conceptual model shows the interrelatedness of actor coalitions, rules, discourses and resources being shaped within a context of developing socio-historic conditions. Different actors
partake in different interactions of ideas that can form into discourses. These discourses, available within different places, can be seen as the cultural institutions from which different rules are being structured. Some rules are more successfully formed to the foreground, others remain in marginal. At least temporarily, since discourses are thought to be highly dynamic. Actors can strategically align with others and use or reform the different rule systems at disposal (explaining the red arrows in figure two). This identification of agency – conscious or unconscious - makes the PAA as presented here slightly more actor oriented in comparison to pure discursive institutionalism. Heterogeneous community coalitions can be observed. Ass well as corresponding discursive backgrounds on basis of which rule systems are structured. Resource distribution is done on basis of overlapping rule/discourse systems that allow a level of maneuver by community coalitions in their quest for benefits from resource management.

This approach illustrates a more inclusive study of access mechanisms that does not only map actors and the distribution of resources as the theory of access prescribes (J. Ribot & Peluso, 2003), it furthermore emphasizes the role of deep discursive influence that is expected to be integral to political actor formations, influences on resources and structuration of discourse into socially embedded and legal bureaucratic rule systems.
'It is difficult to analytically differentiate between agency (the behavior of people that structure access) and related structural environments (the conditioning of people that informs agency)'
3. Methodology

This chapter describes what research methods have been used to study the policy arrangements of Anabeb Conservancy. A first step is the explanation of the research strategy: a single embedded case study that reflects an ethnographic approach to conservancy evaluation within a discursive background of structural developments. Since this study uses both inductive and deductive methods, section 3.1 will consider some aspects important for such approaches. Furthermore, this chapter will shortly discuss: the selection of units for analysis (3.2); the topic list (3.3.1) and mixed accumulation methods such as interviews (3.3.2), direct and participant observation (3.3.3) and document analysis (3.3.4); a thematic and discursive approach to data analysis (3.4) by means of a qualitative software application; and a discussion of this studies’ quality and limitations (3.5) including the researcher’s positionality (3.5.2).

3.1 Research Strategy

In order to get in-depth understanding of how access to natural resources is exercised on a local community level with vast levels of relational complexity, this study has chosen a single case study as a research strategy. Why would such a strategy suffice? To start with: this study has aimed for an alternative evaluation of conservancy management in comparison to common positivist representations by Namibian CBNRM actors that wish for overly positive evaluations of the conservancy model through a story of ascending wildlife population and income generating rural development figures. Such a master narrative takes a macro perspective that is well marketable to other conservancy policy programs in different Southern African policy arrangements around nature conservation. Except, such a perspective excludes in-depth perspectives of local community members for which this program is obviously developed on basis of its founding theoretical basis: ‘community based’ natural resource management (CBNRM). Therefore, a specific community and its relationships to the conservancy program have been analyzed as the central case, beyond the veil of dominant figures. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) stress the need to learn from distant influences in more ethnographic research on the encompassment of transnational governmentality (how international actors have reach into the local). Such studies can reveal vertical power positions of spatially distant actors in a local arena. Rhodes similarly proposes that in order to understand such multi-level and multi-interest interactions, we should indeed focus on ethnographic studies by especially analyzing "beliefs, practices, traditions and dilemma's" (2007, p. 1243). This study focuses on the ethnographic study of access mechanisms – both conscious and unconscious - within a conservancy that challenges the concept of 'community' in the CBNRM. By means of tracing people's beliefs and dilemmas in relation to the conservancy concept, access to benefits from local management in a rural livelihood has been mapped in terms of coalitions, discourses, rules and resources.

A qualitative case study is commonly used to learn and understand from political life. A case study in fact aims for the strategic and intensive study of a societal phenomenon by means of one or several research units in a contemporary context with diminutive ‘control over events’ (Braster, 2000; Yin, 2003). This contextual way of analysis has consequences for limited observations and theory building. The construction of theory is in principal grounded on basis of induction. Such an approach is never truly feasible due to researchers’ own conceptualizations of reality and paradigmatic backgrounds. This has consequences for one’s ‘objectivity’ in the approach of the research object. Some deduction is inevitably created in order to have some pre-
structures in analyzing realities that in turn can differ from these conceptualizations. This case study has made use of two primary sources of theory prior to fieldwork, namely: the Policy Arrangements Approach (Tatenhoven, et al., 2000) that overlaps with insights from i.e. Ribot & Peluso’s *theory of access* (2003) and Schmidt’s *discursive institutionalism* (2008). The PAA strategically focuses on four sensitizing concepts: *actors, resources, ideas and rules*. In combination with socio-historical conditions, different respondents’ beliefs and perceptions about *changing* access to benefits in Anabeb Conservancy (see further chapter four) can be framed within particular contextual aspects.

The analysis of change is important to stress here since the introduction of a new legal institution – the conservancy – is expected to have changed people’s access to important livelihood strategies over time. At least, that has been the aim of policy makers who promote nature conservation through rural development. This would mean that if nature conservation goals are being established, rural development of connected conservancy communities would also have improved as an imperative contributory aspect to nature conservation. In order to understand change in people’s access on the basis of a single case study, discursive practices from *past* policy arrangements have been compared to *contemporary* conflict over access to benefits.

The approach described here makes use of a so-called *analytical dualism* since it is difficult to analytically differentiate between agency (the behavior of people that structure access) and related structural environments (the conditioning of people that informs agency). Analytical dualism, explained by Archer (1996; in Arts & Buizer, 2009), accepts this interrelatedness but purposefully starts analyzing from an actor viewpoint. Once the constellation of actors has been explored, it is important to find out how these *actors* think about important *resources* that people desire access to, how *ideas* are being structured amongst different actors and what *rules* are being applied and/or accepted by actors. In the long run, findings can produce a discursive overview of different practices in the polity of Anabeb Conservancy, and these can be explained as products within a socio-historical context important to the development of such changing practices.

### 3.2 Selection of Research Units

The selection of Anabeb as a case study is based on first probing interviews with conservancy support organizations in Windhoek prior to fieldwork. With regards to a critical discussion of the conservancy model, respondents were asked to identify typical problems around access to conservancy benefits. Anabeb was soon identified as ‘the’ example of community conflict over conservancy management with a great deal of ‘local politics’. Commonly, immediate causalities proposed by respondents inferred that conflict in Anabeb is related to complex headmen relations that all want ‘to eat the money’ from the conservancy. Such an observation seems limited on the surface and could hide how access mechanisms operate in the arrangements of conservancy policies.

To understand these mechanisms, in-depth analysis is necessary and can only be retrieved from personal observations and sharing of ideas. To understand means to retrieve as much information with as little variance to best explain how access is being established. This case study has chosen random respondents within the same geographical context of Anabeb Conservancy. However, since structural relationships stand central in this study, it was important to travel beyond conservancy boundaries and observe/speak with related respondents in neighboring
Access to Benefits from Community Based Tourism

conservancies or (non-)governmental organizations. The focus has always remained with the ‘community’ in Anabeb Conservancy to obtain geographically unique results (Swanborn, 2003).

Nevertheless, respondents are in no way identical, and responses differ noticeably. Since there are no formal limits to the amount of respondents necessary to establish qualitative results in case studies (Patton, 2002), respondents have strategically been selected upon criteria established during fieldwork, namely: family name (to which family clan does the respondent belong to?), tribe (to which ethnic tribe does the respondent belong to?), position (is the respondent a member, a staff member, a committee member, or part of other organizations?), and coalition (How does the respondent relate to other actors, is there a certain form of group formation?). Such a selection already structures the observation of relations between people, but allows more similar responses (and less variance) within specific groups that can contrast amongst groups.

All selection criteria are known by respondents within Anabeb and turned out to be a problematic work ethic in the field. In approaching respondents, people question why other respondents have been approached prior to them, and why certain translators are used while similar translators of their own clan would be more appropriate. This can lead to non-transparent translation where translators of one group theoretically can translate in the advantage of their own group. Respondents are all very much aware of such possibilities and requested different translators for that reason. In the end, five different translators have been used for different groups.

3.3 DATA ACCUMULATION

After a few weeks of interviewing, several community meetings came to mind. These meetings dealt with the current conflict over election procedures in Anabeb Conservancy; an ideal opportunity to observe and compare previous interview findings. Moreover, since most respondents continue to speak of benefits and constitutional rights when we talk of access to conservancy benefits, several documents have been selected for further analysis and triangulation became a fact through the study of: a. the Constitution of Anabeb Conservancy (old and new version), b. the formal correspondence of conservancy group members to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), and c. meat distributions and financial accounts of Anabeb Conservancy.

These different forms of data (interviews, observation and documents) feed into an ethnographic study of shared patterns of (cultural) behavior by actors in the conservancy related to how people deal with benefits from conservancy management. Cultural behavior stands here for the particular ways in which participants engage into the sharing of ideas and the use of particular legal rules amongst different subgroups in a society. It is not simply about the behavior of people that counts here, but rather what meaning people attach to that behavior, giving the analysis a more interpretive character. To put such cultural understanding more explicit to the foreground of this case study, one can ask himself: What is the shared understanding of a ‘proper’ way to manage access to conservancy benefits in Anabeb Conservancy? The proper way constitutes a certain belief structure of what is proper, of what is considered normal. And this belief can change amongst people over time. Beliefs are not explicitly visible in perceptions alone and therefore need to be found through a process of continuous and perseverant questioning and observing to reveal underlying discussions and interests (Moors, 2009).

Although ethnographies are being used in different forms, O’Reilly (2005) provides us with a minimalist definition of what an ethnography more or less stands for. Ethnography is...

“iterative-inductive research [...] drawing on:
3. Methodology

- A family of methods,
- Involving direct and sustained contact with human agents
- Within the context of their daily lives (and cultures);
- Watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, and
- Producing a richly written account
- That respects the irreducibility of human experience,
- That acknowledges the role of theory
- As well as the researcher’s own role,
- And that views humans as part object/part subject” (p.3)

Spradley (1980) argues that an ethnographic study needs well maintained administration of data that can be helpful in describing and understanding cultural behavior. In the beginning of a research project, most observations are descriptive, but become increasingly selective towards the end of the project. In both interviews and participant observations, it is aimed for to create a verbatim account of literal statements from different actors around specific topics. This is not always practically possible due to the speed people engage to in conversations, but wherever possible a recorder device has been used to document conversations.

Hymes (1978, in Spradley, 1980, p. 31) explains that there are three typical forms of ethnographic research; a. comprehensive ethnography (documenting how life is it is entirety), b. topic-oriented ethnography (focusing on specific elements of life in a community), and c. hypothesis-oriented ethnography (selection and analysis are based on prior stated hypotheses). This study has made a combination of the latter two methods by initially coming up with a specific topic list (see figure three) deducted from pre-fieldwork theoretical discussions, demanding a best possible selection of a case study – through a selection of a social situation of actors and their activities within a certain place or places - where conflict is at the order of the day in relation to a Namibian conservancy. Such a selection hypothesizes that clear differences between and shared understanding amongst people exist in relation to the proper conduct of conservancy management.

3.3.1 Topic List

The topic list is based upon theoretical propositions from the research proposal and adapted to emerging themes in fieldwork. The topic-list has been primarily inspired upon Ribot and Peluso’s theory of access (2003) that focuses upon different actors, their constellation, available resources, the distribution hereof, and why such a configuration is found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Different social relationships within community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Differences between ethnic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Differences amongst family clans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Importance of personal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Who is a member, who is not a member?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Overlapping authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Role of external organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Benefits in the Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Monetary and non-monetary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ (Non-)Beneficial for whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ People’s aspirations/concerns about benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Contemporary and past conservation ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Underlying interests of people in relation to conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Differences in terms of national political affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Conservancy Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Rights and Obligations of community members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Topic List
The topics are purposefully not framed in terms of questions, but rather form an anthropological and unstructured basis for inquiry. Topics are, for the sake of uniformity in this report, structured at this point within the policy arrangement approach that has been added after data collection as an important and useful conceptual framework to make meaningful sense of complex discursive views in Anabeb Conservancy.

### 3.3.2 Interviews

Having the topic list and a voice recorder on the side, 38 interviews have been performed with individual respondents. Respondents have openly been approached after an explanation of the research aims and in an anonymous fashion. Occasionally a group interview was useful to get hold of 4-7 perspectives\(^8\) at once (especially with groups of community members). On average the interviews lasted for 45-60 minutes, varying between 30 minutes to one and a half hour. In most cases, fieldwork in Anabeb did not allow strict planning of interviews and people were randomly approached or forwarded to by means of snowballing. It has been important though to keep a well balanced portfolio of respondents that can be distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Organizations:</th>
<th>#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WWF-Namibia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET(^{12})</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACSO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRDNC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Councillor Sesfontein</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilderness Safaris(^{13})</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Members:</th>
<th>staff &amp; committee(^9)</th>
<th>member(^{10})</th>
<th>TA(^{11})</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concern group</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Concern group</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews with support organizations (12 in total) form important comparative and contextual understanding of community relationships found within Anabeb. An important division between concern and non-concern groups is established with interviewees of Anabeb Conservancy. This division is made during fieldwork due to emerging divides between two different fronts in the conflict over election procedures. One group is very much concerned about current practices dominantly undertaken by a non-concerned group (see further section 5.4). For the balance of perspectives, members of both fronts have been approached.

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\(^8\) Group interviews are counted as 1 interview in total per occasion.

\(^9\) Staff & Committee are either staff members of the Anabeb Conservancy or members of the conservancy committee responsible for decision making.

\(^10\) Member stands for all people in the conservancy that are not employed by the conservancy but have the right to benefits from conservancy management.

\(^11\) TA stands for Traditional Authorities. These are councilors of different family clans in Anabeb.


\(^{13}\) Wilderness Safaris is formally no support organization to the CBNRM framework in Namibia, but an important tour operator in relation to Anabeb Conservancy due to bordering concession relations in Palmwag where Anabeb, like Sesfontein and Torra conservancy, depends on income in return for good environmental care of precious wildlife. The latter is important for tourism consumption at the Palmwag lodge near Anabeb.
3.3.3 **PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION**

Besides interviews, several informal discussions have been done on the background to add up to different observation and reflection moments recorded during fieldwork. Spradley (1980) identifies that an ethnographer can get hold of both tacit and explicit knowledge through absorption of taken-for-granted cultural knowledge of the other – the ‘native’ – through participant observation of behavior or by emphasizing speech. Within complex societies, it is understood that different people act upon different cultural codes that are certainly not homogeneous. Even within certain professions there exist differences of individual behavior and perceptions making it hard to create generalizations of a group. This is especially important in former Southern African ethnographies where different groups of people were put into categories for the sake of apartheid.

In terms of understanding how people have access to benefits, one can try to understand how decisions are being made in important decision-making bodies. What interests do people have, and if certain decisions have been made, what interests lie behind them? This can very well signify the meaning of typical decision making culture within a specific society that moves beyond mere perceptions. This study has observed three important community meetings that took place around the election problems and committee decision making (monthly conservancy meeting). During these meetings, I was allowed to sit in together with a translator to get an idea of what arguments were being used by whom. Speech has been most important here, next to the observation of emotional responses in between actors.

3.3.4 **DOCUMENTS**

Respondents have often referred to the constitution of the conservancy. There are however two different versions circulating; the old constitution that has been signed by all traditional leaders of Anabeb, and a new (unsigned) constitution that is already being used by staff and committee members. Opinions about the content differ somewhat and will be discussed in the findings related to different approaches to “proper” election procedures, see section 5.4. The resulting conflict has made a few traditional headmen decide to write a formal letter to the MET where they complain and ask for intervention from the ministry. What is written in such a letter illustrates how people resist to negative perceived outcomes of past election procedures and how people frame their argumentation in order to arrange change. Eventually, both the constitution and this central letter partake in the exercise over control to conservancy benefits. These are formally described by the conservancy and made available for further study.

The results chapter is partly based upon formal financial statements and meat distributions at Anabeb. The financial accounts of Anabeb’s financial year 2009-2010 have been organized in debit and credit categories to get insights into where major revenues are coming from, and where these are spent to (to see complete calculations of numbers in section 5.2.1, see Appendix one). The same has been done for meat quota distributions (see also Appendix two). The quotas are provided by the MET, but the conservancy committee and staff members decide to which categories quotas are allocated. The same decision making body makes for conservancy income/cost structures.

To get an overview of different accumulation methods, see table one for a short summary.
Table 1: Data Accumulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Tool / Product</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>- What is the ‘proper’ way of managing access to conservancy benefits in Anabeb Conservancy?</td>
<td>Topic List:</td>
<td>➢ To deduct categories from theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ <strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>➢ To query insights from interviews, observations and documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ <strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>➢ To reflect upon in the analysis of findings in hindsight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ <strong>Ideas</strong></td>
<td>➢ <strong>Rules</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>- What ideas do people have about benefit distribution in Anabeb Conservancy?</td>
<td>Top List</td>
<td>➢ To find unique responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recorder</td>
<td>➢ To establish an overview of multiple perspective in the study of Anabeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-&gt; Overview perceptions</td>
<td>➢ To find relations between respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>- What ideas and rules are being used by different actors / groups?</td>
<td>Observation of management meetings</td>
<td>➢ To compare with interview findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-&gt; Overview of discursive patterns</td>
<td>➢ To get in-depth understanding of the interaction of ideas amongst actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>around the contemporary conflict over election procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>- What benefits are available?</td>
<td>Distribution mapping of benefits and costs</td>
<td>➢ To compare with interview and observation findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-&gt; overview benefit distributions</td>
<td>➢ To get an idea of the materialization of power over important community resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 DATA ANALYSIS

What to do with a thick description of findings that ought to be presented in an understandable and integral fashion? Where to start your analysis? To start answering the last question; there is no specific modus operandi, but the Policy Arrangements Approach prescribes to focus at least upon actors, resources, ideas and rules. Except from this, the method is quite straightforwardly inducted – like grounded theory - but difficult due to the vast amount of data at hand.

This mix with grounded theory aims at discovering new theories from data (Miller & Salkind, 2002). Tesch (1990) argues that by means of grounded theory, the researcher can sort events from qualitative data into categories by coding them. Through the constant comparison of what these categories stand for, categories are given properties until they become abstract. In a grounded theory approach, the interpretations of data cannot be regarded independently of their collection or the sampling of material. Interpretation is the anchoring point for making decisions about which data/cases to integrate next in the analysis and how or with which methods they should be collected (Yin, 2003).
In the grounded process theories are formulated in greater detail and continually checked against data. The procedure of interpreting data, like the integration of additional material, ends at the point where theoretical saturation has been reached. Rival explanations need however be addressed instead of leaving them (Flick, 2009).

### 3.4.1 Induction-Deduction

In theory these methodological processes sound more rational than in practice. Not only does the collection of data take considerable time (i.e. doing interviews, transcribing them, writing observations, etc.) the analysis needs to be explained in detail too since this is a personal choice of the researcher. There is no accepted logic like with the collection of material. Many social scientists increasingly become acquainted with qualitative research software (i.e. QSR NVivo, Atlas.ti, etc) to analyze their texts, pictures or even videos. These software developments are argued by Seidel (1998, in Barry, 1998) as ‘*the dark side of the technological advance*’ since many researchers seem to be able to distance themselves from their data, in quantitative ways and increasing levels of homogeneity in analysis. The latter particularly, is an aspect that this study wishes to refrain from in its quest to unpack the homogeneity of communities in their management of natural resources. The same can be said about quantifications; with numbers one cannot understand relations between people. The density of relatedness is more important than the number of categories that a researcher finds in his data.

But qualitative analysis software has strong advantages in the capacity to structure researcher’s thoughts. This study has made use of a practical software application called KODANI\(^\text{14}\) for this matter due to the excess of data. Twenty interview transcripts – out of 38 - have strategically been selected to reflect crystallizing opinions of different groups that emerged during fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Organizations</th>
<th>#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WWF-Namibia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACSO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRDNC</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRT</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Councillor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilderness Safaris</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Σ</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community members:</th>
<th>staff &amp; committee</th>
<th>member</th>
<th>ta</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concern group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Concern group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Σ</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total interviews** 20

These tables reflect a different picture as in section 3.3.2. Since many communal respondents have provided little variation in responses, at least from the perspectives of their groups, 14 interviews have been left out of the formal analysis in KODANI. These interviews are important though for the creation of mental categories during fieldwork and vital for internal validation on the background. Supporting organizations are still numerous but contribute to important relations with counterparts on a communal level. In its totality, these twenty interviews provide a rich representation of respondents’ varieties in perceptions.

\(^{14}\) [http://www.ontwerpenvaneenonderzoek.nl/kodani](http://www.ontwerpenvaneenonderzoek.nl/kodani)
The transcripts of these interviews have been cut into verbatim record fragments that fit into four main aspects of discussion: actors, resources, ideas and rules. Primarily data concerning the discussion of these aspects within the context of Anabeb are important for this ethnography, but some respondents spoke in more general spatial terms related to the unit of analysis. Therefore, five spatial levels have been considered: international, national, regional, communal, and individual. The combination of the four main aspects and the five geographic aspects creates a matrix of twenty categories of which the communal level stands central:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Actors</th>
<th>International Resources</th>
<th>International Ideas</th>
<th>International Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Actors</td>
<td>National Resources</td>
<td>National Ideas</td>
<td>National Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Actors</td>
<td>Regional Resources</td>
<td>Regional Ideas</td>
<td>Regional Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Actors</td>
<td>Communal Resources</td>
<td>Communal Ideas</td>
<td>Communal Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Actors</td>
<td>Individual Resources</td>
<td>Individual Ideas</td>
<td>Individual Rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Categories for Analysis

But – and chapter five will elaborate on this - respondents spoke often about the role of regional actors (cooperation with regional NGOs), individual exceptions to group behavior (local entrepreneurship), the role of national policy (affecting national ownership of land and the boundaries of conservancy law), and finally: the impact and interrelatedness of ideas amongst international, national, regional and communal levels. These categories are stressed in table two as emerging categories important for this analysis.

Since the study is concerned with socio-historic developments as important precursors to contemporary policy arrangements, relevant information regarding these subtopics have been collected too. These categories apply to: political developments, land management, ethnic histories, and the past development of the conservancy. Chapter four will discuss these precursors with additional documented accounts to get a substantial picture of socio-historical conditions important to access mechanisms in Anabeb.

The analysis furthermore follows the logic of open, axial and selective coding (Boeijie, 2005; Seidel, 1998). Open coding appears through summing up what respondents have answered to these categories. This is an iterative process where different respondents often talk in similar terms about an issue. The full open coding has been processed in KODANI, see Appendix three. Axial coding searches for related conceptualizations amongst different respondents to create more unification of strong argumentative lines between interviews. Pivot tables in KODANI can show such meta-aspects in an overview which has formed the basis of writing up a story of contemporary discursive practices to Community Based Tourism Benefits in Anabeb Conservancy (see chapter five). Selective coding occurs when axial meta-aspects meet theoretical aspects, and analytical generalizations can be made. This step will be reserved for the discussion of this study in chapter six.

15 Individual ideas have not been identified as critical in this study since ideas are commonly seen to belong to specific groups that exist on different socio-geographic lines: i.e. regional clans, national tribes, politics, etc.
3.5 Quality and Limitations

The process of analytic generalization requires an iterative process of going over the problem statement, theories, results, and discussion aspects, which is considered to be one of the most difficult methods in doing research as there are no ‘routine formulas’ in doing so (Yin, 2003). Even though rigor and objectivity are important aspects in social sciences - especially in quantitative studies where realities are more studied in a laboratory like setting - they are of less importance to qualitative strategies where a thick description and explanation of a research object within a particular context is desirable. One can say here that relevance stands above rigor (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993). Frequencies matter less in this context. And generalizations can only be made in terms of the analytic necessary to construct theory (Yin, 2003). Specificity is key and the accumulation of such can bring the researcher closer to the relationships that embrace the object of study (Erlandson, et al., 1993).

There is a lot to say though about the limited quality of qualitative methods like they are used in this study. Some are related to discussions of validity or reliability, but just as important here is the social construction of reality through the eyes of the researcher himself.

3.5.1 Validity, Reliability and Quality

Reliability is normally an important precursor for validity in social science. Reliability in naturalistic studies as described here are problematic since traditional techniques as replication are not applicable. One cannot do the same interview twice, and very little structure is being used to explore through community relations. If we have to evaluate qualitative studies on basis of conventional reliability standards, Stenbacka (2001) argues simply that such studies can only be evaluated as insufficient.

And if reliability is limited, this has consequences for validity too. There are however various forms of validity that can deal with i.e. content (do questions asked suffice the representation of reality?), external generalizability (can the findings of the sample represent the population?), construct (do we measure what we want to measure?). Normally, triangulation and saturation of data are used to deal with the quality of validity. Especially in grounded approaches, one ought to try making generalizations that de-contextualize specific findings. Charmaz (2006) warns though that these generalizations can be forced into prior generalizations, making it difficult to come up with new fresh ideas. Boeije (2005) mentions that quality of qualitative studies lie in good understanding and that reliability can be found in the replication of observations. Comparing these with in-between evaluation of findings creates more validity. Such replication has been searched for in the analysis of categories in KODANI, and reflected with policy makers in Windhoek in a separate discussion of research findings after all interviews had taken place.

In a practical sense, findings of this study relate to the conservancy model in Namibia. All conservancies are bound to similar conservancy’ experiences through a whole era of apartheid and independence mechanisms. These mechanisms have built the foundations of socio-historical conditions that are unique to every conservancy. Unique in a sense that findings of this study relate to Anabeb specific conditions where findings not necessarily are found in other conservancies. Nevertheless, similar conditions are expected to be valid in different contexts of surrounding conservancies in Kunene where similar social constellations can be found since conservancy boundaries have created imaginary spheres that are different from traditional set ups in the region. Analytically, generalizations can be made for the specific approach used in this...
study that unpacks discursive practices around conflicting issues within the conservancy that can be practiced in other conservancies too. Such an approach differs considerably from existing overly positive representations in the CBNRM framework.

### 3.5.2 Researcher’s Positionality

Lastly, the role of the researcher is exceedingly essential for the findings of this study. First of all, the decision to aim for problematic political conflict is made by the author to challenge conservancy practices. This is due to the belief that a strong centralized positive narrative can hide contradicting processes and stories. The perspectives of the marginalized in the ethnocentric western policy arrangement of the Namibian CBNRM framework seem to have been covered even though policy actors are increasingly becoming aware of problems around conservancy practices (NACSO, 2009, 2010b). This study aims to reveal more in-depth and refreshing stories that can help understand also the larger picture of conservancy problems and the academic fuzzy idea of ‘community complexity’. But why would I choose to perform this case study?

The concept of community has been regularly raised during several personal papers in the context of community participation in sustainable tourism development. In a previous study on equitable benefit sharing for the IUCN in the Netherlands, I was – together with a larger project team – commissioned to find proof of equitable benefit sharing in many community based tourism projects around the world funded by the IUCN. This inner search for proof to legitimize action is understandable from the perspective of an organization to guarantee a continuation of existing tourism programs, but oversees inner community complexities that were studied from a distance over email questionnaires. Such an approach limits our understanding of inner or outer community dynamics. Moreover, my personal experiences with community based tourism (CBT) in settings such as pro-poor tourism developments in rural Rwanda, have made me ever more critical of the limited interactions of public and private organizations in relation to local communities. Most development NGOs, from personal experience, do interact with local communities as strong influencers of how community based tourism ought to be arranged according to specialists’ opinions and what a tourist would like to experience. When I first heard about the Namibian success story of community based tourism initiatives, it has made me suspicious and eager at the same time. Suspicious due to previous negative experiences of inequality and structural relations. And eager to see whether the Namibian conservancy model would provide a hopeful solution to normally problematic approaches of CBT.

Returning to the context of local fieldwork; new opportunities in the politic power vacuum of Anabeb Conservancy were established due to my arrival. For example; in the process, several actors of Anabeb have welcomed me with open arms, particularly local traditional headmen. The introduction of the researcher can be interpreted as an opportunity to resolve personal issues of respondents. Respondents could frame their answers in hope to get something out of a conversation with an external actor to the region and local arrangements. Some people were for example interested whether I could provide for recommendations in this study. This has never been the aim of this study since understanding of local political formations and further theoretical development of CBNRM has been considered empirical. And providing recommendations would most probably lead to some changes of the current policy arrangement in Anabeb and new political formations.
But even if we refrain from giving recommendations, this study can have further political consequences when it is read by policy makers or local decision makers. Providing people with insights to the local political arrangement could open up eyes that normally would be preferred closed by some actors. Understandably the content of this study could be seen as harmful to national policy makers who rather hope for further positive constructions of the conservancy narrative. On the other hand, having insights into background structures of local alliances could be seen as valuable to policy makers that, in the end, hope for good governance structures to continue community conservation for the future. This study is assumed to provide useful insights in this regard and a voice to rural community members that I often miss in policy narratives around CBT.

Different beliefs of community respondents have been quite outspoken in relation to other groups, and some readers of this study might interpret the results and discussions as if one group of community members – the Kasaona’s - is seen as the cause of problems. Such an interpretation is not aimed for either and is most certainly not shared by the author. Like Foucault would argue, power is believed not to be vested in the individual but rather in the production of autonomous micro-events, into interrelatedness and not into isolated realities.

Other but related issues involved the question of how to deal with illegal practices that influence access to benefits in the region. Some traditional leaders would purposefully hand over legal documents that were prepared to sue conservancy personnel over suspicions of ‘eating the money’. Showing me these documents exemplify once more how actors purposefully try to make use of your presence in their struggle for control over benefits. The research aims are however not about strict illegal or legal access mechanisms, but rather on relational and structural mechanisms of access. Any such illegalities have politely been accepted (and put to the side), but stay out of this study. I often replied to actors that my role is to study relations to access resources, and that I certainly am ‘not a legal investigator’.
4. Socio-Historical Conditions

Before diving into four main contextual developments critical to contemporary conflict over benefits in Anabeb Conservancy, a short demographic overview is provided here. Spatially, the conservancy of Anabeb is situated in the Sesfontein constituency of Kunene in the North West of Namibia. Figure four shows the dark demarcation of Anabeb in the current conservancy landscape of Namibia.

The total land size constitutes 1570 km². There is an estimated population of about 2000 people - mainly Herero and Damara - and its key wildlife population consists of: elephant, leopard, cheetah, mountain zebra, oryx, kudu, springbok, ostrich and a few desert lions. The landscape is consisting of rocks, sand, some bushes and a few springs (NACSO, 2010a) typical for the Kunene area. Anabeb Conservancy is named after a special acacia tree: the Anabeb Tree.

"...actually Anabeb is a name of a village...it is just on the way to Sesfontein, at the t-junction to Opuwo. There is a small village called Anabeb. And Anabeb, in Damara-Nama means: ‘nose’, which is called Ana. You might also know about the Ana-boom [‘boom’ is Afrikaans for ‘tree’]. It is growing here close to the river bed. ...there are many and especially useful during drought periods. Their seeds are eaten by our livestock. [The trees] are called acacia ....something, ... it is an acacia tree". – conservancy officer in Anabeb

The conservancy contains four main villages – Warmquelle, Kwowarib, Anabeb and Otzondunda – but the population is spread within formal demarcations of the conservancy. Figure five zooms in on the conservancy and highlights the four villages in blue. The conservancy office is located in Warmquelle, the largest and most developed village in the conservancy. There are twelve community members employed with the conservancy; four office workers and eight game guards. Next to staff, the conservancy has a legal decision making body; the committee. This committee consists of ten

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17 The most bottom village is Kwowarib.
elected members from the different villages in Anabeb, and seven additional advising members who represent the seven different traditional authorities in the conservancy.

In short, Anabeb is situated in the arid northwest (Kunene) in the middle of vast wildlife populations and primarily two ethic groups, the Damara and Herero, yet seven different traditional authorities (three Damara, four Herero). On the surface it seems just like any other conservancy, but some developments from the past are critical to understand how actors think about proper conservancy management to access benefits. These developments deal particularly with: apartheid and post-apartheid political development (where have current political divisions come from? See 4.1); a historical background of different ethnic groups in the conservancy (how have different groups been positioned over the past? See 4.2); land reform and conservancy development (how has land been managed throughout the known past and what role have traditional authorities had in these developments, see 4.3); and some critical turning points in anticipation of Anabeb’s short history as a conservancy (See 4.4). Different discussions are based on a combination of scientific discussions, policy related documents and insights from interviews. The latter have been made anonymous to respect people’s beliefs.

These four contextual categories have been identified from several fieldwork observations as most critical in the current development of conflict and will explain: the impact of SWAPO politics – Namibia’s foremost political party in post-colonial Namibia - in the region of Kunene; how past apartheid policies left homeland communities as self governing entities similar to how conservancy policies prescribe communities to perform nowadays; how traditional leadership has formed itself throughout relationships with colonial presence and that such relationships continue to empower those who engage with modern day conservancy powers; how the Herero’s are known for their well educational and networked competences; how Namibian law homogenizes community and traditional authority as a means to control national community cooperation; and how Anabeb is known to have experienced a series of events prior to its official conservancy status that perpetuate in present configurations of conflict.

These socio-historic conditions contain predictive outcomes as they explain why certain actors/actor groups are powerful in the management of precious resources on communal land by means of powerful ideas that promote self-management in a context of traditional customary rules. Eventually, these conditions are to be discussed in relation to empirical policy arrangements of present-day Anabeb Conservancy (see chapter five) to explain whether and how access relations have changed due to legal conservancy introductions (see chapter six and seven).

4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF (POST) APARTHEID POLITICS

Present day politics in Namibia can be better understood if one starts to understand how different groups have resisted colonial rule in Namibia, formerly better known as South West Africa. The ruling party of Namibia is called SWAPO which stands for South West African People’s Organization. But its existence has a long – and occasionally bloody – history. A full account of historical facts is beyond the scope of this study. The following will only specifically focus on important aspects of present day conservancies, namely: to hold ‘black’ populations separated with low levels of education and economic means to arrange good labor populations in colonial times; the resistance of Namibian groups, particularly SWAPO; the so-called self government of ethnic homelands proposed by South African Turnhalle talks; and the ethnic Damara-Herero politics within the isolated Kunene region of North-West Namibia.
4.1.1 GERMAN COLONIAL RULE

“When the land hungry Western imperialists at the Berlin Conference in 1884, the so-called scramble for Africa, drew up the colonial borders, [South West Africa] became a German territory through an Anglo-German Treaty of 1890” (SWAPO, 2010).

German colonial rule, from 1884, started with a treaty between Herero Chief Maharero and German settlers to allocate land to Germans in return for protection against Nama attacks. It was mostly well farmable land that was handed over to white settlers that assumed to have racial privileges (Gewald, 2003), while less farmable land was provided to Namibian indigenous groups. According to Katjavivi (1988) German colonial rule can be described to have affected Namibian communities in three different ways; a. land was taken away from communities in generally central and southern areas of Namibia, b. traditional social structures were demolished in order to subject Namibian people to colonial regime, and c. Namibians were being employed by force on white farms. Northern parts of Namibia (above the so-called Red Line) were never administered by German colonial rule. However, the Northern area – where mostly Ovambo live - has been a large source of forced laborers that were being employed in mainly mining, industry or commercial farming.

In 1904 the Herero’s turned their backs towards German rule, and a war was declared by Herero Chief Maharero. Nama’s and Damara’s joined the Herero’s in the war, and large portions of different Namibian groups have been killed in this war; i.e 75-80 % of the Herero’s and 50 % of the Nama’s are said to have been wiped out (Gewald, 1999, 2003). After the war in 1907, "a total expropriation of land, a ban on cattle raise and on traditional forms of organization" (Katjavivi, 1988, p. 10) was demanded by German settlers.

4.1.2 SOUTH AFRICAN COLONIAL RULE

During the First World War, in 1915, Namibia was taken over by yet another colonial power: South Africa. Namibia practically became a new province (Hongslo & Benjaminsen, 2002), but so-called South African ‘protection’ did never intend to take care of social and material wellbeing of the Namibian people – as it was mandated - but rather used ‘black’ Namibian citizens as subjects of the ‘whites’ (Katjavivi, 1988).

South African rule took over German divisions of land, and moved the ‘Red Line’ even more upwards to incorporate areas where a majority of Namibians live. More whites, mostly Afrikaners, moved into Namibia to settle on large farms. At the same time growing protests emerged by Namibians against: the influence of the church, the continued change of traditional culture; and lack of education. The latter issue concerned people’s desire to become literate in a European language, as this would be a way to improve people’s position in terms of higher wages, more equality and empowerment. This was nevertheless against the general ‘white way of thinking’ that...“to educate them is to give them contact with world movements and world thinking which, of course...inculcates such mischievous and intolerable ideas as democracy, the brotherhood of man, fundamental human freedoms, and the like” (Wellington, 1967; in Katjavivi, 1988, p. 27).

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18 The Nama are a southern ethnic group in Namibia with whom the Herero were fighting a war over land in the 19th century.
19 Katjavivi is a well known SWAPO spokesman that has written an often cited historical book on the resistance of Namibians during German and Colonial time.
20 The Ovambo represent the majority (half of all) people in Namibia. SWAPO is generally seen by many Namibians as an Ovambo party.
In the 1940s, a principally Herero movement called the *African Improvement Society* was set up to represent concerns about educational and cultural opportunities for Africans. In that same year, Damara’s established their own but comparable educational organization - called *Fakkel* – as Damara’s understood that the African Improvement Society was ruled by Herero’s. But more resistance groups were established. In the 1950s, a group of contract workers set up a labor organization in Cape Town named the *Ovamboland People’s Congress* (OPC). This organization stood up for labor rights of primarily contract workers from Ovamboland. In 1959, another Labor organization evolved from OPC under the leadership of Sam Nujoma (first president of Namibia after Independence), and was called the *Ovamboland People’s Organization* (OPO). OPO had two objectives; concerns over contract workers as well as the desire for independence. One year later, the name of OPO changed into *South West Africa People’s Organization* (SWAPO), which has been the ruling party in Namibia since independence.

### 4.1.3 SWAPO’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Although many petitions had been sent to the United Nations about continued concerns over South African rule, the United Nations have never been able to put a hold to South Africa’s occupation over Namibia.

Several organizations - i.e. the Herero’s Chief Council, SWANU (a first national body against South African rule), SWAPO, et al. - were being established to unite communities nation-wide in their desire for independence (see further dispossession & independence on the right). Although these parties all aimed for independence, they did not clearly cooperate due to different approaches. For example; the Herero’s Chief Council wanted to remain independent of SWANU since most of SWANU’s leaders were Herero and that would undermine the authority of the Chief’s Council. And where SWANU stood for self-determination and peaceful negotiation, SWAPO was willing to use force (Katjavivi, 1988).

In 1963, under the South African *Odendaal Commission*, a development plan for Namibia was made that mainly considered the apartheid divisions of white and black communities in Namibia, see also figure six²¹. Eleven black authorities were proposed; i.e a Damara Advisory Council from 1971, a Nama Council from 1976, yet no legislative assembly for the Herero. Furthermore, seven different homelands were established and apartheid land policy seemed to have reached its peak. Former communal areas had to adopt to rigid land boundaries due to changing levels of European ownership such as the introduction of private freehold²² land (Werner, 1993). There was widespread opposition to these planned divisions, but South Africa went ahead under the

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²¹ [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/namibia_homelands_78.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/namibia_homelands_78.jpg)

²² Free-hold land is accessible for private ownership where most commercial farming (still) takes place in Namibia, particularly in central Namibia. Free-hold land, according to Hinz (2007), is land that “could be individually bought, sold and also mortgaged when need arose” (p. 75).
proclaimed idea of ‘self governing’. The Odendaal commission intended to support ‘native nations’ in South West Africa to in fact become self-governing states, i.e. Kaokoveld, and Damara-land (Corbett & Daniels, 1996), where traditional authorities would gain rights to govern their populations on behalf of the state. These homelands- especially in the Northwest - where typically the least farmable areas of Namibia, not well suitable for crop farming or livestock holding (B. Jones & Murphree, 2001).

In the meantime, SWAPO fighters were being trained in different socialist states (i.e. Tanzania, Soviet Union, China and North Korea). Correspondingly, SWAPO declared to commit to a classless society on the basis of scientific socialism in 1976. In different places where SWAPO members were living in exile, i.e. in Angola and Zambia, self reliant villages were being set up to “put into practice what it preaches…. [namely:] social justice and progress for all” (Katjavivi, 1988, p. 109).

On the 26th of August 1966, historically coinciding with the same day in August that Samuel Maharero is being remembered in relation to the German war, SWAPO started its first armed struggle against the presence of South African Apartheid. This movement was explained by SWAPO due to the non-confidence in the international society to respond to South Africa’s everlasting presence. When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did not manage to condemn South Africa in 1966, many Namibians lost their last hope for a peaceful liberation.

From 1974 till 1977, the so-called Turnhalle talks were being initiated by South Africa under pressure of the international community and different liberation movements in Namibia. This resulted into an assembly of elected representatives of each ethnic group in a national assembly, headed by a president appointed personally by the South African president. Ethnic groups would gain authority - among other issues - over land tenure while local municipalities would gain responsibilities over urban areas on an ethnic basis. The Turnhalle proposals received tremendous criticism by the international community due to its ethnic policy arrangements and divided Namibia politically in those in favor, and those against the proposals. Those against the Turnhalle proposals would increasingly join with SWAPO.
4.1.4 Independence and Politics in Kunene

After intense international pressure, negotiation and armed conflicts between South African forces and SWAPO fighters in exile, a cease fire allowed a transition period to prepare for fair elections in 1988. These elections were eventually held in 1989 where SWAPO won 57% and DTA23 29% of the votes. On March 21st 1990 Namibia became officially independent. SWAPO represented Namibia as its liberator and has been the ruling party ever since. Even though apartheid times are over, politics are still very much based on racial issues. Discriminatory laws are being inverted to favor ‘indigenization’ of public and private administration, better known as ‘black empowerment’. The new powerful elite legitimizes their actions on basis of racial legacies to have “political and economic power” (B. Jones & Murphree, 2001, p. 39)

Strict politically SWAPO has gained acceptance in the whole of Namibia but to a lesser degree in Kunene where UDF and DTA have had strong support after independence. The UDF (United Democratic Front) is a traditional Damara party supported by a large presence of Damara’s in the area. An area24 that formally used to be divided in Damaraland and Kaokoveld under the Odendaal Plan. The DTA used to be the most popular party in regional elections (Mupya, 2000), but this position is now dedicated to the UDF.

Herero’s would generally be charmed with parties such as the DTA or SWANU. Nowadays however, Herero’s are increasingly supporting SWAPO as the representation of Namibian political power. Damara’s, and in some exceptions even some Herero’s, remain faithful with UDF. This divide seems important to political life in Anabeb Conservancy since community activities often parallel politics.

“SWAPO-UDF politics. It is dominating this area. It is more important than the difference between Damara and Herero.” – headman Kasaona, Anabeb

Political differences can easily be identified amongst individuals since members in Anabeb typically follow their traditional leader if it comes to political preferences. Political sensitivity has become a factor of influence in a region that has always been isolated from the rest of Namibia.

4.2 Development of People

In general, around eleven ethnic groups live throughout Namibia. The Kunene area (formerly known as Kaokoveld and Damaraland), North West Namibia, mostly hosts Herero, Damara, and Himba groups that have lived side by side for some centuries. Whoever was first on the lands of Anabeb conservancy is unsure since different groups have their own version of history. Both Damara’s and Herero’s claim to have settled first. According to the latter Herero’s have lived in the area until the Odendaal plan. One Herero chief explains that Herero’s were once translocated by means of force during apartheid divides but that they managed to return six years later;

“The Herero’s took revenge later, so when we came back, the Damara’s moved to Kwowarib, the Herero’s stayed in Warmquelle.”

Warmquelle is now the main Herero location in Anabeb conservancy, while Damara groups live in Kwowarib. In total 7 groups live in Anabeb Conservancy. These are: the Kasaona’s, Kan-

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23 A political party that has been established during the Turnhalle talks as a democratic and multi-cultural party that would represent all peoples of South West Africa. The DTA was supported by the South Africans and was in power prior to independence in 1990.

24 Anabeb Conservancy is situated on the exact boundary of these ethnic lands.
gombe’s, Mbomoro’s, Uakazapi’s (all Herero groups), Taniseb’s, Ganaseb’s and Uises (all Damara groups).

That different ethnic groups live within the same conservancy is not surprising if one considers the former boundaries of homelands to present day conservancies. Figure seven overlaps parts of figure six to show that Anabeb – depicted in yellow – lies on the exact border – depicted in black - of former Kaokoveld (where many Herero’s were allocated) and Damaraland (where many Damara’s were allocated) homelands. Moreover, it is interesting to see how conservancy borders have split up within former homeland boundaries that have created new imagined communities of previous dispersed rural populations.

All groups in Anabeb are said to be traditional pastoralists; mostly depending on livestock such as goats or cattle. Different groups are used to live separately, divided geographically by rivers or other physical demarcation settings such as mountains, and politically through the use of separate customary systems. But besides their differences, people have been similar in terms of food relations and use of land. Since land opportunities are scarce, different communities have been spread out over Namibia in order to grasp most out of existing resources (Werner, 1993).

Sharing of food was and is still common since diverse groups have different livelihood strategies. For example; Herero’s and Himba’s depend on cattle herding, Damara’s are traditionally known to grow crops. If a Damara has a need for milk or meat from cows, they can occasionally share this in return for their crops. In general though, Damara and Herero groups have never been close friends according to respondents. Different Herero groups have been cooperating, just like Damara groups. But conflict used to be foremost a tribal issue.

The following sections provide more background information on particularly Damara’s and Herero’s. Himba’s and Nama’s are not considered here. Himba’s are considered a sub-group of the Herero, and Nama’s particularly have an influence in neighboring Sesfontein conservancy. The following explains the decentralized political structures of both Herero and Damara’s that used to live in central areas of Namibia before colonization; Herero’s are famous cattle farmers that are known to be well connected and educated; Damara’s are less known except for their traditional farming of crops and ancient roots in Namibia.

4.2.1 Herero
Herero’s are said to have migrated from Central/Eastern Africa25 around the fifteenth or sixteenth century (Katjavivi, 1988; Malan, 1980; SEEN, 2011). The Herero’s desired to settle in the central north but were forced to direct themselves to more isolated and western parts of northern Namibia due to the presence of other yet incoming tribes in the north. After two centuries, a

25 The common Herero language and their socio-political decentralized pastoralist composition is comparatively similar to that of Swahili speaking pastoralists in Eastern Africa (Gewald, 1999).
great drought forced a majority of Herero’s to leave the area to find better lands for their precious cattle. Consequently, Herero’s have established throughout Namibia from the North West to central and eastern parts from the 18th century.

The Herero’s are divided into different matrilineal groups. They have in fact a unique ‘dual descent’ social system where inheritance comes from both the mother clan (eanda – in charge of major economic control and inheritance of movable wealth) and father clan (eruzo – in charge of residence patterns, exercise of authority and religious activities) side. This has resulted in a traditional lack of paramount chieftainship that is more normal to other groups in Namibia. A former Swedish adventurer and cattle trader came to Namibia in 1850 and described that Herero’s were probably once “a great unified nation”, but “unlike others which gradually became more powerful by the union of a number of smaller tribes under the head of a single chief or king, they have dwindled into an endless number of petty tribes, ruled by as many chiefs” (Charles John Andersson, 1856 in Gewald, 1999, p. 10).

Family clans – especially the matrimonial line – have become important units of organization for the Herero. People of the same generation are naturally referred to as brothers or sisters, while older generations are called father, mother or grandfather and grandfather. Such familiar interrelations have created political loyalties but also conflicting group interests over cattle divisions amongst families. A matter that often involves the judgment of (different) traditional headmen (Malan, 1980).

It was only until the end of the 19th century that a marriage between main Herero families resulted into a central chieftaincy for the Herero’s: Chief Maharero. This unification was beneficial in the wars with the Khoi-khoins, and would be ideal for German colonial settlers to deal with treaties and resistance. Samuel Maharero, son of Chief Maharero, has been a central figure in the war between the Herero’s and the Germans, and is being remembered yearly on the 26th of August (a public holiday: Herero Day, presently called Hero’s Day), the day in 1923 that his remains have been transported from Botswana – where many Herero’s exiled to after the German answer to their resistance - and reburied in Okahandja, Namibia. A unified Herero chief like Maharero has never been established after his death. During their struggles with the South African occupation, the Herero population lost more of its land and cattle. It is estimated that the Herero community lost around 75-80 % of its land during colonization (Hangula, 2000).

Nevertheless, land occupation and cattle are unmistakably related to Herero livestock management. The Herero’s are known to herd inconceivable numbers of cattle. Especially some chiefs would own such vast numbers of cattle that they were being envied by other groups in Namibia and European settlers in the 19th century (Katjavivi, 1988).

“I have about ....well I don’t count [my cattle. But] it is our diamond. If you don’t have cattle, then it is just like being someone who is naked.” – A Herero councilor in Warmquelle

These cattle stocks have been strong economic resources to trade with other groups, and an important source of subsistence. Cattle is said to be everything for the Herero’s, it even has religious aspects dedicated to them. There are i.e. 36 different sacred categories among cattle for Himba groups alone. Moreover, the quantity of cattle is said to identify a person’s wealth (Malan, 1980).
But Herero’s are known for more than their cattle and wars; they have been described as very well literate and connected people. This has been illustrated by Gewald in his description of Herero sons who sought for assistance from the British during their revolt against the German dispossession and previously mentioned Herero and Nama genocide. These sons became important information providers for incoming South African officers that the sons got assigned to. South African officers were impressed with these guys who “were seen as highly articulate men” (Gewald, 2003, p. 287). Moreover, the dispossession of land and genocide became important elements of Herero resistance which were recurring elements in the launch of SWANU and SWAPO, especially SWANU that became incorporated with Herero ideas.

4.2.2 Damara

Little is known about Damara’s except from some facts. They are said to be known to have been well-skilled hunters, traditionally depend on crop gardening and lacking strong central traditional leadership such as Herero groups.

“We traditionally take care of our gardens in the bush. There are three gardens around here, but they are all empty now. We grow pumpkin.” – A Damara councilor in Kwowarib

While Damara’s are said to have settled originally in central Namibia, they have migrated historically towards the north.

“The Damara’s were living in the mountains, for example at Brandberg. We also call them in Afrikaans, ‘strandlopers’ [=beach walkers]. And I don’t know the year, but after walking the beaches, they were walking themselves more inland up to Sesfontein.” - Officer of regional NGO

Damara’s are known to share a common and unique language as well as culture that they share with the Nama’s. According to Malan (1980) – who clearly wrote in colonial anthropological discourse - Damara’s have typical “negroid physical features” and are not of Bantu origin like Herero and Himba groups. A former Orlam chief in the beginning of the 19th century, “once told some European explorers that the Damara’s had ‘always existed’ in Namibia” (Jonker Afrikaner in: Katjavivi, 1988, p. 2).

Damara groups have probably migrated from central Namibia to more northern mountainous regions because of competition over cattle land that Herero’s were taking over. Considering the earlier described history of Herero’s, this needs to have taken place around the seventeenth or eighteenth century. Figure eight provides an overview of ethnic settlements in Namibia where Damara groups, like the famous San ‘Bushmen’ groups, are thought to have inhabited Namibia.

Figure 8: Ethnic migration Namibia (SEEN, 2011)
before other groups migrated to Namibia.

4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNAL LAND MANAGEMENT

Before colonization, indigenous communities used to have communal land tenure systems that would regulate land use according to customary norms. Actually, there was no authority that would provide pastoralists with rights as we know them in modern societies. Land was used by pastoralist (Herero and Damara) clans for grazing, and groups would travel where the land was most fertile (places with water, like the waterholes in the Sesfontein constituency of this case study). Common state law was not yet applicable (Geraldo & Skeffers, 2007; Hangula, 2000; Werner, 1993).

Due to limited technical hunting tools, self-use, spiritual beliefs dedicated to wildlife and custodian management by local headmen, wildlife was not necessarily harmed either by traditional pastoralists as popular colonial discourses would put forward. During colonization, wildlife as a resource was dispossessed from both ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ due to state and corporate control of land. From 1968, white farmers gained exclusive legal rights over wildlife on commercial farms that would provide them access to consumptive as well as non-consumptive benefits. A development that is parallel to a shift from fortress conservation to community conservation since the 1960s. Trophy hunting and entertainment of foreign guests turned out to a profitable business while wildlife numbers decreased to edges of extinction. Hunting wildlife became a criminal activity for populations in homelands (B. Jones & Murphree, 2001), in contrast to white commercial rights to consumptive and non-consumptive use of game.

The allocation of communal land rights was formally provided to colonial magistrates and superintendents. Traditional headmen had no rights on such matters and where more incorporated as local resolvers of dispute. Nevertheless, communal land was locally believed to be owned by chiefs in the region and thereby de facto allocated but non-legal. Such beliefs were however destabilized after independence when local authorities lost their legitimate role in post-colonial Namibia (Corbett & Daniels, 1996). This is striking considering the competing ideas with the ruling party of “democracy and decentralization and, on the other, command and control through centralization” (B. Jones & Murphree, 2001, p. 40).

In short colonial occupation out stepped customary law in favor of colonial law, whereas post-independence authority has de facto taken away local authorities’ idea of control. The following sections will discuss the level of hegemonic rule over traditional rule; and question where traditional authorities come from; and what status traditional governance have in contemporary Namibia and its conservancy policies.

Notwithstanding restricted mobility’s of people, Northern Namibia has typically been governed indirectly by South African rule. Homelands such as Kaokoveld or Damaraland remained therefore de facto communal lands. Direct colonial rule normally resulted into formal dispossession of land occupied by rural communities in primarily central and southern Namibia (South West Africa). Mostly Damara, Herero and Nama’s from central regions have been dispossessed from land due to these policies (SEEN, 2011). Traditional customary law– or indigenous law as some might call it – was yet frequently applicable to people in isolated areas, especially Northern Namibia.
Hinz (2007) stresses a few important remarks in the legal-pluralist differentiation between modern common law and that of traditional African law in Namibia. It is - to begin with - questionable to what extent traditional law and governance have truly been present in communal areas as far as people can remember. Many known traditions have been – and continue to be - invented through modernity. Moreover, strong traditional leadership, as discussed earlier on the development of both Herero and Damara groups, is historically not proven to be effective. However disputable the concept of traditional law may be, the Namibian government continues to stipulate a clear distinction in the Traditional Authorities Act:

Customary law entails “the customary law, norms, rules of procedure, traditions and usages of a traditional community in so far as they do not conflict with the Namibian Constitution or with any other written law applicable in Namibia.”

Customary law seems to be of a lower status than common Namibian law. Related to customary law, the same section of this act describes an important concept of a traditional community:

A traditional community is “an indigenous, homogeneous, endogamous social grouping of persons comprising of families deriving from exogamous clans which share a common ancestry, language, cultural heritage, customs and traditions, recognizes a common traditional authority and inhabits a common communal area; and includes the members of the community residing outside the common communal area.”

The above underlined indicate that communities are seen as homogeneous cultural groups with a common authority and traditions on common land. This however seems problematic in conservancy practices where communities are said to be self-declared; and can therefore consist of several communal and cultural groups that are dispersed in places.

4.3.1 Traditional Management After Independence

During early independence years, the Namibian government organized several land conferences and censuses to understand the position of traditional authorities in communal areas. Even though traditional authorities have been acknowledged in new national policies - especially the Traditional Authorities Act of 1995 - Hinz (2007) challenges the limited administrative and standardized position of traditional leaders. Especially section 12 indicates the powerless formal position as follows;

“(1) In the performance of its duties and functions and exercise of its powers under this Act, a traditional authority shall give support to the policies of the Government, regional councils or local authority councils and refrain from any act which undermines the authority of those institutions.
(2) Where the powers of a traditional authority or traditional leader conflict with the powers of the Government, regional councils or local authority councils, the powers of the Government, regional council or local authority council, as the case may be, shall prevail.”

The authority of the state remains to be effective in contemporary policy. Indigenous leaders appear not to have improved their status as formerly appointed colonial “lower-level bureaucrats who administer the ‘native areas’ on behalf of the administration in return for an annual salary” (Werner, 1993, p. 136), but are nevertheless – direct and indirectly - recognized in law (Hinz, 1995, section 1)

Conservancy policy demands members of a community to self declare the boundaries of their community.
2007). Apparently, patronage administrative rights were effective since a few decades according to the memory of one respondent:

"Since 1976 we started with this [chieftainship] system, before that time there wasn’t…” - headman from Warmquelle

Yet, Gewald brings forward evidence of particular Herero chieftainship that was invented already in the 1840s. Traditional chiefs from those times are argued to have been created in response to the frontier of the Cape; not only amongst close kinship ties, but also through the fact that “skills and contacts acquired through association with the frontier were applied to create and maintain a new form of centralized Herero polity” (1999, p. 28).

Similar patterns of chieftainship can be found in the South African context, where chiefs were criticized as ‘puppets’ of former Bantustan rule during apartheid (Kessel & Oomen, 1997). Bantustan homeland policies would be executed by those chiefs complying with the Department of Native Affairs of the South African government. If not, they would be fired and replaced. If necessary, the SA government would even hire new chiefs not existing before. After independence, South African chiefs would ally with the ruling party, the ANC, in order to keep their positions. In fact, the whole reason that modern-day chiefs still exist is due to the flexibility of its institution by constant shifting alliances that can safeguard their positions. These alliances do not necessarily align to ‘popular support’, but rather to ‘state recognition’ according to Kessel & Oomen (1997).

Berry (2009) illustrates that similar alliances are found in post-colonial societies in a Western African context. Chiefs typically practice shifting alliances due to changes of legal-political authorities in their national governments. Some chiefs have even built relationships with institutional organizations that are beyond the national levels, such as international NGOs. This development is however double with regards to how access to communal land is being legitimized by historical claims of “authority and social belonging” (p. 23) parallel to democratization of sustainable and rural development.

In Namibia, the liberated were skeptical of the role of traditional authorities during colonialism in a similar fashion as illustrated for Southern Africa. Customary law would be discussed as important after independence, but little to nothing was claimed about the role of traditional leaders, even not in the Constitution of Namibia. According to Hinz, “political minds behind the Constitution did not envisage much of a role for traditional authorities” (2007, p. 69).

The new government requested re-registration of traditional structures after independence and thereby created new uncertainties:

"Villages like Warmquelle and Kwowarib were led by headmen or 2/3 councilors. After independence things have changed. Now you need to be recognized and gazetted by government…. If you want to be recognized as a chief, you must just follow a certain policy path of the government policy. A historical background is most important here.” – Conservancy manager

“Most of the homeland chiefs were going through, not some changes; […] the laws were changing. So there was some uncertainty in terms of…am I still a chief in this area or not, because you had to re-register with government to be recognized as a chief.” - Officer of national NGO
This issue has still – 20 years later – not been resolved for some. To illustrate; the Kasaona family in Anabeb Conservancy is waiting for approval by the government (their headman ‘chief Lucky’ wants to become an official government gazetted chief), while two different Damara groups struggle for chieftainship in neighboring Sesfontein Conservancy. But in general, if chiefs are accepted by their own people, then the government will recognize them as such. Yet recognition is said to happen politically from a top-down approach too, especially in the Kunene region:

“There have been cases though that people have been assigned due to the fact that they belong to SWAPO, and not because they serve a particular community or so. Sesfontein and the Kunene area, politics always has come a long way. It is a stronghold for both UDF and SWAPO. More UDF than SWAPO. UDF is a real Damara organization in the area. SWAPO is now taking up in certain constituencies, but all along it used to be very Damara driven.” – Manager national CBNRM NGO

Coming back to policy related to traditional management of land in Namibia, other national policy developments have been structured to manage communal land. These are the Communal Land Reform Act (2002), the Nature Conservation Amendment Act (1995), and related governmental policy documents; ‘Wildlife Management, Utilization and Tourism in Communal areas’ or ‘The Establishment of Conservancies in Namibia’. Essentially, these policies are implemented under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism – in weak cooperation with several other ministries such as Lands and Resettlement - with the aim to link conservation of resources to rural development by means of financial benefits from sustainable wildlife utilization. Community based tourism forms an important part of this policy due to its promising economic returns for communities. Therefore, policies have aimed to get the tourism industry accepted by communal communities to enjoy greater access to benefits from tourism (Corbett & Daniels, 1996). The two main objectives of the new policy on Wildlife Management, Utilization and Tourism in Communal Areas has been the increased rights and use from wildlife benefits for communities in rural areas such as commercial farmers already enjoyed, and for these communities to have rights from bordering tourism concessions (B. Jones & Murphree, 2001).

In the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002, communal land use is allowed to be allocated by traditional authorities. ‘A chief without land is not a chief’, but official ownership remains under the disposal of the state. Therefore, with regards to the allocation of land, regional land boards need to ratify decisions made under advisory of traditional leaders (Hinz, 2007; Rothfuss, 2000).

These laws or policy documents exemplify which policies have been the result of post-independence thinking. Thinking that is based on a few key developments according to Jones and Murphree: a. pre-policy work of a regional NGO called the IRDNC that has established community conservation since the 1980s in the Kunene area together with local authorities, b. theories on common property management, c. examples of neighboring initiatives such as the CAMPFIRE project in Zimbabwe, d. the practice of socio-economic surveys throughout communal areas after independence, and e. the creation of conservancies as a tool to allow communal property to be benefitted from by members (2001, p. 52).

### 4.3.2 Traditional Management and Conservancies

Ever since the setting up of the Nature Conservation Amendment Act in 1995, conservancies are officially recognized by government. This act has however, but interestingly, refrained to men-
tion the role of ‘communal leadership’ in conservancy management. Wildlife resources on communal lands had previously been under the sole control of the State that has now allowed communities to access management and corresponding benefits from conservancies “to remove discriminatory provisions of the Nature Conservation Ordinance, 1975” (quoted in Anabeb “Anabeb Conservancy Constitution,” 2002) that were previously only enjoyed by white commercial farmers. Communal land was envisioned to be connected to those people who belonged to communal areas where wildlife exists. Such human-nature discourse lead to a common belief with communities that ownership through traditional authority and law was strengthened and a new form of community was established (Corbett & Daniels, 1996).

“On communal land, a conservancy would be a community or group of communities within a defined geographical area who jointly manage, conserve and utilize the wildlife and other natural resources within their defined area.” (Rothfuss, 2000, p. 138)

Nevertheless, conservancies are uniting or changing traditional practices that formerly were under responsibilities of traditional authorities. What you get is a triple system of common conservancy law that overlaps with customary laws into a hybridization of managing natural resources within a unified conservancy (and its own constitution).

“The chief has still authority, but is not involved with the day to day activities of the conservancy. But normally they let some reps of their chieftaincy sit into the conservancy committee. So they still have some form of power in the conservancy management. In this way their interests are being served as well.” - Officer international NGO

“Now, what is happening; everybody in the community is considered as one. So when you are selecting a committee, you might have someone that you would like to appoint as a committee member, but he or she needs to be elected by the number of votes. It is a democratic process.” – Manager regional NGO

The conservancy committee is the official decision making body of a conservancy that needs to ensure that all members of the conservancy receive “equal benefits” (“Anabeb Conservancy Constitution,” 2002; section 4.2). The committee normally operates next to traditional authorities. Traditional authority representatives can however advise the official board members. But where interests differ, conflict often remains emerging. According to most supporting organizations in Windhoek, the problem continues to exist with traditional authorities and local politics.

“I think that the chiefs see the conservancy as a person that is taking over their role. You don’t see this everywhere, but there are some areas where you can see that. Certain chiefs, i.e. in Damaraland, they still cause some friction. Especially when it comes to allocating land for lodges. The chiefs want to be the one allocating the land, and the one who is getting all the benefits. But the conservancies say; ‘no, we are having the right over land, and we are going to allocate this land. We in turn will give you the benefits, like we give to anybody else that is a member of the conservancy.” – Officer national NGO

The new conservancy policies have entered as a new form of political institution between the Namibian state and traditional leadership. Figure nine illustrates this role. The conservancy performs as a hybrid institution where communal actors can ‘self-declare’ their new constitution which needs to be accepted by the Minister of Environment and Tourism. Rural communities are
very much capacitated by national and regional NGOs to make such institutionalization possible. Traditional leaders lose part of their authority over resources on communal land, since land use rights with regard to wildlife are handled by the conservancy committee only. The official land allocation still remains under the informal decision of traditional leaders who advise regional land boards. The question is: How flexible are traditional leaders in this current shift of land use authority to conservancies?

![Figure 9: Conservancy Vs Traditional leaders Vs the State](image)

4.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN ANABEB CONSERVANCY

Whereas earlier sections have provided background information on the political history, the characteristics of people and institutional land management developments, this section will contextualize a few additional background stories on conflict that play a role in present day configurations of conflict in Anabeb. These are: conflict over distribution of elderly benefits during apartheid, conflict over campsite management prior to conservancy, and conflict over conservancy divisions when Anabeb used to be part of Sesfontein conservancy. These example stories illustrate a continuing traditional contest over available resources that are being brought into the region: colonial pension funds, pre-conservancy campsite income, and conservancy benefits.

4.4.1 Kangombe’s Tree in Warmquelle

During South African occupation, elderly in Warmquelle would receive some money from the government to sustain themselves. Money that would be distributed from the central tree near headman Kangombe’s homestead in Warmquelle. Some people would however not prefer the distribution to take place near the Kangombe’s:

“The other headman didn’t want to collect money from the tree, since this tree is owned by me. There are 7 headmen, but the issue was initially just against one here. It was Goliath Kasaona29. He passed away in 2001. The whole issue started in the 1980s. Because the government people said that we initially agreed to meet under this tree, and those people who do not want to come...we don’t care, we just give out to those who come.” - headman Kangombe

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29 Father of Lucky Kasaona who is the current headman of the Kasaona clan in the region.
According to headmen Kangombe, current conflict over conservancy benefits origin from this passage in history. Other traditional leaders in Warmquelle acknowledge that current day conflict was always there as long as people can remember. And the real problem seems to be the traditional set up.

"People are not addressing the actual problem. You are wasting time, energy, but it is not the real problem that you really have. You can say that, if you manage to resolve this problem, next day the same person came out with another problem. There is always a problem." – Headman Kasaona

But this strikes with opinions of non-Kasaona groups who often refer to peaceful times – prior to the introduction of CBNRM and conservancies - where different groups were working together, even Damara’s and Herero’s.

"In the past people were really bonded, calling each other; my brother, my sister. I am talking about the sixties and seventies. People accepted each other." – Regional councilor Sesfontein constituency

To sum up; three different opinions already emerge: a. conflict is as old as we can remember, b. conflict started in the 80s at Kangombe’s tree, or c. CBNRM has brought conflict to communities. The problem does not seem to be between Damara’s and Herero’s, but rather between individual clans and their set-up.

4.4.2 Communal Campsite Management

One relatively recent conflict has been the issue of campsite management in both Kwowarib and Warmquelle. Community tourism development has been part of governmental policy since independence. And different tribes or clans want to have equal access to these campsites, even before conservancies had been installed.

"The politic was, you Herero run the Ongongo, and us Damara guys get our money from the Kwowarib campsite.” – Officer international NGO

In Warmquelle, the Ongongo campsite used to be run by three different headmen since different inhabiting clans of Warmquelle (Kasaona, Kangombe and Mbomboro) were incapable of cooperation. This resulted into a process where “every chief was given a week to get money...to collect money from the campsite...[and] put their people in there to work. And when the week has passed, another chief would put his people to work at the campsite.”

In Kwowarib a community campsite was established by one entrepreneurial Damara who cooperated with his employer - Save the Rhino Trust (SRT) - for funding. When the campsite was completed, the surrounding - especially young - community members demanded a share of incoming revenues. “The people said that you are using our name, and you are using the campsite yourself and eat the money. So let’s turn it vice versa. Let the community run it themselves, you go home, and you will get your share there. But the idea was mine.”- a Kwowarib entrepreneur.

Moreover, the entrepreneur’s relations with SRT became noticed by the managing director of IRDNC who used to work for SRT in the past. "By the time the camp is about to be finished, Garth

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30 Save The Rhino Trust (SRT) is a regional NGO that particularly cares for the protection of Black Rhino’s in Namibia. See further: http://savetherhinotrust.org/
31 Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) is a regional CBNRM NGO that operates in primarily the Kunene and Caprivi regions of Namibia. IRDNC has witnessed CBNRM from the start in the Kunene region prior to any conservancy related
Owen Smith [manager IRDNC] reported to the donors that Blyte [manager SRT, former colleague of Garth] is giving donor money to private people. Then they [SRT] stopped that assistance, and I looked for any help elsewhere. I could not find it. So I start using my own livestock” – Kwowarib entrepreneur.

Interesting in both the Kwowarib and Warmquelle campsite development has been the idea of traditional ownership claimed by different groups. Communal decision making seems impossible where groups take advantage of income generating opportunities. And individual ownership is seen as controversial to the idea of communal rights.

4.4.3 SESFONTEIN DIVISIONS

The role of supporting NGOs in the region becomes more in attendance in the discussion over Sesfontein conservancy. This conservancy used to stretch from Puros (8) to current Sesfontein (9) and Anabeb (27) conservancies, see also figure eight. Since the size of this conservancy was considerably large many groups felt threatened of being unable to benefit from conservancy management in the centre, namely in Sesfontein. Puros split themselves off as a separate conservancy, even though the Kasaona’s (who have relatives up to Puros) tried - in vain - to convince the community of Puros to do otherwise. A similar division was threatening the remainder of Sesfontein. According to some respondents this discussion was not lead by members of the communities, but a product of conflicting NGO interests:

“You know what our people say; if an elephant and an elephant fight, then the grass is suffering. The NGOs in the area are fighting. The grassroots, the poor members are suffering from that.” – regional councilor Sesfontein constituency

Some groups – primarily the Kasaona’s – have been working together with the IRDNC who opted to keep one conservancy from the start. Other groups were more related to the work of the SRT – who according to some interviewees opted for a regional wildlife council - and started to challenge the concept of conservancies amongst their members:

“...people start giving wrong information to the people [by arguing that] 'this [conservancy] is not a government policy, it is an NGO policy, it is a white people thing...they want to take people’s ownership and it is not a government thing, don’t accept these things’."

The IRDNC has always been identified as ‘the’ NGO in Namibia who started the concept of conservancies since the 80s and has supported communities on a large scale to take up the idea of conservancies. The whole idea started in fact in this region where current IRDNC director started his conservancy career as the chairperson of Sesfontein conservancy before he suc-
ceeded his father with the IRDNC. This regional development did not pass by unnoticed to other community members.

“The problem is, the guys were facilitating the conservancy programs. These are the guys from Sesfontein, and they are very well known to be outspoken. Very quite active in terms of that. And I think that some of them have a very strong political background. I think that they learned their facilitation skills from there. And probably they come from SWAPO party anyway. These are the things that have scared, I think, also the other group. They knew that as long as these guys are there, there is nothing for them.” – Officer national NGO

The influence of politics seemed to be evident in the discussions of Sesfontein conservancies, where all members were asked to listen to what the IRDNC had to tell in conservancy negotiations:

“one of the guys of the IRDNC ...was talking; ‘the government that is ruling us is the SWAPO government, and we are SWAPO members, and whoever doesn’t want to listen to the development that we are bringing here...that was won hardly through independence...and all that.’”

Such sentiments have made other groups from different opposition parties even more determined to resist retention of one combined Sesfontein Conservancy.

“...the other fraction, they did not have anybody [with the IRDNC]. And that has made them insecure, cause they know that those guys are facilitating the process. That means that there will be nothing for us. We will be ripped off by those guys.”

Sesfontein Conservancy was eventually split up in order for Anabeb conservancy to be registered as an independent conservancy. The argumentation purported more benefits for different groups of people in the area, and more jobs.

In conclusion, this solution seemed to have tempered conflict that recurs throughout history as the following chapter will spell out on current developments in Anabeb Conservancy where yet different traditional authorities challenge their access to benefits from the conservancy structure. There is insufficient evidence that the SRT and IRDNC have been involved in contrasting strategies in regional Kunene development that would underline how some interviewees blame their interference. The role of the IRDNC is clearly visible though as a supporter of CBNRM and politically aligned with national interest.
5. Discursive Practices to Access in Anabeb

In July 2010, ten conservancy members were elected in different villages of Anabeb Conservancy. In Warmquelle however, two out of three Herero groups decided to refrain from elections due to a disagreement over election procedures. This has created a one-sided election outcome in complete favor of a strong remaining Herero group; the Kasaona’s. The discussion hereof illustrates many current and past issues in the Anabeb conservancy where two different actor coalitions have formed contrasting ideas over proper conservancy management. One concerned group refers its discourse to traditional authorities whereas the non-concerned refer to modern ideas of democracy and efficiency.

The following chapter describes how these different discourses are formed through: coalition relationships (section 5.1) between groups in Anabeb; the distribution of benefits from resources amongst these groups (section 5.2); and how different groups share ideas (section 5.3), specifically in terms of how they infuse particular use of rules and beliefs (section 5.4) to manage Anabeb Conservancy. In other words, this chapter will illustrate the policy arrangements approach applied to the case of Anabeb Conservancy.

5.1 Discourse Coalitions

Upon arrival in Anabeb Conservancy in August 2010, it rapidly became palpable that different tribal/family groups had formed cooperative/opposing formations. To start with, the first two translators - selected on basis of their extensive language skills - for this study were from the Kasaona group. This resulted into strong resistance of other groups where some members refused to even speak in near appearance of these translators. Moreover if one group was approached first for interviews, other groups would question this choice.

“And why did you start with Lucky, and not with the Mbomboro’s? [reply: I have to start somewhere…] Because [your translator] is a Kasaona, because [your other translator] is also a Kasaona, why is there no Mbomboro in between them? Why no Kangombe?” – one Kangombe respondent

“I have a problem with your Kasaona translators since they are of a higher order. I am not sure whether they will react correctly and translate justly.” – one Mbomboro respondent

The largest group is known to be Kasaona, with an estimate of about 2000 people under the authority of Lucky Kasaona (better known as “chief Lucky”). In Anabeb the Kasaona’s live primarily in Warmquelle and some have their homestead in Kwowarib. Since there is no official chief in the area, Lucky is currently applying to get recognized by the Namibian government as a formal chief. There are more Herero groups in the area, each represented by a traditional headmen under a royal house that does not have its base in the conservancy;

“One is in Erongo, the others in Opuwo. Except for Lucky, this was mainly due to…political differences. If I am a supporter of the DTA, and if there is already a chief with DTA in Opuwo, then it

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32 ‘Concern’ and ‘non-concern’ are frames of reference made by the concerned group in their letter of concern written to the MET.

33 “If you start working with one group, then the other group will defy you for working with that group. And they don’t want you to come into their area.” – as experienced by an international NGO

34 Referring to Lucky Kasaona.

35 Mbomboro’s and Kangombe’s have chief lines in Opuwo (more than 140 km north of Warmquelle), the Uakaza pi’s in Omatjeke (Erongo – more than 400 km south of Warmquelle)
was very easy for me to get recognized by him. Except for the Kasaona’s, we have decided that we want to have our own history.”

The majority of Herero people live in Warmquelle (the Mbomboro’s and the Kangombe’s) or in northern Otzondunda (the Uakazapi’s). Kwowarib (about 20 km south of Warmquelle) hosts in total three Damara tribes: the Uises, Taniseb and Ganaseb groups. These groups are related to a chief in Sesfontein. The Uises people live closely to Kasaona homesteads in Kwowarib, and the majority of people between these groups have good relationships, primarily due to essential food exchanges.

“Sometimes we go to [the Kasaona’s] and help [them] with the cattle, so we get some milk from them. We are partly depending from them. We have a good relationship with each other. Politically, enemies are there, but naturally we don’t. We make some dried foods from the garden. Like maize meal…that we give to them…”

Politically, enemies are indicated due to tribal differences amongst Damara’s and Herero’s, see also section 4.1 and 4.2. However, there are exceptions and much intermarriage exists between different clans. And to make things more complicated, some groups are split up in their empathy for Kasaona’s.

“Some [of Uises] people, like that 5 %, they associate with other [Damara] groups…and have issues with the Kasaona’s.”

Remaining Damara groups in Kwowarib - Taniseb or Ganaseb - feel marginalized as a Damara community. Similar anti-Kasaona sentiments can be found with Herero clans in Warmquelle. Especially Mbomboro’s seem to feel excluded from conservancy politics. This group indicates not to have tribal or personal issues with those in power, but indicate to be seen as different and disadvantaged.

“all people from the Mbomboro’s are being neglected. We are regarded as some bushmen who are getting some food from the government”

The Mbomboro headman recently decided to unsubscribe – in resistance to current discontent over conservancy politics - as member from the conservancy in order to subscribe to Sesfontein conservancy. This is due to personal issues with the Kasaona’s. Other group members are however still connected to the conservancy in Anabeb – like the headman’s wife – but do not see many benefits.

“Our people do not get any jobs within the conservancy since we are not being informed. All the jobs go to the Kasaona’s.”

Before important resources such as jobs are being analyzed, a start is made to visualize how groups are divided or connected. The configuration of group relations is explained throughout this chapter and must be seen subject to continuous change.

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36 The Kasaona group used to support the DTA as well, but changed their political preference to SWAPO. The DTA office in Warmquelle still stands next to the homestead of Lucky’s father, the former chief of the Kasaona’s.

37 There is an ongoing conflict over this chieftaincy since two different groups (Ganaseb and Gaubeb) vie for the same Namitma heritage, making it impossible for the government to recognize a formal chief for the Damara area.

38 This divided membership is beneficial for wildlife compensations that members are entitled to. If councilor Mbomboro loses cattle in Sesfontein due to wildlife attacks, he is entitled to compensation. If he loses cattle in Anabeb conservancy he is also entitled to compensation through his wife.
Figure 11 shows current coalitions within Anabeb conservancy and how groups are related to greater chieftainship structures beyond the boundaries of Anabeb Conservancy. These coalitions are based upon diverging perceptions of groups that are explained further in 5.3 and 5.4. Blue groups represent Herero, green groups Damara. The Kasaona group is by far the largest group in the area and therefore depicted bigger than other groups. Kasaona's cooperate with few, especially after election issues in summer 2010. Those rejecting the election procedures – Kangombe and Mbomboro – have united their objections and are working together with Uakazapi and Taniseb. Ganaseb members are similarly disadvantaged as a Damara group but not involved in direct opposition to election outcomes in Warmquelle. The Kasaona group seems to have allies with the Uises through direct relations in Kwowarib. And allies with the foremost regional NGO: the IRDNC. Chief Lucky is the only headman active for this NGO.

With regard to chief houses, Damara groups are entwined in problems with Namitma recognition in neighboring Sesfontein where more Damara's are living in comparison to Anabeb. The Kasaona group wishes to have their own chief installed by government, but is waiting to be accepted by government.

5.2 RESOURCES
In this section, an overview is provided of available access to benefits from natural resource management by members of Anabeb. At first, different forms of benefits from community based wildlife management are described, and an estimation is provided of who is having access to which benefits. Thereafter, an explanation is sought in section 5.3 (ideas) and 5.4 (rules) to why certain groups have more access to benefits from community based wildlife management than others.

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39 Headman Kangombe used to be a game guard for the IRDNC in the past, but is recently not employed anymore.
40 These estimations are based upon perceptions of different interviewees; both from formal and informal talks during fieldwork in the Conservancy.
5.2.1 BENEFITS

There are different perceived forms of benefits that members of the Anabeb Conservancy have described. These are primarily: game meat (from trophy hunting, shoot and sell or own use); jobs with the conservancy office, committee or other related organizations (i.e. regional NGOs or tourism ventures); or the freedom of decision making. No financial dividends are being devoted to any members. To understand why this is the case, it is worthwhile to consider how finances are administered at the conservancy: What revenues come in and what expenses go out?

Revenues

Figure twelve and thirteen depict total revenue and cost distributions within the conservancy. The figures are derived from independent\(^41\) financial analyses of all conservancy accounts from July 2009 till June 2010; mother, savings, running costs and cash accounts. In total around 750,000 NAD have been flowing into conservancy accounts in 2009-2010, with a financial result of more than 50,000 NAD\(^42\). For the full calculation of the following distributions, see Appendix one.

Figure twelve displays that the majority of income is emerging from campsite revenues (Kwowa-rib and Ongongo = 18 %), trophy hunting (= 14 %), community support (ICEMA\(^43\) = 13 %) and the Big Three (=36 %). The Big Three stands for the concession area of Palmwag that borders with three large conservancies (Anabeb, Sesfontein and Torra). The concession area is yet\(^44\) still under the management of Wilderness Safaris, a major tour operator in Southern Africa who benefits from proper sustainable care for wildlife populations that travel between the three conservancies and Palmwag concession. Since boundaries between concession and conservancies are unfenced, valuable resources (i.e. wildlife populations such as black rhino’s, desert lions, giraffes, etc) are tremendously mobile and at risk of extinction. In exchange for sustained practices, Wilderness now compensates these conservancies for their compliance. A compensation that is well worth the effort as it covers the main expense of the conservancy; personnel costs (salaries).

\(^41\) Performed by author through analyses of provided monthly debit and credit accounts of the financial administration of Anabeb Conservancy, but by means of the same categories as in the original conservancy accounts. Some numbers do however somewhat differ from the original annual reporting that is being performed by the conservancy administration, supervised by the IRDNC.

\(^42\) Corresponding to an equivalent of +/- 78,000 euro (revenues) and 5,200 euro (result)

\(^43\) The Integrated Community-Based Ecosystem Management (ICEMA) is a project that supports the larger framework of CBNRM in Namibia by means of a 7.1 million US dollar fund – through the World Bank – to promote integrated community-based ecosystem management.

\(^44\) There are current discussions whether the concession rights of Palmwag will transfer from Wilderness Safaris into the three major conservancies of the Big Three.
Expenses

In addition to personnel costs, running costs of the conservancy are spent in terms of: field running costs (vehicle costs, fuel and field allowances), travel and meeting costs (mostly travel allowances) and membership benefits. The latter category is however contested.

5.2.2 Membership Benefits

What does it mean: membership benefits? One fifth of total expenses are attributed to this category. From these benefits (total = +/- 120,000 NAD): around 5% (or 1% of total expenses) is devoted to Traditional Authority meetings; 25% (or 5% of total expenses) to community projects such as garden, women and sports projects; and 70% (or 14% of total expenses) to a category called HACSIS. HACSIS is a conservancy specific concept that stands for Human Animal Conservancy Self Insurance Scheme that is run in all Namibian conservancies as a method of compensating people who suffer losses from wildlife, mostly for stock deaths. The Namibian government compensates victims (members from the conservancy) of human-wildlife conflict on a yearly basis. It is however debatable that such compensation can be perceived as a benefit for livestock owners since cash compensations insufficiently replace the loss of livestock. One is said to i.e. receive 1500 NAD for the loss of a cow while that corresponds to the value off a “small small smallill cow” according to one of the game guards at Anabeb. Simultaneously, rural actors are expected not to kill wildlife as these game animals are considered extremely valuable for sustainable population sizes that benefit tourism income. ‘Hunting’ is now – since colonial memory - framed as ‘poaching’.

The community projects are contested too. There is a strong sense of distrust among the majority of community members to what extent “monies” from these projects actually arrive at dedicated projects. The financial administrator indicates the impotency to control how project budgets are being spent:

“\textit{The sports activities get about 3 x 5,000 NAD per year. Then you hear: those Kasaona’s, they have just used some of that money to fill up their car for about 1500 NAD, and the food was maybe 800 NAD, the rest of that money, we don’t know where that money is. It is gone....this can happen, and I don’t have control over that.}”

What benefits do community members obtain from running a conservancy considering the little space current financial management provides? Primarily available jobs are identified as important benefits since most frustration of non-job holders is about the fact that they do not have one. Other dominant groups seem to be able to take advantage of available positions and corresponding benefits: salaries, decision making and the use of conservancy facilities (especially conservancy vehicles). Income inequalities are well visible in the communities since those that have no direct involvement with the conservancy have limited access to benefits whereas those that
have access seem far better off. One Damara member illustrates the difference in his explanation of how Damara’s for example differ from Herero groups:

“Look at my clothes, there are holes in them! And look at my donkey car! You see, we Damara are very poor.”

The donkey car is a traditional form of transportation in the region and illustrates the gap between those in poverty and those in better conditions, namely; NGOs, conservancy staff, or passing tourists. These latter actors have access to highly esteemed 4WD vehicles that are necessary to travel on one of the worst accessible roads in Namibia. Villages like Kwowarib and Warmquelle are built around the main road to travel from Palmwag to other important hubs such as Sesfontein or Opuwo. Villagers become experts in different types of vehicles passing by and dream of driving them in the future. And again, some people in the conservancy seem to have privileges according to the non-privileged:

“When the conservancy has a car, then they only serve for the Kasaona’s. Now there is a new one, a Toyota 2.7, and it is only being served for the Kasaona’s.”

“Is there an organization that can help me with a new car because all those Kasaona’s have new cars. If I want to use the conservancy car, it is always occupied”.

Although the majority of people lack access to financial benefits from the conservancy, there is a consented belief that all members benefit in terms of game meat. This meat (from oryxes, springbok, zebra’s to lions, cheetahs, etc) emanates primarily from trophy hunting since hunters are not allowed to take the meat after a successful kill. Nevertheless, the distribution of meat is limited to seasonal supply that conservancies have due to restricted wildlife quotas from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET).

And then, there is the aspect of decision making power for community members. The fact that people were not included in the process of decision making seems important to all members. It is generally believed, amongst all groups, that the conservancy program is “a good program” since community members are given the right to decide over management themselves instead of government control. Even if one is limited to access material benefits like jobs and meat. This means that people are not pessimistic about the program itself, but rather would like to see a different distribution of benefits. The importance of this outcome is underlined by the director of one of NACSO’s main affiliated nongovernmental organizations after presenting the main outcomes of this study in Windhoek:

“A good thing that you show here, is that the concept of a conservancy is not seen – in general – as a bad thing. Even though there are conflicts, people are still positive about the conservancy. It seems more to be about who is getting a job in the conservancy”

5.2.3 Benefit distribution
Main distributable benefits can be underlined in terms of meat or jobs. If we have to believe the – often emotional – responses of different respondents, it would be just the Kasaona’s that are benefitting from conservancy activities. Is it indeed them who take all the jobs, the income and the meat?
Meat
Some members seem to receive more meat than others. Traditional Authorities stand out as they
are given some extra animals per year for their meetings as illustrated by one TA in Warmquelle:

“The conservancy can give me an Oryx that is in the wild. If I have a meeting with my people, then I
can ask the conservancy to get me one Oryx and bring it here. Then everybody that is here for the
meeting will get some meat, the others don’t.” – one headmen in Warmquelle

One needs to be present with his or her Traditional Authority (TA) meetings, otherwise missing out on protein rich\textsuperscript{45} opportunities. Figure 14 provides an overview of wildlife quota distributions in Anabeb. These distributions are decided upon by the conservancy management committee of Anabeb and are established after the financial year. Shoot and sell provides an important source of income, but does not favor members’ general access to meat since game is sold to butchers outside the conservancy. This general access is limited also with categories such as; TA’s meetings or staff meetings (for consumption during conservancy staff meetings). \textit{Trophy hunting} and \textit{Rest}\textsuperscript{46} game do however provide opportunities. \textit{Conservancy office} game has similar opportunities, but is out for sale for reduced prices to members. Access is nevertheless limited due to communication constraints:

“The conservancy is now selling springboks to the members. [Chief] Lucky bought some of them...but I did not receive any information...so now they are all sold.”

Even if it is assumed that all general available game (70 trophy hunting + 67 rest =137 animals)
is distributed evenly, members (+/- 475 in total\textsuperscript{47}) have fairly little access to meat in the conservancy on a yearly basis. And some members even seem to have less access although the constitution provides equal rights to all members. The following quotes illustrate some frustrations:

“...only my mom gets the meat from the conservancy, but she will not always give me something, since it is her meat...[the people from the office tell me:] we cannot give you any meat because you don’t have any kids and you are young.”

“Maybe if there is meat out there, let’s say at the house of Lucky...we will not get any of that.”

“We get some once a year.”

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{There is nothing much out there. You cannot farm with anything there}, as illustrated by one NGO official. General diets of people in the area consist of a limited basis of maize meal porridge (cooked in water and some cow milk/fat) that is often consumed only once a day. People argue that they are used to these diets, and that a piece of meat is a very welcome addition to diets when opportunities arise.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Rest} stands for nonspecific categories that are available for community consumption such as game provided for youth or sports activities.

\textsuperscript{47}The number of members is said to represent more or less all people eligible to be a member since membership can only bring advantages and little disadvantages (except from inequalities and limited access to game meat). Members generally need to be: 18 years of age or older, and permanent legal residents with conservancy boundaries.
Jobs

As the main source of benefits, it is remarkable to find out amongst clans; who is having what positions? Figure 15 shows the same discourse coalitions as depicted in section 5.1, now with positions attached and situated before the elections of summer 2010. Since the number of jobs are not decisive to decide who is having most access to jobs, it is important to consider the perceived value of jobs (and corresponding pay scales). Office positions are colored green since they are relatively well paid (except for game guards, drivers or campsite personnel), committee positions in black. Important positions are underlined or – in case of top committee positions – made bold.

Most positions are allocated with the Kasaona, Uises or Kangombe group before elections. There is a balance (50%-50%) in terms of committee positions between different coalitions (Kasaona-Uises Vs the rest), whereas the ruling coalition holds most key positions (chair person, treasurer, financial administrator, manager and senior game guard).

Figure 16 shows how most important positions remain within the ruling coalition after elections for the new conservancy committee in the summer of 2010. The Kasaona group wins two extra positions in the committee that the Kangombe group loses. The conservancy positions remain the same, but the deci-

Figure 15: Job Distributions before Elections

Figure 16: Job Distributions after Elections
Access to Benefits from Community Based Tourism

Discussion making balance in the committee now favors the ruling coalition’s share (70%-30%). Since the decision for job allocation is democratically chosen with the commission, opposition group members risk losing more positions.

And..."if we talk of democracy...then off course this will be in the interest of the Kasaona’s since they are the majority." – Former chairperson of Anabeb.

What this quote illustrates actually, is the fact that these election outcomes more or less represent a natural outcome of democracy where the majority takes account for most votes and thereby represents majority objectives. In principle this does not seem problematic, but practice learns that such ideas are critical for the wellbeing of other groups who keep hold of traditional structures and not democracy.

5.3 Powerful Ideas

Now that we know more about what benefits are perceived important and how they are being distributed, an explanation can further be found in powerful ideas with actors and their group coalitions. In general the answer is structurally found in discussions over aspects, such as: knowledge, tribalism, nepotism, national politics and personal relations. These aspects are shortly described before discussing (con)temporary discursive competition in current-day conflict over benefits in Anabeb framed around election issues in Warmquelle.

These discussions form an important basis for a critical observation of how actors participate in group thinking. Every member seems to know exactly who is who and of what group people belong to. Ideas are said to be only accepted if they come from your own group, like your political party for example.

“If I come up with a very good idea, and the guy thinks wow...how comes that a SWAPO guy is giving such a nice idea. He will then just say, ...hey I don’t support that idea because it is just like this and this and this...he will just see the person as someone that really has no direction...and it happens that we SWAPO members that are sitting in that committee, although we are few in numbers, then the other guys maybe – the UDFs and DTAs – they are more than the SWAPO guys, then they will just overrule these other guys. They just say...we don’t support your idea, we are supporting this idea.”

5.3.1 Knowledge

Most respondents within the area, but also in Windhoek, are of opinion that Herero groups – particularly the Kasaona group - are very well educated. This in contrast to Damara groups who seem to have little interest into education in general.

“...people get jealous, since [the Kasaona’s] are the literate people. Some are at the Polytechs48, some are at the university49. They work hard in school.”

“Our [Damara] young ones are not interested in education. They just hang around the shops and ride their donkeys. Even if they fail grade 10, and they can upgrade it, they will refuse, since they don’t care. Herero’s are more educated, and therefore more qualified.”

48 Polytechnic of Namibia in Windhoek, see further: http://www.polytechnic.edu.na/
49 University of Namibia, the only university in Namibia, see further: http://www.unam.na/
What does this mean in terms of access to important jobs? It is not automatically the case that the best qualified are being placed into conservancy positions since conservancy management demands western ways of administration new to rural communities. Rather it seems to have created a network of understanding by those that are educated in contrast to those who are not. Many members, even some traditional authorities, do not know how to read and depend on translation and communication on job opportunities or other conservancy matters such as constitution rules. The importance of literacy is stressed by the headman of the Kasaona group:

“The reason that [my father] decided to select me to be his successor, the next of kin…. [is that] there [have been] young guys […] organizing themselves. They wanted to take a community campsite over by themselves. […] Then they decided to draft a letter, and then signatured it on behalf of my father. Saying that the chief has given them permission to take the site over. But really, my father never did that. He did not sign it, because he cannot read or write. And people just went behind doors, and copied his signature.”

The community campsite represents the contested Ongongo campsite as discussed in 4.4.2.

5.3.2 Nepotism
The regional councilor from Sesfontein describes the incapacity of conservancy management even more in general: “people say education is expensive, but ignorance is more expensive”. Knowledge does in fact not seem decisive in acquiring important positions. Nepotistic relations – as they are somewhat visible in figure 16 – seem to have a more decisive role. Most important positions are accessed by members of the same family and such favoritism amongst relatives can be found up to IRDNC positions.

“...if you look at IRDNC, I don’t know how many brothers John Kasaona has working there…but I know there is also a nephew of him there, and some lady called Lina Kasaona. [you mean Lina Kaisuma?] No it is Kasaona! ...nobody is alone there. It is either your brother in law, or the girlfriend of whatever, or nephew, or niece, or...all these things. It is one big family.” – Officer national conservation NGO

This observation is also recognized by those working at the IRDNC.

“... is another Kasaona. It’s a family, haha...jaja it’s a family business.”- manager IRDNC

The role of nepotism will become further evident in the discussion of election procedures in section 5.4.

5.3.3 Tribalism
Tribal issues also still seem to divide the communities in Anabeb. Although officially ethnic divides are claimed not to make a difference by most respondents, some Herero members at the conservancy office feel superior, Damara’s do not feel comfortable with the presence of the Herero’s, and different interests seem to be at stake.

“I am sorry to say; but normally the Damara people in this area, they are very weak. Cause they are making their living out of gardenings. We as Herero’s are livestock farmers. And you know what is livestock? You can get meat and milk and sell it. We are strong.” – Conservancy manager
“We see that only Herero people are benefitting. They are the ones who come to hunt; they receive the fat meat…the Damara’s get the meager ones. We hate therefore the Herero people.” – Damara in Kwowarib

“The Herero are farming with livestock. Damara’s are just cropping. Now Herero’s are the only victims to predators. Herero’s are getting problems. Herero’s are complaining; this lion is killing my what what what….then the Damara’s say:…my friend you just accepted this, now you want to kill the lion. Now why are you complaining? You see, they don’t understand. – senior Herero game guard

5.3.4 Politics

On top of knowledge, nepotistic and tribal relations, a few respondents are of opinion that ruling party politics integrate with well-off groups. Group members are often – but not at all times\(^5^0\) - forced to vote what their councilor or chief is voting for. Traditionally the UDF belongs to Damara groups but seem to have support of some Herero groups too. Likewise, the SWAPO has been popular with Herero groups, but has recently won the hearts of some Damara, particularly the Uises group:

“...my people vote what I vote for. I convinced them to vote for SWAPO. [...] In all regions there is development, but not in this region. That is why we think that we must vote for SWAPO to change.”- Uises headlady

Party politics are often not described by respondents to make a difference. Figure 17 illustrates a contrasting view however on basis of what groups are said to vote for in general. Being part of SWAPO is arguably not counterproductive if one has interests to partake in conservancy employment.

“[do you know about the political preferences of your colleagues?] Yeah very well, why not? They are all the same. We are ruling, so we are SWAPO.”

And, as illustrated by some related Herero policy makers in Windhoek, local political affiliations are not based on pure agreement to political ideas of parties like SWAPO, but are understood as necessary to have access to resources.

\(^{50}\) Kangombe and Mbomboro groups are said to have both UDF and SWAPO members.
“We know that the Herero’s form a dominant group in Namibia. Even if they say they support SWAPO, they will only do so to enable themselves to get access to resources. But if you really ask them, then they would say that SWAPO is just an Ovambo\(^{51}\) party.”

5.3.5 PERSONAL RELATIONS
But here and there individual exceptions emerge, such as the financial administrator within the conservancy office who is: well experienced; the only non SWAPO voter in the office and thereby resisting Uises’ official SWAPO position; from a Damara heritage; yet apparently once involved in a personal relationship with Chief Lucky during her first appointment in the committee. To underline the importance of personal relationships; the treasurer of the new conservancy committee might be considered to officially belong to the concern group (from Taniseb clan), she is married to an important Kasaona member in Kwowarib. The treasurer can now be reconnected in figure 17\(^{52}\) (connected to the Kasaona coalition) due to such personal relations.

5.4 DISPUTABLE RULES OVER ELECTIONS
These formerly described ideas of relations help to understand how different groups interact ideas highlighted during an important era in the conservancy development of Anabeb: the elections of 2010. Two opposing groups have been identified during election conflict mediation supervised by the MET in August 2010: a concern and a non-concern group. The concern group is led by traditional authorities of the Kangombe, Mbomoro, Uakazapi and Taniseb groups, whereas the non-concern group is referred to a combination of the Kasaona’s, especially those in the conservancy committee, and employees of support organizations present during conservancy elections: the IRDNC (including the former chairlady and chief Lucky) and local ministry of environment and tourism (MET) representatives. Both groups differ in their argumentation over what constitutes the best possible procedure at the last elections for the conservancy committee (elected every three years), and these correspond to different discursive views of conservancy management and distribution of benefits. General underlying discursive views are described here from the perspectives of these coalitions and discussed prior to corresponding ideas of proper election procedures.

5.4.1 NON-CONCERN GROUP
For the non-concern group the whole conflict in Anabeb is based upon confusion. Yes there are differences between groups and there is much to say about the management; but the conservancy must foremost be seen ‘as a business’. At least, this is the opinion of non-concern members. According to their view, people working for the conservancy are inexperienced, little educated and have no idea of what conservancy management means.

“The guys who are now on the board...the local guys, they have no plans...”

“They understand that the conservancy is something where people go to, and get money / benefits from. They did not really see a conservancy as a business...that is one....and also, the people that we employed there - and there are some exceptions - they are taking a leadership role, but they are just local guys.”

\(^{51}\) See further also section 4.1.3. Ovambo’s are the largest ethnic group in Namibia living in the North West. SWAPO ‘democratically’ receives most of its political support from this group.

\(^{52}\) See the additional dashed connector from Taniseb’s treasurer to the Kasaona group.
Nevertheless, a great deal of income is taken away by high running costs that a conservancy unfortunately has to make in its slow development this far. This is considered normal in conservancy development and it takes time to actually create benefits for all members.

“In these 14 years people went through up and downs, it was in a small progress. People need to learn, and to make mistakes and adapt. But people are running to confusion. People are afraid that CBNRM does not work. As they see a problem, then this is not working. But people need to understand that we are coming from a long way, this is as old as mankind; farming. But are we successful in farming?” – Manager IRDNC

And even though people receive little benefits, ‘one must not complain’ since community members have all decided to opt for a conservancy instead of a wildlife council in the past. The conservancy is considered a great program for community development, but needs time since it has been registered only since 2003. Many opposition members continue however to blame conservancy managers to be guilty of so-called “eating the money”. This is refuted by management partners and well-illustrated by former chairman/manager in terms of community illusions:

“Yes they do, … Haha…they were accusing me. I don’t take it as jealously, I see it as people who don’t know what they are saying. After all those agreements and negotiations… I was the main person who did this… I was the person who went out for hunters, I went out for business. I got into an agreement with Wilderness Safaris, which is now actually the main income for the conservancy.” – former chairperson/manager Anabeb, now working for the IRDNC

A sharp reader will observe here that there is a good deal of IRDNC opinions interwoven in this discussion. This is not without a cause, since the IRDNC is accepted, particularly by the non-concerned, as the founding organization of community conservation in the region.

“the IRDNC is our mother and father as well. From which we operate now, they have built this for us. And they have, in the beginning, provided us with funds and a vehicle.” – manager Anabeb conservancy

The traditional headman of the Kasaona’s – Lucky Kasaona – is employed as one of IRDNC’s managers. One particular observation has been the portrait of Lucky that is hanging in the Conservancy office. Like the president of Namibia is represented in all ministry offices of Namibia, Lucky is considered “our chief” in the conservancy office. Other traditional chiefs of Anabeb are however not portrayed.

ELECTIONS FIRST!

For the non-concern group, elections were insurmountably exercised prior to past term reporting. During an Annual General Meeting (AGM), conservancy members have the opportunity to decide over future directions, get informed over past performance and elect a new committee. Since the discussions at an earlier AGM this year were lengthy, financial reporting could not be discussed in time. Therefore, present members decided to postpone the reporting and elections to another date after long discussions.

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53 Communal members in Namibia are provided with two different options with regards to conservancy management; a conservancy or a wildlife council. Whereas the conservancy needs no further explanation, a wildlife council stands for the regional management of wildlife where decisions are made between community members and government officials (Corbett & Daniels, 1996).
“The elections were completely constitutional. The elections had been planned far ahead during the past AGM, and arrangements with the supporting facilitators from the IRDNC, the MET and others were set.” – newly elected committee member in Warmquelle

“People could not agree upon how ....uhh.... how the election process should be. And eventually....any...any...like any other election...you will agree upon the process, but at the end of the day if you lose, you start complaining, complaining, complaining...about the other party of breaking the election....this and this and this...” – IRDNC manager

The elections are claimed to be fully constitutional since new amendments have been added to the old constitution.

“The new constitution had been discussed to my opinion in 2006 or 2007, but possibly never been minuted” – headman Kasaona

At the day of elections, the 10th of July, there were problems with transportation to get all voters from the area to Warmquelle. The meeting therefore got delayed and postponed to the 11th. When the election facilitators (a mix of people from the MET/IRDNC/local councilor) arrived that day, the reporting was still due. Since more elections were planned in different villages in Anabeb, time constraints demanded to continue with elections. Not doing so would constrain the development of the conservancy.

“The chairperson of the monitor group said that we could do the report after the elections, since we can always replace a person if he or she turns out to be guilty of some sort of offence after the elections. The chairperson of the monitor group addressed the group by mentioning that this is the same as with a normal company!” - newly elected committee member in Warmquelle

Moreover, it was stressed inappropiate to point out people in public as guilty of misuse. Such an issue ought to be dealt with in court, not in a community meeting. And at the earlier discussed AGM it was apparently agreed upon that elections should be hold on this day specifically, and that financial reporting would be presented separately. The concern members did not agree with this fact. It was therefore opted that:

“...we do a majority account to see who wanted to proceed with the elections, and who does not want this? This is in our democratic constitution”

All headmen wish for representation in the conservancy. Hence democratic procedures are not in the interest of other headmen (Kangombe and Mbombo), since majority counts favor the largest group. As a consequence;

“...they [including their members] left the meeting by looking for the minutes and list of attendance. When they found these documents, they ripped both apart, and left.”

A main issue put forward was the idea that elections were to be continued hereafter with consent of the chairman from the IRDNC. An inevitable decision according to the chairman:

54 “we have to go back to our Namibian constitution were we have democracy. What does the majority say in the conservancy? On basis of that we can decide to proceed with elections or not.” - “...the constitution stipulates how this committee needs to be set up. And this is in a democratic process. So, majority rules, as it does in our country Namibia.” - IRDNC manager
“If I do not proceed, then the group who wants to proceed will think I suppress them. I will not choose any side... Conservancies are not politics!”

Six different members have been nominated in Warmquelle, and three new committee members were elected that day: Sokoi Kasaona (vice secretary), Elvis Kasaona (secretary) and Edward Tjivinde (relative of the Kasaona and elected as the new chairperson).

5.4.2 CONCERN GROUP

The concern group is led by four different headmen that distrust current management of the conservancy. To their opinion, conservancy benefits go out to primarily one group; the Kasaona’s. The problem is often framed as follows:

“The problem comes from the people that work for IRDNC, the MET members and the Kasaona group. These three groups are together, and that is just where the whole problem comes from.”

This observation becomes more evident if one takes a helicopter view of the Kasaona headman homestead. Figure 18 sketches the fenced premises of Chief Lucky in Warmquelle. IRDNC members normally stay over here (and not at the community campsite nearby) when they visit the area, the manager of the conservancy lives opposite to the chief’s house and recently arrived conservancy chairman temporarily lives in a tent next to Lucky’s house.

As long as especially IRDNC and Kasaona groups take sides other groups feel threatened. It is the Kasaona’s who take the jobs, the meat, and the cars. And these benefits are supposed to be shared by the whole community in Anabeb since the conservancy is seen as ‘a community program’ and ‘we should at least consider the seven different headmen in the process for unity in our community!’

‘We’ as a community have chosen to benefit from conservancy activities in the region in favor of a wildlife council. However, if this situation is going to last without governmental support from the MET, we might not continue with the conservancy program and switch to poaching again. Who will find out?

“...me and you, will both do poaching...and we will not tell the government since we are both involved.”

This however opposes conservancy aims of the national CBNRM policy in Namibia. It resembles a popular belief that: ‘money is the only motivational factor’. So-called governmentality of con-
Access to Benefits from Community Based Tourism

Conservation hopes to establish such a mechanism through conservationist’ discourse: ‘You don’t shoot a springbok and eat it, because now we are conserving it for the future generation. They have been made aware. The awareness was created within them you know.” – Officer International conservation NGO.

People are very well aware that a great deal of income is arriving at the conservancy. It is considered to be ‘a good program’, since it is also ‘our conservancy’. Nevertheless, people distrust where the money is going to:

“The management is eating the money!” or “Wherever you go, there are problems because of the IRDNC. There is a lot of money going into conservancies. And a lot of money is missing, while the community is in poverty. [...] The MET needs to take control of this region. Our people need the MET, because this is a good program.”

<table>
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<th>REPORTING FIRST!</th>
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<td>The national Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) is considered neutral in this conflict between community and the Kasaona/IRDNC coalition, and asked to intervene by the concern group. In an official response the deputy director of wildlife management argues that “within the ministry [it is felt] that certain procedures need to be followed. They must have an AGM. You need that prior to the elections. These procedures have not been followed. We now have to make sure that these mistakes are not repeated”.</td>
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➢ REPORTING FIRST!

The people of the concern group have a complete different view to proper election procedures in comparison to the non-concerned. According to the constitution - they say – ‘we’ always need to have financial reporting of the last term before we continue with elections. There are however two different constitutions in circulation. The old one (that is familiar with these headmen) and a newly amended one:

“If it is the old one, then the elections can be in the last place. If it is the new one, then I don’t know since there have been changes that I don’t know about. – headman Uakazapi

‘After changing some amendments, the chiefs are allowed to have a look at them, so they can make some changes. But the chiefs have never had the chance to look into them yet....even though Uakazapi asked for a public read out of the amendments, the committee never did so.’ – former committee member

‘After I became aware of the new order of election procedures, I wanted to know about all the new amendments that form the new constitution before proceeding.’ – headman Kangombe

During conflict meetings under the supervision of MET officials from Windhoek, it was argued by the MET that the so-called new constitution has never been legitimate since this constitution ought to be signed by all traditional authorities before it can become effective. This has never occurred. Surprisingly, there is literally nothing mentioned about the order of procedures in the old constitution and any reference to this can only be explained to have accepted by communities of Anabeb as an unwritten self-invented norm.
The previous agreed election date is also debatable according to concern members:

“The election date was indeed set at the AGM in June, but not all people agreed with this decision. During the Election Day on the 11th of July, one group wanted to start the elections since this apparently was decided upon in the former AGM. The concern group rejected this by mentioning that we should do this operation according to normal procedures. ‘Why should we change from this?’ Kangombe also said: ‘Normally we first do the reporting, then the elections. If we do differently, I [Kangombe] will withdraw.’ Subsequently one electoral officer [from the IRDNC] said: ‘If anyone withdraws, we should proceed with the elections’.”

People from the concern group perceived the latter idea as anarchic and in contrast to constitutional policy. It could be that someone is ‘guilty’ of misusing the conservancy money since the administration is non-transparent and us as concerned members have the right to get informed about these issues.

‘There are some hidden issues behind the report that we need to know. Those people of the IRDNC are friends with the same group here. And therefore they are hiding the report because they know something is messed up’. – headman Uakazapi

We as a community need to share all the income, and it seems that the people of the IRDNC and the Kasaona’s are the only people benefitting. When we object to such practices of favoritism, the non-concerned put us under pressure, as argued by a concerned headman:

“I left the meeting since I was not feeling comfortable. The Kasaona group, and the MET, the IRDNC...they are the people who have made pressure...so they can just continue with the elections. When we are talking about the constitution, other people don't know...and they say if you want to go, we will just go ahead.” And the decision to delay conservancy reporting: “...was never done on my behalf!” – headman Kangombe

“It is just the Kasaona’s who are alone with that NGO [the IRDNC] that is ‘good’. That means that these four communities.....are they not right?” – headman Uakazapi

It is key to understand here that the position of non-ruling traditional authorities is being put to the test in this process. If decisions are “never done on my behalf”, how can they be accepted by traditional authorities? In the end, all members of such authorities refused to elect and left the meeting. “How many people have elected in Warmquelle? This is, I believe, 94 people. 300 people have refused.” The remaining 94 were from the Kasaona group who elected three ‘non-respected’ committee members from their own people.

‘It is the devil who is sending these people, we don't know these people.’ – headman Kangombe
“They understand that the conservancy is something where people go to, and get money / benefits from. They did not really see a conservancy as a business...that is one.... and also, the people that we employed there - and there are some exceptions – they are taking a leadership role, but they are just local guys.”
6. Discussion: Discursive Deadlock

To sum up the discursive contradictions of chapter five can be depicted into the following:

![Discursive Deadlock Diagram]

The whole contemporary conflict over conservancy committee elections stands on different perceptions of proper procedures but are ‘deeply influenced’ by discursive practices (J. Ribot & Peluso, 2003) that divide those actively allying with the overall framework of CBNRM and those who are less able to partake in these regional/national/international alliances and thereby take refuge into local claims of authority. This discussion implies that the study of access to natural resources must be studied on both local and non-local scales through a focus upon both institutions and active agency.

Two different actor coalitions have been observed in the short time-span of this study's fieldwork and must first of all be seen as a temporary arrangement of actors in relation to wildlife management at Anabeb Conservancy. That the composition here is framed as a discursive deadlock does not mean that the situation seems hopeless since current distributions of resources have called for serious resistance by those groups who feel marginalized by dominant alliances found between IRDNC, MET and Kasaona’s in Anabeb, yet also in neighbouring conservancies of Sesfontein and Purros. In order to keep the conservancy of Anabeb going, some arrangement in distribution of benefits ought to be changed according to marginalised concern members, otherwise risking the end of Anabeb conservancy (as resistance groups could opt for an abortion of the conservancy in the future) and serious consequences for the legacy of conservancies in Namibia since its origins are found in exactly this specific region where the ‘founding father and
mother’ – the IRDNC - initiated its first community conservation practices in cooperation with local leaders in Kunene.

The results have identified some serious limitations to the simplified role of communities in conservancy policies. The community of Anabeb has illustrated not to be a local harmonious organic group of homogeneous people who by definition care for nature where they have ‘lived for ages’. These people are first of all fixated in the region due to former apartheid policies where so-called traditions and traditional authority have been established in colonial relations. And secondly, now after independence, former leaders are demanded to re-establish their legitimacy which has been made marginal in relation to conservancy management as a new technique of government to control resources at a distance. This new ‘bureaucratic’ layer of a conservancy, as Cleaver (2002) puts it, has created a hybrid form of authority where ideas of “new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory, and wealth” (M. Foucault, 2000, p. 217) are materialized. Such relationships are found in the network consisting of the local NGO (IRDNC), local ministry (MET) and collaborating Herero clan (Kasaona’s) who are interrelated with international donor support with preferences for participatory, democratic and incentive based conservation practices so popularly represented in NACSO publications. How these shifts have been made possible, can only be explained from past conditions relevant for Anabeb Conservancy.

The national conservancy development has created new alliances with new partners whereas Herero’s used to be independent pastoralist societies that functioned more or less autonomously in pre-colonial history. By means of colonial trade in the Cape, Herero groups would similarly and strategically start to align / learn from new developments that requested political unity (Gewald, 1999, 2003). The institutionalization of traditional leadership in colonialism – as ‘lower-level bureaucrats’ - have been the result of such dependency to outsiders. The position of a local traditional leader is nevertheless weakened in contemporary post-colonial policy environments where more space for conservancy committees is allowed due to legal interventions of the Namibian State.

The Kasaona’s pioneered as an outspoken clan in community conservation initiatives of the 1980s when the IRDNC was erected together with growing discourses of independence, participation and conservation. It is not surprising that this clan has maintained their position as well outspoken, literate and the more networked in comparison to other locally residing clans. Moreover; nepotism, close relationships and political positioning have resulted into contemporary job distributions where many people seem to have the same surname.

Even though conservancies are claimed not to be ‘political’ by CBNRM policy makers, SWAPO has become the norm in Anabeb Conservancy. SWAPO stands for democracy and decentralisation (in resistance to former colonial top-down rule), but at the same time allows for little other political ideas or strong local leadership. Those affiliated with SWAPO – like the ‘non-concerned’ in this study - can count on political and resourceful support. Some political opponents to SWAPO – like Damara driven UDF supporters – have intermittently shifted their support to SWAPO due to visible national developments in other regions of Namibia where SWAPO is also the norm. The IRDNC has moreover been known in the conservancy to be affiliated to SWAPO (rep.: “the government that is ruling us is the SWAPO government, and we are SWAPO members, and whoever doesn’t want to listen to the development that we are bringing here...that was won
hardly through independence...”) just as much as the conservancy staff of Anabeb (rep: “...We are ruling, so we are SWAPO”).

The current desire by concerned coalition members for intervention by the national Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) has been an inevitable evil since local conflict resolving did not suffice for an acceptable resolution by all clans in Anabeb. The acceptance of legal authority from the MET unconsciously created legitimacy for a larger embeddedness of the conservancy into yet another community; the nation of Namibia and – in more abstract imagination due to international structural support – our planet earth for our ‘common future’. The call by the concerned for intervention by the MET is striking since the coalition of the non-concerned is part of the same CBNRM framework where IRDNC, MET and Kasaona’s are perceived to be cooperating. This indicates that the non-concerned are well aware of the existence of different foregrounding rationales (such as the idea of participatory community conservation and benefits for all) which they can strategically make claims upon.

Likewise, it is remarkable to see how the idea of the conservancy is accepted as a positive development by all members of the conservancy. The self management of resources is welcome after colonial experiences of dispossession of both land and traditional structures. The independence rationale is exceptionally powerful and – unconsciously - does not allow for any criticism to the idea of conservancy on the background, even if one does not benefit directly in terms of jobs or income. The struggle for independence has become an important institutional cultural structure, seemingly normal for all formerly ethnically divided Namibians. The institutionalization of independence liberties is rooted in many urban and rural Namibians and thereby does not merely ‘float in the world’ (Hajer, 1993) as a cultural institution, but is rather socially constructed by actors throughout events from Namibia’s colonial past that perpetuate present policy making and acceptance of self-governing policies.

Self-governance was similarly promoted in SWAPO’s initial ideas to make Namibia a self-reliant classless society according to scientific socialism to regulate difficult control over distant land and precious resources. These resources used to be contract workers from the North; nowadays they increasingly represent wildlife and opportunities from profitable tourism development in communal areas. The incorporation of a community, as Fitzpatrick (2005) claimed, has secured legal relations in a community but has at the same time created polarization of groups due to income inequality and political positions of traditional leaders that are formed through local histories. The traditional structure remains a technique to resist against the accumulation of wealth by better positioned coalitions.

Making claims for the community contrasts an efficient well oiled conservancy business that ought to be managed in a democratic fashion according to the new order of conservancies. Such modern ideas see the conservancy as an apolitical mechanism while those feeling ‘marginalised’ partake into different yet very overt political discussions where traditional authorities and the idea of a community are once more raised to the attention. Different interventions – of pension funds, community campsites, conservancy developments in the past - have shown how such patterns reoccur over time in different policy arrangements where traditional structures have been important institutions that launched conflict on issues around communal territory. A territory that is simultaneously perceived as local property, but rather also owned by national and international authorities with interests to access resourceful opportunities: wildlife and tourism.
Finally, it must be argued by now that in general local access to natural resource management is based upon deep discursive patterns of thought as illustrated in the notion of a ‘discursive deadlock’. This would imply a strong structural role for the new relationships international community conservation – as a level of political modernisation (Arts, et al., 2006) - has brought to the Anabeb region where community conservation has found its birth according to contemporary narratives of CBNRM in Namibia. Nevertheless, some examples have illustrated that there exist some levels of strategic agency (political innovation) by different actor groups within Anabeb Conservancy. Where the concerned have resisted in name of traditional structures, the non-concerned have similarly – even though less explicitly – made claims on basis of their traditional leadership next to their focus on democratic businesslike development of conservancies. Opportunities are continuously sought, such as; asking for interventions from the MET, becoming a member of a different conservancy to gain more benefits, or making up of imagined institutions like so-called proper election procedures that are never framed in any local constitution of Anabeb conservancy. At least not in written form.
7. Conclusion

Can we conclude with a statement that there is either agency or structural access to natural resources in Anabeb Conservancy? No, I argue that such a distinction is difficult to make except that we can trace patterns of both processes within their socio-historical context. We can nevertheless increase our understanding of how change has come about in people’s access to natural resources. Change that is argued to be due to shifting alliances with new legal-political networks that have made communities more heterogeneous groups in comparison to former – but continuous national identities of – homogeneous representations of pre-colonial pastoralist livelihoods. New alliances have made emerging discursive ideas available for local institution making for the betterment of those who share the ideas of proper management by the new ally; the (inter-) national policy programme of CBNRM in Namibia.

This study has provided for a different picture of community conservation in comparison to common national publications that are framed within self-securing success stories of national wildlife conservation and communal livelihood improvements in Namibia. The policy arrangement approach has provided a helpful framework that simultaneously addresses agency and structure to understand whether it is the agent or the order of structures around communal management that produces the abilities of community members to benefit from local resource management. By focusing on coalitions instead of one community or individuals, the policy arrangement approach is useful for the identification of temporary political formations arranged amongst actors, resources, discourses and institutionalised rules. Moreover, coalitions provide understanding of how people are connected to institutions and thus potentially to external influences to the local. Hereby the policy arrangement approach was proven useful as an addition to the theory of access that proposes to map out benefits and the distribution of benefits to understand how bundles of powers operate over natural resource management. Ribot and Peluso (2003) already indicated that access mechanisms are deeply influenced by discourse. Policy arrangements are useful to shift the focus more in the direction of underlying beliefs and institutionalised rule systems instead of initially focusing on who is having access to what resources. The question why was proposed to be both structural, through strategic agency and studied by means of focusing on both local ethnography and discursive back- and foregrounds.

In terms of structure, changing discursive patterns of independence, self-regulation, conservation and participatory development have catapulted the collaborative approach where different local-global interests have collided into the creation and acceptance of CBNRM policy in Namibia. Such developments, particularly the emergence of new alliances between actors within the CBNRM discourse, have contributed to socio-political changes on a local scale where some can align and some cannot.

If we speak of agency, we can observe that different individuals have strategically positioned themselves in relation to these new developments. Whether this positioning is successful or unsuccessful is proven throughout history. Some coalitions have been more resilient than others and consequently will maintain/resist their position by means of strategic discursive positioning. This is particularly visible if we look at individual behaviour of actors; i.e. local leaders who have the ability to actively look for ways to improve their position within the region by referring to different available cultural or legal institutions: benefits for all, (non-) democratic distribution, traditional structure and how things are ‘always’ done is considered important. Contempo-
rary conservancy management constitutes democratic procedures that, in combination with resilient traditional ethnic and nepotist structures, will understandably favour political power over conservancy management to those groups that are in majority. This is an interesting appearance of limited bricolage where community members apparently do not vote for people’s capacities – as most of these remain lacking in this relatively young conservancy – but for traditional descent of family clans. Such a process exemplifies a limited process since it is expected from people to vote and follow for their own clan, making the process of bricolage also structural.

Moreover, some developments seem to be unnoticed on the background where winners are unchallenged due to the internalisation of common ideas. One interesting observation has been the unchallenged idea of nature conservation while discussions continuously challenge benefit distribution and decision making power in the local arena of Anabeb Conservancy. That one ought to take care of the environment and that the conservancy program is accepted universally as a ‘good programme’ by members of the Anabeb Conservancy, can be seen as a victory for the philosophy of collaborative organizations around CBNRM in Namibia. Conservation has become the norm that has its roots in early establishment of the 1980s when the IRDNC and local leaders in Kunene self-initiated local approaches to conserve natural resources before any legislation or national policy was formed.

On the whole, the introduction of new conservancy policies within previously established local rule systems is not seen as a simple structural change for community access. If we consider the socio-historic conditions that have played a decisive role for shifting alliances, we can only argue here that the institutionalisation of conservancy policies has temporarily favoured those actors that have been involved with community conservation since the beginning, and those groups – the Herero’s - who are known to have strategically aligned themselves to improve their conditions within local/Namibian history. Those that are having less access to resources partake in resistance alliances – and are prominently also from Herero heritage - and theoretically could have started a counter narrative to dominant interactions of idealized conservancy ideas: democracy, business efficiency, nature conservation and benefits to all.

The co-existence of discursive backgrounds show how different groups interact with different institutionalised ideas. This results into endless discussions in conservancy meetings in Anabeb where little consensus is created due to ideological differences ('the deadlock'). The introduction of conservancy institutions into the socially embedded institutional environment of Anabeb can be argued to have created a stronger divide between traditional leadership structures that already are in a crisis of uncertainty after independence. This uncertainty has provided the institutional space for conservancies to become effective controllers over resources in communal societies. The formation of control is however dynamic and static at the same time. Relation to a coalition or an opposition are temporal formations within the community, whereas relations to ethnicity or family clans are seen as more static cultural formations that people unmistakably belong to, although they are slowly subject to change due to intermarriage and subsequent offspring. Political affiliations are also subject to continuous change where you see whole clans shifting their preference for different parties. In general it is the local authority’s preference that is being followed by people of the same clan.
Finally, it is concluded that the provision of property rights over wildlife consumptive and non-consumptive rights does certainly not guarantee an equal distribution of benefits as it ideally would do in CBNRM thinking. The presence of socially embedded institutions and production of power in different levels of organization (primarily the shifting alliance to intermediary NGO practices) constitute recent observed differences. Democratic representation of community interests in conservancy committee’s does moreover not match traditional divides between clans and relatives that are requested to form a homogeneous communal unity. A representation that people in Anabeb, by far, cannot comply with due to socio-historic conditions and related discursive thinking.

7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Focusing on coalitions can oversee individual behaviour of actors within the conservancy. There have been numerous observations of i.e. local entrepreneurs who look for whatever opportunities to start a business on communal land within the different traditional or conservancy constraints. This study has overseen the actions of those, and other, individuals in detail since the main focus has been sociological with some level of individual agency to explain for group/individual bricolage processes. Individual agency is likewise expected to relate to discursive patterns amongst groups and would be an interesting object of study in different conservancies where local entrepreneurs work closely with private and public organisations to set up their businesses.

Yet, and this is imperative to this study, individual agency must not be seen too much within the isolation of an individual. The same holds for a tendency to point to some elite force as the source of problems in community conflict. The resistance against the IRDNC and the Kasaona’s is expected to be very local within the conservancies of Anabeb, Sesfontein and Purros where community members are exceptionally familiar with the strong presence of Kasaona’s in the region. The results of this study could be easily interpreted by readers as if the author thinks badly of these groups due to the represented emphasis of the distributional and ideational divides in the conservancy. However, the representation aims for an understanding of how access is being produced in a conservancy and that this can be explained from how people relate to each other, to resources and to ideas. Such relationships of alliances and resistance are expected to be found more in the Kunene region but need to be highlighted in more ethnographic studies in different regions of Namibia’s conservancy landscape where other relationships could provide a whole different picture of local community dynamics.

In terms of benefit distributions, this study has primarily been interested with direct benefits from the conservancy but has excluded more indirect forms of benefit accumulation like lodge/campground employment within the conservancy or a broader regional nongovernmental distribution of jobs. Moreover, as indicated during discussions of preliminary results with support organisations in Windhoek; it would be interesting to see whether more conflict arises due to increased levels of income in conservancies. It is expected that Anabeb will multiply its income from growing concession rights from nearby Palmwag that the Big Three conservancies benefit from (see further section 5.2.1). Other conservancies, like those in the Caprivi region, are claimed by commentators of support organisations to have intensified conflict situations due to rising income. Is this due to rising inequalities of income distributions? And what role does discursive thinking have in relation to such distributions?
On an even larger scale, the success of Namibia’s conservancy programme lures interested nation states in Southern Africa that are interested to implement similar community conservation amongst communities in communal lands. Some transboundary projects are already undertaken over the past few years and it would be interesting to see how similar policy programmes are arranged in different places. Similarly, what is found in Anabeb, could be further studied amongst policy actor arrangements on a national level. One could do a similar study of national support organisations and their relatedness to international aid organisations. Discursively the use of concepts, like Mosse (2004) has done in his ‘aidnography’ of policy success, could be studied amongst different organizational workers and how they are related to one another, up to international ties. What discursive thinking would lay the basis for these collaborations?

In short, access to conservancy benefits can be studied from many different locales. This case study has been extremely local – with exception of related regional and national relations - and cannot make hefty generalizations for the larger geographic context of Namibia or other related policies in different countries. Similarly, as stressed before, the political formations need to be seen as temporal and subject to further change over time. A more comparative discursive study could indicate whether similar or different mechanisms apply in different conservancy arrangements.
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