TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS

ISLAM AND CHIEFSHIP IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE
ca. 1850-1974

BY

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DISSERTATION

Submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Historical Studies
University of Cape Town

March, 2007
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Shamil Jeppie, for his invaluable advice on matters of theory and method, for the encouragement and trust that he gave me, and especially for the genuine enthusiasm for the subject of this dissertation. My indebtedness also goes to Prof. David Hedges, my co-supervisor, whose unique experience, versatility and insight into Mozambican history and historiography has powerfully enriched my research.

I am grateful to Eduardo Mondlane University for providing me with financial and institutional support, in particular, to Professor Brazão Mazula and the staff of the Higher Education Development Project. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Eduardo Mondlane University; in particular, Joel das Neves Tembe, Isabel Casimiro, Teresa Cruz e Silva, Gerhard Liesegang, João Paulo Borges Coelho, Armindo Ngunga and Benigna Zimba for giving me their unfailing moral support and intellectual inspiration.

Very special thanks are due to Dr. António Sopa and the staff of the Arquivo Histórico de Mocambique, Maputo, Mozambique, and to Dr. Maria de Lurdes Henriques and the staff of the Instituto de Arquivos Nacionais/Torre de Tombo in Lisbon, Portugal, for prompt and valuable assistance with documents and other material.

I would like to extend my gratitude to all the people who spoke with me during fieldwork in Nampula province and Maputo city, for generously sharing their time, lives and thoughts. My fieldwork would not have been possible without the efficiency, friendship and commitment of my fieldwork assistant, Mr. Abdurrahman Adambai. I am also thankful to local government officials, shaykhs and countless ordinary people, who helped to identify, locate and establish fruitful relationships with those to be interviewed.

To my former Professors, Robert Launay, Louis Brenner, Kate Zebiri, Lynn Welchman, Tessi Liu and Abdullahi An-Na’im I will always be indebted for their
encouragement. I thank Eric Morier-Genoud and Paula Meneses for fruitful exchanges and discussions of ideas, and for their friendship.

I am grateful to Ludmila Stepanova, Lubov Lushinskaya, Mohan Nair and his family, Ibrahim Shamsuddin, Orlando and Leia Zacarias, and Anabela Ratilal, who cheered me on in my efforts, and gave support, warmth and understanding to me and my husband that only true friends can do. Finally, I thank my husband, Alfredo, for his patience and love.

I would like to extend my gratitude to everybody who directly or indirectly helped me to accomplish my work and complete this thesis. However, I am solely responsible for all of its possible shortcomings.
ABSTRACT

Author: Liazzat J. K. Bonate

Thesis Title: Traditions and Transitions: Islam and Chiefship in Northern Mozambique, ca. 1850-1974

Date: March, 2007

This thesis is based on the archival and fieldwork research, and sheds light on the area which has been little studied or reflected in scholarly literature: Islam in northern Mozambique. Its particular focus is on African Muslim leadership in Northern Mozambique, which has historically incorporated Islamic authority and chiefship. The link between Islam and the chiefly clans existed since the eight century when Islam made inroads into the northern Mozambican coast and became associated with the Shirazi ruling elites. With the involvement of the region in the international slave trade during the nineteenth century, the Shirazi clans secured alliances with the most powerful mainland chiefs through conquest and kinship relations in order to access supplies of slaves from the mainland. This process was accompanied by a massive expansion of Islam from the coast into the hinterland. The alliances between the Shirazi at the coast and the chiefdoms further into the interior resulted in a network of paramount chiefs and their subordinates making up the bulk of Muslim slave-raiders, who established the limits between themselves (the Maca, Muslims and ‘civilized’) and those to be enslaved (the Makua and Lomwe, derogatory terms, meaning savagery, i.e., ‘non-Muslims’ and ‘uncivilized’).

Muslim chiefs would come to fight for Islam, throughout the colonial period. They struggled particularly against outside ethnic and racial elements associated with new conceptions of Islam, such as Sufism and the Wahhabi trends. The association between Islamic authority and African chiefship was officially acknowledged by Portuguese colonial rule, the self-proclaimed benefactor of Islam in the late 1960s and 1970s.
While Muslim *chiefly* clans of northern Mozambique would provide massive support to the liberation movements in their formative stages in the early 1960s, their participation went unrecognized in the official narratives of Mozambican independence and in FRELIMO history. The thesis concludes with an attempt at recovering this neglected history of northern Mozambique.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAM - Companhia Algodoeira de Moçambique, Mozambique Cotton Company

CONCP - Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas, Conference of Portuguese Colonies Nationalist Organizations

DGS – Direcção Geral de Segurança, General Directorate for Security

FRELIMO - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambican Liberation Front

UN – United Nations Organization

JFS – João Fereira dos Santos Company

MANU – Mozambique African National Union

PIDE – Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, Portuguese Secret Police, International Police for the Defense of the State

SCCI – Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informação, Services for Centralization and Coordination of Information

SCCIM - SCCI for Mozambique

TAA - Tanganyika African Association

TANU – Tanganyika African National Party

TMMU- Tanganyika Mozambique Makonde Union

Z-MANU - Zanzibar Makonde and Makua Union be

ZNP – Zanzibar Nationalist Party

UDENAMO – União Democrática de Moçambique, Mozambique Democratic Union

UNAMI – União Nacional Africana Independente de Moçambique, Independent Mozambique National African Union
GLOSSARY

*Administradores* (Port.) - Commissioners

*aldeamentos* (Port.) - strategic hamlets, villagirization

*Anhandare* (Ekhoti, pl., sing., *Nhandare*), one of the chiefly lineages of Angoche

*Anhapakho* (Ekhoti, pl., sing., *Nhapakho*), Muslim chiefly clan of Angoche

*apia-mwene* (Emakhwa, pl., sing. *pia-mwene*) – females chiefs

*Assimilado* (Port.) – someone who adopted European/Portuguese culture and identity

*asynene mbumba* - a ritual was of ancestral sacrifice performed by *apia-mwene*

*awliya* (Ar., pl., sing., *wali*) – ‘those who are close to God’, ‘God’s friends’, saints

*banja* (Bantu, also *b’andlha*) - the assembly of the prominent members of the community

*baraka* (Ar.) – ‘blessing,’ ‘grace’

*al-batin* (Ar.) - ‘the interior,’ realms of the soul, esoteric

*Chefe de Posto* (Port.) - Chief of the Post

*Circunscrições* (Port.) - Circumscriptions

*comprometidos* (Port.) –‘compromised’

*Concelhos* (Port.) – Councils

*dabbus* (Ar.) – ‘a needle,’ locally *dabushi*

*bid’a* (Ar.) – ‘abominable religious innovation’
dhikr (Ar.) - Sufi ritual prayer

din (Ar.) – faith, religion

dtiqiri (Emakhwa, from Ar. dhikr) – a Sufi Order, tariqa, also, locally, twaliki

dufu (Sw., from Arabic, tuff or daff) - a large diameter frame drum or tambourine

dw’a (Ar.) – prayer

ehakko (Emakhwa) – divination

Ekatchi – the language of Sangage;

Ekoti – the language of Angoche;

epepa - the sacred flour of the chiefs’ clan, also chiefly installation ceremonial (ou ólàpa ritual)

errukulo (Emakhwa) - ‘a womb’

Estado Novo (Port.) – ‘New State’

fatwa (Ar.) - legal opinion

feitorias (Port.) - ‘factories’ or ‘commercial establishments’

fiqh (Ar.) – Islamic jurisprudence

grupo de povoações (Port.) – a group of settlements

Hadith (Ar.) - traditions of the Prophet Muhammad

hajji (Ar.) - a pilgrim to Mecca

hakim (Ar.) – ‘one skilled in medical, philosophic and scientific learning,’ ‘whose judgment is legally binding, i.e., hukm
haram (Ar.) – illicit

hiriz (Ar., tawiz; Swahili, Emakhwa, Ekoti)- amulets with Qur’anic inscriptions

jahiliyya (Ar.) – ignorance

jihad (Ar.) - holy war

jihad an-nafs (Ar.) - spiritual struggle against the self

ijazas (Ar.) - a certificate

ijma (Ar.) – consensus

‘ilm (Ar.) - Islamic learning, knowledge

Indigenato (Port.) – a colonial legal system establishing Africans as subjects to customary laws

jamhuri (Sw.) – ‘liberation’

juma (Ar.) - Friday prayer

karamat (Ar.) – miracles

khalifa (Ar., sing., pl., khulafa’)- ‘deputy’, local leader of a Sufi Order.

khitima (Sw., Ar.) - collective reading of the Qur’an on someone’s funeral

kitabu (Sw., Ar., sing., pl., vitabu) - ‘the book’, i.e., the Qur’an; also, Islamic religious book

nipele (Emakhwa) - ‘a breast’

Maca (Emakhwa) – a Muslim

maddhab (Ar. sing., pl. madhhahib) - Islamic juridical school
**madrasa (Ar.)** - *Qur’anic* school

**mahimo or maloko** (Emakhuwa, pl., sing. *nihimo* or *nloko*) - people descending from a common female ancestor

**manaqib** (Ar., pl.) – hagiographies

**marabout** (Ar., sing., pl., *mourabit*) – a term used to identify Sufis in French colonial North and West Africa

**mawlid or mawlid un-Nabi** (Ar.) - Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebration

**Molidi** (Emakhwa, also *Mawlid, Mawlid Naquira*, or *Mawlid Rifa’i*) – Rifa’i dhikr

**moradores** (Port., pl., sing., *morador*) – settlers

**mufti** (Ar.) - Islamic legal specialist, a jurisconsult

**muta-hano** (Emakhuwa) - a tax consisting of two-day work per week, along with the payment in kind

**muyini** (Bantu, sing., also, *mwene, muno, monhé*; pl. *wamwene*) - lord, master

**mwalimu** – local vernacular, from Ar., a *Qur’anic* school teacher, also, Muslim healer, Sw., *walimu*

**m’kulukwana** (Emakhwa) - healer

**muridun** (Ar., pl., sing., *murid*) – ordinary members of a *tariqa*

**murshid** (Ar., pl., sing., *murshidun*) – singers, third in a *tariqa* hierarchy

**nashidi** (Sw., from Ar., *nashid*) - clapping hands

**nahodha** (Ar., Sw.) - a sea-captain
negreiros (Port., pl., sing., negreiro) – slave traders

nuqaba’ (Ar., pl., sing., naqib, or muqaddam) – assistant to a khalifa, a teacher, second to a khalifa in the hierarchy of a Sufi Order

ommama mussafu (Emakhwa, from Ar., mushaf, Swahili musahafu, “a saint book”, “a book of prayers”) - a ritual of taking oath on the Qur’an

pangaio (Port.) – coasting vessel, a small wooden short-distance ship, also generic term for Arab and Swahili craft

prazos (Port.) - landed estates

ramuli (Emakhwa from Arabic, khat al-raml)- geomancy

râtib (Ar.) - a litany consisting of invocations and Qur’anic verses

raya (Ar.) - banner

regerdoras (Port., also, régulados) – chiefdoms

régulos (Port., also regedores) – a small-scale king, a chief

qasaid (Ar., pl., sing., gasida) – devotional poetry

sadat (Ar., pl., sing., sayyid) - ‘lord’, ‘master,’ also an honorific title reserved to the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad

sajadda (Ar.) – a prayer mat

sajada khadima – local vernacular from Ar., the chief khalifa of a Sufi Order

sepoys - slave solders (Port., sepaios)

shaykh (Ar., sing., pl., shuyukh) – Islamic religious leader
shawriyya – local vernacular, advisors to a tariqa khalifa and muridun

shehe (Sw., sing., pl., washehe) – coastal Swahili chiefs

Shari’a (Ar.) - Islamic legal framework

shirk (Ar.) – ‘polytheism’

shurafa’ (from Ar., pl., sing., sharif) - descendents of the Prophet Muhammad

silsila (Ar.) - a document attesting to the legitimacy of the Order and its founder, containing a sequence of Sufi masters reaching back to the Prophet Muhammad

sukuti (Sw., from Ar. sukut) – ‘silent’

sunnat (Ar.) – a ‘tradition’, also, a male Muslim circumcision

Surah (Ar.) – a chapter or verse of the Qur’an

tariqa (Ar., sing., pl., turuq) – a Sufi Order

Terras Firmes (Port.) – mainland, continental lands

tibb (Ar., tiba in loca vernacular) - ‘medicine’

uhuru (Sw.) – ‘independence’

‘ulama (Ar., pl., sing., ‘alim) - Islamic religious scholars

wadhifa (Ar.) - ‘recommendations’ or principals of s tariqa

waganga (Sw.) – a healer

Wahhabis, also, Ahl al-Sunna (Ar., people of Sunna) – shaykhs educated in Saudi Arabia; also, Islamists
waqf (Ar.) – property

wird (Ar., sing., pl. award) – a ‘litany’, daily prayers of a tariqa members

xeicados (Port.) - sheikhdoms

al-zahra (Ar.) - ‘the exterior,’ realms of external religious observance and learning, exoteric

zawiya or zawiyani (Ar.) - a special buildings for dhikr

ziyara (Ar.) - a ritual visit to the tomb of a saint or holy man
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Introduction

This thesis addresses a unique historical feature of Muslim societies of northern Mozambique: the correlation between Islam and African chiefship. Islam and chiefship thus are two objects of study of this dissertation, though each of them is treated as an independent historically grown discursive tradition, they are interwoven with each other in complex ways. Against the background of the long-term continuity of these two traditions, the thesis analyses the transitions which northern Mozambican Muslims, specifically in the region of contemporary Nampula province, went through between ca. 1850 and 1974. The focus of this study is on how local African people, particularly the ruling elites or chiefly clans, actively (re-)created these traditions during this period. Despite internal and external pressures coming from colonial rule, the wider Muslim world, and African liberation movements, they maintained these two traditions interconnected with each other.

I. Tradition of Chiefship in Northern Mozambique

The thesis focuses on the concept of chiefship rather than ethnicity, because the term ethnicity is extremely difficult to apply to the northern Mozambican context. Eduardo C. Medeiros has convincingly demonstrated that groups that exist today are linked to specific names of the founding chiefs rather than to ethnic denominations as such. He also provides ample historical and ethnographic evidence that these chiefs and their respective chieftaincies emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century and occupied their respective territories as a result of significant population migrations triggered by the expansion of the Maravi/Zimba and Nguni, and of the international slave trade, when chiefs fought for the control of the territories that offered better chances for

benefiting from the slave-trade, either as slave suppliers, or as outlets for slave export, or through which major fluvial and terrestrial caravan routes ran.

Though each of the founding lineages had specific clan origins and a particular language, they absorbed various groups of people with different languages and cultures in the course of their formation. This was common in southern-central Africa at the time and Martin Chanock maintains, “the newly dominant groups pursued the so-called politics of ‘assimilation’, which meant taking control of the defeated and turning them into subordinates and dependants.”² As a result of these politics, with the exception of the Makonde and the coast, most of the contemporary northern Mozambican Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces ended up speaking the Makua language.³ The Makonde language was formed when people of various origins, mainly runaways from enslavement, were concentrated and created a common language, the Chi-Makonde on the Mueda plateau in the nineteenth century.⁴ In the case of the coast, because it withstood the mainland migration waves and spearheaded the slave trade, it managed to maintain Ki-Swahili-influenced languages. But the whole region shared a common matrilineal culture, including Muslims and those who originally were patrilineal Nguni.

From this premise it is difficult to apply to the northern Mozambican context the concept of ‘ethnicity’ in a sense of a “homogeneous cultural unit, geographically and socially isolated from other such groups,” as the ‘primordialist’ school of ethnicity suggests⁵. This school relies on essentialist, cultural and psychological dimensions of the ethnic identity and was influenced by theory of culture and symbolism.⁶ It views ethnicity

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as a historical artifact, whose affective power in the modern world is derived from ‘traditional symbols’ rooted in the past.\(^7\) Some post-independence scholars of Mozambique, such as Iraê Lundin and her team, perceive chiefship in line with the ‘primordialist’ school as a manifestation of an immutable, a-historic ‘tradition’ linked to the essence of the African timeless ‘ethnic’ being.\(^8\)

As Malcolm Chapman, Maryon McDonald, and Elizabeth Tonkin emphasize, ethnicity is a relatively new word, a classificatory category of a disciplined academic discourse.\(^9\) From the middle of the nineteenth century, scholarship made *ethnos* a word meaning “group of people of shared characteristics.”\(^10\) In the 1960s, ethnicity acquired the status of an analytical concept within the disciplines of anthropology, political science and history, and spilled over into the imagination of the general public, who, consciously or unconsciously, tended to use it as a substitute for the ‘discarded’ categories of race and tribe.\(^11\)

Steven Feierman remarks that “local ethnic boundaries in Africa have always been a fiction when taken in the classic ethnographic sense as marking off coherent, isolated islands of cultural practice, each with its own political structure.”\(^12\) In addition, in the Mozambican context, Portugal as a colonial power was not as concerned with applying categories of ethnicity or ‘tribe’ for exerting control and imposing their rule as the British and other colonialisms did, and the endeavors to classify or codify ‘customary law’ did not have consequences in Mozambique. A spatially bounded and coherent ‘tribe’ or ‘ethnic’ group began taking root in the Portuguese literature in the last decade of colonialism, when attempts to identify and classify Mozambican peoples according to the emerging ethnographic and anthropological disciplinary frameworks were made but had

\(^7\) Spear and Waller, *Being Maasai* ibid.


\(^11\) Chapman, McDonald and Tonkin, *ibid.*

\(^12\) Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), p. 35.
little impact on colonial policies as a whole. Instead, the Portuguese relied on the category of chiefdoms (régulados/regedorias) as territorial and political units, each ruled by a specific chief (réguolorégedor), and which appeared during the nineteenth century in the context of violent and rapid change. As with the Shambaa described by Feierman, the local groups could not have existed in this period without chiefship to define their boundaries, because the chief, as Feierman points out, was “the owner of the land’s collective wealth, [and] provided an ultimate guarantee, a refuge, to individuals and local social groups at the extreme margin of survival.”

Another analytical school on ethnicity, which has been referred to as the ‘instrumentalist’ tendency, views ethnicity as a recent phenomena emerging from the colonial context. According to this school, the colonized ‘traditional’ and modern elites attempted to mobilize social and cultural values in order to gain access to restricted resources in ‘traditional’ as well as modern sectors. The ‘instrumentalists’ see ethnicity like ‘tradition’, as social constructs that are constantly being ‘invented’, ‘created’ and manipulated for the socio-political ends of interest groups able to mobilize shared historical consciousness. Notwithstanding the influence of Benedict Anderson’s theory of imagined communities and Edward Said’s critique of Orientalist discourse on their perspective, the ‘instrumentalists’ generally ignore that nationhood or ethnicity could result from a moral project, and uphold that material self-interest is the major force behind the creation of ethnicity in modern times.

Terence O. Ranger describes how Europeans and the ‘Europeanized’ local elite invented African ‘traditions.’ He suggests that diverse forms of local practices and discourses were systematized, classified, categorized, and fixed in writing along the lines

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14 Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p. 53.

15 Spear and Waller, *Being Maasai*, p. 15.


of the European modernized, disciplined and universalized conceptions of tradition, law, and custom. This process represented a significant departure from the way African societies lived and conceived of their traditions in pre-colonial time. Ranger stressed that “before colonialism Africa was characterized by pluralism, flexibility, multiple identity; after it African identities of ‘tribe’, gender and generation were all bounded by the rigidities of invented tradition.”

In Mozambique, the ‘instrumentalist’ approach was adopted by the Frelimo secularist-Marxist elites emerging from 1969 onwards, who envisioned post-independence Mozambique as a completely new society to be created from scratch, which would be free from past historical burdens, ‘tribalism’ and the old colonial structures centered on chiefs, who allegedly clung to and ‘invented’ ‘tradition’ in order to maintain the power they acquired as servants of the colonial state. Bridget O’Laughlin and Alice Dinerman also argue that despite Portuguese efforts to draw in existing political structures, there was little that was ‘traditional’ about chiefship during the colonial period.

In his recent revisiting of *The Invention of Tradition*, Ranger recognizes some of the shortcomings of his earlier work, in particular with regard to the dichotomy of the European and colonial versus the African and pre-colonial, especially following research by Jan Vansina, Steven Feierman and Martin Chanock. According to these authors, tradition does not mean territorial or functional structures or a uniform mode of thought,

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as assumed for example in the Mozambican context by O’Laughlin or Dinerman cited above. Tradition is an ideological or discursive language of the *longue durée*, compatible with change and active (re-)creation, because even when a tradition is inherited from the past, “there is competition about what will become part of immutable tradition and people make decisions to say what is meaningful at a particular moment.”

Though tradition often appears to be a mere ideological tool for supporting and legitimizing the hegemonic socio-economic and political positions of the elites, in reality it is a form of discourse shared at many levels of society, by elites as well as by subordinates who collectively engage in defining the ideal community. As Mark LeVine and Armando Salvatore point out,

The engine of traditions and of their adaptations and transformations, lies...in the collective effort to redress and improve the stock of practical and theoretical knowledge that allows for the pursuit of the social and transcendent goods defined as central by a given tradition.

Christian Geffray has persuasively demonstrated that chiefly traditions of northern Mozambique revolve around the political discourse of matriliney, land/territory, kinship and the foundation myths of the ruling clans establishing the rights and obligations of the putative first-comers and late-comers to the territory. The tradition of chiefship continued throughout the colonial period because the authority of the chiefs was legitimized not so much from their association with colonialism, but through more

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‘traditional’ *longue durée* historical discursive means adapted to the new historical context.\textsuperscript{26} Local societies were profoundly transformed by their relationship to the colonial state and to the capitalist economy, and as Feierman rightly underscores, “even the most static-looking local institutions, such as African chieftainship revealed, on closer examination, to have been radically reshaped from within.”\textsuperscript{27} Nevertheless, Africans maintained local discourse on chiefly traditions because, in their understanding, the legitimacy of chiefship guarded them against malevolent spirits, and allowed them to maintain a connection with and enjoy the protection of the ancestors, who were believed to guarantee the prosperity and fertility of the people and the land. The fact that the Portuguese colonialists were acutely preoccupied with preserving the legitimacy of the chiefs in the eyes of Africans contributed to the perseverance of the tradition of chiefship as well. The Portuguese also did not codify customary law but left it up to chiefs to formulate and apply it, and so by relying on historical precedent they assured the continuity of the discourse on tradition.

### II. Islam as an Object of Study

The link between Islam and local chiefship existed since the eighth century when Islam made inroads into northern Mozambique and became associated with the coastal ruling elites, who later claimed Shirazi descent. With the involvement of the region in the international slave trade during the nineteenth century, the Shirazi clans secured alliances with the powerful mainland reigning clans (referred to in this dissertation as *chiefly* clans from this point on) through conquest and kinship relations in order to access supplies of slaves and to control the caravan trade routes. This process was accompanied by the conversion to Islam of the hinterland peoples in general, and in particular, of their reigning elites.

Feierman points out that “local society and the larger society merge and interpenetrate in many levels, to the point where we cannot say what is local and what is


\textsuperscript{27} Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p. 14.
The intersection between the local and the larger world in northern Mozambican Muslim societies corresponds to the link between specific local contexts and the coastal Shirazi Islamic tradition of the Swahili world and the discursive tradition of chiefship of the matrilineal belt of the southern African region. In northern Mozambique, the two longue durée traditions, the Shirazi and the matrilineal, merged into one, that of the network of Muslim chiefdoms in the nineteenth century. The Shirazi-inspired Islamic tradition expanded into the mainland, accompanied by the conversion of the mainland chiefs, who became a part of the network of Muslim chiefly clans identified as the Maka (Muslim, and ‘civilized’). But, as Chanock maintains, the hierarchies and the relationships of the slave period “had their justification in the ideologies of kinship and custom, and the controls imposed by beliefs in sorcery,” or in other words, on the discursive tradition of chiefship. Thus, the network of Muslim chiefdoms was grounded in this tradition, which encompassed at once matrilineal kinship and spiritual and territorial/land relations of the peoples incorporated into a particular chiefdom, and tied to a chief through these relationships. As a result, in the northern Mozambican context of the nineteenth century, conversion to Islam did not transform the existing matriliny into an Islamic patriliny. On the contrary, the network of Muslim chiefdoms was embedded in successful political maneuvering and strategic reshuffling of the discursive tradition of chiefship, in particular, of the semantics of kinship and territorial relations that were at the base of the political concepts and shared perceptions of the matrilineal societies of the region. Thus the northern Mozambicans did not relinquish their existing discursive traditions of chiefship during their adoption of Islam, but recreated and adapted them to the emerging context. The distinctive link between African chiefship and Islam, which is so unique to this region, found its renewed continuity and expanded to the mainland.

28 Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, pp. 36-37.
29 Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, pp. 10, 13, 15.
II. ‘Islão Negro’

Compared to the research on Islam in other parts of Africa, scant attention has been given to this subject in Mozambique. Throughout the colonial period, the Portuguese implemented diverse policies toward Islam and Muslims, discussed in detail in Chapter Five, but their approach remained distinctly Orientalist. The link between African chiefship and Islam that prevailed among the northern Mozambican Muslims, made the Portuguese consider Islam in this region to be particularly flexible and accommodating to African culture. Similar to the French ‘Islam Noir’ in West Africa the colonial writers had developed the notion of ‘Islão Negro’, or a ‘Black Islam’ (sometimes referred to as ‘Mozambican Islam’ by the Portuguese). This notion emphasized that Islam in northern Mozambique was not a ‘true’ Islam akin to the one in the Middle East, but a ‘syncretistic’ one, “mixed with gross superstitions,” such as fetishism, magic and other ‘African’ practices.

The notion of ‘Islão Negro’ was, of course, derived from what Edward Said has termed Orientalism. According to Said, the encounter of the European West with the non-European Other resulted in a particular style of thought, based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction of “the Orient” and “the Occident.” It is with colonialism


33 Said, Orientalism, p.2.
that Orientalism was transformed into “a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority” over the Other.\textsuperscript{34}

Though Said points out that Orientalism was inserted into almost all of Western philosophical discursive approaches to the Other, evolutionary theory and later on theories of modernization along Durkheimian and Weberian paths were important components in these discourses. For it is only when human history was perceived as a linear development from primitive to modern man, with Western Europeans at its apex, that the Other could be reduced to the one to be dominated. Orientalism juxtaposes “an absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior, eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself, and thus as something to be feared or controlled.”\textsuperscript{35}

Orientalists viewed Islam as one of the “transcendent, compelling Oriental facts,” identified with a ‘classical’ body of principles found in the writings of the ‘orthodox’ ‘\textit{ulama}’ (Ar., pl., Islamic scholars, sing., ‘\textit{alim}’) class.\textsuperscript{36} Islam was seen as a single, unitary, and all-defining object, a part of the nature and essence of Oriental people living within a rigidly bounded set of structures.\textsuperscript{37} It was not perceived to be a living faith but a continually reasserted version of the old principles, and all the changes and different conceptions of Islamic discourse and practices were assessed against these principles. When these diverged too much from the classical ideal, Islamic reform movements emerged. These movements allegedly pursued religious purification from the alleged ‘innovations’ and ‘ignorance’ prevailing in Muslim societies and fought to bring back the ‘true’ Islamic essence. The ‘reform’ approach, to which the scholar Fazlur Rahman

\textsuperscript{34} Said, \textit{Orientalism}, Ibid.


contributed to a great extent, maintains that reform and renewal have been an organic part of the Islamic tradition.\textsuperscript{38}

When Muslim conceptions and practices were not in conformity with the classical ideal, they were also perceived to be an anomaly. Islam in Africa was not only far removed from the core of the ‘orthodox’ Islamic essence but appeared to be a form of aberration, a peculiar kind, thus a ‘Black’ Islam, which in Mozambique, according to the Portuguese colonial writers, resulted from both ‘biological’ and ‘spiritual’ ‘mixings.’\textsuperscript{39} Branquinho, for example, maintains, “first, there was a physical mixing, a harmonious one,” when Arabs, Indians and Persians by marrying African women had “founded a new improved and nobler race [than mere Africans].”\textsuperscript{40} Second, there was a “higher spiritual mixing”, when the precepts of Islam became ‘syncreticized’ with African ‘traditions and customs.’

The Portuguese did not believe that Africans were capable of comprehending the intellectual and spiritual dimensions of Islam on their own. While explaining the historical roots of northern Mozambican Islam, the Portuguese underlined that it was ‘brought’ and ‘imposed’ on Africans by Persians, ‘Arab sharifs’ (from, Ar., sing., pl., shurafa, descendents of the Prophet Muhammad) and Indians. The three groups of Asian Muslims settled on the coast and embarked upon ‘missionary’ activities similar to the Catholics (who also first settled on the coast) by ‘proselytizing’ and ‘evangelizing’ Islam. Portuguese writers indicated that ‘foreign Muslim missionaries’ succeeded by “exploring


\textsuperscript{40} Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 415-1.
psychological weaknesses of the Blacks,” who adopted Islam as means of social mobility and prestige rather than as a faith.41 The resulting Islam was a “Mozambican Islam”, a local brand of an ‘African’ or ‘Black Islam,’ which was not a ‘real’ Islam, but a “superficial” one, “bastardized,” and “ignorant.”42

The Orientalist approach to Islam has been one of the lasting legacies of colonialism and unfortunately it continues to exert a significant influence over post-colonial scholarship on Mozambique. Muslims of northern Mozambique are still seen as ‘syncreticised’ ‘heterodox’ followers of ‘Islão Negro,’ lacking agency, who have been converted by and continuously co-opted and manipulated by Indians, Arabs, or the Swahili.43 For example, Eric Morier-Genoud writes in 2000 that in Nampula province, “a traditional and syncretic form of [Islam] was dominant.”44

But while the Portuguese equated Islam in northern Mozambique with African ‘tradition’ and ‘customs’ and therefore with the Indígenato system, and accepted that Islam and matriliney could co-exist and indeed co-existed simultaneously in this region, post-colonial scholarship tended to maintain that northern Mozambican Muslims “miscegenated with Arabs [or Indians] with patrilineal ancestry” and that matriliney was replaced by patriliney and patriarchy.45


II.2. Sufi Orders in Mozambique

The Portuguese were not able to discern or understand Sufism and Sufi Orders in Mozambique for a long time. For example, the agents of ‘effective occupation’ in the late nineteenth century, such as João de Azevedo Coutinho and António Enes witnessed the Rifa’iyya rituals but identified the Order as only a ‘dance society.’

Until the late 1960s, the Portuguese were also unable to perceive the existence of the Shadhuliyya and the Qadiriyya Sufi Orders (locally, *d/tiqiri* from *dhikr*; Ar., sing., *tariqa*, pl., *turuq*). Passing remarks on *tiqiri* without any detailed consideration can be found in the writing of Pedro Massano de Amorim, another military officer of the ‘effective occupation.’ In the late 1930s, the Portuguese Inspector for Indigenous Affairs, Captain Armando Pinto Correia, cited a local Administrator describing the annual gathering of Muslims, apparently for the Qadiri *ziyara* (Ar., sing., visit, pilgrimage to the tomb of the saints), using such terms as *tiqiri*, *sharif* and *khalifa* (Ar., sing., pl. *khulafa*, local heads or delegates of a *tariqa*). But again neither Pinto Correia nor the Administrator could relate these Muslims to Sufi Orders. The studies produced in the 1950s and early 1960s by the Catholic missionary scholars attached to the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas Ultramarinas (Higher Institute of Social Sciences and Overseas Politics), provided ethnographic evidence for the presence of the *turuq* in Mozambique, but did not identify them as such. For example, from the book of Father Frederico José Peirone describing the Yao Muslims, it is possible to extrapolate information on the Qadiriyya, though he never mentions any Sufi Order throughout his text.

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50 Peirone, *A tribu ajaua.*
The situation changed only in the late 1960s, when the Portuguese realized that besides the Makonde of the Mueda plateau, significant numbers of Muslims of northern Mozambique were taking part in the liberation movements. In 1961 the Portuguese state created a branch of the Secret Services called the Services for Centralization and Coordination of Information (SCCI), with the aim of centralizing, coordinating, studying, and distributing knowledge and information about the politics, administration and defense of the Portuguese overseas territories.\(^{51}\) The SCCI for Mozambique (SCCIM) collected data on Islam in general and Muslim leaders in particular through fieldwork and the local administrations, the Secret Police (PIDE) and military, among others, in 1965-1968.\(^{52}\) The SCCIM officials, such as Branquinho and Fernando Monteiro, who had knowledge of Islam and other religions interpreted the findings and wrote reports.\(^{53}\) Monteiro, in particular, produced several academic articles and a book in the late 1980s and early 1990s, based on the colonial documents and his personal experience.\(^{54}\)

The influence of the French-West African ‘Islam Noir’ school on the writings of the Portuguese at this time is particularly perceptible. Monteiro was a graduate of a French university, and A. J. de Mello Machado, who wrote a book on Angoche in 1970, acknowledges directly Portuguese indebtedness to the French.\(^{55}\) However, in contrast to the earlier studies and in line with the French ‘Islam Noir,’ these studies stressed the preeminence of Sufi Orders in northern Mozambique (corresponding to French West


African ‘maraboutism’), which supposedly were deeply enmeshed with local culture, with leaders representing a more ‘traditional’ and ‘conservative’ wing of African Muslim leadership.⁵６ The Portuguese saw Sufi Orders as a part of ‘Islão Negro’ and not of the ‘orthodox’ ‘true’ Islam of the ‘Asians’ in the colony. No research has been done on Sufi Orders since independence, and colonial ideas still hold a strong grip in contemporary Mozambique.

Portuguese colonial writers thus shared similar views current in the scholarship until fairly recently, which maintained that Sufism was a type of illiterate, rural and popular Islam, to which Africans became attracted because of its supposed tolerance to and integration of popular or local cultures.⁵⁷ Ernst Gellner, for example, has argued that in the Moroccan high Atlas, urban Sufi mysticism was an alternative to the legalistic, restrained and arid Islam of the ‘ulama, while rural and ‘tribal’ Sufism was not even Sufism, but a substitute for it.⁵⁸ Gellner, Clifford Geertz, and Michael Gilsenan in his Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt, and Dale F. Eickelman in Moroccan Islam, believed that the ‘unorthodox’ character of Sufism was due to its origins in the periphery of the Muslim world rather than among the elite in Muslim heartlands.⁵⁹ According to these


authors, Sufism emerged among the marabout (Ar., sing., pl., mourabit, saints of the fortresses or Sufis) in zawaya (Ar., pl., sing., zawiya, Sufi lodges) of the warriors in ribat (Ar., fortress) along the frontier of Muslim lands in Northern Africa, Iran, Abadan, Damascus, Ramla and Transoxania. These regions were centers of major Islamic military and missionary activities throughout the centuries. A need for maintaining a strict military discipline where the warriors had to obey the commands of their superiors served as the basis for the hierarchy of a ribat, which were later transported into the turuq, whose members, like warriors, were bound together by loyalty to a shaykh or a guide. Sufism and the turuq in these contexts were related to local ethnic cultures undergoing Islamization and as Gilsenan has emphasized “Sufi orders had no distinct type” and assumed different forms of manifestations in different historical and cultural contexts. Sufism is better conceived, as Geertz puts it, as “a series of different and even contradictory experiences… variety of mentalities, the multiplicity of local forms of faith.” All and every zawiya was a Sufi tariqa, and all Sufis were mourabit.

Eickelman in his later works, however, switched from the term mourabit to the notion of ‘pious ones’ (as-Salih), because, as he argues, the term “mourabit has accumulated a baggage of misinterpretation over the years.” As with the Moors of Mauritania described by C. C. Stewart, he sees zawaya in Morocco as primarily social units, the members of which claim common ancestry and privileged access to Islamic knowledge. Thus, zawaya per se cannot be automatically identified as pursuing Sufi


61 Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi*, pp. 4-5.


64 Eickelman, *The Middle East and Central Asia*, p. 276.

principles; moreover they were dominated from their inception by the ‘orthodoxy’. Eickelman recently denounced the dichotomized view of Sufism versus orthodoxy or Sufis versus ‘ulama as distorting, because both conceptions and groups were fluid and open to each other.\textsuperscript{66}

Orientalists also believed that there was an ‘ideal type’ Sufism in a Weberian sense, the only ‘true’ and legitimate type, against which all other forms could be assessed. Sufis who did not conform to this type were considered impostors, mixing a ‘true’ religion with local ‘pagan’ cultures.\textsuperscript{67} According to this school of thought, by the ninth century, Muslim intelligentsia tended to become divided into two groups – the ‘ulama, the theologians and jurists, on the one hand, and those who gave to religion a more personal basis and stressed personal religious devotion, hailed as Sufis, on the other.\textsuperscript{68}

While the first group created the institutions of ‘orthodox’ schools of law - madhhahib (Ar., pl., sing., maddhab) and incorporated theology into Islamic centers of education, the second group institutionalized the concept of tasawwuf (Ar., principles of esoteric Islam) transforming it from private meetings of the elite into the form of a tariqa. This transformation provided a structure and method for the pursuit of one’s inner religious development.

The two conceptions of Islam, the ‘ulama ‘orthodoxy’ and Sufi tasawwuf were allegedly in constant conflict but were reconciled by al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), who was credited with bringing Sufi doctrines into compliance with the ‘orthodoxy’. The compromise paved the way for the wider acceptance of Sufi ideas and can in itself explain the impressive advance of the turuq in the following centuries. However, the further the turuq went away from Muslim heartlands, the more they became involved in ‘dubious’ practices harboring the heretical. By the eighteenth century, “Muslims were oblivious of the discordant elements” between ‘popular’ Sufism and ‘ulama ‘orthodoxy’ and the initial ‘high’ Sufism resulting from al-Ghazzali’s ‘orthodox’ reconciliation was


\textsuperscript{67} Abun-Nasr, The Tijaniyya, pp. 37-38.

lost in later historical periods during which Sufism acquired more ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ characteristics.\textsuperscript{69} In Africa, Sufis were missionaries whose activities were frequently conducive to the “vulgarization of some of the basic Muslim beliefs” and had a strong appeal for the illiterate masses, rather than interpreted as constituent elements within a comprehensive system of ritual and belief.\textsuperscript{70}

Sufi Orders, such as the Tijaniyya, the Khatmiyya, the Kittaniyya, the Sanusiyya to mention only a few, were thought of as being implicated in Islamic reform movements, allegedly attempting to purify ‘popular’ Islam and ‘vulgar’ Sufism from ‘un-Islamic’ elements and implement a stricter \textit{Shari’a} (Ar., Islamic legal principles). Their doctrinal outlook appeared to be so different from the generalized ‘vulgarization’ and the decay of Sufi ideals that some scholars thought that these \textit{turuq} were ‘neo-Sufi’. This notion, also first introduced by Fazlur Rahman, was subsequently adopted by Nehemia Levtzion and John Voll.\textsuperscript{71}

The ‘neo-Sufi’ notion has been extensively criticized since then. In particular, Rex Sean O’Fahey has expressed some doubts whether ‘neo-Sufism’ represented any kind of doctrinal innovation but suggested that if the notion is to be accepted, then it should be viewed as embodying new organizational phenomenon among the \textit{turuq}, whose importance was felt mainly in the peripheral zones of the Muslim world, such as Africa, where more structured and centralized Sufi Orders with significant popular following, emerged.\textsuperscript{72}

In northern Mozambique, such Orders were the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya, which arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century through traditional Swahili networks. They were pan-Islamic in character with connections to the global Muslim community and broad cognizance of the issues and debates engulfing the wider

\textsuperscript{69} Abun-Nasr, \textit{The Tijaniyya}, p. 2.


Muslim world. Both Orders underwent an extraordinary expansion during the twentieth century.

II.3. Approach of this Dissertation

Since Said’s seminal work, it has been a challenge to find an adequate theoretical approach to the study of Islam because practices initially judged atypical of Islam, such as ‘popular Islam’ and ‘vulgar Sufism’ believed to be widespread in Africa most of all, turned out to have much broader distribution in the Muslim world than initially imagined. Hence, there was a need for a new approach which should have reconciled the universal and global character of Islam on the one hand, and the multiplicity of conceptions and practices in various parts of the world, on the other. As Robert Launay points out,

> the challenge [was] to find a framework in which to analyze the relationship between this single, global entity, Islam and the multiple entities that are the religious beliefs and practices of Muslims in specific communities in specific moments of history.

However, some researchers such as Clifford Geertz, have disengaged from the universalistic and ‘scripturalist-classical’ Islam altogether, highlighting instead the diversity of its localized conceptions. In *Islam Observed*, Geertz replaced the Orientalist universal category of ‘Islam’ with another universal category of ‘religion’, whose specific, localized contents were “embodied in the images and metaphors its adherents use to characterize reality.” Geertz has separated religious belief from other sorts of beliefs, such as ideological, philosophical, scientific, or commonsensical and suggested situating religion within the anthropological discussion of culture. He has limited

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74 Launay, *Beyond the Stream*, pp. 5-6.


76 Geertz, *Islam Observed*, pp. 95, 98.
religion to the domain of symbols and culture that cannot be altered by practical worldly means. According to him, a person cannot freely articulate his culture or religious belief as these are prior to his individual human experience, and an individual is usually born into his culture and religion, rather than acquire them through experience or conscious choice.\textsuperscript{77}

Studying religion for Geertz entails focusing on the socially available “systems of significance’ [or symbols] – beliefs, rites, meaningful objects - in terms of which subjective life is ordered and outward behavior is guided.”\textsuperscript{78} These symbols embody collectively created patterns of meaning that form a worldview and a lifestyle of an individual or of a collectivity of people who share meanings and symbols within that culture.\textsuperscript{79} Contrasting Islam in Morocco and Indonesia, Geertz has exemplified the particular cultural adaptations of Islam in each of these two presumably antipodal contexts.\textsuperscript{80} But he makes both local culture and local forms of Islam in each of these specific geographical settings essentialized and pervasively trans-historical.

Talal Asad has criticized Geertz for insisting on the primacy of meaning without regard to the processes by which meanings are constructed.\textsuperscript{81} For Asad, attributing certain meanings to symbols and practices within a given religious domain is neither an inherent nor an automatic process but an historical one. Different actors throughout history contested for power to legitimately and authoritatively define the symbolic/discursive and practical contents of the religious traditions such as Christianity and Islam. Like Michel Foucault, Asad contrasts the modern episteme with that of the Middle Ages, and demonstrates that a universal definition of religion is primarily a product of the modern period. Only in the twentieth century religion came to be perceived as “a distinctive space

\textsuperscript{77} Geertz, \textit{Islam Observed}, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{78} Geertz, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{79} Geertz, \textit{Islam Observed}, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{80} Geertz, \textit{Islam Observed}, pp. 9-11, 19.

of human practice and belief, which cannot be reduced to any other.” Though this perception “invites us to think of religion as trans-historical and trans-cultural phenomenon,” it is the product of a unique post-Reformist western European history and thought and thus cannot serve as a category applicable to religious discourses and practices universally and unambiguously for all human kind and in all times. Therefore, there cannot be a universal definition of religion at all, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific to western European Christianity, but because that definition is itself an historical product of disciplining discursive processes associated with modernist Western rational thinking ranging from Kant to contemporary theory. As a result of these processes, according to Asad, religion became dissociated from a concrete and contextualized set of practical rules attached to specific relations of power and knowledge, from which it was abstracted and made universal. The theoretical search for an essence of religion invites us to separate it conceptually from the domain of power. But, as Asad points out, “religious symbols cannot be understood independently of their historical relations with nonreligious symbols or the articulation in and of social life, in which work and power are always crucial.”

Voicing his discontent with approaches that either essentialize or disintegrate ‘Islam’ as an object of study, Asad has held that scholars should treat Islam “neither as a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of beliefs, artifacts, and morals, but as a discursive tradition that links past, present and future in a variety of ways”.

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82 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 27.
83 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 28.
84 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 29. See also, Paul Stuart Landau, The Realm of the Word: Language, Gender, and Christianity in a Southern African Kingdom. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann; Cape Town: David Philip; London: James Currey, 1995), pp. xix- xx; xxv-xxvi; Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity, pp. 5-17, 24-29
85 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 42.
86 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 29.
87 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 50.
Islamic tradition is thus those unequal relationships of authority and compliance that are constructed around and through specific discourses that constitute the social core of religious traditions.\(^89\) The social core of this tradition is the discourse over the ‘correct’ knowledge of Islam or ‘orthodoxy’ and Muslim differences are fought on the ground of the concept of an ‘orthodox’ Islam.\(^90\) ‘Orthodoxy’, in Asad’s view, is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship of power, and it is not the finished product of ‘orthodoxy’ that is at stake, but rather, the process of creating relationships of ‘orthodoxy’.\(^91\)

Launay has emphasized that because Islam has a universalistic dimension to it, it cannot be reduced to a virtually infinite series of purely local idiosyncrasies.\(^92\) But one of the shortcomings of Geertz’ approach has been his limited concern with the different ways that different groups within a single society conceive of and use religious tradition.\(^93\) Launay’s own work deals with how different conceptions of Islam have emerged and confronted one another in Korhogo town, Côte D’Ivoire, during the colonial and post-colonial periods.\(^94\) He points out that religious conceptions are not only conceptions of the world but conceptions of society, and that different understandings of Islam define and express the ideal nature of communities and consequently the proper place of individuals within them.\(^95\) As Louis Brenner maintains, internal Muslim conflict about the nature of Islam itself


\(^92\) Launay, *Beyond the Stream*, pp. 6-7.


\(^94\) Launay, *Beyond the Stream*, pp. 10-14, 28, 32-33.

\(^95\) Launay, *Beyond the Stream*, pp. 28, 32.
is as healthy as it is inevitable, since it is a direct result of the fact that Islam is a living religion that is constantly being reinterpreted and re-understood by those who adhere to its doctrines. Over the centuries, the tension between a committed belief in the eternal immutability of God’s word on the one hand, and the diverse pressures and demands of ordinary life on the other, has produced many varied ‘Islamic’ solutions to social and political problems, without eliminating Islam.\textsuperscript{96}

This dissertation approaches Islam as a living and discursive tradition, centered on historical agency and the relations of power because, as Launay upholds, Islam “does not exist apart from the specific beliefs and practices of diverse individuals in particular communities at precise moments of historical time”.\textsuperscript{97} The thesis argues that the connection between the two discursive traditions, that of matrilineal chiefship and of Shirazi Islam emerged during the nineteenth century in response to the slave trade and the expansion of Islam to the mainland, and persevered throughout the colonial era, because Africans, in particular, the chiefly clans of northern Mozambique were the principal agents and actors of Islamization of the region. These clans, organized into a regional network of the \textit{Maka}, while maintaining the old matrilineal discursive tradition of chiefship also appropriated Islam and transformed it into one of their chiefly domains.

The thesis concentrates on how Muslim chiefly clans of northern Mozambique fought incessantly throughout the colonial period for the control of Islam against outsiders and racially different people associated with different conceptions of Islam, in particular Sufism and \textit{Wahhabism}, both of which appeared at times when chiefship was under a great deal of pressure and threat. For example, Sufi Orders emerged when the Portuguese were undertaking the military conquest of “effective occupation” of the region by subjugating and conquering local chiefs and chiefdoms at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. While initially Muslim chiefs were focused on colonial encroachment rather than the expansion of the Orders, with the gradual and inevitable implementation of colonial rule, they set about recovering the Muslim side of the authority by appropriating the new Sufi conception of Islam, and from the 1930s, the Sufi Orders were practically under their control.

\textsuperscript{96} Brenner, \textit{Controlling Knowledge}: pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{97} Launay, \textit{Beyond the Stream}, pp. 5-6.
The so-called Wahhabis became publicly visible in Mozambique in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when African independence ideology and liberation movements began taking root in northern Mozambique. This new conception of Islam also threatened the hold of the Muslim chiefly elites over an Islamic authority, now associated with Sufism, but the intervention of colonial rule in favor of Sufis, safeguarded their status quo.

The thesis focuses on how, with the emergence of the new conceptions of Islam, Muslims revived internal debates about the nature of the Islamic tradition, and set about delineating what constituted locally the centre and the margin of this tradition. Each time a new debate emerged, they questioned the compatibility of the tradition of chiefship and associated rituals and conceptions, such as matriliny, chiefly installation ceremonies and African healing with an Islamic ‘orthodoxy’.

III. Sources

The dissertation relies on archival documents, memoirs and reports of colonial officials and fieldwork in Nampula province and Maputo city. Historical data on northern Mozambican Muslim societies in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century is drawn from published official reports and memoirs of the Portuguese military conquerors of the “effective occupation,” such as Mousinho de Albuquerque, António Enes, Pedro Massano de Amorim, Eduardo do Couto Lupi, João de Azevedo Coutinho, Ernesto Jardim de Vilhena, David Rodrigues, and others. They provide detailed military accounts of the conquest and information on local African rulers, including their interaction with each other, the Portuguese and the Swahili world. Many of these Portuguese military personnel also acted as Governor-Generals of Mozambique and produced official reports containing economic, socio-political and ethnographic description of the region.

Other material for this and the later historical periods was obtained from the archival documents kept in the Mozambique Historical Archives (AHM, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique), especially from the official Portuguese administrative reports

held at the collection of the Government-General of Mozambique (FGG, Fundo de Governo-Geral), the collection of the Indigenous Affairs and Administration Inspections (ISANI, Fundo de Inspeção de Administração e Negócios Indígenas), and the collection of the Special Section (S.E., Secção Especial).

Besides reports, the Special Section contains ethnographic material produced by local administrators of specific regions and by military officers, often serving in remote and little known locations and places in Mozambique. Some unpublished reports of the ethnographic research by the mission of the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarinas (Higher Institute of Social Sciences and Overseas Politics) in the 1950s and 1960s are also located in the Special Section. Most of this Institute’s studies, such as those by José Julio Gonçalves\textsuperscript{99} and Frederico José Peirone\textsuperscript{100} were published, but some, such as that by Albano Mendes Pedro,\textsuperscript{101} were not.

In addition, the Special Section collection holds the reports, notes and memorandums by the Portuguese state police (PIDE) and by the Services for Centralization and Coordination of the Information for Mozambique (SCCIM), which included reports by the officers of SCCIM at the time of the independence war (1964-1974), in particular by R. I. Ferraz de Freitas and Mello Branquinho.\textsuperscript{102} But the scope of the PIDE and SCCIM material in Mozambique Historical Archives is very limited, because most of the military and Secret Services archives were taken to Portugal at the time of the independence of Mozambique and kept since in the Portuguese State archives at the Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre de Tombo in Lisbon. Though Mozambique PIDE archives were burned down or destroyed by the Portuguese shortly before leaving


\textsuperscript{100} Peirone, A tribu ajaua.

\textsuperscript{101} Albano Mendes Pedro, Influencias político-sociais do Islamismo em Moçambique. Relatório Confidencial (Typescript dated 31 May 1961, in AHM, Maputo).

\textsuperscript{102} Ivens Ferraz de Freitas, Conquista de Adesão das Populações, Lourenço Marques, SCCIM, 10 May, 1965, exemplar No 372, AHM, SE, II p 6; Branquinho, “Relatório.”
the country in 1975, nevertheless, it was possible to find some useful material in the PIDE archives at the *Torre do Tombo* in Portugal.

Most of the SCCIM archives are kept in the *Torre de Tombo* in Lisbon, containing *inter alia*, extracts of some PIDE lost archives, which were transcribed by the SCCIM officers in order to draw on them for their own research and strategies. The SCCIM archives at *Torre de Tombo* provided important and detailed material for the period of the independence war. But individual answers by Muslim leaders to the SCCIM questionnaire, collected by local administrators in almost all localities and regions of Mozambique were particularly useful, because they contained historical and ethnographic material, and details on localized Islamic conceptions and practices. However, they also reveal a limited awareness of Islam by the administrators, using diverse and often incorrect spellings and explanations for religious terms, titles and designations.

As stated earlier, one of the leading SCCIM specialists on Islam, Monteiro, who is now Professor at the Portucalense University in Portugal, published a book and several academic articles based on Secret Services material and his personal experience on Islam in northern Mozambique, above all during the independence war. His works served as an important source for this dissertation as well. Portuguese colonial politics, strategies, approaches to Islam and Muslims in Mozambique and their shortcomings are discussed in detail in the Introduction and the Chapter Five.

Finally, the dissertation relies on the material acquired through fieldwork and interviews in Nampula province and Maputo city. The aim of the fieldwork was to uncover the scope and the content of Islamic conceptions and practices, and the relationship between African culture and Islam. It was relatively easy to identify the key figures to be interviewed, which included religious leaders and chiefs, all well known people in their respective communities. Muslim religious leadership was also selected according to their stance so as to reflect the diversity of Islamic discourses and practices. For example, healers and *mwalimu* (local vernacular from Ar., Sw., *mw’alim*, religious teacher), Muslim chiefs, Sufi *shaykhs* (from Ar., sing., *shaykh*, pl., *shuyukh*, religious leaders), and people known as the *sukutis*, *Wahhabis*, and *Ahl al-Sunna*, and members of the Islamic Council and Islamic Congress of Mozambique were interviewed individually.

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and sometimes collectively. Important Muslim women were also targeted for interviews, especially the female branches of the Sufi Orders. The authority of Sufi shaykhs at Mozambique Island was often acknowledged beyond their regions of residence, some were known as heads of the Orders nationwide. Some of them had immigrated to Maputo or Nampula cities, where they were traced for interviews.

**IV. Layout of the Thesis**

The dissertation is organized into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on Islam and chiefship in Northern Mozambique by the end of the nineteenth century, and the history Mozambican coastal societies associated with the Swahili world, and their roles in the slave trade and the expansion of Islam. Chapter One also provides an outline of the relationships between various ruling elites of the coast and the mainland before and during the nineteenth century, accompanied by the expansion of Islam and the extension of matrilineal kinship ties, which resulted in the formation of the network of the Muslim chiefly clans during the second half of the nineteenth century. And lastly, the first chapter analyses how Islam was conceived of and practiced in northern Mozambique at the end of the nineteenth century.

The second Chapter addresses the expansion of the two Sufi Orders, the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya in colonial northern Mozambique. The main focus of this chapter is on the strategies that Muslim chiefly clans used in order to secure Islamic religious leadership and authority in response to the changes that were engendered by the turuq. The most important change was related to religious authority, which involved competition and contest between the old Muslim chiefly clans and the new claimants for Islamic authority and ‘orthodoxy’, which resulted in the split of the two Orders into eight turuq.

The third Chapter focuses on the transformations which Mozambique in general and northern Mozambique in particular went through in the context of twentieth century colonialism, when the colonial government introduced administrative, economic, political and legal changes. The questions such as how the meaning and the role of Muslim chiefship changed, if it did, and in which ways local debates about the traditions of Islam
and chiefship were influenced or altered by the Portuguese colonial rule are central to this chapter.

Chapter Four concentrates on the internal Muslim debates and competition and contest for Islamic authority and the definitions of ‘orthodoxy,’ within the context of the successive emerging of the various conceptions of Islam, such as those associated with chiefship and with Sufism and those against these, like the sukuti, Deobandi and Wahhabi, all confronting one another. This Chapter focuses primarily on the shifts in Islamic practices and rituals, which local Muslims debated in similar and parallel ways as they debated other transformations.

The fifth Chapter focuses on the ways Portuguese colonialism perceived of Islam and the kind of politics and policies it adopted toward Islam and Muslims in Mozambique during the twentieth century. The first part outlines Portuguese Orientalism and the related notion of ‘Islão Negro.’ The second part describes the course and the consequences of the “Portugalizing” (portugalização) policies of the 1930s and the late 1950s, when a nationalist Estado Novo made an agreement with the Catholic Church which was expected to undertake “Portugalization” of Africans through mission schooling. Thereafter, the Chapter focuses on the social policies aimed at co-opting Muslims in Mozambique to the side of the colonial rule in the 1960s and 1970s in the face of the emerging liberation movements in northern Mozambique. After violently suppressing those who took part in the liberation movements Muslims in Mozambique for the first time in history were surveyed, learned about, and wooed by the Portuguese by various public means.

Chapter Six focuses on the participation of northern Mozambican Muslims in the liberation movements, first in alliance with MANU and later with Frelimo. The Chapter argues that the involvement of Muslims of this region in liberation movements stemmed primarily from African grass-roots and historically and culturally-rooted nationalism, and the historical tradition of resistance to colonialism. Northern Mozambican Muslims were also influenced by the involvement of Muslims of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in the independence movements there, in particular in TANU, especially because they had close kinship and religious ties with them. The presence and the founding of the Mozambican liberation movements in Tanganyika and Zanzibar with support from TANU was another
important factor for the participation of northern Mozambican Muslims in the liberation movements.
Chapter One

Islam and Chiefship in Northern Mozambique by the End of the Nineteenth Century

This Chapter focuses on four issues. First, it describes the ways in which northern Mozambican coastal societies were historically related to the Swahili world, addressing in particular the history of the coastal regions of the contemporary Nampula province, such as Quitongonha, Sancul, Sangage, and the Sultanate of Angoche. These entities played important roles in the slave trade of the nineteenth century and became regional Muslim centers from which Islam expanded to the rest of northern Mozambique. They also spearheaded the resistance to the Portuguese military campaigns of “effective occupation” at the turn of the century.

Alamin M. Mazrui and Ibrahim Noor Shariff describe shifting definitions and continuous scholarly debates about the notion of ‘Swahili.’ The mapping of the aforementioned regions as ‘the Swahili,’ however, is not intended here so much to take up on those debates as it is meant to establish the contours of the shared regional tradition of Islam and chiefship, a Swahili approach common to East Africa and the northern Mozambican coast.

Second, the Chapter provides an outline of the relationships between various ruling elites of the coast and the mainland before the nineteenth century, who while expanding the reach of Islam were also extending the matrilineal tradition of kinship ties and territorial/land control. This meant that, despite scholarly assumptions, Islam did not alter the matrilineal ideology of chiefship in northern Mozambique and did not render it patrilineal or patriarchal.

This point becomes even clearer when focusing on the third issue - the establishment of the network of the Muslim chiefdoms during the second half of the nineteenth century. The network, incorporating coastal as well as mainland chiefdoms,

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resulted from the region’s involvement in the international slave trade and the massive population migrations of the time. The two regional traditions, the tradition of matrilineal chiefship and of Shirazi Islam had converged in the network.

Chanock points out that there “is a competition about what will become part of the immutable tradition,” however, as the second half of the nineteenth century was characterized by rapid change, it was anything but traditional.\textsuperscript{105} He also remarks: “very little in the way of political authority, systems of marriage, statuses or ‘law’ can be regarded as having been established in these circumstances; all were matters of the most intense conflict.”\textsuperscript{106} But in the violent context of the slave trade, significant population migration and conquest wars, the chiefs with strength and power were the ultimate guarantee for survival and protection, and people sought for ways to be linked to certain chiefs and chiefdoms. By being incorporated into these chiefdoms, they also gained access to the land. Consequently, they were concerned with maintaining their positions linked to other persons and secure rights to land.\textsuperscript{107}

The chiefs, who regulated and controlled territories and people incorporated within them, were the ones who authorized the discourse on tradition.\textsuperscript{108} They used pre-existing matrilineal ideologies of kinship, custom and land to justify the newly established hierarchies and domains of power.\textsuperscript{109} However, the slave trade controlled by the coastal Muslim Swahili ruling elites and the mainland slave supplying chiefs, influenced the expansion to the mainland of Islam, which became a marker between those who could raid for slaves (Muslims) and those to be enslaved (non-Muslims).

While chiefs were the ones who authorized the discourse on tradition, they also relied on a complex entourage for the process of elaborating and legitimizing it. The entourage, when the chief was a male, included the female branch of the matrilineal chiefship, the \textit{apia-mwene} (Emakhwa, \textit{a-} plural prefix, \textit{pia-} woman, \textit{mwene-} a chief, a

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\textsuperscript{105} Chanock, \textit{Law, Custom and Social Order}, pp. 9-10.
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\textsuperscript{106} Chanock, \textit{Law, Custom and Social Order}, p. 9.
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\textsuperscript{107} Chanock, \textit{Law, Custom and Social Order}, p. 231.
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\textsuperscript{108} See for discussion, Feierman, \textit{Peasant Intellectuals}, pp. 31-34.
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\textsuperscript{109} Chanock, \textit{Law, Custom and Social Order}, pp. 13, 15.
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lord, or a master), bearer of the ancestral mythical substance called nihimo in Makua (Emakhwa), which defined the spiritual hold of the chiefly lineage over the land and its people. It also incorporated the advisors or the mahumu (Emakhwa, pl., sing., humu), the heads of the subordinate chiefdoms and clans, and a range of specialists, such as ‘traditional’ healers and Muslim mwalimu.

And fourth, the Chapter analyses how at the end of the nineteenth century Muslim societies of northern Mozambique conceived of Islam within which matriliny was maintained, and what discourses and rituals were central to that conception.

Shirazi Tradition and the Swahili World

On their arrival in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Portuguese noted that northern and central Mozambican coastal regions shared a regional Swahili identity, culture, and language, and were firmly established within Swahili economic networks stretching from Kenya to the Inhambane region of southern Mozambique.110

Similar to the East African coast, the Swahili settlements of northern Mozambique were each ruled by a shehe (Sw., sing., pl., washehe, from Ar., shaykh), and the Portuguese called these settlements xeicados or sheikhdoms, such as for example, xeicados of Quitongonha, Sancul, Sangage, Mogincual, Quivolane, Cabaceiras, Mossuril, etc.111 Moreover, even in Mossuril and Cabaceiras, where the Portuguese supposedly ruled, the Swahili washehe were local rulers. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were also two sultanates in the region, the historical Angoche Sultanate in contemporary Nampula province and the Tungui Sultanate in Cabo Delgado.


111 The geographical borders and limits of these xeicados were not clearly established, and the chiefs who were their subjects as well as the territories included in their dominion were in a continuous state of fissions and fusions, and changed over time. Quitongonha included the island with the same name, and its mainland at the Bay of Condúcia, between Matibane to the Fernão Veloso and Nakala; Sancul included the mainland of the Mocambo Bay, between the Lumbo and Mogincual rivers, with centers in Infusi and Quivolane; Sangage covered the lands between the Mogincual and Metomode rivers; and the Sultanate of Angoche stretched its political rule from the Angoche islands along the coast up to Pebane in Zambezi region to the south and Sancul to the north, and the immediate mainland territories of these coastal regions as well.
Islam at the coast was conceived as a regional Swahili tradition, incorporating African coastal culture and the influences of the Western Indian Ocean regions. Locally, this meant that Islam was associated with the Shirazi clans at the coast, whose religious conceptions and identities on the one hand, incorporated local African perceptions, and on the other, those of the Western Indian Ocean, such as of Hadramawt. Simultaneously, they were constructed so as to maintain the legitimacy of the Swahili clans over the coastal territory against possible encroachment of the foreigners. For instance, to Arab Muslims’ claims of greater Islamic authority and ‘orthodoxy,’ coastal clans responded by elaborating their own Arab and Persian ancestry making them Shirazi.\textsuperscript{112} On the other hand, the Shirazi identities were also constructed in opposition to the Africans of the hinterland portrayed as pagans and uncivilized people of the bush. The Shirazi thus believed that they had exclusive claims over Islamic identity and authority, and that the coastal soil itself was blessed by the Islamic faith and Muslim ancestors.\textsuperscript{113}

However, scholars have been reluctant to classify as ‘Swahili’ those coastal peoples south of Cabo Delgado, in particular of modern Nampula province of Mozambique, such as Quitongonha, Sancul, Sangage and the Sultanate of Angoche.\textsuperscript{114} One reason is that there has been little research on the languages and cultures of this region. The only linguistic research remains on the Ekoti, the language of Angoche, recently completed by Thilo Schadeberg and Francisco Mucanheia.\textsuperscript{115} Though in the 1970s, Mello Machado also considered Esangagi (Ekatchi) and Ekoti, languages of the Angoche and Sangage regions, as Swahili.\textsuperscript{116} The only detailed historical study is by

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\item \textsuperscript{113} Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 33, 36-42, 147, 213, 326.


\item \textsuperscript{115} Thilo Schadeberg and Francisco Mucanheia, \textit{Ekoti: the Maka or Swahili Language of Angoche} (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2000).

\item \textsuperscript{116} Mello Machado, \textit{Entre os Macuas}, p. 165.
\end{itemize}
Nancy Jane Hafkin, concentrating on the eighteenth and nineteenth century Quitongonha, Sancul, and Sangage and the Sultanate of Angoche, though again earlier Mello Machado briefly classified them as Swahili.117

Another reason for this scholarly reluctance is that in comparison with the Swahili of Tanzania, Kenya, Comoro Islands, and even Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique, the Nampula coastal Muslims appear to be less influenced by ‘Arab’ culture. Among the Portuguese conquerors of the beginning of the twentieth century, only Eduardo do Couto Lupi and João de Azevedo Coutinho believed that, for example the Anhapakho (Ekhoti, pl., sing., Nhaphako, clan names of the alleged “founders” or “first-comers”) of Angoche, were “descendants of pure Arabs and Persians” and ‘true’ Muslims.118 The majority of the Portuguese, like contemporary historians, assumed that the initial Arab or Swahili immigrations were gradually overwhelmed and ‘diluted’ by Makua culture and language.119 For example, Edward A. Alpers, in his recent work, points out that “coastal northern Mozambique remained distinctly Muslim – Swahili at its northern extreme toward Cabo Delgado, and shading off into Makua-speaking communities toward Angoche”.120 Malyn Newitt too nowadays avoids the ‘Swahili’ term.121 But both authors in their earlier works did not hesitate in identifying Nampula coastal regions, especially Angoche, as ‘Swahili’.122 Portuguese scholars José Capela and Eduardo C. Medeiros, on the other hand, prefer to use the notion ‘Swahilicized’ rather than Swahili.123


119 Amorim, Relatório, p. 99.

120 Edward A. Alpers, “East Central Africa” p. 305. See also, Pélissier, História de Moçambique, Vol. 1, p. 54.

121 Newitt, A History of Mozambique.

Only Nancy Jane Hafkin insists that the xeicados of Quitongonha, Sancul, and Sangage and the Angoche Sultanate were unequivocally Swahili, culturally similar to the Swahili of the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts, and the Comoro islands, with whom they had family ties and used Swahili language for communication. Hafkin is also alone in explaining what she means by ‘Swahili’. According to her,

Swahili are the Muslim African peoples of the Indian Ocean Coast who spoke an Arabized Bantu language...There is a common culture of the East African coast from Somalia to Mozambique that takes many varied forms but has enough commonalities as well as differences from other cultures of the area to be identified by the term Swahili.

Hafkin’s own research contradicts some of her definitions for the Swahili. For example, she maintains that the Mozambican Swahili do not share the agriculturally-based economy of the neighboring Makua, and that traditional occupations of the Swahili have been sea-faring, fishing, trading, and particularly in the nineteenth century, slave-trading. However, her thesis shows that land and farming were so important that entire local worldviews and politics revolved around them. The significance of the rituals related to land, such as the epepa, and incessant attempts to secure access to land, as well

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Map 2: Northern Mozambique, end of 19th century

as resistance to the territorial encroachments by others, attests to that also. On the other hand, Hafkin believes that the Swahili “lived outside tribal society,” and therefore, did not assign significance to kinship and ethnic and land-related relationships and rituals.\(^{127}\) However, the land and territory-related rituals mentioned above, and the centrality of the semantics of kinship and territory/land in this region suggests that kinship was perceived by local people to be crucial.

While Hafkin states that “the Swahili of northern Mozambique …are Muslims, miscegenated with Arabs with patrilineal ancestry,” she also points out that in contrast to Swahili elsewhere adopting patrilineal patterns of Islamic society, succession and inheritance in this region were matrilineal.\(^{128}\) This unique feature can be explained by the fact that in comparison to the Swahili communities of the Tanzanian and Kenyan coasts, the numbers of Arab immigrants to Mozambique were insignificant.\(^{129}\) In northern Swahili regions, the Hadrami began arriving in the fifteenth century, and the Omani, who later established the Sultanate of Zanzibar, in the eighteenth century.\(^{130}\) For the Swahili there, Arabs posed more challenges than Africans and local Shirazi chronicles depict frequent Arab/Shirazi standoffs.\(^{131}\) In particular the Hadrami \textit{shurafa’}, as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and members of the learned ‘\textit{ulama}’ class, contested Shirazi Islamic claims. This impacted, as Kelly M. Askew points out, on local conceptions of Islam which came to incorporate some principles of Islamic ‘orthodoxy’, including the replacement of the earlier matriliny by the Arab patrilineal ideology, weakening women’s social situation and legal status.\(^{132}\)

\(^{127}\) Hafkin, “Trade”, p. 34.


\(^{129}\) Hafkin, “Trade”, p. 50.


By contrast, the Mozambican Shirazi traditions underscore internal strife and relationships with mainland Africans. The absence of Arab competition over Islamic authority allowed local Swahili to retain their distinct cultural characteristics, such as matrilineal descent and inheritance, along with Muslim identity. Though as Claude Meillassoux points out, matriliney does not mean matriarchy, it nevertheless allowed women to occupy important political and social positions in northern Mozambique as opposed to their counterparts in Swahili settlements of Kenya and Tanzania. Some women were even major chiefs, for example in 1902 when the shehe Matibane Musa Phiri died, a ‘queen’ was elected. In the late 1930s and 1940s, one of the leading chiefs in Matibane, that of Chicoma was again a ‘queen’ named Cebo. She was a daughter of the former shehe of Fernão Velozo subordinate to the shehe of Quitongonha and a sister of the principal chief of the region, the Suluho Mumba. In 1974, according to the official colonial records, there were five female chiefs in Cabo Delgado Province, all Muslims; and three in Nampula Province, two of whom were Muslims. As José Alberto de Melo Branquinho’s 1960s survey shows, some apia-mwene were quite powerful despite the fact that they were not the actual chiefs.


135 This case was reported by local officials to the Governor-General Jaime Perreira Sampaio Forzaj de Serpa Pimentel, in AHM, FGG, Cx. 1012.

136 Inspector Pinto Correia, “Relatório duma Inspeção às Circunscrições do Distrito de Moçambique”, Vol. 1, p. 84, in AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76; and Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 34.

137 Individual files of the chiefs of Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces, dated between 1959 and 1974, are kept in AHM, FGG, Cxs, 899 and 901.

Portuguese legislation allowed women to occupy the position of a chief within the colonial administrative system. For example, the 1933 Portuguese Law on Overseas Administration Reforms (*Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina*) permitted the investiture of a woman for the post of local chief in cases where having a female chief was “a local tradition.” 139

Both Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts and northern Mozambique suffered from the Portuguese ravages of the sixteenth century. However, the Portuguese were later expelled from the northern Swahili coasts, where nevertheless the successive waves of Omani, German and British impinged negatively on the political and social standings of the Shirazi. 140 In contrast, though the Portuguese in Mozambique occupied Swahili islands and the ports of Quelimane, Sofala, Mozambique, and Bazaruto, their bearings on local Muslim affairs subsequently diminished significantly, because, according to oral tradition, most of the ruling Shirazi clans moved out of these territories and established new settlements along the coast. 141 For example, Mozambique Island’s Shirazi clans established the *xeicados* at Quitongonha, Sancul and Sangage 142. These Swahili settlements and those of Angoche, Moma, and Pebane remained independent of the Portuguese until the early twentieth century. Among them, the Angoche Shirazis enjoyed dominant positions since the sixteenth century, because Shirazi traditions of Mozambique credit Angoche Shirazis with antiquity and supremacy in comparison to other Swahili.

Joaquim d’Almeida da Cunha, a Portuguese official in Angoche, brought the Angoche Shirazi tradition to the attention of the European public for the first time in

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139 Decreto-Lei No. 23: 229, 1933. The 1938 Mozambique Interim Governor General’s proposal of uniforms for African chiefs included skirts for women chiefs, for which see, AHM, FGG, Cx. 226-D/6.


1885. Eduardo do Couto Lupi, who was one of the conquerors of the region, had published a book on Angoche in 1907, which contains more detailed information on this tradition. Malyn Newitt has correlated this tradition with the actual historical events of the time and also, with the contents of the Kilwa Chronicle, and concluded that most of it could be considered historically accurate. This tradition ascribes the founding of the ruling coastal clans to two important men, Hasani and Musa, who fled Kilwa to Zanzibar and from there to Mozambique with families and slaves due to religious and political dissent. They came to Angoche, Quelimane and Mozambique Island shortly before Vasco da Gama in 1498. Musa and Hasani settled at Mozambique Island and Quelimane respectively. At each place they encountered an earlier Muslim community already established. For example, at Angoche, the ruler was Bwana Mucussi, also originally from Kilwa. While on a visit to Mozambique Island, Hasani died and was buried on an island off the mouth of the Angoche River, known as Kisiwa Sultani Hasani (referred to as Mafamede by the Portuguese). Musa came to visit his grave and installed Hasani’s son, Xosa, as the Sultan of Angoche (archipelago named Nguja after Zanzibar, of which the principal island was named Kilwa), because Musa found Angoche to be a better place than Quelimane.

When other important Swahili trading settlements in Mozambique, such as Quelimane, Sofala, Bazaruto and Mozambique Island, were occupied by the Portuguese, Angoche escaped the Portuguese ravages and secured its independence. This allowed Angoche to take over the traditional Swahili trading networks. And, the ruling Shirazi clans of the regions under Portuguese control opted to migrate away from their original settlements and requested land and permission to settle in the regions under Angoche’s control. By doing so, they acknowledged the hegemony of the Angoche Anhapakho, who accepted their Shirazi kin as ‘newcomers’ to their lands.


Despite the scholarly reluctance, the Shirazi traditions and Muslim identity of the coastal peoples of the contemporary Nampula province of Mozambique, as well as material, spiritual and economic culture that they share with other Swahili, allow them to be considered the ‘Swahili’. As Randall L. Pouwels points out, Islam and the Shirazi tradition were the keys to Swahili identity:

The ‘Shirazi’… were the Swahili par excellence, those original ‘people of the coast’… original social core of recognizable local kin groups… whose claims to residence in their coastal environs were putatively most ancient… these local Muslims … were ‘Shirazi’.147

Thus, Swahili families, commonly identified as Shirazi, retained connections and kinship ties to each other along the Mozambican and East African coast.

Matriliny, Islam and the Politics of Kinship and Territory

Derek Nurse and Thomas Spear, Abdul Sheriff, Pouwels, August Nimtz Jr., and others, argue that the term ‘Shirazi’ of the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts refers to “the founders”, “original rulers”, or “a core of a relatively ancient descent group”, who identify themselves as the muyini (Bantu, the lord, master), ”the “lords” of the lands under the Swahili settlements148. The Angoche Shirazi clan of the Anhapakho also claim to be the “founders” and the alleged first-comers to the land/territory, the muyini (variations are mwene, muno, and the Portuguese also used monhé to convey the meaning of “a Muslim muyini).149 In this role, the Anhapakho ‘owned’ the land and oversaw its

147 Pouwels, *Horn and Crescent*, pp. 36-37, 40-41.


149 In 1885, Cunha mentioned that the monhé (also, myinh) of the coast had called themselves Assirazi (Shirazi), but later, Vilhena, Lupi, Amorim and other Portuguese conquerors of the region, omit completely Assirazi designation, and refer to the Swahili mainly as myinh or monhé, though they recognize that Muslims are also called Amaca (pl., sing., Maca, from Ar., Mekka) and Issilamu. See, Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 265; Francisco Lerma Matrinez, *O povo Macua e a sua cultura* (Lisboa: Ministério da Educação, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 1989), p. 62; Geffray, *Nem Pai Nem Mãe*, pp. 138-
distribution to the later arrivals to whose allegiance they had special claims through marriage and kinship relations. The latecomers were expected to receive a portion of land from the first-comers in return for tribute and loyalty. The first-comers gave wives, usually sisters or some other relatives to the important latecomers, who then became their kin.

In another context, William P. Murphy and Caroline H. Bledsoe note that the idiom of first-comers based on the dual principle of land (territory) and kinship provides the basic historical reference point in the political life of the (‘matrilateral’) Kpelle. This analysis is appropriate for the peoples in modern northern Mozambique, both in the hinterland and the Swahili coast, who are all matrilineal. As with the Kpelle, here “kinship and territory constitute semantic resources which are put to rhetorical use in the political process.” In this region, people claim matrilineal clanship, mahimo or maloko (pl., sing. – nihimo or nloko in Emakhuwa, lihimo in Ekoti) descending from a common female ancestor symbolically identified as errukulo (Emakhuwa, ‘a womb’) or nipele (Emakhuwa, ‘a breast’). The Anhapakho group of Angoche claims to constitute

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150 The information related to the notions of muyini/mwene/ munolmoné, and kinship and land (territory), and first-comers status, among the Koti and the Makua is based mostly on oral data, which was collected during the fieldwork in Nampula Province in 1999-2000 through interviewing various régulos (pl., sing., régulo, Port., “a small-scale king”, an African chief), including Hasan Bashir and his nephew, Shaykh Adamji Karhila, both Anhapakho at the Catamoio Island, Angoche District; See also Vilhena, Companhia, p. 57; Lupi, Angoche, p. 145; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 115-116.

151 Lupi, Angoche, pp. 144-46; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 115-116.


major clans (*Nhandare, Nhamilala, Nhatide* and *M’bilinzi*), the alleged descendants of four sons of a mythical woman founder.\(^{155}\)

The word ‘first-comer’ does not so much reflect the actual order of arrival as it serves as a political-ideological device with respect to the foundation and the rights of paramount chieftainship.\(^{156}\) The first-comers are usually conquerors violently appropriating the land from the autochthons consequently expelled or reduced to inferior social status. However, some first-comer clans, including the *Anhapakho* of Angoche, claim that the land was vacant on their arrival.\(^{157}\)

Before the nineteenth century, Angoche *Anhapakho* were already the *muyini* with respect to nearby coastal regions, such as the *xeicados* of Sangage, Moma, and Sancul, and as far as Pebane, whose Muslim populations all shared Swahili identity and culture and recognized the supremacy of Angoche rulers as the direct descendants of the Kilwa Shirazi and the lords and first-comers to the lands. Among them, the *Anhandare* (pl., from sing., Nhandare) clan of Moma is considered the closest kin of the Angoche *Anhapakho*. According to the local oral tradition, after repeated failed attempts of the *Anhandare* to monopolize power in Angoche, they were forced by the other *Anhapakho* to leave Angoche and consequently, had settled in Moma.\(^{158}\) From that time on, the three remaining *Anhapakho* clans, the *Nhamilala, Nhatide* and *M’bilinzi*, each took turns in ruling Angoche.

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\(^{157}\) Interviews with the *régulos* of Angoche District.

\(^{158}\) Lupi, *Angoche*, pp. 163-64; Amorim, *Relatório*, p. 3.
Angoche Anhapakho were the muyini to the xeicado of Sangage whose founders, according to oral tradition, came from the coast of Sancul near Mozambique Island in the eighteenth century and received permission from Angoche to settle there.\textsuperscript{159} The Sangage washehe claimed to be Shirazis as old as that of Angoche because they descended from Musa, and were forced by the Portuguese to flee to Sancul in the sixteenth century and from there to Sangage. While the Angoche Sultans extended their influence along the coast south to Moma and Pebane, the xeicado of Sangage expanded to the north, covering the xeicado of Mogincual, bordering with the lands of Sancul.\textsuperscript{160}

The Angoche Anhapakho had been muyini to the Makua under the paramount chief, the Maurruça-muno, who the most influential Makua chief on the mainland up to the mid-nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{161} Frederic Elton, who became the British Consul in the


\textsuperscript{160} Lupi, \textit{Angoche}, pp. 165-66.

region in 1875 and traveled into the hinterland of Mozambique Island, identifies the Maurruça-muno as a Muslim chief, a *hakim* (Ar., “one skilled in medical, philosophic and scientific learning”, “whose judgment is legally binding, i.e., *hukm*”), enjoying a reputation of a “wizard” and “spiritualist”. However, the migration towards the coast of the Mpamella and Marrevoni, and finally, the Nguni diasporas, altered the existing *status quo*, so that by the mid-nineteenth century the newcomers gained political power above most of the old settlers, such as for example, those under the Mauruça-*mwene*.

Among these newcomers, the Mpamella and the Marrevoni especially came dangerously close to the coast. The military prowess and conqueror status of these new immigrants diminished further the influence of Angoche. They blocked Angoche’s access to the mainland and took over control of the caravan routes, imposing their tolls and tributes. It is to these newcomers that Angoche had to become a *muyini* in order to take advantage of the slave trading opportunities and have access to the mainland whose people could be enslaved and sold for export.

Some Marrevoni forcibly occupied the Angoche mainland of the M’luli River valley under the Maurruça-*muno*. When the reigning Maurruça-*muno* was assassinated, the *Anhapakho* intervened in the role of first-comers, moving the M’Lay Makua to other lands and officially conceding the lands to the Marrevoni. With this move, Angoche had not only secured peace and the gratitude of the warrior newcomers, but also imposed its first-comer status and senior *mwene*-ship on the Marrevoni, whose *wamwene*, in turn, gained access to the coast’s infinite trading opportunities. With another group of the Marrevoni under Muatope-*muno* who came to the Larde river valley

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on the mainland of Moma, the *Anhapakho* established kinship relations through the *Nhamilala* lineage.\(^\text{166}\)

Something similar occurred with respect to the Mpamella. According to tradition, the Mpamella were comprised of two groups, the *a-Nella* and the *a-Iadje* (the third group *a-Sena*, disappeared soon after coming to the coast). In the early nineteenth century the Maurruça-*muno* gave the fertile lands in the valley between the rivers M’Luli and Larde to the *a-Iadje* under the Guarnea-*muno* to the detriment of the *a-Nella* of the Morla-*muno*, who not only received less fertile lands, but also found their group divided in half.\(^\text{167}\) The *a-Iadje* and the *a-Nella* continuously clashed with each other not so much for the land’s agricultural potential, but over the territory where the caravan routes of the interior ran through. Eduardo Lupi points out that the *a-Iadje* “lived in great promiscuity” with the *Anhapakho*, intermixing with them and establishing kinship through marriage, while the *a-Nella* lost hope of getting closer to the *Anhapakho*.\(^\text{168}\) The desperation of the Morla-*muno* made him seek an alliance with the Portuguese. With their tenuous support he pursued wars against the *a-Iadje* that ensured a continuous supply of captives for the slave trade.

Other Swahili dealt with the newcomers in similar ways. Sangage for example, managed to establish the *mwene*-ship over the newcomer Mogovolla, among whom the Cubula-*muno* became the most important *mwene* during the height of the nineteenth-century slave trade.\(^\text{169}\) Moma and Pebane did the same thing with the Mogovolla, Mpamella and others who came to their mainland.\(^\text{170}\)

\(^{166}\) Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 322-23.


Slave Trade and the Expansion of Islam

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the region became involved in the international trade in ivory and slaves. The Swahili of northern Mozambique gained prominence once more as leaders in international trade, especially the slave trade, due to their location near ports serving as outlets for slaves to be exported, and as middlemen between the mainland African slave suppliers and the slave buyers coming from across the Indian Ocean. Slave trade and firearms modified the internal social and political outlook of northern Mozambique. In this context, Islam and the political influence of certain Swahili regions, such as Angoche, expanded significantly into the mainland. As mentioned above, Angoche had been involved in trade directed to the Swahili of the north, but the growing demand for slaves beyond the Swahili world offered an exceptional and relatively quick chance to accrue wealth for ports such as Angoche.

Angoche’s chances had increased considerably due to rising European abolitionist movement. In 1815, the Vienna Treaty between Portugal and Great Britain on the gradual abolition of the slave trade was signed. With the 1836 Sá Bandeira Decree, followed by the Decree of 1842 prohibiting the exportation of slaves, the ports of Mozambique Island and Quelimane from where slaves were exported earlier, became difficult destinations for slave traders (negreiros in Portuguese).

As it became clear that Lisbon would not respond to their grievances, they opted to transport the human merchandise to ports independent of European control. The existence of these ports affected negatively the situation of Quelimane and Mozambique Island because the prices and taxes practiced at the independent ports were much lower. So ports such as Angoche became popular destinations for all kinds of merchandise,

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172 Bonate, “The Ascendance of Angoche.”

including slaves, and greatly benefited from collecting fiscal dues. By 1847, many moradores of Mozambique Island had relocated their feitorias (Port., ‘factories’ or ‘commercial establishments’) to Angoche.\(^{174}\) Slaves were sold to other Swahili and Arabs, who used slave labor in lucrative export-oriented clove production in the second half of the nineteenth century.\(^{175}\) Slaves were also sent to the European plantation economies in Brazil, Cuba and the Mascarena Islands\(^{176}\). The Swahili, Brazilians, French, and the Sakalava of Madagascar dominated the export slave trade.

By the 1850s, some of the Anhapakho were not content any more with Angoche’s intermediary entrepôt role alone. They wanted to seize for themselves the opportunity of capturing and selling slaves. Sporadic sales of criminals and domestic slaves, and small numbers of kidnapped persons could satisfy neither the demands of the market nor the greed of the Anhapakho. They could not enslave people near the coast, because these had become the Anhapakho’s kin through marriage and the rule of sequence of occupation (first-comers/latecomers), because “only strange people [non-kin] can be enslaved.”\(^{177}\)

According to Claude Meillassoux, “the saleability of slavery contaminates and reifies kinship relations,” and the very essence of slavery is “the social incapacity of the slave to reproduce socially – that is, the slave’s juridical inability to become ‘kin’.”\(^{178}\) In previous times, healers undertook rituals aimed at integrating aliens as cadets into the host society. With the rise of the export slave trade, the healers performed rituals in which the kidnapped were kept hidden for some days and then given a magic potion, which made them forget their origins and their kin, and only after that they could be sold into slavery.\(^{179}\) The Yao shared these perceptions too, as described by Benigna Zimba.\(^{180}\)


\(^{175}\) Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory*, pp. 57-61, 228-238.


\(^{177}\) Lupi, *Angoche*, p. 149.


The discontented Anhapakho became determined to create their own mainland basis of slave supply and take control over the hinterland caravan routes. Musa Mohammad Sahib Quanto (d. 1879) was instrumental in bringing the mainland under the aegis of Angoche.\(^1\) He was an archetype of a northern Mozambican Shirazi Swahili: a maternal brother of the Angoche Sultan, Hassani Yussuf, and a paternal brother of shehe Ali, the ruler of the Cabaceira Grande, Musa was a son of Amadi Sabo, the ruler of the Cabaceira Pequena, and a nephew of Gulamo Huseni, the official interpreter of the Portuguese administration at Mozambique Island.\(^2\) Musa traveled and learned extensively during his teens while accompanying his uncle, an Islamic proselytizer, a hajji (Ar., a pilgrim to Holy Mecca) and a sharif. Together they went to Zanzibar, Madagascar, the Comoros and to the Mozambican interior along the Rivers Zambezi and Lugenda. It seems that during these journeys Musa became convinced of the possibility of Angoche’s expansion into the interior and conceived of the project to conquer the mainland. Previously, similar projects were unthinkable. In 1787, the Portuguese legalized gun sale to Africans and from that time on, the firearms could be purchased virtually from anybody, Arabs, French, Swahili, British, etc. Some Africans learned to produce gunpowder domestically.\(^3\) Soon, guns and ammunition became the most sought after merchandise and currency. With the widespread circulation of firearms and increasing armies of slave sepoys, Musa could put his ambitions to practice.

Among the regional powers, the Zambezi prazos (Port., landed estates) of Maganja da Costa threatened Angoche ambitions the most.\(^4\) The Maganja da Costa

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\(^{183}\) Capela and Medeiros, O tráfico, pp. 80, 105.

extended between the Indian Ocean coast, Quizonga or Tejungo River in the north, Licungo or Lugela Rivers in the south and up to the confluence of the rivers Luo and Lugela in the west in the interior, and was militarily powerful and agriculturally rich, with big annual fairs that became a popular destination for the caravan routes from the interior.\textsuperscript{185} It controlled slave trade routes linking the Lake Nyasa region and the Maganja coast. The slaves brought by the Yao were sold at the Maganja fairs, from where the Maganja da Costa troops took the slaves to the coast they controlled and shipped for export. The expansion of Maganja da Costa posed an immediate threat to Angoche’s Swahili kin in Pebane, who also suffered from the incessant migrations from the interior, which blocked their access to the mainland caravan routes. These routes were also being actively diverted from the Swahili port of Tejungo to the ports of Maganja.\textsuperscript{186} The pretext for Musa’s campaign came from complaints of one of the Angoche’s \textit{Anhapakho} kin on the mainland of Pebane, the Nampi-\textit{mwene}, whose lands Maganja da Costa warriors ravaged.\textsuperscript{187} Musa was selected as the commander-in-chief of Sultan Hassan and bestowed a war name of \textit{Namuali} (“The Fearsome”).

Musa succeeded in his military mission. He annexed some lands of the \textit{prazo} and enslaved some of its population.\textsuperscript{188} In 1861, João Bonifácio da Silva, one of the two da Silva brothers who owned the Maganja da Costa \textit{prazos}, not only re-conquered his family lands, but also triumphantly entered the Sultan’s seat on Catamoyo Island of the Angoche archipelago.\textsuperscript{189} The Zambezians, however, were not interested in staying in Angoche

\textsuperscript{185} Capela, \textit{A República}, 21; Medeiros, \textit{As etapas}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{186} Coutinho, \textit{As duas conquistas}, p. 13; Lupi, \textit{Escola}, pp. 37-39; Capela, \textit{A República}, p. 16.


permanently, leaving their praços at home unguarded. As soon as they left, Musa Quanto restored the Sultanate.

Both the lords of the praços and Musa represented a new kind of leadership emerging in Mozambique. They relied heavily on large numbers of slave armies and firearms, and sought to take control over slave trade routes. Like the African soldiers who ruled Maganja da Costa, Musa wanted to have sole control over trade. Thus, when Sangage harbored the Banyan (Hindu Vanya) Indians who attempted to take over local trade, Musa attacked Sangage. In 1870, Musa attacked the a-Nella Mpamella, who did not want to recognize Angoche’s first-comer status, but only in 1876 was Musa able to defeat their paramount chief, the Morla-mwene.

Following Musa’s operations, Angoche became an important destination for slave traders from the interior, attracting caravans led by the Yao and the Marave, descending from the territories surrounding Lake Nyassa. It is after Musa’s conquests that the Anhapakho of Angoche were finally able to impose their status as first-comers and superior muyini of Muslim faith (the monhé) unequivocally on the most important paramount chiefs both of the coast and the interior. Cunha, who studied the customs of the people nearby Angoche in 1880s, maintained that the Anhapakho were the most powerful among all the monhés of the region. In the 1890s, F. A. da Silva Neves, the Portuguese captain-major of Angoche, noted that the Anhapakho alone claimed the title of monhé for themselves because of their

prestige [derived from their] tradition and antiquity, and it could be said that they are the mentors of all others, even the Macua, [all] under Ibrahim bin Sultani Suleiman bin Rajah [the Sultan of Angoche at that time] residing at the Catamoio Island, where also live the noble race of the monhé (anhapakho).

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192 Capela and Medeiros, *O tráfico*, p. 81.
193 Hafkin, “Trade”, p. 344.
195 Neves, *Informações*, pp. 8, 21. See also, Neves’s 1900 official report as the Captain-mór of Angoche in AHM, FGG, Cx. 1008.
In order for the caravans to pass peacefully from the interior through different chiefdoms all the way to the coast, Musa Quanto had to build up a web of allies through conquest and kinship relations. As discussed earlier, establishing kinship ties between various chiefly lineages in northern Mozambique, including Swahili at the coast and the mainlanders, such as the Maurruça-muno, for political and trade purposes, was a common practice in earlier times too. The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Portuguese sources underscore kinship relations between Angoche Anhapakho rulers and the powerful but fairly recent mainland chiefs. Amorim even identifies Guarnea-muno of Mpamella as a Nhapakho, while Coutinho mentions that, “Mollid Vullai, Maravi, shehes of Cabaceiras, Sangage, Infusi, Matibane and others, all have kinship ties, more or less close, with the people of Angoche.” These relationships extended up to Muslim Yao chiefs of the Lake Nyasa region, such as Makanjila, who, as W. P. Johnson pointed out in 1911, saw himself “as one with the coast.” Little is known about the kinship relations of the Yao chiefs and coastal Swahili, but Hafkin mentions that the Yao Muslim chief Mussaca was a brother of Abudurabe, the Swahili Sultan of Tungui in the contemporary Cabo Delgado province, and was married to Cuffria, sister of another Swahili ruler at Mocimboa da Praia.

There was a substantial expansion of Islam in northern Mozambique as a result of the significant population movements from the mainland to the coast and the involvement of the region in the international slave trade during the nineteenth century. Alpers mentions the 1852 report by the Governor of Mozambique that refers to “the extraordinary Muslim advance, its infiltration into the interior and the consequent

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197 Newitt, A History of Mozambique, pp. 4, 6, 10, 12, 22.

198 Amorim, Relatório, p. 33, Coutinho in Memórias, pp. 31-32.


Alpers further cites Elton, who travelled in the Mozambican coastal hinterland in 1875-76, and the 1890 Nyasa Company survey, both indicating considerable inroads of Islam among the mainland Makua. The expansion of Islam into the hinterland was intimately tied to Angoche’s ambitions regarding the export slave trade. The network of paramount chiefs and their subordinates made up the bulk of slave raiders. Those who were not accepted into the network, who were not Muslims, and those who resisted, became Angoche’s pool of slaves, enabling the Anhapakho to ship their own captives for export. The network established the limits between the slave-raiders (the Maca, Muslims and ‘civilized’) and those to be enslaved (the Makua and Lomwe, derogatory terms, meaning savagery, i.e., ‘non-Muslims’ and ‘uncivilized’), and their respective territories. The internal, local social history of slavery in northern Mozambique is yet to be written, but this dichotomist classification of Muslims as Maca in opposition to Makua and Lomwe viewed as an inferior category persisted throughout the colonial period.

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202 Alpers, Ibid.

203 Branquinho in “Relatório”, p. 306, points out that at the Mozambique Island, “people who bought slaves [in the past] were called the Maca or Amaca (meaning civilized and Mohammedan), while slaves that came from the continent and the ‘terras firmes’, were known as the Macua or Macoa, the way they are also known in Madagascar and Comoros, to where in the past slaves were taken and where their descendent still can be found”. René Pélissier in História, Vol. 1, p. 245, cites Manuel Fernandez-Fernandez (“La résistance socio-culturelle des Amakhuwa à la colonisation portugaise (1868-1973)”, Ecole d’ès Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1976, p. 27), who maintains that the term “Macua” had and still has a certain connotation of derision: “in effect, M’makhuwa means somebody who is savage, who eats rats and walks naked. M’Makhuwa also means someone from the mainland country [or bush].” See also, Inspector Armando Eduardo Pinto Correia “Relatório duma Inspeção às Circunscrições do Distrito de Moçambique, 1936-1937” (2 Volumes), Vol. 1, pp. 33, 100, in AHM, ISANI (Inspeção dos Serviços Administrativos e dos Negócios Indígenas), Cx. 76; Inspector Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa “Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Distrito de Nampula da Província do Niassa, 1948” (6 Volumes), Vol. 1, p. 168; Vol. 2, p. 240; Vol. 3, P. 649; Vol. 4, p. 751; Vol. 5, p. 1112, in AHM, ISANI, Cx. 77; Plínio Lopes de Oliveira, Secretário de Circunscrição de Mogincual “Monografia Etnográfica. Circunscrição de Mogincual” in AHM, S.E. 2. III., P. 6, No 31, 1956, pp. 1, 9; J. R. Pégado e Silva “Agrupamentos Étnicos e Religiões do Eraati” (Separata do Boletim do Instituto de Investigação Científica de Moçambique, Vol. 1, No 2, paginas 174-82, Lourenço Marques, 1961), in AHM, S. E., A. II, P. 9, No 93, 1961, pp. 4, 7; D. Reis, “Os Macuas do Mogovollas”, in Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique (XXXI, 131, 1962, pp. 5-37), p. 35.

204 Cunha, Estudo, pp. 43, 46; Lupi, Angoche, pp. 70, 106, 178-79; Coutinho, Memórias, pp. 31-32; Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 36, 82; Mello Machado, Entre os Macuas, p. 117; Capela and Medeiros, O tráfico, pp. 97-98. See also, Pélissier, História, Vol. 1, p. 245.
In the context of the nineteenth century slave trade, Angoche’s position had also been strengthened by the fact that the Anhapakho were the Shirazi Swahili, so Angoche also became the regional center of Islam. This bolstered Angoche’s position not only vis-à-vis the networks of the Indian Ocean dominated by the Anhapakho’s Swahili Shirazi kin, but also the people of the hinterland, to whom they became supreme muiyni of Muslim faith, or as the Portuguese called them - the monhé. Musa Quanto’s own upbringing and standpoint might have added some strength to the expansion of Islam, because apparently he had a solid Islamic education and knowledge through his association with a zealously religious sharif uncle and his travels around the most important Islamic centers of East African coast. Hafkin even suggests that one of the objectives of Musa’s military operations was proselytizing Islam among the people of the interior, and that he pursued a campaign of holy war (jihad).

In fact, Musa’s main objective was to gain control over the slave trade by creating networks throughout the region, and his projects influenced the course of ‘ethnic’ and territorial transformations, resulting in the creation of the new paramount chiefdoms and new ‘ethnic’ identities. As Joseph F. Mbwiliza points out, from the 1850s onwards, “the Macua [and by extension, other ‘ethnic’ groups] resurfaced under a new generation of military leaders”. These transformations were already underway because of the population movements, influenced for example by the Marave and Nguni expansions. Mbwiliza argues that many Makua junior lineages also opted to leave the territories controlled by the elder lineage heads in order to assert their autonomy and take advantage

205 Cunha, Estudo, p. 43; Lupi, Angoche, pp. 70, 135, 182; Amorim, Relatório, passim; Bonate, “The Ascendance of Angoche”; Bonate, “From Shirazi into Monhé.”


207 Lupi, Angoche, pp. 129, 134; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 22-23; A Manual of Portuguese East Africa, compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty (London: Published by His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1920), p. 96.

208 Mbwiliza in A History, p. 144.

of the long distance trading opportunities.\textsuperscript{210} It might be so for the hinterland people, but the power of the old Shirazi clans was only reinforced because of their convenient coastal geographic location and leading roles in the slave trade. Constant wars and slave raiding caused many groups to flee their settlements and search for safer places to live, which also contributed to the wide-spread population relocations of the time.

Paul Baxter maintains that the use of the natural resources requires activities not by a politically or territorially bounded group but by a ritually bounded congregation.\textsuperscript{211} However, as the history of northern Mozambique has shown, it is difficult to bind a group only through a ritual and maintain a control over natural resources such as land, when the warfare, slave-raiding, violent conquests and significant population migrations are all happening simultaneously. It was necessary to secure politically the territory and bind people in it using a shared or accepted ideological and epistemological discourse and ritual. That is what happened in northern Mozambique.

\textbf{Islam and the Tradition of Chiefship}

Mbwiliza and Alpers maintain that kinship ideology in general, and the matrilineal one in particular, came under a great deal of pressure due to the expansion of Islam.\textsuperscript{212} But while Alpers recognizes that “nevertheless, customary law and matrilinearity prevailed among the Yao [and by extension, the Makua] throughout the colonial era”, Mbwiliza upholds that Makua social structure was transformed in ways that led to the decline of kinship ideology and to masculinization of political power.\textsuperscript{213} This, Mbwiliza believes, paved the way for the generalization of the paternal right and patriarchy, and to “the subordination

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\textsuperscript{210} Mbwiliza, \textit{A History}, pp. xiii, 67-71.


\textsuperscript{213} Mbwiliza, \textit{A History}, p. 70-72; Alpers, \textit{Ibid.}
\end{footnotesize}
of women and the emergence of the polygamous patriarchal family.”\footnote{Mbwiliza, A History, p. 51.} However, as Jean Davison points out, Islam’s theoretical predilection for patriliney and patriarchy has not been adopted wholesale in Africa and is not consistent everywhere.\footnote{Jean Davison, Gender, Lineage, and Ethnicity in Southern Africa (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 39-40, 54-56; Pauline E. Peters, “Introduction”, in Critique of Anthropology (Vol. 17, No 2, June 1997, pp. 123-147), pp. 133-34. See also Neves, Informações, p. 11; Camizão, Governo, pp. 4-5; Lupi, Angoche pp. 142-44; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 102-04, 124-134; Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 331; Mello Machado, Entre os Macuas, pp. 181-192, 221; Bonate, “Matriliny”.} In fact, in northern Mozambique as coastal Shirazi and the mainland chiefs were the lords of the lands, the conversion to Islam altered the matrilineal ideology of neither.\footnote{Vilhena, Companhia, p. 56. See also, Neves, Informações, pp. 13, 102-103; Lupi, Angoche, pp. 144-45; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 100, 102-104, Hafkin “Trade”, pp. 194-95, and passim.} On the contrary, the ascendance of Angoche to supremacy in the region was embedded in its leaders’ successful political maneuvering and strategic reshuffling of kinship ideologies, in particular, of the semantics of kinship and territorial relations that were at the base of political organizations and shared perceptions of the matrilineal societies of the region.\footnote{Bonate, “The Ascendance of Angoche”; Bonate, “From Shirazi into Monhé”.} The reports by the Portuguese conquerors and Hafkin’s research confirm this view.\footnote{Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 91, 94-95, 205, 240, 342.} In 1885, da Cunha noted that among Anhapakho of Angoche,

On the death of a father the inheritance is not transmitted to children, as it is prescribed by the Muslim custom, but to the eldest nephew, son of the sister, or to brothers [of the deceased] according to the custom of the Kaffirs [i.e., Africans].\footnote{Cunha, Estudo, p. 47. See also, Amorim, Relatório, p. 120.}

Moreover, individual files of the chiefs of the three northern Mozambican Districts (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Mozambique) collected between 1954 and 1974, indicate that the majority of the chiefs were Muslims and had inherited their positions and
title as a rule from maternal uncles, with rare exceptions being from their uterine brothers and sisters or children of uterine sisters.\footnote{220}

Mbwiliza also believes that on conversion to Islam, “the role of the \textit{pia-mwene} [a woman-\textit{mwene}] was taken over by the village sheikh” and that “for Muslim converts, the Koran was an alternative to the traditional \textit{epepa}.”\footnote{221} However, if the chiefs remained matrilineal then the ritual power of the \textit{pia-mwene} continued unchallenged because as the descendants of the first-comers, the chiefs’ lineages represented a link between the world of the ancestral spirits left behind and the spirits of the new homeland. They had to appease the spirits of the new land if it was vacant, or expel them together with its previous owners. Through these relations to the spirit world, the first-comers were responsible for the well being and fertility of the land and its inhabitants that were ensured through appropriate ritual performed a \textit{pia-mwene}, a putative or real elder uterine sister of the chief. Lupi does not mention \textit{pia-mwene} at all, and does not consider women to be important in social or political life in the regions of Angoche, but Amorim, Branquinho and other Portuguese colonial officials underscore the importance of \textit{pia-mwene} in several passages, and do not make any distinction between \textit{muyini} of Angoche or the Makua in this respect.\footnote{222} Although the scholarly literature usually attributes importance to the male \textit{mwene} at the expense of the female one, oral traditions underscore that each \textit{mwene} was accompanied by a \textit{pia-mwene}, and sometimes a \textit{pia-mwene} led a group on her own.\footnote{223} In fact, it would be accurate to say that in northern Mozambique, as with the Asante of Ghana, the ritual and political roles of the male \textit{mwene} and the female \textit{mwene} or \textit{pia-mwene}, were complementary and parallel.\footnote{224} The political and ritual influence of the \textit{pia-mwene} in northern Mozambican coastal Swahili


\footnote{221} Mbwiliza, \textit{A History}, pp. 72-73.

\footnote{222} Lupi, \textit{Angoche}; Amorim \textit{Relatório}, pp. 101, 104, 114. See also, Branquinho “Relatório”, pp. 266.

\footnote{223} See for example, Christian Geffray, “Structures precoloniales” (unpublished research paper, Eduardo Mondlane University, Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, 1984), pp. 29-30.

\footnote{224} Stoeltjie, “Asante Queen Mothers,” cited above.
societies could be also paralleled to the roles of the *wamiji* women of the Twelve Tribes in Mombasa as described by Margaret Strobel.\(^\text{225}\)

The *pia-mwene* represented a symbolic link between current children and the spirit of their Great Ancestor Mother, and as such she presided over important political decisions and was an indispensable advisor of the chief.\(^\text{226}\) She was also responsible for the bestowal of “spiritual essence” of the lineage or the clan on the ensuing *pia-mwene*, whom she chose and educated, while her own child was expected to succeed the existing chief upon his death.\(^\text{227}\) Scattering the *epepa*, the sacred flour of the chiefs’ clan, she asked for answers and guidance from the spirits of ancestors about when to start a war, or how to proceed with criminals.\(^\text{228}\) The blessing of the ancestors through her *epepa* ensured plenty of food and the fertility of women. It was from the *epepa*, “that the chief’s power as guardian of his people and protector against evil spirits was embedded.”\(^\text{229}\) In the context of the slave trade, the ancestral blessing was also believed to have guaranteed the success and safety in slave raiding and of long-distance caravan trade journeys.\(^\text{230}\) Therefore, the *epepa* could not be replaced by the *Qur’an*, and in fact, the official installation ceremony of a Swahili ruler, the *shehe* of Quitongonha in 1847, described firsthand by the Portuguese officials, was accompanied by the *epepa* ceremonial (also, *ólàpa* ritual).\(^\text{231}\) The Portuguese reports, such as by Pedro Massano de Amorim and Mello Branquinho attest to the continuous historical importance of the *pia-mwene* and of the *epepa* ritual in this region.\(^\text{232}\)

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\(^\text{228}\) Amorim, *Relatório*, p. 104.


\(^\text{230}\) See for example, the case of the Yao in Benigna Zimba “Ahivanjili I”, cited above.

\(^\text{231}\) Quoted in Hafkin, “Trade,” p. 39.

Mbwiliza also disregards political and religious roles of local Muslim women and maintains that “there is no evidence that women ever raised to a position of leadership within Muslim… communities”. Although the historical sources do not provide direct evidence, it is more likely that important female chiefs, who took active part and greatly benefited from slave trading networks, were Muslims because most of them had Muslim names and were under Muslim paramount chiefs next to the coast. Among them were the ‘queens’ Naguema of the Namarral, Mwana Saiemo of M’tumalapa, Maziza of Meze, and Salima of Nakala, to mention a few. In the case of Mwana Saiemo, her Swahili title ‘Mwana’, which is in local vernacular means a female version of the title ‘Bwana’ (though in standardized Swahili, this word means a ‘child’), suggests that she was a Muslim ruler. With respect to Maziza and Salima, it can be inferred that they were Muslims from the facts that they both had Arabic or Swahili names. All three female rulers were chiefs at the coast under the Swahili shehe of Quitongonha. Finally, the queen Naguema was one of the Namarral chiefs beneath the Mucuto-muno. The historical sources identify the Namarral as Muslims and their chiefs as hakim, while the Namarral confederation as founded and united by the legendary chief Ibrahim, the Mucuto-muno, in the mid-nineteenth century.

As a result of Musa’s conquests, Islam expanded not only geographically but local conceptions of Islamic identity and authority were fundamentally altered. Before, Islam was related to the Shirazi Swahili clans at the coast, who felt they had exclusive claims

233 Mbwiliza, A History, p. 72.

234 On the ‘queen’ Naguema, see the 1900 report by the captain-mór of Mossuril, António Augusto Ferreira Braga in AHM, FGG, Cx. 1008; and also, Mousinho de Albuquerque, A Campanha contra os Namarrais. Relatórios (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1897) pp. 11, 50, 60; Camizão, Governo, pp. 9, 14, 16; Botelho, História, pp. 497, 500. On Maziza, the “chieftainess of Mesa”, see Elton, Travels, p. 196; and Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 267-72. On Mwana Saiemo, sister of the chief of Mewa, see Camizão, Governo, p. 14. There were also other “queens”, such as Sygia of Namarral, all of whom were strong leaders and important slave traders in the coastal regions of the modern Nampula Province. See Pélissier, História, Vol. 1, p. 312 on Sygia (1911-13), one of the Namarral chiefs under the Mucuto-muno; on Salima or Sarima, one of the chiefs in Fernão Velozo region under the shehe of Quintongonha, see Mbwiliza, A History, pp. 108, 114; Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 127-28; and on Dona Rosaura, whose Macua name was Mazi-Praia, see Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 117-140 and Mbwiliza, A History, pp. 54-55.

235 Elton, Travels, p. 216; Albuquerque, A Campanha, pp. 7, 11-12; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 16-17; Botelho, História, pp. 496-97, 500. See also 1900 official report by the Captain-Mór of Mossuril, António Augusto Ferreira Braga in AHM, FGG, and Cx. 1008.
over Islam, and the coastal soil itself was perceived as blessed by Islamic faith and Muslim ancestors. Like other Swahili, Mozambican Swahili viewed Africans of the hinterland as pagans and uncivilized people of the bush. Following Musa’s raids, however, the inland Africans too could embrace Islam, and in a spirit of *jihad* (Ar., the holy war), they were given an option of converting in order to escape enslavement, while the ‘infidel’ and ‘pagan’ Makua and Lomwe could be ‘legitimately’ enslaved. Islam, on the one hand, became an inclusive and broader faith of all Muslims identified as the *Maca*. On the other hand, as it was Swahili in character, initially circumscribed to the coastal ruling Shirazi clans alone, it was extended to other rulers, the chiefs of the mainland. Thus, Islam in northern Mozambique in the second half of the nineteenth century was an Islam of the ruling elite, whose power and authority rested above all on the premise that they were lords of the lands (the *muyini/mwene/monhé*), as well as on their Muslim identity of the *shehe* on the Swahili coasts and the *hakim* in the hinterland.\(^{236}\) This contradicts Mbwiliza’s view on that Islam, especially among the Makua, was not “a court religion”.\(^{237}\)

The creation of the web of chieftaincies with common Muslim identity did not guarantee their relationships would be peaceful. Islam did not avert bloodshed among them. On the contrary, the era of the international slave trade was marred by acute rivalry and contradictions between rulers of different territories and between various candidates for the position of the ruler inside these chiefdoms. For example, the growing power of Sangage in the slave trade caused tensions with Angoche, which the Portuguese tried to manipulate.\(^{238}\) Maziza, a female subordinate chief of the *shehe* of Quitongonha did not hesitate to murder him when he tried to accommodate Portuguese interests and obstruct the slave trade.\(^{239}\) The Makua chief Maurruça-*muno* and the Namarral chief Mucuto-*muno* were both Muslims, but that did not prevent them from being in opposing sides

\(^{237}\) Mbwiliza, *A History*, p. 68.  
\(^{238}\) Hafkin, “Trade”, 314.  
during Mousinho de Albuquerque’s campaigns against the Namarral in 1896.\footnote{Alpers, \textit{Ivory and Slaves}, p. 228.} Though the Portuguese frequently attempted to take advantage of these controversies, the persistence of these rivalries during the nineteenth century indicates that local rulers were focused on internal African politics and did not consider the Europeans to be harmful enough as to concentrate their undivided attention on them. Only when the European colonial threat became real at the turn of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the local rulers united in a common resistance against the Portuguese.

With Islam, the new ritual experts, such as the mwalimu and sharifu (Sw., but both in local vernacular), expanded into the hinterland too. The power of these experts rested upon their Islamic religious knowledge, in particular of the kitabu (Ar., Sw., and in local vernacular ‘the book’, i.e., the Qur’an).\footnote{According to northern Mozambican Muslims, interviewed during fieldwork, Islam is primarily “a kitabu (Ar., Sw., literate or book-centred’) religion.} Perhaps, they had undermined to a certain extent the pia-mwene’s role of the deliverer of success and good luck, because the mwalimu’s ability to write protective amulets (Ar., tawiz; Sw., Emakhwa, Ekoti, hiriz) using the Qur’an, against illnesses, natural disasters, and bad luck, especially in war or business undertakings, came to be widely sought after.\footnote{Neves, \textit{Informações}, pp. 14-15. Amorim, \textit{Relatório}, p. 95 points out that some of the “chiefs of Mogovolla and Mpamella wore real rosaries of amulets [with Qur’anic inscriptions] around their necks”, while Mousinho de Albuquerque in \textit{A Campanha}, p. 11, reports the episode when he seized a bag of papers with Arabic writings from his local guide and interpreter Mohammad Sharmadan, containing Qur’anic verses written with the purpose of defeating the Portuguese in their attempts to conquer the Namarral Makua.} The kind of expertise that mwalimu possessed was an esoteric one, which dealt with invisible spirit and magic world, and could only be transmitted from individual master(s) to disciple(s).
By and large, these new experts could hardly take over the ritual roles of the *pia-mwene* associated with the ancestral spirits of the ruling lineages, chiefly installation and female initiation rites. The *mwalimu* and *sharifu* posed more tangible threats to the healers, the *m’kulukwana*. Each chief had his own principal *m’kulukwana* of the ruling lineage and, as Amorim emphasizes “the power of the mwene was sustained by a mculucuana”243. The *m’kulukwana* was a repository of the ‘traditional’ spiritual and ritual knowledge, and expert in local genealogical histories and physical environment, whose main purpose was to deal with the spirit world and provide for protection and prosperity of the people and the land.244 This was also the case with the *mwalimu* in the Swahili societies at the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts, and in Comoros.245 As in northern Mozambique, in these societies the distinction between the *waganga* (Sw., bush sorcerer) and *mwalimu* was illusory, and the knowledge and training of *mwalimu* reflected his


status and belonging to the ruling clans aimed at maintaining socio-political status quo of those classes. In both regions, the conversion of Africans to Islam transformed their perceptions of the spirit world, which now came to contain ‘Muslim’ spirits, the sheitani, the majini and the mala’ica, along with the old non-Muslim spirits. This spiritual permutation, encapsulating the duality of the old and the new, forced the m’kulukwana of northern Mozambique to acquire an Islamic expertise in addition to the old ‘traditional’ one. A Muslim m’kulukwana then became a mwalimu, an amalgam of both the Islamic and the African ‘traditional’, whose powers were broadened by new types of magic derived from the Qur’an and Muslim exoteric sciences on top of the old ones centered on the ancestral and land spirits. The transformation of the m’kulukwana of the chiefly lineages into a mwalimu served to strengthen the power and authority of the chiefs, whose remarkable political success and extraordinary wealth could be perceived by ordinary Africans as a compelling manifestation of the magical and spiritual might of Islam. Islam in nineteenth century northern Mozambique, therefore, developed into a “walimu style of Islam,” associated with Shirazi Swahili tradition. It was not so much a ‘cosmological compatibility’ of Islam and Makua beliefs, and ‘apparent similarity’ of the Mulungo worship and the unity of Allah that had ‘predisposed’ the northern Mozambicans to adopt Islam. Rather, historical circumstances, and above all the export slave trade dominated

246 Pouwels, Ibid.

247 Lupi, Angoche, p. 76; Pouwels, Ibid; Caplan, Ibid; Chanfi Ahmed, Ibid.

248 Pouwels, in Horn and Crescent, pp. 75-81, underlines the importance of attaining wealth and perceived correlation between wealth and baraka (Ar., blessing) in a Swahili town: “an idea common among Africans, whether or not they were Muslims, was that the person who had wealth had baraka, whereas he who was impoverished was ‘wrongly guided’ and ‘had no power with God’ (p. 75). “Wealth and attainment of wealth stood at the centre of all social arrangements” (p. 76). “Wealth was the key, and however wealth was earned was ultimately unimportant” (p. 78). “How wealth was acquired was not so important ultimately so long as means were considered honorable” (p. 81). See also, Neves Informações, pp. 14-15; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 94-102; Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 338. Alan Thorold develops this point for the Yao chiefs in Thorold, “Metamorphoses”, pp. 80, 83-84.

249 Pouwels, Horn and Crescent, p. 95. See also, Chanfi Ahmed, Ngoma et Mission Islamique, p. 111 and passim.

250 Mbwiliza, A History, pp. 72-73; See also, Apers, “Towards a History”, p. 176.
by the Shirazi, made the expansion of Islam possible and to acquire this religious tradition specific regional characteristic.

![Picture 3: A Muslim healer performing divination through contact with wa-jinni, Mozambique Island.](image)

The Qur’an and the mwalimu became central to justice, previously the procedural domain of the m’kulukwana. The chief, who was the main judge, now became a hakim. Taking of the oath of allegiance, now done on the Qur’an in written form, under the supervision of the mwalimu, turned into a ritual known as ommama mussafu (Emakhwa, from Ar., mushaf; Swahili musahafu, “a saint book”, “a book of prayers”).\(^{251}\) The mwalimu also assisted chiefs in administering justice by performing divination and imposing tests on criminals, whose innocence was determined by the results of their swallowing flour or rice balls mixed with Qur’anic inscriptions or drinking the water with those inscriptions dissolved in it.\(^{252}\) The justice system itself became known as the Shari’a both on the coast and among the peoples of the Muslim interior.\(^{253}\) One of the most celebrated mwalimu at this time, an undeniable Shari’a authority was Shah Daud,


\(^{252}\) Neves, *Informações*, pp. 16-17; Lupi, *Angoche*, p. 76.

originally from Ngazidja of the Comoros, who lived in Angoche for more than 30 years by 1907.\textsuperscript{254}

Besides functions associated with the authority of chiefs, the \textit{mwalimu} also served as clerks and scribes for local rulers, and accountants in commercial dealings, especially while accompanying trade caravans.\textsuperscript{255} The Portuguese conquerors report that in addition \textit{mwalimu} led mosque prayers, and rituals associated with farming activities, the Islamic calendar and life cycle ceremonies, such as birth, marriage, and death.\textsuperscript{256} The \textit{mwalimu} was also responsible for Islamic education. “There is no Muslim settlement without a Qur’anic school”, wrote João de Azevedo Coutinho.\textsuperscript{257} By the second half of the nineteenth century, literacy in Arabic spread from coast into the mainland, and the Swahili, including women and all the major chiefs of the interior were corresponding in Swahili or in local languages using Arabic script.\textsuperscript{258}

All religious rituals were accompanied by collective dancing, feasting and drumming. It was common to use drums and feast on funerals, and if a deceased was a \textit{muyini}, then the feast also took place on the third, eighth or tenth, and the fortieth day after funeral.\textsuperscript{259} Because of the importance of dancing and drumming in local Muslim

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\textsuperscript{254} Neves, \textit{Informações}, p. 22; Lupi, \textit{Escola}, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{255} Cunha, \textit{Estudo}, p. 48; Alpers, “Towards a History”, pp. 185, 187.

\textsuperscript{256} Neves in \textit{Informações}, pp. 10, 11, 13-14, mentions that “a Muslim man can marry up to four wives and husband and wife have equal rights in marriage”. For marriage celebrated in the mosque, the \textit{mwalimu} received a maximum of 40 Reais for each. Amorim in \textit{Relatório}, pp. 113 and 125, maintains that on Muslim marriage the payment of \textit{mahr} was due to the marrying woman and that the marriage ceremony of a virgin woman was called \textit{harussi}. The \textit{mwalimu} also wrote the divorce formula (locally, \textit{talaqa}, from Ar., \textit{talaq}, repudiation).

\textsuperscript{257} Coutinho, \textit{Memórias}, p. 67; Neves in \textit{Informações}, p. 17, noted that in Angoche teaching and studying in the Qur’anic school was assiduous and demanding, and that “the \textit{mwalimu} teaches in a Qur’anic school in the morning and afternoon, three hours each time.”


\textsuperscript{259} Neves in \textit{Informações}, p. 10, describes a drumming dance of men \textit{molidi}, performed on the fortieth day of the birth of a child accompanied by a feast called \textit{caramo}, when its first cutting of hair also took place. Amorim indicates that the weddings were accompanied by the women drumming \textit{taira}. Elton in \textit{Travels}, p. 297, maintains that the end of Ramadan was marked by feasting, drumming, and even beer-drinking in Nyasa region. See also, Cunha, \textit{Estudo}, p. 48; Neves, \textit{Informações}, p. 13; Lupi, \textit{Angoche}, p. 88; Amorim, \textit{Relatório}, p. 124.
life, numerous dance societies existed both at the coast and the mainland, and were fierce rivals of each other and each reflected a belonging to different clan.\footnote{Lupi in \textit{Angoche}, pp. 106-107, mentions the abundance of dance societies both at the coast and the mainland. For comparative purposes see, Terence O. Ranger, \textit{Dance and Society in Eastern Africa, 1890-1970: the Beni Ngoma} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), p. 18; Strobel, \textit{Muslim Women in Mombasa}.}

One of the ‘dance societies’ was the Rifa’iyya Sufi Order. It is called in Mozambique \textit{Molidi, Mawlid, or Mawlid Naquira} (from Emakhwa, “the dancing \textit{mawlid}”, and \textit{mawlid} or \textit{mawlid un-Nabi} is from Ar., Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebration), as well as \textit{Mawlid Rifa’i}. Very little is known about the Rifa’iyya in Mozambique.\footnote{In 1901, J. and M. Lazarus had depicted in a photo album a group of the Mafalala Muslim men dressed in \textit{kanzu} and performing a dance that looks like a \textit{mawlid ya hom} of Zanzibar. In 1955 José Craveirinha, and later, in the 1970s, Manuel J. C. de Lemos described the \textit{mawlid Rifa’i dhikr} in the Mafalala zone of the Maputo city, inhabited by the immigrant Makua. The J. and M. Lazarus’s photo entitled “The Mafalala Kafir Dance” was first printed in J. and M. Lazarus. \textit{A Souvenir of Lourenço Marques} (Lourenço Marques: 1901), and also can be found in \textit{Arquivo} (Boletim de Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Maputo No 4, October 1988), pp. 53-55. See also, Manuel J. C. de Lemos, “Reviver a Ilha, na Mafalala” in \textit{Arquivo} (Boletim de Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Maputo No 4, October 1988), pp. 49-59; Interview with Shaykh Faqui Sayyid Shamakhani, November 2, 1999, Mozambique Island.} Hafkin, Mbwiliza and Alpers do not mention it. Local informants during fieldwork indicated that the Rifa’iyya existed prior to the arrival of the Shadhuliyya and...
the Qadiriyya, which are discussed in the following Chapters.\textsuperscript{262} In the Comoros and Zanzibar, according to Trimingham and Nimtz, the Rifa’iyya also preceded the arrival of the Shadhuliyya and the Qadiriyya, though Abdallah Chanfi Ahmed seems to suggest that it was introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{263} All this information suggests that Hafkin’s and Mbwiliza’s hypothesizing about the pre-eminence of the Shadhuliyya and the Qadiriyya Sufi Orders during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries does not seem to be correct as the evidence suggests that these two Orders came to Mozambique for the first time only in 1897 and 1904/5.\textsuperscript{264} As northern Mozambique had close ties with East African coast and the Comoros, we can assume that the Rifa’iyya had expanded there at approximately the same period as in these regions. According to Nimtz, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the Rifa’iyya was present not only on the coast but also on the mainland of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{265} In 1887, João de Azevedo Coutinho had witnessed a drumming festival near Fernão Velozo or Mogincual, performed during “special occasions of the lunar calendar” (most likely during the \textit{mawlid un-Nabi}), the description of which matches a Rifa’i \textit{dhikr} (Ar., Sufi ritual prayer) though instead of the \textit{dufu} drums the \textit{rewa} drums are mentioned:

\begin{quote}
I saw sometimes [people] dancing a rewa drum during certain important occasions of the lunar calendar…almost always Muslims, who appeared to be hypnotized and insensitive to the pain…dancing on burning charcoal…piercing their arms with sharp knifes…Is this an influence of the Orient? It is well possible…reminds of the Indian fakirs.\textsuperscript{266}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{264} Hafkin, “Trade”, pp. 43-44; Mbwiliza, \textit{A History}, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{265} Nimtz, \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{266} Coutinho, \textit{Memórias}, p. 67.
Later, António Enes, who was in Mozambique in 1891-92 and 1895, described in his memoirs, the Rifa’i *dhikr* performed for him on the mainland of Mossuril, which he called “drumming dance with knives”, referring to the use of *dabbus* (Ar., needle) in the Rifa’i *dhikr*.\(^{267}\) Although Lupi maintains that he did not see any proof for the existence of the Rifa’i practices in Angoche, fieldwork informants believed that the Rifa’iyya expanded from Angoche to the rest of Mozambique, and that Farallahi (see below) and his warriors were especially fond of this form of *mawlid*.\(^{268}\) In Mozambique it seems that the Rifa’iyya *dhikr* was practiced by Muslim chiefs of the coast and of the hinterland, involved in long distance slave trading networks of the nineteenth century, as well as by the *sepays* (slave armies) under their command organized into caravans raiding for slaves in the regions linking the deep interior to the coast.\(^{269}\) Slave trade and the membership in the Rifa’iyya seem to be important uniting factors for these ethnically and socially diversified networks of peoples.

An interesting example attesting the Order’s antiquity is the relationship between the Rifa’iyya and matriliny, because although the Rifa’i *dhikr* is all male, the *khalifa* of the Order, as a rule, is a woman\(^ {270}\). Another remarkable feature of the Rifa’iyya in Mozambique is that it is called *Mawlid* (*Molidi*) which again demonstrates the links of the northern Mozambicans to other Swahili societies. Trimingham observes that the Rifa’iyya in Zanzibar is called *maulidi ya hom*\(^ {271}\). Currently, the *mawlid* ceremony and ritual in Mozambique is known as “the *Brazanji*”, and is associated with the Shadhuliyya.

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\(^{267}\) António Enes, “De Lisboa a Moçambique” in *Serões*, Vol. 2 (Lisboa: Administração e Officinas, 1902), Chapter VIII, pp. 87-93. According to Valerie J. Hoffman, in 1976 Frederick de Jong reported that in Egypt a *dabbus* (or *sikr*) meant “a metal or wooden ball of about 4 inches diameter, attached to an iron skewer resembling a knitting needle about 15 inches long. Attached to the circumference of the ball are a number of chains at the end of which are small pieces of metal resembling razorblades. When, during the *hadra* it is not put through parts of the body, it is spun around so that the chains stand out like umbrella.” In Valerie J. Hoffman, *Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt* (University of Carolina Press, 1995). In contemporary Mozambique, the *dabushi* are small metal skewers.


\(^{269}\) Bonate, “The Ascendance of Angoche”, p. 130.

\(^{270}\) Interview with Shaykh Faqui Sayyid Shamakhani, November 2, 1999, Mozambique Island.

Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya Sufi Orders. This indicates that prior to the arrival of these two Orders, the mawlid celebration was probably associated with the flamboyant and noisy dhikr of the Rifa‘iyya. Thus, the Rifa‘iyya dhikr probably had once constituted the mawlid, “the center” of Islam in Mozambique, because mawlid festivities and life-cycle ceremonies accompanied by mawlid ritual were and still are central to the lives of the Muslims in northern Mozambique.

The ritual dances related to mawlid were probably also the precursors of the modern day Tufo dance, which as Lutero and Pereira maintain was performed during the celebrations of the mawlid un-Nabi. The contemporary Mozambican Tufo somehow resembles molidi ya hom of Zanzibar too, but probably it followed the introduction of the Mawlid al-Habshi in East Africa around 1912.

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273 The Mozambican Tufo is derived from Swahili Dufu, associated with is a large diameter frame drum (or tambourine), usually round, and made of wood and animal skin, with no jingles used to provide bass rhythm accompaniment. The smaller version of dufu is called d/taira and is played mainly by women. Iranian Musician, Peyman Nasehpour maintains that Daff, Deff and Taf (the ancient name is Tof), is the Arabicized version of the Persian Dap (Pahlavi, pre-Islamic Persian). It was used in Islamic Persia and other Muslim countries in Kangan (temple of dervishes) during the dhikr ritual. In: http://www.donbak.co.uk/Articles/DafTheSpiritualFrameDrum.htm, last accessed January 14, 2006.

In Mozambique, the only study on Tufo is a short chapter about Arabic influences on Mozambican traditional music by Martinho Lutero e Martins Pereira “A Influência Arabe na Música Tradicional” (Paulo Ribeiro Soares, ed., Música Tradicional em Moçambique, Maputo: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1980), pp. 18-24. According to local oral tradition, the Tufo was born on the day of Prophet Muhammad’s entrance to Yathrib (Medina) the 1st of Muharram 1st year of Hegira (16 of July 622), when local women greeted him by drumming and singing a qasida in his honor. In Mozambique, it is believed also that the female version of the Tufo is due to that ‘Aisha, wife of the Prophet, had sang Tufo to the Prophet Muhammad to distract him from his preoccupations. Previously, Tufo was sang and danced both by men and women, but nowadays it is mostly practiced by women. Interview with Shaykh Faqui Sayyid Shamakhani, November 2, 1999, and with Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, Mozambique Island, November 2, 1999, Mozambique Island.

274 The Tufo performance in Mozambique resembles Trimingham’s description of mawlid al-Habshi in Lamu, which according to Anne Bang was introduced in East Africa around 1912. The name mawlid al-Habshi was derived from the name of the author of mawlid qasida collection, Sint ad-Durar (“Neclace of Pearls”), by Ali b. Muhammad b. Husain b. ‘Abdallah ibn Shaykh al-Habshi al-Alawi (ca. 1843-1914) of Saywun, in Hadramawt. Muslims interviewed in Nampula Province of Mozambique in 1999-2000 maintained that the Tufo was a relatively new ‘dance’, allegedly brought from Zanzibar by a Qadiri shaykh, Yussuf Arabi in the 1930s. Caleb Chulsoo Kim’s portrayal of the mawlid ya hom in his PhD dissertation “Supernaturalism in Swahili Islam”, pp. 88-89, 90-n.42, resembles the description of the Mawlid Rifa‘i by a
Conclusion

Through many centuries, northern Mozambican coastal Muslim societies were historically situated within the wider regional Swahili world of East Africa, with whom they shared a common culture, economic networks, kinship and religious ties, and language influences. They also shared a common discursive tradition of religious and political leadership, with a shared Shirazi Islamic identity, establishing as kin to each other the coastal Swahili ruling elites of northern Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania and the Comoros.

This common political conception, however, also included a notion of a matrilineal chiefship shared at a regional level along the matrilineal belt of southern Africa, and which dominated pre-Arabic and pre-colonial northern coastal Swahili regions of Kenya and Tanzania, as well. The discursive tradition of a matrilineal chiefship was shared not only by the political elite but also at many levels in their respective societies mainly because of the perceived spiritual foundation of this political leadership. As putative first-comers to the territory, the chiefly clans were responsible for the well-being of the people and the land incorporated within chiefdom. In a matrilineal tradition, the pia-mwene, the elder sister of a chief or a chief herself, was a carrier of the ancestral essence (nihimo) of the first-comers, which enabled them to confront and expel the malevolent and potentially harmful spirits of the physical and natural environment and of its previous human settlers. By bestowing their ancestral blessing on the territory, the first-comers provided protection, prosperity and fertility to the people and the land. The matrilineal tradition of political leadership in northern Swahili regions was challenged and altered with the increase of Arab, and later European presence, but it persevered in northern Mozambique.

Matriliny does not mean matriarchy, although women’s position in northern Mozambican societies was considerably higher than in patrilineal societies, because only a woman could be a carrier of the nihimo and sometimes a woman was also the first-

comer to the territory, and therefore, a chief herself. Even when the actual first-comer was considered a male, he was required to be accompanied by a *pia-mwene*. Therefore in northern Mozambique as among the Asante of Ghana, the female and male domains of a political power co-existed simultaneously and were parallel to each other. The position of chiefship in principle has never been denied to someone on the basis of gender, a fact that was duly acknowledged and maintained by Portuguese colonial rule. During the nineteenth century, many female chiefs of northern Mozambique were involved in and profited from the international slave trade.

In the context of rapid and violent change of the time, associated with the expanding international slave trade and significant population migrations from the mainland to the coast, northern Mozambican coastal Shirazi ruling elites gained the upper hand due to their geographic domination of ports serving as outlets for slaves. Armed with wealth acquired through the slave trade, firearms and slave soldiers, the coastal Swahili, in particular Angoche advanced into to the mainland in search of slave supplies and in order to control the caravan routes. Though they undertook military conquests, it was the establishment of kinship relationships with the important mainland chiefs, through the processes of re-creating and re-adapting a shared matrilineal regional discursive tradition of chiefship that allowed them to succeed in this endeavor as well as to expand Islam into the mainland. With this a Muslim *chiefly* network of northern Mozambique was launched.

How was the *longue durée* tradition of Islam adapted and re-created in this context? In his analysis of Islam and West African pluralism, Lamin Sanneh points out that “Islam may on the surface appear to be a break with the indigenous life, but in practice it represents an affirmation and a fulfillment of it, though it may challenge, too.” He mentions that Islam was easily incorporated because it did not bring radical secular alienation and demythologization of African life and custom. Though it represented something of a metaphysical reconstruction of the traditional worldview, Islam strengthened the existential and instrumental tendencies of traditional African religions, by introducing a social and public code and materials from Islamic sources to

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complement and supplement techniques of divination, oneirology, astrology, and similar practices.\textsuperscript{276}

While these statements ring true for the nineteenth century northern Mozambique context as well, Sanneh bases his analysis on ‘Islam’ as a universal category and an agency and actor of its own. This Chapter has shown that the incorporation of Islamic ideas and practices, and the (re)creation of the Islamic tradition of the region was undertaken by concrete groups of people, such as the coastal Shirazi and the mainland chiefly elites. Amidst the generalized upheaval and violent change of the slave trade era, the chiefs and their people were confronted by a choice of becoming Muslim and a part of the slave-raiding network or remaining non-Muslim and thus a target for enslavement. In choosing to become Muslims, the chiefly elites relied on pre-existing ideas of matrilineal kinship and land relations and absorbed the Shirazi Swahili tradition of Islam. This resulted in a particular kind of local conception of Islamic tradition, which stressed matrilineality and was associated with the tradition of chiefship in northern Mozambique.

Chapter Two

The Advent of the Turuq and the Scramble for Leadership

This Chapter addresses the expansion of the two Sufi Orders (locally, d/tiqiri from dhikr; Ar., sing., tariqa, pl., turuq), the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya in colonial northern Mozambique. The overall aim is to delineate historical development and identify the principal actors of Sufi expansion. First, the Chapter describes the context into which the two turuq arrived, including the effects of the Portuguese military campaigns of “effective occupation” on northern Mozambican Muslims and forms of their resistance. Second, it outlines the course of the spread of Sufi Orders coming from East Africa and the Comoros and addresses questions such as who were the initial converts and how the local society, in particular the religious and African chiefly elites, responded to the arrival of the turuq.

The main focus of this Chapter is on the strategies that Muslim chiefly clans used in order to secure Islamic religious leadership and authority in response to the changes that were engendered by the turuq. The most important change was related to religious authority, as the highest tariqa leadership was situated abroad and was passed down locally to people lacking kinship ties to Muslim chiefly clans, such as recent Comorian immigrants and the “Moors” of the Cabaceira Pequena. Until the 1930s, Muslim chiefly clans were heavily involved in resistance against the Portuguese and were not concerned with Sufi Orders to a great extent. But with the consolidation of the colonial rule, they started competing for Islamic authority derived from the leadership of the Orders with the abovementioned groups of “Moors” and Comorians. This competition resulted in the split of the two Orders into eight turuq.

The Chapter also highlights the participation of women in Sufi Orders. Muslim women of northern Mozambique were as active in matters Islamic during colonial period

277 I am using the term “Moors,” a Portuguese term applied to Muslims in general, and to Indians or those descending from Muslim Indians and local African women in particular, whom the Portuguese also often identified as the descendants of the ‘Moors of Daman’ (Mouros de Damão) in Gujarat, India.
as they were before. Each tariqa had its female branch, headed as a rule by member of local women elites. Although their social and economic standings were important, these women strived to acquire religious authority through Islamic education and to extend their patronage to other women of lower social status.

The “Effective Occupation” of Northern Mozambique

As the second half of the nineteenth century progressed and the rulers of Angoche learned that without access to the mainland they would not benefit from the opportunities of the international trade, a number of the Anhapakho became increasingly involved in mainland politics. According to the Portuguese conqueror of Angoche Eduardo Lupi, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the presence of the “nucleus of Arabs and of Arabized people”, as Lupi describes them, stretched 30 to 40 km deep into the mainland of Angoche and 40 to 50 km on the mainland of Sangage. 278

While Sultan Ibrahim, who reigned between 1889 and 1920, continued to guard Angoche’s maritime interests from his seat on Catamoyo Island, Farallahi (Farelay in Portuguese sources) opted to settle on the mainland. 279 Omar bin Nacogo Farallahi, 280 Musa Quanto’s nephew and the brother of the Angoche Sultan Ibrahim controlled the hinterland interests of Angoche by launching relationships with new chiefs. It seems that by this time the Anhapakho sought not only slaves and the control of the caravan routes, but land as well. This was due to the continuous European assaults on the slave trade from the sea that restricted the profits of the Anhapakho from slave export. Furthermore, the increasing importance of forest products and agricultural crops in the international market elevated the value of land. 281 It seems that Farallahi, for example, had several

278 Lupi, Angoche, pp. 166-67, 177.

279 Lupi, Angoche, pp. 211-235; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 14-18, 60, 65, 200; Amorim, Informações, pp. 11-36; Coutinho, As duas conquistas, pp. 31-55.

280 No records are available on his birth and death dates.

281 Amorim in Relatório, p. 18, mentions that Farallahi imposed tolls on the Makua caravans bringing to the coast rubber and groundnuts for sale. Mbwiliza in A History, pp. 110-111, 113, describes that at the end of the nineteenth century, Mozambique was exporting rubber. By the turn of the century, top on the list of exports were groundnuts, copra, beans and oilseeds. These together with the traditional staple foodstuffs
wives in different chiefdoms through which he had access to the local lands. By the 1890s, Farallahi and other Anhapakho were distributed in the mainland ranging from Angoche up to Lake Nyassa on the west, to the Zambezi in the southwest and to the lands of the Namarral Makua in the northwest. During Mousinho de Albuquerque’s 1896-97 campaigns against the Namarral Makua, on the mainland of Mozambique Island, the Sultan Ibrahim and Farallahi each sent to the Namarral paramount chief, Mucuto-muno, fifty Anhapakho accompanied by their respective slave soldiers.

Most of the Swahili and Muslim rulers continued slave trading and resisting European encroachments on their lands. Among them were:

- the Shehe Mahmud Bwana Amadi (reigned in 1884-1908) of Quitongonha and his wazir, Sayyid bin Amissi Alua
- the Shehe of Sancul, Molidi Vullai (reigned in 1895-1898) and his nephew, Swali bin Ali Ibrahim (Maravi)
- the Shehe of Sangage, Musa Ibrahim Phiri (reigned in 1904-1912)
  - the Mucuto-muno of Namarral
- the Guarnea-muno and the Morla-muno of Mpamella
- the Cubula-muno of Mogovolla.

Despite constant European attempts to curtail the slave trade along the coast and sporadic appearance of the Portuguese and other European vessels at ports, slaves were the major preoccupation of the Makua during this period of transitions, and the contemporary observers noted greater involvement of both men and women in agriculture. See also, Neves Informações, pp. 23-24; Arlindo Chilundo “Quando começou o comércio de oleaginosos em Moçambique? Levantamento estatístico da produção e exportação no período entre 1850 e 1875” (Cadernos de História, Maputo: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane Press, 1988, No 7), pp. 107-127.

282 Lupi, Angoche, p. 143.
283 Elton, Travels, p. 216; Albuquerque, A Campanha, pp. 7, 11-12; Amorim, Relatório, pp. 16-17; Botelho, História, pp. 496-97, 500. See also 1900 official report by the Captain-Mór of Mossuril, António Augusto Ferreira Braga in AHM, FGG, Cx. 1008.
continued to be exported from the Swahili coasts.\textsuperscript{286} Moreover, Africans used small and easily manageable \textit{pangaios} (Port., coasting vessels) that were difficult to detect or capture by the Europeans.\textsuperscript{287} Thus, the Swahili and the chiefs of the interior accompanied by the armed youth and \textit{sepoy} slaves, continued to raid for slaves when the chances became propitious.

Notwithstanding the Portuguese rhetoric of domination, they frequently played minor roles within the arena of local politics, often reduced to the status of \textit{de facto}, if not \textit{de jure}, clients to powerful African chiefs.\textsuperscript{288} Up to the early twentieth century, the attempts to consolidate Portuguese sovereignty in this region were futile.\textsuperscript{289} Only in 1906, did Portuguese military officers, such as Pedro Massano de Amorim, Ernesto Jardim de Vilhena, and others conceive of a successful project of total and effective occupation of northern Mozambique.\textsuperscript{290} After four years in preparation and study, Amorim’s military conquest took place in 1910. Farallahi and his troops joined those of the chiefs of Mpmella, the Mogovolla, Marave, Mossuril, and others in the lands extending from Moma to Nakala in confrontation against the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{291} This time, the Portuguese conducted a very systematic and well-organized operation. They had now gained enough experience and knowledge, and were also supported well by the metropolitan government that felt an urge to demonstrate “effective occupation” of its African territories and delineate the borders of its colonies due to the pressure and threat from the Germans and British.\textsuperscript{292} Especially the Portuguese felt threatened following the Berlin Conference in


\textsuperscript{287} Hafkin in “Trade,” p. xviii, identifies \textit{pangaio} as “small wooden short-distance ships, also generic term for Arab and Swahili craft.”


\textsuperscript{290} Amorim, \textit{Relatório}, pp. 195-216.


1884-1885 and the 1890 British proposal on the future borders between Portuguese and British colonies in Africa. The Treaty between Portugal and Britain was signed in 1891, by which time many lands and ports in southern Mozambique and the region of the Zambezi had already been partially subjugated by the Portuguese. As the Portuguese troops proceeded, the northern Mozambican paramount chiefs continued to confront them, while more and more of the lesser chiefs formally recognized Portuguese rule, furnishing them with people and support.293 Some of the paramount chiefs were killed in the process, but the most important ones were imprisoned. First among them to be captured was the Cubula-muno, then the Guarnea-muno, and finally, Farallahi and Sultan Ibrahim of Angoche, all later deported to Portuguese Guinea.294 Although most of modern-day Nampula province gradually came under Portuguese rule, some Muslim rulers, such as Swali bin Ali Ibrahim of Sancul (Maravi) and Shehe Musa Phiri of Sangage, among others, continued resistance up to 1912-13. Between 1914 and 1918, the advancing Germans gave guns and support to Angoche, Moma, and other Muslim regions, fuelling their anti-Portuguese sentiments.295 With British assistance, the Portuguese re-conquered these regions in 1918, when a new uprising took place in Sancul.296

Sporadic African resistance to colonialism continued until the 1930s. Along with the armed resistance of the chiefs and popular revolts, mwalimu also undertook their own struggle against colonialism. Their ways of resisting, often described as ‘passive resistance’ by the Portuguese, involved the use of hiriz.297 This was one of the traditional forms of resistance in this region. As mentioned earlier, during the 1896 campaigns against the Namarral, Mousinho de Albuquerque seized a bag of papers with Arabic writings from his local guide and interpreter Mohammad Sharmadan, containing

294 Amorim, Relatório, pp. 329-331.
296 Péllissier, História de Moçambique, Vol. 2, pp. 433-34.
Qur’anic verses written with the purpose of defeating the Portuguese in their attempts to conquer the Namarral Makua. In 1922-23, a certain Saquina (a man) of Nivete region in Eráti was arrested and sentenced to exile to Quelimane. According to the witnesses, called for depositions “Saquina offered prayers and liquid substance, which seemed to be water with some mixture”, to those people who wanted to escape forced labor. Saquina’s prayers and liquid were believed to have made them “invulnerable to iron [referring to bullets and weapons], and sepoys” and to Portuguese attempts to enforce compulsory work in agriculture “for the benefit of the [colonial] State”. Although Portuguese sources do not give any specific details on the identity of Saquina or on the properties of the liquid substance, the reference to prayers suggests that Saquina was a ‘traditional’ mwalimu, and the mystical liquid most likely contained Qur’anic inscriptions dissolved in water.

The beginning of the twentieth century thus was characterized by a widespread socio-political crisis in northern Mozambique. In particular, the Swahili and Muslim chiefs saw not only the upcoming end of their economic prosperity derived primarily from the slave trade, but also the loss of their political independence due to Portuguese military conquest and the imposition of the colonial administrative and political systems. The crisis caused a rupture of the previously existing structures and created a sense of personal and collective uncertainty for the population of northern Mozambique, in particular the Muslims. It was into this environment that the Shadhuliyya and the Qadiriyya Sufi Orders arrived. In Mozambique, as elsewhere, the crisis of power aggravated by economic and social tension enabled the emergence of charisma and the new Sufi Orders. 

298 Albuquerque, A Campanha, p. 11.
299 “Correspondência recebida de Moçambique, 1919-1922”, AHM, FGG, Cx. 1025, 29-113 (1), Ibid.
300 Auto de Notícia, in AHM, FGG, Cx. 1025, 29-113 (1), Ibid.
The Re-Emergence of Mozambique Island as the Centre of Islam

The arrival of the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya Sufi Orders represented a geographical shift in local conceptions of Islam in northern Mozambique. The Orders first arrived at Mozambique Island probably because other Muslim regions were still involved in the resistance against the Portuguese, but the centre of Islam moved away from the independent Swahili settlements, such as Ancoche, to Mozambique Island, which was under Portuguese rule for centuries.  

Although the internal transformations were important, historical and cultural links of the Mozambican coastal Muslims to the world of the Swahili for the emergence of Sufi Orders cannot be overlooked. Both regions were in fact integral to each other and changes with respect to Islamic dogma and practices in northern Mozambique replicated shifts taking place elsewhere in the Swahili world. To start with, the new Sufi Orders were brought to Mozambique at approximately the same time as in other parts of the East African coast and practically by the same people. First to arrive was the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya in 1897, with Shaykh Muhammad Ma’arouf bin Shaykh Ahmad ibn Abu Bakr (1853-1905) of the Comoro Islands, the founder of the Order in East Africa. He probably came to Mozambique during his years of exile due to the

302 During the 1999 fieldwork, practically every Muslim of the Mozambique Island belonged to one of the Sufi Orders. Among Muslims in Nampula City originating from this region also the overwhelming majority identified themselves as members of the turuq during fieldwork in 2000.


persecution by the French, but Branquinho maintains that his Sufi master, ‘Abdallah b. Darwish sent Shaykh Ma’arouf to Mozambique with the mission of recruiting people to the Yashrutiyya.\textsuperscript{305}

![Picture 5: View of Mozambique Island from the continent.](image)

There is some controversy in the sources as to whom he gave the first \textit{ijaza} (Ar., a certificate) and \textit{silsla} (Ar., a document attesting to the legitimacy of the Order and its founder, containing a sequence of Sufi masters reaching back to the Prophet Muhammad) of the \textit{tariqa} and who became the chief \textit{khalifa}, known also as the \textit{sajada khadima}, of the Order when he left Mozambique Island. However, taking into account historical ties and shared cultural perceptions of the Swahili in the Comoros and northern Mozambique, it is likely that the first Yashruti recruits were from among local Swahili or Muslim chiefs. Álvaro Pinto de Carvalho is thus probably right when he argues that Shaykh Ma’arouf had given the first \textit{silsla} and \textit{ijaza} of the \textit{khalifa} to Hajji Muhammad Ahmad Gulamo

\textsuperscript{305} Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 358.
and Neimane bin Hajji Ali Twalibo (also known as Neimane Hajji Galibo), both Namarral rulers in Mossuril, rather than to a fellow Comorian, Amur bin Jimba, as other sources claim.\textsuperscript{306} Branquinho’s survey reveals that Momade Gulamo was one of the most respected Mossuril chiefs with great prestige, and uncle to Neiman Hajji Galibo, the chief of Ampoense, also in Mossuril.\textsuperscript{307}

Although the Comorian chronicler Burhan b. Muhammad Mkelle depicts Amur bin Jimba as a \textit{sharif} and \textit{shaykh} that had left Moroni with the expressed mission of recruiting followers to the Shadhuliyya, Amur bin Jimba’s only surviving son at the time of fieldwork, Sayyid Abdurrahman, informed us that his father, a trader, had actually ended up on the Island by accident in 1896 while \textit{en route} from the Comoros to Zanzibar.\textsuperscript{308} Carvalho also mentions that Amur bin Jimba stopped at Mozambique Island due to bad weather but later settled there permanently.\textsuperscript{309} Shaykh Ma’arouf might have contacted him as a fellow Comorian of a \textit{sharifian} descent, and passed on to him an \textit{ijaza}, but it is unlikely that Amur bin Jimba would have been accepted as a religious leader by local Muslims in 1897. At the time, he was still an alien without strong credentials, having no valuable kinship connections to local populations and having lived on the Island for only a year in very turbulent times. When, on Shaykh Ma’arouf’s departure in


\textsuperscript{307} Branquinho in “Relatório”, pp. 192-93 mentions that Momade Gulamo’s successor, Mahando Ahmed, was removed due to the 1939 “Naharra” revolt (see below) while the Ampoense chieftancy under Neiman Haji Galibo was later extinguished by the colonial rule.

\textsuperscript{308} According to B. G. Martin, Burhan Mkelle maintains that Amur bin Jimba was accompanied by a fellow townsman, Ahmad Mruzi, who settled in Angoche to teach Arabic and Islamic law. Sayyid Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, however, believes that his father was forced to stop at the Island due to a bad weather at the sea. He was taken into custody by the Portuguese, and was released after local Indians contacted the owner of the merchandize in Zanzibar, an Indian too. Then, he stayed with a fellow Comorian, named Abdul Abu Sayyid, and after marrying his daughter, settled at the Island permanently. He died in 1921, leaving behind four children. Interview with Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, Mozambique Island, November 2, 1999; collective interview with Sufi \textit{shaykhs}, November 3, 1999, Mozambique Island. See also, Martin, \textit{Muslim Brotherhoods}, p. 156; Chanfi Ahmed, \textit{Islam et Politique}, p. 120-150n.

1897, Shaykh Amur bin Jimba started behaving as the chief *khalifa* of the Yashrutiyya, many resisted.\(^{310}\)

In 1898 Shaykh Ma’arouf sent his brother, Shaykh ‘Ali bin Shaykh, to settle the disputes related to the leadership of the Order.\(^{311}\) Shaykh ‘Ali passed on additional *ijazas* to *Haji* Muhammad Ahmad Gulamo, as well as to Bashir Salim, the chief of the *Areal* quarter of the Island-city, and to Amur bin Jimba\(^{312}\). Probably because of the controversies among Mozambicans, Shaykh ‘Ali decided to maintain the Order under Comorian control, first that of Shaykh Alawi bin Sayyid Abu Bakr, who was already a Yashruti *khalifa* in the Comoros, and after his death, that of Amur bin Jimba.\(^{313}\) Nevertheless, local Muslim chiefs, especially Neimane and Gulamo, continued resisting and challenging Amur bin Jimba. This resistance was related to two factors. First, although Amur bin Jimba married a daughter of Abdul Abu Sayyid, a Comorian *shaykh* of Hadrami descent residing at Mozambique Island, both Abdul Abu Sayyid and Amur bin Jimba did not establish kinship relationships with Muslim chiefly lineages. As such, Amur bin Jimba did not have access to any landed estate through his local wife, and all his life was a trader, the occupation which he passed on to his children.\(^{314}\) Notwithstanding his *sharifian* pedigree, this fact undermined Amur bin Jimba’s religious authority in the eyes of local Muslims. Second, Amur bin Jimba as well as his father-in-law had close ties to the Indian community in Zanzibar, Comoros and Mozambique because both of them were sea-captains and traders working for Indians.\(^{315}\) Not only


\(^{313}\) Carvalho, “Confrarias”, p. 17

\(^{314}\) A Portuguese official in the 1960s, Licínio Nogueira, noted that Amur bin Jimba’s son, Amuri bin Jimba did not have landed estates and was only a trader, the activity which he also abandoned due to the lack of capital. In Licínio Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário Estado da Situação, Distrito de Moçambique,” SCCIM, Cx. 65, No 417, p. 223, IANT/TT, Lisboa.

\(^{315}\) According to Sayyid Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, his father worked for an Indian trader named Abu Sattar Methá. Interview with Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, Mozambique Island, November 2, 1999.
were they conceived of as complete ‘aliens’ by Mozambican Muslims but also as close to the interests of Indians.

The Qadiriyya reportedly was brought to Mozambique Island in 1905 (or 1904) by a certain shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad, residing in Zanzibar who was originally from Ngazidja in Comoros.\footnote{During the fieldwork, all interviewees were unanimous that Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad was the founder of the Qadiriyya in Mozambique, but they were not able to give any detailed information on his life, except that he was originally from the Comoro Islands and lived in Zanzibar. Collective interview with Sufi shaykhs, November 3, 1999, Mozambique Island; Interview with Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, Mozambique Island, November 2, 1999; See also Santos Alberto, A “Questionários – Estudo da Situação”, p. 36, and Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário,” pp. 187, 204, 353-54; Carvalho, “Notas”, p. 63.} It is possible that he and Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad al-Ngaziji (also al-Msujini) al-Barawi, mentioned by B. G. Martin and Nimtz, are the same person.\footnote{Martin, \textit{Muslim Brotherhoods}, pp. 157, 159, 174; Nimtz, \textit{Islam and Politics}, pp. 57, 202-n.10. See also, Pouwels, \textit{Horn and Crescent}, p. 159.} This Shaykh ‘Issa was also born in Comoros (Ngazidja or Tsujini in Grand Comoro) but lived most of his life in Zanzibar.\footnote{Martin, \textit{Ibid}.} Martin points out that he was a disciple of shaykh ‘Umar Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi (1847-1909), the leader of the Qadiriyya in East Africa.\footnote{Martin, \textit{Ibid}.} The Qadiriyya center and Shaykh Uways himself were based in Zanzibar, from where the \textit{tariqa} carried out missionary activity in Tanganyika and Kenya and as far as the eastern Congo.\footnote{Lapidus, \textit{A History}, \textit{Ibid}.} Martin cites Burhan Mkelle stating that Shaykh ‘Issa “led many among African polytheists to Islam, who accepted it at his hand.”\footnote{Lapidus, \textit{A History}, \textit{Ibid}.} Despite all the information provided by Martin, Nimtz argues that Martin does not present any evidence to support that Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad was a Qadiri \textit{khalifa}.\footnote{Nimtz, \textit{Islam and Politics}, p. 202 - n.10.} But, if in fact both shaykh ‘Issas were the same person, then ‘Issa bin Ahmad was a Qadiri \textit{khalifa}, because he was responsible for the initiation of the Order in Mozambique. Branquinho points out that Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad was a \textit{khalifa} of ‘Umar ibn al-

316 During the fieldwork, all interviewees were unanimous that Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad was the founder of the Qadiriyya in Mozambique, but they were not able to give any detailed information on his life, except that he was originally from the Comoro Islands and lived in Zanzibar. Collective interview with Sufi shaykhs, November 3, 1999, Mozambique Island; Interview with Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, Mozambique Island, November 2, 1999; See also Santos Alberto, A “Questionários – Estudo da Situação”, p. 36, and Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário,” pp. 187, 204, 353-54; Carvalho, “Notas”, p. 63.


318 Martin, \textit{Ibid}.


320 Lapidus, \textit{A History}, \textit{Ibid}.

321 Martin, \textit{Muslim Brotherhoods}, p. 159.

Qullatayn an-Nadhiri in Zanzibar, who in his turn was a disciple of Shaykh ‘Uways. According to Amina Ameir Issa, Sayyid ‘Umar al-Qullatayn was a Hadrami-Zanzibari scholar, born probably in mid-nineteenth century. He received his Qadiri ijaza from Shaykh ‘Uways. Carvalho also stresses that the Qadiriyya (later Qadiriyya Sadat) in Mozambique “was under the tutelage of Zanzibar.”

B. G. Martin maintains that Shaykh ‘Issa was persecuted by German rule in Tanganyika due to the “Mecca Letter” affair and was forced to take refuge in northern Mozambique around 1908. Probably, Shaykh ‘Issa was already involved in this region much earlier. Shaykh Abdurrahman ‘Amuri bin Jimba maintained during the interview that when Shaykh ‘Issa came to Mozambique Island in 1905, he was informed about the existence of the Yashrutiyya, but ‘Amur bin Jimba was performing hajj (Ar., a pilgrimage to Mecca). Shaykh ‘Issa was welcomed in the house of probably parents of Abdurrahman Sayyid Ba Hasan (also known as Abahasan), but he did not launch the new Order due to the absence of and out of respect for Amur bin Jimba. This episode indicates that by 1905, ‘Amur bin Jimba had become an influential religious authority on the Island. Shortly, shaykh ‘Issa traveled to the Cabaceira Pequena, a region of the continental mainland next to Mozambique Island, where he initiated the Qadiriyya and recruited first adepts of the Order. The fact that among the first Qadiris were many Cabaceiran so-called “Moors,” a mixed-race Indian-African group of Muslims, paved the

325 Amina Issa mentions that he established a Qadiri centre ay Hamamni, in the Stone Town area of Zanzibar, where he also taught other religious science subjects. His students spread the Qadiriyya to the mainland. ‘Umar al-Qullatayn was succeeded in the tariqa leadership by his three sons, Sayyid Abubakar, Sayyid Shibli, and Sayyid ‘Ali. His grandson, Sayyid ‘Umar b. Ali is a leader of this group of Qadiriyya tariqa in Zanzibar nowadays. See also, Martin Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 164; Issa, Ibid.
326 Carvalho, “Confrarias”, p. 17.
327 The Letter had strong millennial overtones and was directed against Europeans and Christians. See, Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods, pp. 156-57; Coulon, “Vers une sociologie,” pp. 116-17.
328 Interview with Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, Mozambique Island, November 2, 1999.
way for competition over the leadership of this *tariqa* between them and African Muslims. On his return from *hajj*, ‘Amur bin Jimba assisted *shaykh* ‘Issa in launching the Qadiriyya on the Mozambique Island and surrounding regions.

The initial expansion of the *turuq* outside Mozambique Island was limited. Angoche continued to resist Portuguese colonialism and also the *Anhapakho* group and the *chiefly* hold over Islam remained strong there. In 1911 Amorim related that funeral drumming previously called *mafufuni* was turned into a performance of *dhikr* (*d/tiqiri*), which attests to the presence of Sufi Orders. Fieldwork in Angoche confirmed Branquinho’s view that up to the 1920s there was only one *tariqa* there, the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya. Among other regions, one of Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad’s *khulafa’, *shaykh* Abdul Magid expanded the Qadiriyya to the coastal Cabo Delgado, especially Chiúre, Mecúfi, Montepuez and Mocimboa da Praia between 1920s and 1940.

### The Rise of the “Moors”

The advent of the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya set in motion another major shift in local conceptions of Islam, that of religious authority. The fact that the *tariqa* leadership was situated abroad, in the Comoros and even further, in the Middle East, and that this leadership was passed down locally to people who were not necessarily from important Muslim lineages, signaled a second significant transformation in local conceptions of Islam. A key manifestation of this shift was the emergence of the “Moors” of the Cabaceira Pequena, who began competing for the leadership of the *turuq* with the members of the African chiefly lineages.

As mentioned earlier, according to oral tradition, the Shirazi clans ruled Mozambique Island before the sixteenth century. After Portuguese colonization, the

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Shirazi left the Island and founded the *xeicados* of Quitongonha, Sancul, and Sangage along the coast. The Portuguese began settling at the Island and the adjacent *Terras Firmes* (Port., continental mainland) of Mossuril and Cabaceiras since 1508. East African and Mozambican territories became subordinate to the Portuguese Viceroy of India, which encouraged immigration of Indians. Indians were involved in exporting textiles from Gujarat to East Africa in exchange for ivory. Edward Alpers maintains that “in 1600 there do not appear to have been any Indian residents at Mozambique”, while “in 1646 the total population of *Vanyas* [Hindu Banyan] residents in Portuguese India was reckoned at about 30,000 individuals, with their headquarters at Diu.” In 1752, the Portuguese territories in Mozambique, which included Mozambique Island with the *Terras Firmes*, as well as coastal Inhambane, Sofala, and Quelimane, were legally separated from India and Mozambique Island became a colonial capital. Officially, Indian traders from Daman and Diu in Gujarat were permitted to settle in Portuguese territories of Mozambique from that time on. But, as Alpers points out, “after the collapse of the Mughal Empire in the 1750s and the emergence of British Bombay,” the numbers of Indian settlers at Mozambique dwindled. In mid-eighteenth century, there were more than two hundred *Vanya* residing at Mozambique but only fourteen Muslims, while in the mid-nineteenth century the number of Muslim Indians was only five. The decline of Indians at that time seems to reflect, among other causes, the growing importance of the slave trade to the detriment of the trade in ivory, which was more valuable from the


333 Alpers, “Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa, p. 36.

334 Alpers, “Gujarat and the Trade,,” p. 44.

335 Alpers, “Gujarat and the Trade”, pp. 40-44.
Indian standpoint. Only from the beginning of the twentieth century until about 1930 did the immigration of Indians to northern Mozambique increase again, this time coming from British East Africa, mainly Zanzibar. 336 Most of them remained British citizens until the end of the colonial era, and in contrast to the “Moors,” these new Indian immigrants did not mix with Africans.

The “Moors” of Mozambique Island claim to be descendants of the earlier eighteenth-century wave of Gujarati Sunni Muslim men, mainly from Daman and local African women. Until the twentieth century, Indian women were rare in Mozambique and the immigrant Indians married African women or kept African concubines.

Indians were credited with the Islamization of Mozambique in general, and of northern Mozambique in particular because of the long-term presence of the Gujarati Indians. Carvalho, in particular, believes in a ‘benign’ and ‘civilizing’ role of the “Moors” with respect to Africans. He also erroneously argued that Islam and Sufi Orders spread along with Indian trade, and that the turuq were dominated and controlled by Indian Muslims. He writes:

the majority of the tariqa leaders were the “Moors” from Daman (Gujarat), who had settled in Mozambique Island two centuries earlier, and who married into local Arab families…Because the “Moors” were rich people, they practiced charity and sought to convert the locals [Africans]. Thus they neutralized ravages and bloodshed that the coastal [African] people practiced until then.” 337

But this assumption is historically inaccurate. Due to the intermarriage with African women and because of their trade contacts with Africans, Shirazi Islamic perceptions influenced the religious identity of the “Moors” to a certain extent. 338

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However, continued relationship with India, as well as recurrent Indian immigration to Mozambique maintained the flow of Indian (Muslim) cultural influences. Moreover, the fact that the “Moors” remained under Portuguese rule kept them separate from the bulk of the African population. As a consequence, the Islamic identity of the “Moors” was distinct from that of African Muslims, whose worldviews and identities combined land-related and ancestral spirits along with Islam. As it was rare for the “Moors” to marry into an African ruling clan, they did not seem to have competed for the position of chiefs. Though this situation was reversed to some degree in the early twentieth century, the African population often refused to accept the appointment of a “Moor” for this position by the Portuguese.339

Muslims under Portuguese rule were organized into the “Captaincy of Moors” led by the richest Muslim, usually of Damanese Gujarati Indian Sunni descent.340 These “Moors” were shopkeepers, moneylenders, and traders, involved in the foodstuffs trade with mainland Africans, besides the textile trade with India in exchange for African ivory.341 Some of them were ship-owners and had landed estates on the mainland Terras Firmes, in particular in Cabaceira Pequena. Branquinho recounts the story of a certain Mizamuddin Faqir Lambati, who came from Daman in Gujarat to settle at the Cabaceira Pequena in the eighteenth century and who was known for his extraordinary wealth.342

As with Portuguese “moradores” (Port., settlers), African chiefs and Hindu Vanya, the “Moors” prospered from trade. But with the depression of trade to India since the mid-nineteenth century, their economic fortunes began to wane.343 Mozambique Island itself started declining in importance, especially after abolitionist prohibitions of the slave trade, and the transfer of the colonial capital to the Portuguese settlement of

339 Branquinho provides some examples for this type of resistance, in Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 154, 192-93, 195.


341 Andrade, Ibid; Hafkin, Ibid. See also, Mbwiliza, A History, p. 120.

342 His descendants were appointed as chiefs of Cabaceira Pequena in 1939 by the Portuguese and ruled there up to the end of the colonial era, though they had little African acceptance. Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 192-93. See also, Hafkin, “Trade,” 188-89.

343 Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, p. 234.
Lourenço Marques in the south in 1898. With this move, the Island stopped benefiting from the international trade further because colonial economic interests were redirected towards South African networks. In addition, the settlement of the African population on the Island was no longer restricted. Previously, the status quo of the “Moors” in relation to Africans was safeguarded by the presence of the Portuguese administration. Left without colonial backing, the “Moors” had to arrange for their economic survival and compete for Islamic authority with Africans. In this context, the appearance of the new Sufi Orders offered them opportunities to gain religious authority and access economic means through tariqa leadership.

The “Moors” of the Cabaceira Pequena competed in particular for the leadership of the Qadiriyya. According to Carvalho, though many Cabaceirans “Moors” received ijazas from Shaykh ‘Issa, all of them, except for khalifa Momade Cortelain Renderà, had received lesser ijaza of the nuqaba’ (Ar., pl., sing., naqib, or muqaddam) and murshidun (Ar., pl., sing., murshid). Among them were the nuqaba’ Haji Ahmad, Haji Yussuf and Momade Arune, and murshidun Assane Ossemane Jamú and Ainaddin Ahmad Samo. They all claimed a khalifa title later.

Besides Momade Cortelain Renderà, initially Shaykh ‘Issa passed on the ijaza of the khalifa to two local Swahili Africans, Abudo Swamad (also known as Abudo Murima) and Sayyid Ba Hasan. Swamad in particular had a close personal relationship


with Shaykh ‘Issa because they studied together in Zanzibar. Carvalho points out that Shaykh ‘Issa frequently used Swamad’s influence in order to convince local people, “who did not believe in [Islam preached by the Qadiriyya] and did not want to join the Order”.

Fieldwork findings and Branquinho and Carvalho indicate that Shaykh ‘Issa resided at Mozambique Island until 1925 when he left for Zanzibar and apparently died there. Despite this, it is difficult to say whether he actually dwelt on the Island between 1905 and 1925, or just traveled there with great frequency, because he did not leave any descendants in Mozambique to substantiate long-term residence. At least it is clear that Qadiriyya was under his direct control until 1925.

In one passage, Carvalho mentions that before leaving for Zanzibar, Shaykh ‘Issa organized a meeting at the Celeiro mosque of the Island, where he emphasized that on his departure Abudo Swamad should remain among the principal leaders of the Orders. It is possible that Shaykh ‘Issa expected Swamad to assume the position of the chief khalifa of the Order. On the other hand, probably Shaykh ‘Issa felt uneasy about Swamad’s position in the hierarchy of the Order and wanted to assure that Swamad’s status remained intact after Shaykh ‘Issa left. At any rate, this episode seems to demonstrate that he was aware that the Order was dominated by the “Moors” and suspected that they might have difficulties in accepting an African as a chief khalifa. In other passages, Carvalho and the remaining sources specify that Shaykh ‘Issa appointed Momade Arune, a “Moor” of the Cabaceira Pequena, to the position of the chief khalifa. Whichever of the versions is correct, Momade Arune is known as the leader of the Qadiriyya following Shaykh ‘Issa. Within the new colonial context, Momade Arune, an official of the local Tribunal and a landowner, was probably viewed as a person capable of mediating

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349 Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 353; Carvalho, “Confrarias” (Voz Africana, 29 de Agosto de 1972), p. 17; Carvalho, “Notas”, pp. 63-64; Collective interview with the shaykhs of the turuq, November 6, 1999, Mozambique Island.

350 Carvalho, “Confrarias” (Voz Africana, September, 5, 1972), p. 5; Carvalho, “Notas”, p. 64; Branquinho, Ibid.
between colonial rule and Muslim interests. Carvalho points out that the Portuguese administration regarded Momade Arune in a very positive way.\footnote{351 Carvalho, \textit{Ibid.}}

\section*{The Scramble for the Tariqa Leadership and the Split of the Orders}

The third important manifestation of the shift in the conception of Islam in northern Mozambique was the intervention of the Orders’ authorities abroad in settling local disputes, exemplified by Shaykh Ma’arouf and his brother’s involvement in disputes surrounding the Yashrutiywa leadership.

Another example is related to the founding of the Shadhuliyya Madaniyya in 1925. When in 1921 Sayyid Amur bin Jimba died, Haji Muhammad Ahmad Gulamo finally became a chief \textit{khalifa} of the Yashrutiywa, who, when deceased was followed in this capacity by Shaykh Neimane. But the conflicts over the \textit{tariqa} leadership were already deeply rooted. In 1925, one of the “Moors”, Cassimo Yussuf, took advantage of the presence at the Island of Sayyid Muhammad Mansur, a \textit{sharif} from Medina and a \textit{khalifa} of the Madaniyya Sufi Order, to whom he complained about being discriminated against by Muhammad Gulamo.\footnote{352 There is nothing known from the literature or oral sources about the reasons for Sayyid Mansur’s visit to the Island, but some Portuguese sources indicate that he later resided in South Africa. See, Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário,” p. 191; Santos Alberto, “Questionários Estudo da Situação”, p. 36; Carvalho, “Confrarias” (Voz Africana, September, 5, 1972), p. 5; Carvalho, “Notas”, p. 62; Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 355.} Sayyid Mansur attempted to intervene on his behalf but he himself ended up feeling disrespected by Gulamo. He then wrote to his father in Medina, requesting the Madaniyya \textit{silisla}, a collection of the \textit{qasaid} and other liturgy, including the banners of the Order, all brought the following year by his brother, Sayyid ‘Abdallah Mansur. Sayyid Mansur subsequently gave an \textit{ijaza} and the \textit{silisla} of the Madaniyya to Cassimo Yussuf, who founded the Shadhuliyya Madaniyya on the Island. Unfortunately, shortly thereafter, Cassimo Yussuf died. Sayyid Mansur gave authorization to Sayyid Abdurrahman Sayyid Ba Hasan, to extend his patronage over the
Madaniyya.\textsuperscript{353} The leadership of the Madaniyya thus passed to a representative of the local Swahili chiefly clan instead of a “Moor.”

According to the Sufis interviewed at Mozambique Island, Sayyid Ba Hasan like Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad, was a son of a Hadrami nahodha (Ar., Sw., sea-captain) from Ngazidja in Grand Comoros and a sharifu (Sw., from Ar., sharif).\textsuperscript{354} His father was of the sharifian Ba Alawi clan in Hadramawt, married into ruling Swahili lineages of coastal northern Mozambique, including those of Sancul and Sangage.\textsuperscript{355} Ba Hasan himself was married to Swafitamo, the daughter of Mucussi ‘Umar, a Sancul shehe who preceded Mollid Vulai in this position, and who was Mollid Vulai’s elder brother and uncle to Maravi.\textsuperscript{356} Through both of his pedigrees, Ba Hasan had family ties to Zanzibar, Comoros and Hadramawt, as well as to several coastal Swahili and mainland Muslim chiefly clans of northern Mozambique.

Although Sayyid Ba Hasan maintained the Madaniyya under his tutelage throughout his life, he chose to become a Qadiri chief khalifa upon the death of Momade Arune in 1929. Some Portuguese officials, such as Pinto Correia, Licínio Nogueira and Branquinho maintain that Sayyid Ba Hasan was among Shaykh ‘Issa’s first recruits and received from him a khalifa ijaza; while Carvalho argues that he joined the Order afterwards.\textsuperscript{357} This is probably related to the fact that when Shaykh ‘Issa arrived at the Island Ba Hasan was still very young. Since Shaykh ‘Issa stayed in Ba Hasan’s family home when he first arrived, and given Ba Hasan family’s high socio-political and

\textsuperscript{353} Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 359-60.


\textsuperscript{355} Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 56, 83; Collective interview with Sufi shaykhs, November 3, 1999, Mozambique Island.


religious standing and links to East Africa and Hadramawt, it is likely that Shaykh ‘Issa knew them before coming to Mozambique Island. He trained Ba Hasan himself.

The transition of the Qadiri leadership from the “Moors” to Muslim chiefly clans, epitomized by Sayyid Ba Hasan’s figure, was not without incident. The Cabaceiran “Moors” started attacking him when they realized that he was planning the Qadiri takeover.\footnote{During Branquinho’s survey of the region in the 1960s, some Cabaceirans still held such a grudge against Sayyid Ba Hasan that one of them, Musa Hajji Sacuji, the chief khalifa of the Shadhuliyya Ittifaq, refused to enter the house of Sayyid Ba Hasan’s grandson, Sayyid Bakr. In Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 381-82.} In response Ba Hasan obtained a silsila from Sayyid ‘Umar ibn al-Qullatayn in Zanzibar, which was read at a ziyara gathering at the Central mosque of the Island.\footnote{Licínio Nogueira, o Governador Interino, “Em aditamento ao Ofício No 40/A/20 de 15 de Fevereiro de 1968”, Nampula, 22 de Fevereiro de 1968, SCCIM, Cx. 62, No 412, 11/11/1966 – 02/07/1970, p. 495, IANT/IT, Lisboa; Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 354; Sayyid Ba Hasan is listed in Zanzibar among the important Qadiri khalifas of Sayyid ‘Umar al-Qullatayn. Courtesy of Mwalimu Idris (M. Idris M. Saleh), Stone Town, Zanzibar, September 26, 2004.}

Despite the fact that Sayyid Ba Hasan was ultimately accepted as the supreme khalifa of the Qadiriyya, his visit to the Cabaceira Pequena in the following year (1930) stirred up such a controversy among Muslims that the Portuguese had to dispatch a military regiment and arrested twenty six people, while more than a hundred were called for depositions during the subsequent trial.\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 365.} On this occasion, as a peace offering to Cabaceirans, Shaykh Ba Hasan promised to cut relations with the head of the Order in Zanzibar, which, of course he did not fulfill and the Order continued to maintain its ties with Zanzibar until the end of the colonial era, and in the 1950s, he sent his grandson Sayyid Bakr to study in Zanzibar and Hadramawt.\footnote{Pinto Correia, “Província do Niassa. Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária as Circunscrições do Distrito de Moçambique, 1936-1937),” Vol. 1, Capítulo IV, “Política Indígena, Circunscrição do Mossuril, O Problema das Remissas do Imposto, VI – “Do Posto da Lunga. Um “Trust”de Mercadores Indo-Britânicos, Chefiado por um Capitão Português, para Exploração Feudal de 1.3000 Casais Indígenas”, p. 163-n2, AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76; Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 362.}

Even though Ba Hasan secured his position, some of Shaykh ‘Issa’s khulafa’, such as Abudo Swamad, and two Cabaceiran “Moors”, Haji Ahmad Haji Yussufo and Assane Haji Ossemame Jamú, did not accept his leadership. Seeing what a role a silsila from Zanzibar played in Ba Hasan’s ascendance to power, the three shuyukh decided to
get hold of an even more powerful silsila. So, while performing hajj, Ahmad Haji Yussufo visited in Baghdad the grave of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d.1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya, where he claimed to obtain a silsila. On his return, he displayed it to Sayyid Ba Hasan, who however dismissed it saying that in this region he was the leader of the Qadiriyya and therefore the silsila was not valid in Mozambique.

The distressed shaykhs set up a new tariqa called the Qadiriyya Bagdade (from Baghdad) in 1934. Assane Haji Ossemane Jamú became the first chief khalifa of the new tariqa. The Qadiriyya Bagdade was dominated by the Cabaceiran “Moors”, and included Momade Ainaddin, a nephew of the deceased Momade Arune. Abudo Swamad did not become a chief khalifa after all; he died in 1936.

The split of the Qadiriyya into two distinct turuq weakened the position of Sayyid Ba Hasan and diminished the numbers of his personal followers and clients. Besides the threat from the new Qadiriyya, his tariqa also suffered a blow from the Yashrutiyya that extended its patronage to the Qadiriyya Bagdade in the same way Sayyid Ba Hasan did earlier with the Shadhuliyya Madaniyya. However, the competition between the Qadiriyya and the Yashrutiyya and between Africans and the “Moors” took a toll on the Yashrutiyya’s religious and social standing also. As Branquinho points out, particularly the emergence of the Shadhuliyya Madaniyya destabilized the Yashrutiyya. The fact that both the Yashrutiyya and the Madaniyya had Shadhili origins, and that the Madaniyya was founded as a result of a conflict between the Yashruti chief khalifa and an Arab sharif aggravated the situation and fuelled the ensuing competition between these two turuq. Moreover, the Madaniyya silsila was obtained directly from Medina, viewed as one of the centers of Islam, which granted it with greater legitimacy and more
powerful religious authority as opposed to Yashrutiyya whose *silsila* came only via the Comoros.

Following the death of Neimane, the Yashruti leadership passed to Yussuf Jamal, who despite being a “Moor” himself, was more accommodating to the local chiefly clans than to the “Moors.” According to Licínio Nogueira, Yussuf Jamal was a grandson of a Gujarati Indian from Daman at Cabaceira Pequena, and he seems to have been quite wealthy as he owned landed estates of mango, coconut and cashew trees at Cabaceira Grande. He remained the most influential *khalifa* of the Yashrutiyya throughout the colonial era. But in 1934 (or 1936), a group of prominent Yashruti *shuyukh*, including Mussaji Sacuji, a Cabaceiran “Moor,” accused him of abuses allegedly perpetrated using his position of a chief *khalifa*. The group then set up a committee with the aim of correcting supposed excesses of Yussuf Jamal, and maintaining the unity of the members of the Yashrutiyya, especially in the face of the growing importance of the Madaniyya. The committee was called, according to Portuguese sources, “*Ittifaq al-Karame Hudjalh al-Yashrutiyya*” (“A Noble Agreement to Correct Mistakes of the Yashrutiyya”). As Yussuf Jamal did not appear to a meeting despite the invitation, the group launched a new *tariqa* called Shadhuliyya Ittifaq, with Mussaji Sacuji as a chief *khalifa*. In effect, the Ittifaq turned into a Comorian and “Moor” *tariqa* as opposed to the Yashrutiyya that retained local Swahili and African memberships. Yussuf Jamal carried on as the chief *khalifa* of the Yashrutiyya until his death in 1970, when he was followed by Sayyid Amuri bin Jimba, the son.

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With the purpose of overcoming the competition once and for all, Sayyid Ba Hasan changed the name of the original Qadiriyya to Qadiriyya Sadat (Ar., pl., sing., Sayyid, “the lord”, “the master” also an honorific title reserved to the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), with its leaders claiming an exclusive *sharifian* descent. Sayyid Ba Hasan wanted his *tariqa* to be an inherently legitimate and authoritative *tariqa* as compared to other *turuq* in Mozambique. The new name suggests that in effect the *tariqa* became an elite Sufi Order, and as such it threatened the positions of the Yashrutiyya who had *shurafa’* amongst its leadership. It endangered religious authority of the Cabaceiran “Moors” too because their Islamic identity was generally detached from the *sharifian* claims. Branquinho as well as the interviewed Sufi *shuyukh* confirm that the majority of the Qadiriyya Sadat leaders were in fact *sharifs.*

Sayyid Ba Hasan strengthened the Qadiriyya Sadat’s religious standing by ‘accumulating’ *silsilas* and *ijazas* attained from Islamic centers abroad. Hence Ba Hasan persuaded Haji Ahmad to leave the Qadiriyya Bagdade and to return to the original Qadiriyya in 1935. Certainly, Haji Ahmad Haji Yussufo, a Cabaceiran “Moor”, was one of the non-*sharif khulafa’* of the Order. In his case, the fact that he had a strong *silsilaijaza* from the cradle of the Qadiriyya in Baghdad conferred him with a substantial authority and power. By luring him into the Qadiriyya Sadat, Sayyid Ba Hasan on the one hand, strengthened legitimacy and authority of his own *tariqa*, while on the other, eliminated a strong rival in a competition for a Sufi leadership. This act paralleled what he did earlier with Shadhuliyya Madaniyya with a *silsila* from Medina.

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374 In 1964, Portuguese Secret Services in a confidential report wrote on Haji Yussuf Haji Ahmad’s son, Momade Yussufo, that he had no relation to the ‘traditional authority’ (*régulos*), neither Arabic ancestry, and that his family originated in Daman, India, who three generations ago established themselves in the Cabaceira Pequena and later, Mozambique Island. In “Administração do Concelho de Lourenço Marques, Resposta ao questionário a que se refere a nota No 164 de 24/2/1966 do extinto Gabinete de Zona do Serviço de Acção Psicossocial de Lourenço Marques”, pp. 57-64 - SCCIM, Caixa 395 “Islamismo”, Arquivos da PIDE/DGS, IANT/TT, Lisboa.

375 Ba Hasan’s grandson, Sayyid Bakr later married the daughter of the chief *khalifa* of this Order, Abdurrahman Adambai. Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 359-60, 372.
Madaniyya *khulafa’* also comprised a sizeable number of the *sharīfian* elite, especially in Angoche region, among whom was the widely acclaimed *khalīfa* Tarusse Sayyid ‘Ali.\(^{376}\)

The Madaniyya was launched in Angoche in 1924 and became a second *tariqa* in the region following the Yashrutiyya.\(^{377}\) Carvalho however maintains that Assane Ossemane Jamú, one of the first ‘converts’ of Shaykh ‘Issa, a Cabaceiran “Moor” and a worker at the Port Captaincy was transferred by the Portuguese to Angoche where he founded a Qadiriyya branch in early 1920s.\(^{378}\) If it was so, it seems he had no acceptance of the local Africans, because his name was not mentioned during fieldwork in Angoche.\(^{379}\) Moreover, according to those interviewed, the Qadiriyya does not even exist there until today. Both Amur bin Jimba and Sayyid Muhammad Mansur traveled to Angoche, where they distributed Yashruti and Madani *silsilas* and *ijazas*. When the Madaniyya passed under Sayyid Ba Hasan’s tutelage, he visited Angoche in the capacity of patron of the Order, but he did not impose the Qadiriyya on the *Anhapakho*, who remained attached either to Yashrutiyya or Madaniyya.\(^{380}\)

Through his Sancul family background, Sayyid Ba Hasan had particular influence in the regions formerly covered by this *xeicado*, such as Lunga and Quivolane in Mossuril. The Portuguese Inspector for Indigenous Affairs, Captain Armando Eduardo Pinto Correia, who assessed the region in 1936-37, noted that Rodrigues Lapa, the colonial Administrator of the Lunga, felt “asphyxiated” and overwhelmed “amidst so many mosques and Arabicized [Muslim] chiefs whose acts of solidarity of faith represented an impermeable mystery.”\(^{381}\) Lapa mentioned to Pinto Correia the annual congregation of Muslims reaching 100 people at one time in Lunga, coming from


Mozambique Island, Mogincual, Nakala and other regions. These annual gatherings are more likely to be the Qadiri *ziyara* under Sayyid Ba Hasan’s leadership, though Lapa describes them as “*tiqiri*”. Lapa also noted that this *tiqiri* ritual was “practiced by specific kind of indigenous Muslims,” a “kind of a special religious caste”, referring to the membership in a Sufi Order. Muslims contributed 10 or 15 Escudos each, used for buying large quantities of rice and several heads of cattle to be consumed during the feast of *ziyara*. The feast served for gathering donations as well, intended in part to be distributed among the poor, while the major part went to the *khulafa’* and *shura*.\(^{382}\)

African Sufi leaders, such as Sayyid Ba Hasan were turning into uncontested religious authorities in other regions, but at Mozambique Island he, like other African *khulafa’,* faced stiff resistance from the “‘Moors.’”\(^{383}\) Resulting from these old contradictions, a group of non-Cabaceiran *muridun* left the Qadiriyya Bagdade in 1945 and founded a new *tariqa* called the Qadiriyya Jailani with chief *khalifa* Assane Ahmad from Mozambique Island.\(^{384}\) The Jailani founders were considered as not having a legitimate *silsila* because it was not authenticated by the important Sufi centers abroad. The Qadiriyya Sadat, Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and Madaniyya became the most widespread *turuq* with significant African following. In contrast, the “‘Moor’” and the new *turuq*, such as Qadiriyya Jailani remained small-scale and mostly confined to Mozambique Island. Only Momade Ainaddin (nephew of the deceased Momade Arune) left the Island and settled in Fernão Velozo, and in 1953/54, probably seeing that he did not stand much chance of becoming the chief *khalifa*, he left the “‘Moor’”-dominated Qadiriyya Baghdad and launched a new *tariqa* called the *Tariqa Baghdad Hujat Saliqina* or Qadiriyya Saliqina.\(^{385}\) The leadership among the “‘Moor’”- dominated *turuq* was not

\(^{382}\) Some part of these donations, according to Pinto Correia, also went to Aga Khan which seems to be unlikely. In Pinto Correia, *Ibid*.

\(^{383}\) Portuguese sources underlined that Sayyid Ba Hasan was a renowned *tariqa shaykh* at a national level, but at Mozambique Island he continued to be a controversial figure throughout his life. See, Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 354-55, 368, 382, 409-411; Mello Machado, *Entre Macuas*, p. 277.


only handed down gradually to other “Moors”, but also became hereditary. The Qadiriyya Baghdad continued under the auspices of Haji Assane Ossemane Jamú until his death in 1954, when his son, Abdurrazzaq Assane Jamú became the chief khalifa.\textsuperscript{386} Concurrently, when Momade Ainaddin died in 1966, his son Ainaddin Momade became the chief khalifa of the Qadiriyya Saliquina.\textsuperscript{387}

**Women and the Turuq**

Pinto Correia writes in his 1936-1937 report, while describing the Qadiriyya ziyara in Mossuril that “the organizers are called halifas and sharifs, sometimes men and other times, women.”\textsuperscript{388} This allusion to women khulafa’ and shurafa’ of the Sufi Orders is particularly revealing. Historical sources, as well as scholars, such as Capela, Medeiros, Hafkin, Mello Machado, Alpers, and others, do not mention female participation in Sufi Orders in Mozambique at all. The only exception is Mbwiliza, who maintains that “there is no evidence that women ever rose to the position of leadership within Muslim brotherhoods or communities”.\textsuperscript{389}

Fieldwork in Angoche, Mozambique Island, and Nampula City, however, demonstrated that women were as active members of Muslim societies as before and joined the turuq from their inception. Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad and Sayyid Ba Hasan in particular, were remembered for paying especial attention to female religious training and initiating many women into the turuq.\textsuperscript{390} The fact that the founders and leaders of the Orders such as Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad and Sayyid Ba Hasan, both with strong ties to Zanzibar and other East African Swahili, encouraged women to join the turuq casts some

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\textsuperscript{386}Telles Carvalho, *Ibid*; Carvalho, “Notas”, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{387} Carvalho, *Ibid*.


\textsuperscript{389} Mbwiliza, *A History*, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{390} Interviews with Khatidja Jamal, *khalifa Khuttura*, November 4, 1999; with *khalifa* Shifa Yussufo, November, 5, 1999; and collective interview with female members of the turuq, Mariamo Abudo, Waké Mutualibo, and Muaziza Ali, November 3, 1999, all in Mozambique Island.
reservations on Nimtz’s and Strobel’s view of East African women entering the *tariqa* after the banning of the dance societies and as an alternative to these societies.  

Among the prominent female Sufi *khulafa’* was Khatidja Jamal, known as *khalifa* Khuttura, currently the *khalifa* of the Qadiriyya female branch, who received her *ijaza* from Sayyid Ba Hasan’s hands. Another example is Shifa Yussufo who is also a *khalifa* of the female branch of the Qadiriyya Sadat, a granddaughter of Sayyid Ba Hasan. She was also trained by Shaykh Ba Hasan and received the *ijaza* from him.

![Picture 6: Some of the Interviewed Qadiri *shaykhas*, Nampula City.](image)

As a result of women’s initiation into Sufi Orders, a female branch, a parallel structure of the male *tariqa*, emerged. The respectability of the new *turruq* was extended to the women from local patrician families in detriment to the former female slaves and outsiders settling on the Island. Like in other Swahili societies, the high-status Muslim women were initiated into the new Sufi Orders and began receiving a sound religious education.

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393 Interview with *khalifa* Shifa Yussufo, November 5, 1999, Mozambique Island.

training from the new shuyukh. In the context of the fervent expansion of religious education, many a newly educated shaykha opened Qur'anic schools in their homes for other women, bringing the old meanings of the client-patron relations of the Island to a new level. In Mozambique, as elsewhere, Sufi Orders impacted on the improvement of women’s Islamic education. The female patricians like their male counterparts came to occupy positions of relevance in the hierarchy of the Orders while the former slaves and female outsiders maintained marginal religious practices such as “dance societies”.

Despite the links between social and religious standings, it was rather the religious learning of these women, “the authority of learning” in Dale F. Eickelman’s terms, which was at the base of their religious authority and power. Though they depended nominally on men, in practice the status of the female khalifa of the Order was as important as that of the male one. During the annual ziyara it is common in northern Mozambique to visit the tombs of the deceased Sufi shuyukh, including women. These tombs are believed to be of the awliya (Ar., pl., wali, sing., those who are close to God), who could perform karamat (Ar., miracles) and whose tombs emanated a baraka (Ar., blessing). Some names of these female awliya that came up during the interviews were Fatima Amur, Saquina of the Qadiriyya Baghdad, and Abuda Hafish of the Shadhuliyya Madaniyya, among others. The economic power of the female khulafa’ was also assured. From Pinto Correia’s report it is clear that during the annual festivals of the turuq associated with the ziyara ceremony, male as well as female khulafa’ received donations from their followers.


396 Interview with Shaykh Faqui Sayyid Shamakhani, November 2, 1999, Mozambique Island.


398 Collective interview with members of the female branches of Sufi Orders, November, 1999, Mozambique Island; May 2000, Angoche city; June, 2000, Nampula City.

Nowadays, with the increasing presence of the anti-Sufi and Islamist critique in northern Mozambique, Sufi Orders in fact remain mostly, though not exclusively, in the hands of women. At the time of the fieldwork in Mozambique Island, some female khulafa’ of the Orders held much higher esteem and authority than the male ones due to their religious learning, and also, because they received their ijaza from the founders of the Orders. Such was the case of the khalifa Khuttura. Amina Umm Muhammad, on the other hand, was referred to as the khalifa of the Shadhuliyya Madaniyya by Muhammad Sandique, who despite being a nominal head of the Order considered himself as only a shaykh.  

Sayyid Habib Bakr

The idea that the tariqa leadership was hereditary became widespread to such an extent that when Sayyid Ba Hasan died and it was announced that he appointed, Mahmud Haji Selemanji as a successor, Ba Hasan’s direct descendants argued against this appointment. Actually, the ensuing dispute over this nomination also reflected views, on the one hand, of those who opposed the selection of a Cabaceiran “Moor” in principle, and on the other, of the khulafa’, close to Sayyid Ba Hasan and who expected to succeed him, and finally, his own direct descendants. The first objection came from one of the khulafa’ of the Qadiriyya Sadat’s, Habib Mussagy, who expressed his disagreement with Ba Hasan’s choice, stating that he himself was supposed to be the chief khalifa and besides Haji Mahmud Selemaji was a Cabaceiran. Muhammad Haji Selemanji was a descendant of Faquira Lambati, and brother of the régulo of the Cabaceira Pequena,  

100, in AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76. Also interviews with female khalifas of the Orders, November 1999, Mozambique Island.

400 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Sandique, November 1, 1999, Mozambique Island

401 Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário,” p. 187; Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 356-58; Carvalho, “Notas,” p. 64; Carvalho, “Confrarias” (Voz Africana, September 5, 1972), p. 5; in fact during the fieldwork in Mozambique Island, Sayyid Ba Hasan’s great-grandson, Ali Daud argued that the khalifa-ship of the Qadiriyya Sadat was hereditary to his family. Interview with Ali Daud and Shifa Yussufo, November 5, 1999, Mozambique Island.


403 Branquinho, “Relatório”, p. 357.
appointed by the Portuguese in 1939 after the “Naharra” revolt (see below). Habibo Mussagy was cousin of the régulo Atumane of Pulanga in Mossuril and Ba Hasan’s student. He accompanied Ba Hasan to Lourenço Marques, where Ba Hasan was hospitalized and treated from complications related to diabetes and later died in 1963.

Despite objections, Haji Mahmud Selemanji became the chief khalifa, but the following year (1964), Habib Mussagy organized another ziyara in Ba Hasan’s memory. After reading the Qur’an, Abdulmajid Andique, a khalifa from Monapo, suggested that Ba Hasan’s son, Sayyid Salim should take the position of the chief khalifa and not Selemanji. But Sayyid Salim rejected the offer though he did not accept Selemanji’s nomination either. Instead, he expressed his conviction that his nephew and Ba Hasan’s grandson, Sayyid Muhammad Sayyid Habib Bakr was the right person for the title.

Sayyid Bakr was a son of Ba Hasan’s daughter, Alawiya. According to the Portuguese Secret Services report, he worked for the Secretary of the Mozambique Island Administrative Council in 1958 -1960 as an interpreter for PIDE (Portuguese Secret Police) in Nampula City. When he heard about Mahmud Selemanji’s nomination, he quit his job at once and as Portuguese sources put it, started a ‘campaign’ to win the support of the members of the Qadiriyya Sadat. From that time on, he did not have any specific job and looked after his mother’s landed estates at Cabaceira Grande.

During the aforementioned ziyara, Sayyid Salim pointed to the fact that Sayyid Ba Hasan spent a considerable amount of effort, money and time on Habib Bakr’s religious education and this must be taken as a sign of his wish to Sayyid Bakr to succeed him as a chief khalifa of the Order. According to Branquinho, with Sayyid Ba Hasan’s support, Sayyid Bakr had studied in Zanzibar under Sayyid Omar Abdullah, a student of

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406 Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário,” pp. 3-1º, 188.
407 Nogueira, Ibid.
409 Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário,” p. 188.
‘Umar bin Ahmad bin Sumayt al-Alawi (1886-1976).410 Probably, Sayyid Bakr attended
the Muslim Academy of Zanzibar of which Sayyid Omar was the principal.411 Then he
got to Hadramawt to study under Shaykhs Sayyid Hasan bin ‘Umar Shatiri and Sayyid
‘Umar Shatiri, of whom unfortunately there is no information available, except that these
two people were from a prominent sharifian Ba Alawi family of religious scholars in
Hadramawt. Some Shatiri had settled in Mombasa and Mafia Island, where they
integrated the Shirazi ruling elite.412 Sayyid Bakr also met Abdallah Saleh al-Farsy
(1912-1982) in Zanzibar, under whom he did not study personally, but according to
Branquinho, al-Farsy left on him lasting impressions.413 He returned to Mozambique
Island in 1957 when his grandfather (Sayyid Ba Hasan), fearing political changes in East
Africa, did not allow him to go abroad again.414

Habib Musagy’s ziyara ended up with the rejection of Sayyid Bakr’s candidature
on the basis that he was still too young.415 However, Habibo Mussagy and Sayyid Salim
were not prepared to acknowledge a Cabaceiran “Moor” as the sajada of the Qadiriyya
Sadat; rather, they launched a new Order, Qadiriyya Mashiraba, to which other African

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410 Branquinho, “Relatório,” Ibid. Nogueira, “Respostas ao Questionário,” p. 188 also mentions that Sayyid
Bakr studied in Zanzibar and Hadramawt. On Omar Abdullah see, Nimtz, Islam and Politics, pp. 22-23; on
‘Umar bin Sumayt, see Chanfi Ahmed, Islam et Politique, pp. 120; and Loimeier, “Patterns and
Peculiarities of Islamic Reform, p. 251.

411 Nimtz, Islam and Politics, Ibid.

412 Trimingham, Islam in East Africa, pp. 16, 22, 34; Pouwels, Horn and Crescent, p. 72; Bang, Sufis and
Scholars, p. 114.

Politique, pp. 117, 121-22; Chanfi Ahmed, Ngoma et Mission Islamique, pp. 3-4; Justo Lacunza-Balda,
“Tendances de la literature islamique Swahili” (F. Le Guennec-Coppens et P. Caplan, eds., Le Swahili entre
of Kiswahili in East African Islam” (Louis Brenner, ed., Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-
Enlightenment”? East African Reformist Discourse at the Turning Point: The Example of Sheikh
Muhammad Kasim Mazrui” (Journal of Religion in Africa, Volume 33, Number 3, 2003:279-309), pp. 280,
284-288.


khulafa’ of the Qadiriyya Sadat joined. Sayyid Salim, the first khalifa of the new tariqa died soon, and was followed by Haribo Muzé, who unfortunately was blinded shortly afterwards. At the end, Habibo Mussagy became the chief khalifa of the Mashiraba.

The split of the Qadiriyya Sadat caused much embarrassment to Mahmud Selemanji, who seeing that he did not have approval among Africans, nominated Sayyid Bakr as his deputy khalifa. Selemanji announced his choice in a ziyara at Cabaceira Pequena, to which besides the members of the Order were invited Portuguese administrative officials. However, one of the “Moor” khulafa’ Ahmad Badruddin expressed his annoyance, and left the meeting saying that he was no longer with the Qadiriyya Sadat. Later he joined the “Moor” tariqa, the Qadiriyya Bagdade. According to a PIDE report, in order to avoid further controversies, the Qadiriyya Sadat promised to discontinue its relationships with Zanzibar again, in particular with Shaykh ‘Umar bin

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Ahmad bin Sumayt al-Alawi, to whom the *tariqa* usually resorted to for religious advice.  

Sayyid Bakr’s authority and legitimacy were widely recognized by African Sufis, who barely took notice of Selemanji. Branquinho’s survey reveals that almost all branches of the Qadiriyya Sadat and Shadhuliyya Madaniyya in northern Mozambique indicated Sayyid Bakr as their supreme *khalifa*, except for few regions where Abdul Magid’s sons were rivals to Sayyid Bakr, but even they recognized Bakr rather than Selemanji. The authority of Mahmud Selemanji was practically limited to some parts of Mossuril, especially the Cabaceiras, the fact mentioned by the Portuguese Secret Services too. Sayyid Bakr was recognized as the chief *khalifa* of the Qadiriyya Sadat in Mozambique District (contemporary Nampula Province), in Cabo Delgado District with the centre in Chiüre, Mecúfi (established by Shaykh Abddul Magid and continued by his sons), in Niassa District, Beira and Pebane in central Mozambique, in some parts of Inhambane, in Lourenço Marques, and in Durban, Natal. During fieldwork, all the Muslims interviewed remembered Sayyid Ba Hasan and Sayyid Bakr, emphasizing in particular their *sharifian* ancestry and Islamic learning and authority, while only one person, Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri Jimba, mentioned Mahmud Selemanji.

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At the end of the colonial era, there were eight ‘formal’ Sufi Orders in Mozambique, with their centre in Mozambique Island, and one ‘informal’ (the Rifa’iyya) \textit{tariqa}. According to the Portuguese, formal \textit{turq} had the following chief \textit{khulafa’}:

- Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya - Shaykh Haji Sayyid Amuri bin Jimba;
- Shadhuliyya Madaniyya – Shaykh Abdurrahman Adambai and Shaykh Cassim Ali;
- Shadhuliyya Ittifaq - Shaykh Mussagy Haji Sacuji;
- Qadiriyya Sadat - Sayyid Muhammad Sayyid Habib Bakr (and Shaykh Haji Mahmud Haji Selemanji);
- Qadiriyya Bagdade - Shaykh Absurrazaq Assan Ossumane Jamú;
- Qadiriyya Jailani - Shaykh Abubacar Calam;
- Qadiriyya Saliqina - Shaykh Haji Ainaddin Momade Ainaddin;
- Qadiriyya Mashiraba – Shaykh Habibo Mussagy (and Shaykh Harib Muzé).

The Orders did not undergo further splits because the religious authority of the \textit{tariqa} leaders was challenged from the late 1960s onward by the growing presence of the so-called \textit{Wahhabis}, the independence war and by the late colonial and post-colonial socio-political and economic environment.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This Chapter outlined the historical course of \textit{turq} expansion in northern Mozambique during the colonial period. Though the Orders came through the traditional Swahili routes and were spread into northern Mozambique practically by the same people as in other East African regions, they arrived into a radically different socio-political context, as most of the \textit{chieffly} African Muslim leadership of the region was involved in resistance against colonial encroachment into their territories. Though the \textit{chieffly} elites of Angoche

and Mozambique Island were the first to receive and to adopt the new Sufi conception of Islam, the historical Muslim chiefly network of the region as a whole could not focus on preserving and maintaining their hold over an Islamic authority as in earlier times, because they were facing Portuguese military conquest, or “effective occupation”. This was one of the main reasons why the Sufi Orders did not expand beyond Angoche and Mozambique Island until the early 1930s, when colonial rule was consolidated.

The fact that the Muslim chiefly clans were concerned with their political independence when the Orders first came provided a mixed-race Indian-African group of people, or the Moors, with an opportunity to lay claims to Islamic authority. The Moors, who traditionally lived under Portuguese rule and thus separate from the bulk of African population, were left without colonial backing and immersed in a region dominated by Muslim chiefly clans, when the colonial capital was moved from Mozambique Island to Lourenço Marques in southern Mozambique. In 1896, when the first tariqa, the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya, arrived in northern Mozambique, the Muslim chiefly clans could still secure control over Sufism to a certain extent, but they had to deal with a Comorian sharif, Sayyid Amur bin Jimba, who, in contrast to the earlier immigrants, did not establish kinship relations with the important chiefly clans of the region. The Qadiriyya, on the other hand, which arrived in 1904/05, was completely ‘hijacked’ by the Moors, and thus on both occasions the traditional hold of the local chiefly elites over Islam was threatened.

With the consolidation of colonialism in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and the integration of the chiefs within the colonial administrative and politico-legal systems, Muslim chiefly clans began reclaiming their traditional Islamic domain, now centered on Sufi Orders. Shaykh Sayyid Ba Hasan, a quintessential representative of the historical Muslim chiefly elites of northern Mozambique, embodying a Shirazi sharifian and matrilineal chiefly ancestry, through which he was a relative to numerous Muslim chiefs of northern Mozambique and the Shirazis of East Africa and the Comoros, and was the owner of the lands through his first-comer pedigree, brought Islam back to the Muslim chiefly clans by accumulating strong silsilas and khalifa-ships of the Orders in his own hands.
However, Islamic authority, which was previously grounded in the link between regional tradition of chiefship and Shirazi Swahili Islamic tradition and now associated with Sufi Orders, continued to be a focus of competition between the old chiefly clans and the new racial and ethnic elements throughout the colonial period and influenced the split of the turuq in Mozambique. Fernando Amaro Monteiro and Carvalho, two Portuguese colonial writers, point out that the division of the Orders represented internal disputes over their leadership and that the resulting multiplicity of the turuq “corresponded to political-religious clientele of different factions of local society.”

Fieldwork respondents believed that the split of the Orders resulted from personal interests of the tariqa leadership, who each wanted to maintain control over their own clients, take advantage of tariqa donations, and gain religious and social prestige. Monteiro, however, also points to racial overtones of the competition, whereby “groups with different degrees of racial miscegenation gradually and with great difficulties relinquished power to Africans.” Thus, in northern Mozambique, as among the Muslims of Mafia Island analyzed by Patricia Caplan, the tariqa cleavages reflected other cleavages of the society. In northern Mozambique specifically, they reflected cleavages between local and immigrant people, and those of a racial nature. Most importantly, they mirrored the cleavages between different groups competing for Islamic authority, in particular, incessant attempts of the chiefly clans to restore Islam as one of their chiefly domains.

As in previous historical periods, women of northern Mozambique were actively involved both in politico-economic and religious life of their societies. Along with male members of the Muslim chiefly clans, female elite women were initiated into Sufi Orders. With this, the turuq acquired a parallel female structure mirroring its male counterpart. The elite Sufi women from chiefly families were considered as having better religious

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425 Carvalho, “Notas”, p. 6; Monteiro, O islão, o poder, p. 97. Though in earlier articles, Carvalho maintained that the split of the turuq resulted from different kinds of “obtuse moves” of the tariqa leaders, and from their personal ambitions and even “autocracy.” Carvalho, “Confrarias” (Voz Africana, 29 de Agosto de 1972), p. 19; Carvalho, “Confrarias” (Voz Africana, dia 5 de Setembro de 1972), p. 5. See also, Alpers, “East Central Africa,” p. 312.

426 Monteiro, O islão, o poder e a guerra, p. 97.

427 Caplan, Choice and Constraint, p. 96.
training and sounder *ijaza*, which they received from the founders of the Orders, than many of the male Sufi *shuyukh* of more modest descent. Like men, Sufi elite women became involved in religious proselytizing and created *Qur’anic* schools in their homes and sponsored lower class and non-Muslim women’s Islamic education. Women thus contributed to the expansion of the *turuq*, of Islamic education and literacy in the Arabic script in northern Mozambique.
Figure 1

Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya (1897-ca. 1974)

Muhammad Ma’arouf b. Shaykh Ahmad b. Abu Bakr (1853-1905)

1897

Muhammad Ahmad Gulamo

(Amur bin Jimba (d. 1924))

Neiman b. Ali Twalibo (Galibo)

Alawi b. Sayyid Abu Bakr

Amur bin Jimba (d. 1924)

Muhammad Ahmad Gulamo

Neiman b. Ali Twalibo (Galibo)

Yussuf Jamal

Sayyid Muhammad Mansur
Cassimo Yussuf
Shadhuliyya Madaniyya (1925)

Sayyid Amuri bin Jimba

Abdurrahman Adambai
Cassim Ali

Mussaji Sacuji
Shadhuliyya Ittifaq (1934/36)
Figure 2

Qadiriyya (1904/5-ca. 1974)

‘Umar Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi (1847-1909)

‘Umar al-Qullatayn

‘Issa b. Ahmad (d. 1925)

1904/5

Abudo Swamad
Hajji Ahmad Hajji Yussuf
Mohamad Arune (d. 1929)
Abdul Magid (d. 1940)
Assane Hajji Osseman Jamú (d. 1954)

Qadiriyya Bagdade (1934)
Abdurazaque Assane Ossemane Jamú

Qadiriyya Jailani (1945)
Assane Ahmad

Qadiriyya Saliqina (1954/5)
Momade Ainaddin
Abubacar Calam

Ainaddin Momade Ainaddi

Sayyid Ba Hasan (d. 1963)
Qadiriyya Sadat (1930)

Mahmud Selemanji
Habib Mussagy
Qadiriyya Mashiraba (1964)

Sayyid Habib Bakr (d. 1989)
Haribo Muzé
Chapter Three

Muslim Chiefs and the Colonial Order

This Chapter focuses on the transformations which Mozambique in general and northern Mozambique in particular went through in the context of twentieth century colonialism. The colonial government introduced administrative, economic, political and legal changes. Questions addressed in this Chapter include: how did Muslim chiefs adjust to the new political and socio-economic environment created by colonial rule in Mozambique? How the meaning and the role of Muslim chiefship changed, if it did? In which ways the debates about local conceptions of Islam, chiefship and matriliny were influenced by the colonial order?

The second set of questions addressed in this Chapter is related to the increase of the presence of Sufi Orders. What were the main reasons for this increase? How did Muslim chiefs react to this increase and to the challenges that Sufi Orders posed to their religious authority? Were Muslim chiefs able to preserve the dual basis of their power and legitimacy, that of Islam and that of matrilineal chiefship?

The Incorporation of Chiefs into Colonial Administration

With “effective occupation”, the Portuguese like other colonial powers in Africa, became concerned with demarcating territories and naming political office holders who could then be held responsible for those territories, and through whom they could rule, maintain law and order, and levy taxes.\(^{428}\) As Paul Baxter points out, European colonialists in Africa assumed that one ‘ethnic group’ or ‘tribe’ could be distinguished from another and that ‘tribe’ came to have a designated ‘tribal’ territory.\(^{429}\) But in northern Mozambique,

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the Portuguese were not so clear-cut on the use of the definition of ‘tribe’ because the most wide-spread group was a Makua-speaking group, covering significant parts of contemporary Nampula, Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Zambezi provinces. The Makua-speakers were not a homogeneous bounded group, neither territorially or ethnically. As with the Oromo, this group was too varied and complex to be taken or analyzed as a whole.\footnote{Baxter, “Ethnic Boundaries and Development,” p. 258.}

When implementing a new colonial administrative system, the Portuguese sought not for ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘tribes’ as for chiefs and chieftaincies to make units to be incorporated into the administrative system.

In general, the Portuguese tended to preserve pre-colonial African political structures. However, this did not mean that these structures were transported into the colonial system unaltered. At the end of the “effective occupation,” the most influential Muslim chiefs, especially Swahili at the coast, had been killed or sent to exile, leaving a void in the local hierarchy. Also, new territorial arrangements were made, unsettling pre-colonial balances of power between different chiefdoms. First, Mozambique was organized into military captaincies by the end of the nineteenth century.\footnote{In 1897, Mousinho de Albuquerque, a Royal Commissary (Comissário Régio) of Mozambique, separated Mossuril from the Mozambique Island, and created a new Captaincy of Macuana on the continent. By 1904, there were four military captaincies in the District of Mozambique: Fernão Velozo, Macuana, Mossuril and Angoche. After military conquests of the mainland by Neutel de Abreu in 1907, most of the hinterland was included into the Macuana Captaincy. In 1917, there were 15 military commands. See, “Correspondência recebida de Moçambique, 1904, Portaria No 52 de 7 de Abril de 1897 e Portaria No 85 de 19 de Outubro de 1897, pelo Comissário Régio, Mousinho de Albuquerque”, in AHM, FGG, Cx. 1015; A. Cotta Mesquita, “Relatório da Inspecção feita a Câmara Municipal de Nampula, pelo Inspector Administrativo, A. Cotta Mesquita, 1965-66”, p. 2, and A. Cotta Mesquita “Relatório das Inspeções aos Concelho e Comissão Municipal do Erati, pelo Inspector Administrativo A. Cotta Mesquita, 1965”, pp. 4-5, in AHM, FGG, Cx. 2142; Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa, “Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Distrito de Nampula da Província do Niassa, 1948”, pelo Inspector Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa (6 Volumes), Vol. 5, pp. 1107-1108, and Vol. 6, p. 1318, in AHM, ISANI, Cx. 77.}

The 1907 Portuguese Administrative Reform organized the country into five civil Districts.\footnote{João Paulo Borges Coelho, “Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968-1982): A History of State Resettlement Policies, Development and War” (PhD Dissertation, University of Bradford, 1993), p. 100.} The Reform incorporated chiefs within the new administrative system as régulos (Port., small-
In 1921-22, the military captaincies were replaced by civil circumscriptions. The situation of the régulos as part of the colonial administrative system became even more pronounced following the 1926 coup de état and the establishment of the Estado Novo in Portugal. The government introduced reforms through the 1930 Acto Colonial and the Carta Orgânica do Império Colonial Português marking the end of formal autonomy of Mozambique, which became one of the Portuguese overseas ‘colonies.’ The 1933 Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina (Administrative Reform of the Overseas Territories) put local administrations of the colonies under direct control of Lisbon and the colonies themselves were restructured in a manner as to fit this subordination. The Districts were subdivided into urban Concelhos (Councils) and rural Circunscrições (Circumscriptions), directed by civil Administradores (Commissioners). These in their turn were divided into between two to six Administrative posts, each headed by a lower level local administrator called the Chefe de Posto (Chief of the Post). As João Paulo Borges Coelho points out,

The Local Administrator was at the bottom level of the administrative hierarchy, the one which operated the interface between European colonists and the African peoples. As the sole representative of the entire colonial state apparatus in a given territory, the Local Administrator had to perform an endless number of tasks.

Following the 1933 Reform, the legal status of the régulos corresponded to the lower echelons of the Portuguese administrative system below the Chefe do Posto. Each Administrative post was subdivided into several regedorias which in turn incorporated a

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436 Borges Coelho, “Protected Villages,” p. 115.

437 Borges Coelho, “Protected Villages,” p. 115.
number of groups of settlements (Port., grupo de povoações) led by the cabos or chefs de grupo de povoação run entirely by Africans. All these African office-holders were paid wages, and had to collect taxes, organize labor locally, and in general, exert control over territorial units and population according to “local traditions and customs” on behalf of colonial rule.\footnote{Newitt, \textit{Portugal in Africa}, pp. 54, 100-105.} In the 1940s the Governor-General Bettencourt reduced the number of regedorias and standardized their hierarchies.\footnote{Borges Coelho, “Protected Villages,” p. 114.} The less populous régedorias were dissolved and their rulers and population were put under the control of the more densely inhabited regedoria.\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 286.} This process continued into the 1950s and 1960s, when entire populations, often together with their régulos, crossed the frontier to the Nyasaland or Tanganyika in order to escape forced labor and abuses of local Portuguese administrators, virtually reducing some of the former regedorias to nothing.\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 128.}

Sometimes the Portuguese appointed those members of the ruling clans who were more accommodating to colonialism or even people from different clans as chiefs of defiant regions. But they quickly realized that the African population had little regard for these appointed chiefs, and this fact undermined colonial efforts for control. In 1928 the Indigenous Affairs Directorate in Lourenço Marques circulated a Memorandum, directed specifically to the Administrators of Mozambique District but circulated in other parts of the country too, in which it recommended that “the régulos should succeed according to local customs, because the régulo is responsible for maintaining order and tranquility in the lands that belong to him.”\footnote{Consulado do Portugal em Zanzibar ao Governador-Geral da Colónia de Moçambique, Pasta D/3, Processo Geral, 1931-1948, Negócios Indígenas, 1926-1948, AHM, FGG, Cx. 226.} Many Portuguese administrative and military officials, among whom, Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa, an Administrative Inspector in the 1940s and 1950s, Eugénio Ferreira de Almeida, the military Commandant of northern Mozambique in the 1950s, and Branquinho in the 1960s, all highlight problems that arose as a
consequence of installing ‘illegitimate’ régulos.\textsuperscript{443} Thus, as Harry G. West and Scott Kloeck-Jenson point out,

\begin{quote}
…the Portuguese normally paid attention to pre-existing hierarchies (however subtle) and attempted, when possible, to incorporate them — at least nominally into the colonial State’s own system of native administrative intermediaries, even if the individuals who occupied positions in these hierarchies changed at the moment the structures were co-opted to colonial ends.\textsuperscript{444}
\end{quote}

The Portuguese legislation of the 1950s and 1960s maintained the position and status of the régulos, though the 1951 Constitution of Portugal changed the concept of ‘colonies’ into ‘overseas provinces’ (\textit{Províncias Ultramarinas}).\textsuperscript{445} The 1961 Overseas Administrative Reform (\textit{Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina}) also maintained the regedorias as an administrative unit and even granted the régulos (now regedores) military attributes.\textsuperscript{446}

According to individual files of the regúlos collected by the Portuguese Administration in Mozambique, and dated between 1959 and 1974, there were a total of 689 regúlos in the three northern Mozambican Districts (now separate provinces), almost


\textsuperscript{444} West and Kloeck-Jenson, “Betwixt and Between,” p. 471.


\textsuperscript{446} Decreto-Lei No 43:896, Ministério do Ultramar, República Portuguesa aprova a Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina (\textit{Boletim de Moçambique}, I Série- No 36, Lourenço Marques, 14 Setembro de 1961).
all matrilineal, who were characterized in terms of their religious affiliations as illustrated by the following table.\textsuperscript{447}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Districts} & \textbf{Total} & \textbf{African} & \textbf{Christian} & \textbf{Muslim} & \textbf{Not spec.} \\
\hline
Niassa & 107 & 1 & 16 & 81 (incl. 2 women) & 9 \\
Cabo Delgado & 180 & 20 & 9 & 150 (incl. 5 women) & 1 \\
Mozambique & 402 & 127 (incl. 1 woman) & 40 & 150 (incl. 2 women) & 85 \\
\textbf{Total} & \textbf{689} & \textbf{148 (incl. 1 woman)} & \textbf{65} & \textbf{381 (incl. 9 women)} & \textbf{95} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{The Indigenato}

The 1933 Reform launched a legal system based on a separation of metropolitan and African ‘native’ or ‘customary’ laws. Customary laws, in their turn, were equated with a system called \textit{indigenato}, which “was a cultural and juridical doctrine, maintaining that the mass of African subjects were not yet prepared to exercise Portuguese citizenship.”\textsuperscript{448}

As such, Africans were under the jurisdiction of local African ‘traditional customs and usages’ administered by the \textit{régulos} (now \textit{regedores}) and their entourage (\textit{apia-mwene, mahumu, cabos}, healers, etc. in northern Mozambique), viewed altogether as leaders of ‘traditional communities’ (\textit{comunidades tradicionais}) by colonialists.

Since the introduction of the \textit{1917 Portaria do Assimilado}, some Africans in Mozambique could also theoretically acquire Portuguese citizenship and pass under the jurisdiction of metropolitan law by becoming \textit{assimilados} (Port., assimilated). In this


case, they had to obtain a certificate (alvará) from Portuguese administrators proving that they were in fact ‘assimilated’ into Portuguese culture and adopted “Portuguese common law.” Thus the Portuguese system, as other European colonial systems in Africa, was dualistic in nature, whereby mostly rural African population was comprised of ‘traditional,’ ‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ subjects, and Europeans and assimilados, by and large living in the cities, were citizens of the colonial state.

The numbers of assimilados in Mozambique remained insignificant throughout the colonial period. In 1961, as Eduardo Mondlane points out, 94 percent of the Mozambican population was African rural peasantry living under indigenato, and only 2.55 percent was comprised of citizens, including African assimilados, while 3.5 percent were uprooted African proletariat in sub-urban and urban areas. An assimilado as a rule suffered abject racial discrimination from the Portuguese and remained in practice a second-class citizen. Muslims in northern Mozambique could not become assimilados not only because the vast majority of them lived under the indigenato but also because the pathway to Portuguese citizenship and one of the pillars of Portuguese culture and identity was the Catholic faith. As described earlier, many northern Mozambican ruling clans, feeding into the ranks of the colonial régulos together with their subjects remained Muslim due to their historical association with Islam since pre-colonial time.

The 1951 Constitution of Portugal and the 1954 Law on Status of the Portuguese Indigenous Peoples (Estatuto dos Indígenas Portuguesas das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique) maintained the position and status of the régulos, though the 1954 Law reaffirmed the right of Africans wishing to transform their status from the

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450 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Kampala: Fountain Publisher, Cape Town: David Philip, London: James Currey, 1996).


452 Mondlane, Lutar por Moçambique, pp. 45-56. See also, Roberts and Mann, “Law in Colonial Africa,” p. 17.

453 Mondlane, Lutar por Moçambique, pp. 31-33; Vakil, “Questões Inacabadas,” pp. 255-58, 274.
Indígenas into the Assimilados to do so.\textsuperscript{454} The 1961 Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina revoked the status of an Indígena and conceded equal legal rights independently of their race, culture or creed to all citizens who became Portuguese nationals.\textsuperscript{455} But in the 1950s as well as in the 1960s, the State reiterated its respect for local “customs and traditions” and for the status of the chiefs, and thus preserved the Indigenato system upon which the power and legitimacy of the régulos were based.

Throughout the colonial period then, the population in Mozambique continued to be divided into two groups with different sets of civil and political rights: those who followed African “traditions and customs” and were under régulos and those who were under the State civil law. As the customary law had never been codified in Mozambique, it was regulated continually by the régulo and his entourage according to local historical precedents and traditions.

Because the authority of the chiefs remained generally in place, the ideologies related to their legitimacy and authority persevered too. In effect, the colonizers safeguarded the continuity of matriliny, the fundamental long dureé discursive framework of reference of the northern Mozambican peoples.\textsuperscript{456} Among Muslims, the power of chiefly Islam and “walimo style Islam” thus persisted. What Feierman describes for the Shambaa in Tanzania is well applicable to northern Mozambique,

African society was profoundly transformed through its relationship to the colonial state and capitalist economy. Even the most static-looking local institutions were shown on closer examination to have been reshaped, radically, from within. Social phenomena seemingly reminiscent of pre-colonial Africa acquired an entirely new meaning in a colonial context…chiefship became something new in its new context.\textsuperscript{457}

\textsuperscript{454} Decreto-Lei No 39: 666, 20 de Maio de 1954, Aricles 2 and 3; and Decreto-Lei No 39: 666, de 10 de Junho de 1954, on “acquiização da cidadania portuguesa”, and the status of an “assimilado.” In AHM, FGG, Cx. 901, Política Indígena, Distrito de Moçambique. See also, Meneses, Fumo, Mbuilana, and Gomes, “As autoridades Tradicionais,” p. 344.

\textsuperscript{455} Decreto-Lei No 43:896, Ministério do Ultramar, República Portuguesa aprova a Reforma Administrativa Unltramarina (Boletim de Moçambique, I Série- No 36, Lourenço Marques, 14 Setembro de 1961).


\textsuperscript{457} Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, pp. 14-15.
But as he points out, the colonizers were “responsible for continuities in pre-colonial African political language.”

Turuq and the Chiefly Network

Until the 1930s, the influence of the Orders remained mainly restricted to the Island and mainland of Mossuril and Cabaceiras, with some extensions to Angoche and coastal Cabo Delgado. The rest of the country was going through a generalized socio-political turmoil following the Portuguese “effective occupation” campaigns. Former Muslim ruling elites were still focused on concerns not directly related to the emerging Sufi Orders. This prevented many Muslim chiefs to take advantage of or challenge the religious ideology of the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya at the time when these turuq first arrived. At the same time, the turuq were not yet able to contest the religious authority of Muslim chiefs and the mwalimu.

Notwithstanding the reduction of the scope of their political power and autonomy by colonialism, from the 1930s onward local Muslim chiefly clans began reclaiming Islamic authority, which was part and parcel of their historical domain. Conceiving of Sufi leadership as representing this authority, they competed for it because it also stood for considerable social prestige in the twentieth century colonial context. Gradually, in northern Mozambique, like in Mafia Island, as analyzed by Patricia Caplan, “tariqa affiliation [became] connected with both social hierarchy and the descent groups.”

Monteiro and Carvalho uphold that the turuq in northern Mozambique proliferated with an extraordinary speed between 1930 and 1963. The map and the table indicating the regional presence of Sufi Orders in the 1960s, which are annexed at the end of this Chapter, confirm this point.

According to the two aforementioned authors, this expansion was related to the growth of the means of communication, such as roads, railways and radio, and the

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458 Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, p. 16.
459 Caplan, Choice and Constraint, p. 96.
460 Monteiro, O islão, o poder e a guerra, p. 96; Carvalho, “Confrarias” (Voz Africana, August 29, 1972), p. 19; Carvalho, “Notas,” p. 60.
development of urban centers, agglomerating people of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Although political and economic changes were important, it was the increasing African involvement in the turuq and their African leadership that were crucial for the spread of Sufi Orders. The extraordinary advance coincided with the period of Sayyid Ba Hasan’s leadership and was related in the first place to Sayyid Ba Hasan’s own personality as a charismatic leader with extensive religious training and knowledge. His family ties to local Shirazi elites and Muslim chiefs, and his sharifian ancestry conferred him with substantial legitimacy and immense religious and ‘traditional’ authority also favoring this expansion. Ba Hasan’s life exemplifies the point that the spread of Sufism, which gradually became the dominant Islamic conception in northern Mozambique, was due to the involvement of the chiefly clans in the turuq leadership, when regional tradition of Islam linked to chiefship was put to the test, challenged and (re)created in the new context. Simultaneously, the tradition and the process of its transformation extended legitimacy and authority to the turuq.

Ba Hasan, through his Sancul and sharifian pedigree, was a relative to numerous important Swahili and Muslim chiefs of northern Mozambique. For example, he was a brother of the chiefs of Muticuti (Mantepa), Quivolane (Panto) and Mutomonho (Aiupa), all sharifs in Mossuril. He was a cousin of the chiefs of Lumbo and Mória in Mossuril, and Morrupa of Angoche, and through them he was a relative to the chiefs of Nakala, Nampula City and Porto Amélia (currently, Pemba city in Cabo Delgado Province). Besides these, Sayyid Ba Hasan had close family ties to the paramount chief of Fernão Velozo, the Suluho Mumba, Sayyid Nuruddin (also Nuro), a son of a Hadrami Comorian sharif. Nuruddin, in his turn was a nephew of the chiefs of Matibane (Metacane and Nacoha), and of Abdul Kamal of Megama, the chief of Chiúre Valley in Cabo Delgado. Therefore, Sayyid Ba Hasan was also Abdul Kamal’s kin. Abdul Kamal was a disciple of Shaykh Abdul Magid, one of the Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad’s khulafa’ and the

461 Monteiro, Ibid.

462 Pinto Correia, Ibid; Branquinho, “Relatório”, pp. 84, 195.


chief khalifa of the Qadiriyya in Cabo Delgado.⁴⁶⁵ According to Branquinho, before his death in the 1940s, he passed the title of the chief khalifa of the Qadiriyya in Cabo Delgado on to Sayyid Ba Hasan.

Besides northern Mozambique, Sayyid Ba Hasan launched the turuq in Lourenço Marques, which he visited several times and where he died.⁴⁶⁶ By the time of Ba Hasan’s death in 1963, tariqa-based Islamic authority and identity constituted a predominant religious authority for the vast majority of the indigenous African Muslims of northern Mozambique. Branquinho rightly refers to Sayyid Ba Hasan as the “grand architect” of tariqa expansion.⁴⁶⁷ Due to Sayyid Ba Hasan’s activities, the Qadiriyya Sadat came to be the most widespread and influential Sufi Order with a considerable African membership, followed by the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya, and then, the Madaniyya.⁴⁶⁸

While Mozambique Island constituted a hub of competition and contest over the tariqa leadership between the old Muslim African elites and the “Moors”, the expansion of the Sufi Orders beyond the Island, spearheaded by the African khulafa’, went along the historical Muslim chiefly networks. Between 1930 and 1963, the descendants of the old Muslim ruling clans that took part in the slave-trading networks of the nineteenth century became tariqa khulafa’. In the new colonial context, they transposed pre-colonial political networks of kinship and territory onto the tariqa networks. The following two tables, both based on the Branquinho and SCCIM reports of the 1960s, illustrate this point.⁴⁶⁹

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Table 2: Régulos, holding a Tariqa Khalifa-ship simultaneously (1960s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khalifa</th>
<th>Tariqa</th>
<th>Régulo</th>
<th>Region(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aiupa Rehman</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Panto</td>
<td>Lunga, Mossurl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Momade Atuman</td>
<td>Shadh. Yashr</td>
<td>Motomonha</td>
<td>Lunga, Mossuril</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulcader Sayyid Nuruddin</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Suluho</td>
<td>Fernão Velozo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abudo Juma</td>
<td>Shadh. Yashr</td>
<td>Nakala</td>
<td>Nakala-a-Velha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abudo Mepava</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Metacane</td>
<td>Matibane, Fernão Veloso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumane Bacar Abdurrahman</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Nacoha</td>
<td>Matibane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Eduardo Zaita</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Namanca</td>
<td>Nakala-a-Velha, Fernão Veloso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available (n/a)</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Mazope</td>
<td>Nakala-a-Velha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayupa Catava</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Nakala-a-Velha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Muripa</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Muripa</td>
<td>Nakala-a-Velha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Murrimone</td>
<td>Nakala-a-Velha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Mezepe</td>
<td>Membe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Mazua</td>
<td>Membe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumalgi Momade</td>
<td>Shadh. Yashr</td>
<td>Ali Amisse</td>
<td>Kilwa Island, Angoche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Mecanhelas</td>
<td>Malema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Kamal Megama</td>
<td>Qadir. Sadat</td>
<td>Megama</td>
<td>Chiúre, Cabo Delgado</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: *Tariqa Khulafa’, Kin to Régulos (1960s)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khalifa</th>
<th>Tariqa</th>
<th>Region in which khalifa</th>
<th>Relation to régulo(s)</th>
<th>Name of régulo(s)</th>
<th>Region of régulo(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Sayyid Habib Bakr</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Districts of Mozambique and Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>- nephew</td>
<td>- Mantepa</td>
<td>- Lunga, Mossuril</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- grand-nephew-nephew</td>
<td>- Panto</td>
<td>- Lunga, Mossuril</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- nephew</td>
<td>- Motomonha</td>
<td>- Lunga, Mossuril</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cousin</td>
<td>- Malimo</td>
<td>- Lunga, Mossuril</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-cousin</td>
<td>- Suluho</td>
<td>- Matibane, Fernão Veloso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-cousin</td>
<td>- Palungo</td>
<td>- Fernão Veloz, Posto Sede</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-relative (uspec.*)</td>
<td>- Megama</td>
<td>- Chiúre, Mecúfi, Cabo Delgado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assubuge Gulamo</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Chicoma, Matibane</td>
<td>- cousin</td>
<td>- Suluho</td>
<td>- Fernão Veloz, Matibane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- uncle</td>
<td>- Nacoha</td>
<td>- Chiúre, Mecúfi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cousin</td>
<td>- Megama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habibo Mussagy</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Mashiraba</td>
<td>Mozambique Island, Mossuril</td>
<td>cousin</td>
<td>Momad Attuman</td>
<td>Lunga, Mossuril</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amisse Naquerque</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Muecate</td>
<td>-cousin</td>
<td>- Panto</td>
<td>- Lunga, Mossuril</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cousin</td>
<td>- Rainha</td>
<td>- Matibane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bwanali Ahmad</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Muatua</td>
<td>nephew</td>
<td>Bwanali Ahmad</td>
<td>Lumbo, Matibane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caieve Musa</td>
<td>Shadhul. Yashrut.</td>
<td>Metacane</td>
<td>cousin</td>
<td>Metacane</td>
<td>Matibane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Abudo Mepava)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amisse Abdallah</td>
<td>Shadhul. Madan.</td>
<td>Muatua, Mogovolas</td>
<td>nephew</td>
<td>Supaira</td>
<td>Angoche City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amade Murula</td>
<td>Shadhul. Madan.</td>
<td>Angoche</td>
<td>- cousin</td>
<td>- Amisse Mucuame;</td>
<td>- Kilwa Island, Angoche</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cousin</td>
<td>-Zamuzamo</td>
<td>- Angoche City</td>
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* Unspecified
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abudo Abuchama</td>
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<td>Shadhul. Yashrut.</td>
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<td>uncle</td>
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<td>Chale Attumane</td>
<td>grandson</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Shah</td>
<td>Posto Sede, Mogincual</td>
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<td>Chabalo Ali</td>
<td>relative (unspec.)</td>
<td>Mogincual City</td>
<td>Shah Selemame</td>
<td>Mogincual City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>father</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Naipa</td>
<td>Quinga, Mogincual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mulehia Nantia</td>
<td>relative (unspec.)</td>
<td>Shadhul. Yashrut.</td>
<td>-Mahulam Muemuna - Calipo</td>
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<td>Mucuegue Fernando</td>
<td>relative (unspec.)</td>
<td>Shadhul. Yashrut.</td>
<td>-Maioela - Nameluco</td>
<td>both at Mogovolas, Posto Sede</td>
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<td>son</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Maviha</td>
<td>Membas</td>
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<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
<td>Ginama</td>
<td>Chalaua, Moma</td>
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<td>-cousin -cousin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mecufi - Porto Amélia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Muada</td>
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<td>Mecufi (Cabo Delgado)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naquire Naúhe</td>
<td>brother</td>
<td>Qadiriyya Sadat</td>
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<td>Megama</td>
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Sayyid Ba Hasan, the Embodiment of Continuity and Change

The Estado Novo imposed protectionism and a more vigorous exploitation of the colonies, intended to trigger the growth of the metropolitan economy. The new laws restructuring external trade of the colonies for the benefit of Portugal were promulgated in 1932. Some resulting measures, such as making the mainland city of Nampula a provincial capital and transferring the Captaincy of Ports and Customs to Nakala Port, diminished further the political importance and economic opportunities of Mozambique Island. In agriculture, cash crops with greater demand in the metropole and the international markets were introduced. At the same time, the value of copra and of cashew nuts increased significantly. All these novelties became discernible in the regions of modern-day Nampula Province, which witnessed the rise of cashew-nut production in the 1930s and from the 1940s, became one of the main centers of cotton production.

As Martin Chanock points out people with desires to acquire new rights to land were quick to turn the ideas of colonial officials to their own use. Sayyid Ba Hasan was one of those people. He took the opportunity to profit from the new economic developments by getting involved in cashew nut production in the 1930s, for which purpose he used the new colonial legislation and services of the local Portuguese

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475 Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order: p.232.
officials. At the same time, he used his position as a representative of the ruling chiefly clans and his Islamic authority as a chief khalifa of the region.

During the inspection of Lunga and Quivolane in Mossuril in 1936-37, Pinto Correia found that Sayyid Ba Hasan together with some Europeans and Indians, coming from East Africa and Zanzibar, set up a “Trust” aimed at exploring cashew nut production, which Pinto Correia also calls the “Sociedade de Quivolane.”

Pinto Correia recounts events preceding the creation of this “Trust” in his report. According to him, after the conquest of the Sancul Xeicado, there were several attempts to appropriate its lands, including Quivolane and Lunga. Large concessionary companies, such as Companhia de Boror, João Ferreira dos Santos, and Sociedade de Matibane, tried to occupy the lands between 1911 and 1915. Afterwards, around 1917, an Indian Catholic priest of Goan origin also attempted to appropriate them. The régulo Panto of Quivolane wrote a complaint letter to the Governor-General saying that the Companies and the Indian priest had not consulted the indigenous population and were causing a reason for revolt, which in fact took place in 1918. Although the Companies gave up on their intentions and the priest left for India, all these attempts made the local population quite edgy and insecure with respect their landownership.

In 1918 and 1919, when the first colonial demarcations of the lands of the former Sancul Xeicado took place, Sayyid Ba Hasan already had strong Islamic credentials, derived from his religious training and association with Shaykh ‘Issa and Zanzibari shuyuks, along with his ‘traditional’ ones related to his Sancul ancestry. He was already a wealthy and well-traveled person, who had been to Zanzibar, Natal and Lourenço Marques, spoke Portuguese and enjoyed friendship and respect of the local colonial officials. So, when he suggested registering land titles in Lunga and Quivolane, many

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478 Pinto Correia, Ibid.

479 Pélissier, História de Moçambique, Vol. 2, pp. 433-34.

480 Pinto Correia mentions that Sayyid Ba Hasan traveled to Durban, Natal and had some religious contacts there; Branquinho stresses that the Qadiriyya Sadat had its branches in Durban, Natal in the late 1960s. See, Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 364.
Africans used the opportunity to do so and local Portuguese administration officials extended their assistance and support.\footnote{Pinto Correia, “Província do Niassa. Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária,” Vol. 1, pp. 162-n.2, 163, 167.} The lands were registered in the names of the\textit{ régulos}, their wives, children, brothers, nephews, and other relatives, as Pinto Correia point out, “all known as the sharifs”, with the exception of one plot recorded by an Indian Hindu\textit{ Vanya} (Banyan).\footnote{Pinto Correia, “Província do Niassa. Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária,” Vol. 1, p. 167.} Certainly, Ba Hasan registered lands in his own and his direct relatives’ names too which, according to the customary law, belonged to them by right. But with the registration, the landowners had to pay property and land taxes, and many were unable to do so, and remained indebted to the colonial State.\footnote{Pinto Correia, “Província do Niassa. Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária,” Vol. 1, p. 169; Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa, “Questão de Terras” (Inspector Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa, “Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Distrito de Nampula, 1946-1948, 6 Volumes, AHM, ISANI, Cxs. 77-78), Vol. 1, Cx. 77, p. 105-107.}

Modern historians, such as Paulo Ribeiro Soares and Michel Cahen, have described the conflict around the\textit{ muta-hano} tax and the 1939 ‘Naharra Revolt,’ involving the lands in Mossuril, which were already private Portuguese and Indian properties since the nineteenth century.\footnote{Soares, “O caju e o regime”, pp. 91, 93-94; Cahen, “Mossuril (1939)”, pp. 2, 3-5. See also, Hedges\textit{ et al}, \textit{História de Moçambique}, Vol. 2, pp. 53-55,112-114.} Soares and Cahen link the\textit{ muta-hano} system to the appropriation of the lands by the Portuguese following the ‘effective occupation’ in particular in Mossuril Terras Firmes.\footnote{Soares, “O caju e o regime”, p. 93; Cahen, “Mossuril (1939),” p. 6.} According to these two authors, Africans who remained in those lands were obliged to pay a tax called\textit{ muta-hano}, consisting of two-day work per week on the lands of the new landowners, along with the payment in kind.\footnote{Estêvão de Sousa, “Questão de Terras”, p. 101.}

Before the 1930s, the lands in Mossuril and neighbouring Mozambique Island regions did not represent such a significant financial asset as they became afterwards.\footnote{Soares, “O caju e o regime”, pp. 94-95.} Following colonial measures against alcoholism in 1902, forbidding the production of
traditional beverages derived from the cashew-nut fruits, the importance of cashew-nut trees had fallen too.\textsuperscript{488} However, the value of cashew nuts in international markets increased by 1.000 percent in 1933.\textsuperscript{489} Mozambique Island inhabitants rushed into Mossuril and other mainland regions in order to acquire cashew nuts for export to India. They decided to appropriate lands and collect the \textit{muta-hano} for their own benefit. It does not seem that the Mossuril lands \textit{per se} were of as great concern for the new landowners, as it was obtaining cheaply cashew nuts.

According to the new arrangement, peasants who rented lands, mainly to grow subsistence crops, were not disturbed for most of the year.\textsuperscript{490} But they had to pay a yearly rent of 15 Escudos to the landowners and, in theory tend cashew trees two days a week.\textsuperscript{491} However, during the cashew collection season, they had to work five days a week and each pay to the landowners a total of 16 cans of cashew per year.\textsuperscript{492} Portuguese Administrative Inspector, Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa mentions that during the cashew harvest season, sometimes peasants had to collect seven measures a week, of which five measures went to the landowner and the remaining two were kept by a worker.\textsuperscript{493} In exchange, peasants were liberated from the State property taxes paid by the new landowners and safeguarded from compulsory labor and forced relocations to other regions.

Using his family ties to the ruling régulos of the region, Sayyid Ba Hasan was instrumental in creating the “Trust”, or what Pinto Correia calls the “Sociedade de Quivolane”, in about 1934-35. Ba Hasan used to that end colonial legal system along with the provisions of the African customary laws, conferring him with considerable rights. The “Trust”, besides him, his wife and sister, also included several Portuguese officials and Indian traders. The first step taken by Sayyid Ba Hasan was that on the death

\textsuperscript{488} Soares, “O caju e o regime”, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{489} Hedges \textit{et al}, \textit{História de Moçambique}, Vol. 2, pp. 54.

\textsuperscript{490} Estêvão de Sousa, “Questão de Terras”, pp. 107-109.


\textsuperscript{492} Pinto Correia, \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{493} Estêvão de Sousa, “Questão de Terras”, p. 101.
of his brother, the régulo Maticuto, he appropriated his lands using a testament that the régulo had left in his favor.\textsuperscript{494} Pinto Correia points out that by this act the wife of the régulo was deprived of her property rights.\textsuperscript{495} But according to customary law, she did not have any rights over the lands of her husband which was a property of his matrikin, including Ba Hasan, and besides, the régulo left a testament. Then, Ba Hasan registered the lands of a certain deceased Amisse Ali, a major landowner of the region, in the name of his sister, Alawia, who, as Pinto Correia points out, was Amisse Ali’s lover, while leaving his ‘real’ wife, Fatima, with nothing.\textsuperscript{496} Here again, Pinto Correia’s approach to laws and rights is overtly European. It is quite probable that Alawia was considered a second wife of Amisse in terms of local custom, and the first wife, Fatima, had no rights over the lands belonging to her late husband’s matrikin, of which Alawia was a legitimate representative. Ba Hasan repeated these kinds of operations several times, appropriating the lands and registering them in his own and his direct family members’ names, and became a major landowner of the region. Then, some of the lands were sold or re-rented to Europeans or Indians residing at Mozambique Island, who were not interested in the lands as such, but in imposing muta-hano and acquiring cheaply the cashew nuts for export to India.

Another legal device that Ba Hasan and his associates used was related to the fact that many people in whose names the lands were registered in 1918 and 1919 were not paying their State property and land taxes for quite a long time. Pinto Correia lamented the fact that the Portuguese officials who participated in the “Trust” did not use their numerous sepoys to collect the State taxes, while using them for the benefit of the “Trust".\textsuperscript{497} According to colonial law, in these cases the properties should be subject to sale through public auctioning. However, as the colonial administrators lacked financial and fiscal means and, also were not interested in creating new tensions with local population similar to those of 1918, these laws were rarely applied until the height of


\textsuperscript{495} Pinto Correia,\textit{Ibid.}


cashew nut production of the 1930s. In this instance, Ba Hasan’s associations with the Portuguese officials, including lawyers, notary officials, and administrative clerks, facilitated the sale of the lands.\textsuperscript{498} The lands were then bought by him and his Indian and European associates.

There were a lot of complaints from local Africans to Inspector Pinto Correia against the “Trust” that, no doubt, were justified. The “Trust” committed excesses against and caused grievances to the local population. But, Pinto Correia’s own European sensibilities of justice and morality played decisive roles in condemning the “Trust” and specifically the \textit{muta-hano}.\textsuperscript{499} In particular, Pinto Correia and other Portuguese officials argued against muta-hano according to the provisions of Article 18 of the Acto Colonial, forbidding non-remunerated work, and in 1938-39 they introduced additional legal amendment leading to its total prohibition.\textsuperscript{500}

As the local landowners did not back down, the Portuguese dispatched \textit{sepoys} from Monapo region under the Mucapera-muno to impose the payment of the colonial taxes in money and see the end of the muta-hano. Surprisingly, this move was followed by a generalized revolt in Mossuril (the “Naharra” revolt), directed mainly against the presence of the Monapo \textit{sepoys}. One of the reasons for revolt was the fact that the sepoys were from the non-\textit{Maca} region, and thus perceived to be inferior to the \textit{Maca} of Mossuril. The Mucapera-muno did not adopt Islam and was not integrated into the \textit{Maca} slave-trading networks, and fought against them incessantly, especially against the Napita-\textit{mwene}, a kin of the \textit{Anhapakho} of Angoche, who was particularly close to Farallahi.\textsuperscript{501} He also became an ally of the Portuguese, in particular, of Neutel de Abreu during his campaigns of “effective occupation.”

The revolt, therefore, was not against the imposition of the \textit{muta-hano} or the new landowners. When in 1940, the Commission for the Defense of the Rights of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{500} Estêvão de Sousa, \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{501} Amorim, “Relatório,” pp. 14, 200, 274.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Indigenous People was dispatched to the region by the Portuguese government, its report stated that the “indigenous people were less reluctant paying the muta-hano to those descending from the old “feudal lords” than to the recent landowners”.

Thus, the population seemed to support both the landowners and the muta-hano system. They might have considered it to be legitimate to pay a muta-hano to Ba Hasan and his family in principle, but they probably were not happy about the Europeans and Indians collecting it too. But these two groups of the “Trust” also operated as the moradores of the previous centuries relying on the ‘traditional’ African methods of obtaining wealth, such as muta-hano, and therefore, did not appear to disrupt the ‘traditional’ tax and labor arrangements of the region.

Soares believes that the muta-hano was a “feudal system of exploration” and points out that its continual practice in the new colonial context was highly unusual.

Cahen also argues about the extent to which the muta-hano system was counterproductive to the colonial attempts of monetarizing economy, but he points out that however ‘traditional,’ the muta-hano could not be considered a ‘feudal system’ in this instance because modern methods of obtaining land, such as auctioning and titling accompanied by modern perceptions of land rights were used. Rather its use in the new colonial context, according to Cahen, was, on the one hand, a reaction and resistance of the coastal society to the economic marginalization to which it became subject since the transfer of the economic centers to other regions of the country. On the other, it represented a collision of the old perceptions of patronage with the new capitalist monetary economy.

The ‘reactionary’ character of the muta-hano episode and the “Naharra” revolt, centered on the patrimonial relations could mean not so much an attempt to maintain the old forms of economic relations, or defend the “tradition,” but rather represent a form of

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504 Cahen, “Mossuril (1939)”, pp. 8-10.


discourse over the tradition and thus, over constitution of the community and over how this community ought to be.\textsuperscript{507} Within this discourse certain issues were defined and debated, especially “in the face of threats which were perceived to come from outside the community”, and using this discourse “peasants and plebeians defended certain aspects of what they considered their “traditional” rights and privileges.”\textsuperscript{508} As the peasants lacked money, and the new arrangement did not completely expel them from their lands, the preservation of the muta-hano system appeared to have been advantageous to them. It allowed peasants to use the lands, rid of monetary debts and of the payment of the colonial State tax, which was much higher, about 40 Escudos a year, than the rent of 15 Escudos paid to the landowners in muta-hano. They were also protected from the forced labor and compulsory relocations.\textsuperscript{509}

In October of 1939, the colonial administration managed to obtain an agreement with the landowners, according to which they had to sign contracts with their workers, pay wages and collect a rent of 2.5 Escudos a month (30 Escudos, a doubling of the previous rent of 15 Escudos a year).\textsuperscript{510} As the administration still did not have sufficient fiscal power, local administrator noted that situation did not change much until 1942, despite the fact that the value of cashew nuts in the international market declined during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{511} After that, colonialism imposed cotton production in the region. The value of cashew nuts in the international markets rose again in the 1950s and 1960s, but the colonial government invested in its production in southern Mozambique too, and the contemporary Nampula province became a regions mostly specialized in cotton.\textsuperscript{512}

\textsuperscript{507} Glassman, \textit{Feasts and Riot}, pp. 12-25.

\textsuperscript{508} Glassman, \textit{Feasts and Riot}, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{509} Soares, “O caju e o regime”, p. 100; Cahen, “Mossuril (1939),” pp. 18-20.

\textsuperscript{510} Hedges et al, \textit{História de Moçambique}, Vol. 2, pp. 112-113; Cahen, “Mossuril (1939),” p. 16.


The “Trust” episode might have damaged the religious reputation of Sayyid Ba Hasan in the eyes of ordinary Africans to a certain extent, but their attitudes were most likely to have been ambiguous. Ba Hasan acted as a representative of the ‘traditional’ authority of the chiefly clan entitled to dispose of land and to collect taxes. He also posed as a broker between Africans with no capital, speaking no Portuguese and unaware of the colonial legal instruments, and Portuguese rule. Though he appeared to have solely used this brokerage to his own advancement, he also could be perceived as acting as a patron towards his African clients, as someone who looked after the best interests of his clients unable to pay their State tax. The numbers of his clients might have even risen after the display of Ba Hasan’s associations with Indian money and the colonial rule embodied in his Portuguese connections. In a new context, the ability to broker between the colonial power and Muslims, along with mediating between people and the Divine Revelation was one of the crucial roles of an Islamic authority.\(^{513}\) The \textit{muta-hano} episode illustrates, that authority embodied in Sayyid Ba Hasan’s personality, which incorporated a tariqa khalifa-ship along with the old idea of kinship and territory, was being adapted to the colonial context in northern Mozambique.

The \textit{muta-hano} episode and the 1939 revolt marked the unambiguous end of the relative autonomy and power that some Muslim chiefs had managed to hold onto despite the Portuguese campaigns of “effective occupation.” The colonial government demonstrated its renewed power by deposing important Muslim chiefs that led the revolt. Among them was the \textit{régulo} of Ampoense, Mahando Ahmed, a descendant of the Mucuti-muno of Namarral, who was replaced by someone with little local legitimacy.\(^{514}\) Mahando Ahmed was also a nephew of the deceased Yashruti chief \textit{khalifa}, Haji Muhammad Ahmad Gulamo. In Cabaceira Pequena too, the legitimate \textit{régulo} was replaced by a “Moor”, Gulamo Selemanji, a great grandson of the legendary Mizamuddin Faqira Lambati, whose nephew became a chief \textit{khalifa} (\textit{sajada khadima}) of the Qadiriyya Sadat on the death of Sayyid Ba Hasan in 1963.\(^{515}\)

\(^{513}\) Eickelman and Piscatori, \textit{Muslim Politics}, pp. 46-80.

\(^{514}\) Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 192-93.

\(^{515}\) Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 192.
The Contradictory Nature of a Muslim Régulo

The Portuguese Administrator of Mossuril, Freés Currusca, points out in his 1965 report that Sufi “sheikhs and khalifa enjoyed a great respect and prestige. The traditional authority [régulos and their entourage] respected them and did anything they required.”

As mentioned earlier, those Sufi shuyukh who belonged to the historical ruling Muslim clans were conferred with greater legitimacy and popular acceptance in contrast to those who lacked this relationship. But the association of these shuyukh and especially of Muslim régulos with the colonial regime, which was neither ‘traditional’ nor Muslim, made the nature of their authority quite controversial, causing a great deal of internal conflict and heated debates among Muslims, which sometimes led to the gradual disjunction between the chiefly and Islamic authorities.

The 1933 development of its administrative network allowed the colonial state to penetrate more and more into the sphere of peasant production. Through more efficient techniques of population control, cotton production, introduced in northern Mozambique in the 1930s and intensified in 1940-1960, was extensively imposed on Africans. The plantation economy required a great deal of labor and, in order to obtain it, the colonial regime instrumentalized the régulos further by leaving in their hands the recruitment of workforce. To that end, it offered them some incentives and motivation. From the 1940s onwards, besides receiving wages, the régulos were allowed to significantly improve their financial and social standing by employing means such as retaining a percentage from the collected taxes, and forcing peasants to work on their private machamba (local vernacular, land plots). In addition, the régulo and his entourage collected tributes for undertaking ‘traditional’ and religious ceremonies and rituals. Branquinho reports that for

516 Freés Currusca, “Respostas ao Questionário,” p. 121.


the initiation rites in the 1960s, each initiate paid on average 200 Escudos to the régulo and pia-mwene, or to the person they appointed to undertake this practice. According to the 1942 Circular No 818/D7, the régulos who successfully complied with the demands of colonial rule were to be rewarded with stone houses and water deposits built at the expense of the State. The legal provisions of the 1942 Circular with respect to régulos were enforced by the 1944, 1947 and 1953 Bills. In 1950, special schooling destined exclusively for the children of the régulos was introduced. However, as Borges Coelho notes, the seeming recognition and respect by the Estado Novo of the régulos as legitimate heirs of the pre-colonial African traditional structures, and through them culture and identity of the colonial subjects, was mainly a means to “preserve the indigenous social and technical forms of production.”

The life of the Abdul Kamal Megama of Chiúre exemplified cordial relationships between the colonial regime and the régulos in this period. Abdul Kamal continued his association with the Qadiriyya Sadat, and enjoyed influence and power among Muslims of northern Mozambique and, also sent his children to Zanzibar to pursue Islamic education. But in his capacity as régulo Abdul Kamal recruited workers for cotton companies, such as the Companhia Algodeira de Moçambique (CAM) and for the railway construction and other projects. According to João, usually he forcibly sent as cheap labor those peasants who did not cultivate obligatory cotton, or unable to pay taxes, and finally, those whom he considered ‘troublemakers,’ ‘lazy’ and ‘disobedient.’ By 1960, the colonial state rewarded him for his services with a stone house, a mechanical pump and a windmill. Abdul Kamal became a rich man by collecting tributes from his subjects, and by compelling peasants who could not pay taxes to work in his private

521 Hedges et al, História de Moçambique, p. 183.
523 Hedges et al, História de Moçambique, pp. 183-86; João, Abdul Kamal.
524 João, Abdul Kamal, pp. 85, 109, 113-114.
machambas, including lucrative plantations of cotton. He also acquired several shops, two trucks and other luxury goods through his own means.

In the period between 1940 and the 1960s, due to the benefits that the régulos gained from the colonial power, the position of the régulo became much sought after among different members of the ruling clans, deepening internal competition and conflicts within these clans. Branquinho mentions several conflicts of this nature.\textsuperscript{525} As one of the régulos of Moma, Nambui, pointed out to him: “before, when the régulos were beaten up [by the Portuguese], nobody wanted to be régulo. Nowadays, everybody wants to be a régulo.”\textsuperscript{526} Even Abdul Kamal Megama’s coming to power was not peaceful and he had to overcome the rivalry from his relatives.

Another manifestation of this conflict was the competition of Muslim régulos with the tariqa shuyukh for power and influence, notwithstanding the fact that they often both belonged to the same clan. For example, in Mogovolos, Musa Quaito, a local tariqa shaykh, complained to Branquinho against his uncle, the régulo Pedro Lahia, who was allegedly performing witchcraft against him.\textsuperscript{527} In another case, Abudo Suluho, in an attempt to seize the chieftaincy from his brother, Abdulcader Sayyid Nuruddin (or Nuro) of Fernão Velozo, had created an altogether ‘different branch’ of Islam from the Qadiriyya Sadat to which Nuruddin belonged.\textsuperscript{528} At the same time, some tariqa shuyukh posed a threat to the power and legitimacy of the régulos by voicing complaints on behalf of the peasantry, for instance, against the unjust pricing of agricultural produce practiced by the Portuguese and presumably, the régulos.\textsuperscript{529}

In contrast to the authority of the old Muslim leaders embedded in Islam and the tradition of chiefship, the leaders of the turuq established the authority of learning (‘ilm)

\textsuperscript{525} For example Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 121-22, 161, and passim.

\textsuperscript{526} Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 174.

\textsuperscript{527} Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 161.

\textsuperscript{528} Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 121-22.

and of written *ijaza* and *silsila/isnad*.\footnote{Francois Constantin, “Charisma and the Crisis of Power in East African Islam” (Donal Cruise O’Brien and Christian Coulon, eds., *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 67-90.} The conflict between Islamic and *chiefly* authorities now was frequently concentrated on the persons of Muslim *régalos*, many of whom began taking up the notion of incompatibility of the matrilineal ideology and the *chiefly* installation ceremonies with a ‘true’ Islam.\footnote{For example, Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 32-33, 123-24, 154, 276, 276, 274; João *Abdul Kamal*, p. 83.} As a result, some chiefs attempted to discontinue practices associated with the institution of ‘traditional’ chief, such as the use of the *mwene* drum *ncavete* or *topotope*.\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 32-33, 123-24, 154, 267, 274.} Some chiefs such as the Mwala in Lalaua preferred to perform a shortened version of the installation ceremony so as to gain popular support, guarantee protection from witchcraft, withstand the competition from other relatives, and maintain a semblance of Islamic ‘orthodoxy’.\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 267.}

Many chiefs who came under the influence of the *tariqa* refused to comply with some rituals of the *chiefly* installation ceremonies. The *régulo* Nacoha of Matibane explained to Branquinho that the chiefly installation ceremony was “uncivilized, ugly and un-Islamic,” because as a rule the new chief inherited previous chief’s wives, and “had to have sexual relations with his own nieces or cousins.”\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 268.} As João reports, for example Abdul Kamal Megama declined marrying the widows of his uncle, the chief N’khaya.\footnote{João *Abdul Kamal*, p. 83.} The episode demonstrates that Abdul Kamal had knowledge of the *Shari’a* and was quite ‘orthodox’ in his religious outlook despite being a matrilineal *régulo*. Though João believes that Islam permitted such practices as a son marrying father’s widows, it is not acceptable in Islam to marry relatives by affinity. As a rule, Islam also forbids marrying wet nurses, which these women could have been to Abdul Kamal. Besides, João mentions that Abdul Kamal had already had four wives at the time of his installation, which is the maximum number of wives that the *Shari’a* permits a man to have at one time. This did
not preclude Abdul Kamal, however, taking several concubines offered to him by subordinate chiefs.

Branquinho also reports that in the 1960s, coastal Muslim chiefs in Matibane, Cabaceiras, Namarral, Mossuril, Angoche, Mogincual, and Moma, adherents of the turuq, denied having *apia-mwene*. One such chief, vehemently denouncing incompatibility of the institution of the *pia-mwene* with the ‘true’ spirit of Islam was Abdulcader Sayyid Nuruddin, the Suluho Mumba of Fernão Velozo. His assertion was particularly surprising because just few years earlier his own aunt, known by the name Cebo, was a chief of the Chicoma region of Matibane. After a good deal of insistence by Branquinho, Abdulcader introduced his elder sister Fatima as his *pia-mwene*, who, according to the custom, should have inherited the previous *pia-mwene’s* name, Amina, if she were allowed to become one herself.

Abdulcader’s case in general reflects the ambivalent attitudes of Muslim *régulos* of the time towards matrilineal ideology. According to Branquinho, Abdulcader’s cousin, Abudo Suluho, the son of a deceased chief, wanted to become a chief himself, the desire which he justified in religious terms by claiming Islamic patriliny. However, the local population did not accept him and put Abdulcader in charge as a legitimate successor to his uncle in accordance with the matrilineal rule of succession. Since then, Abudo Suluho and Abdulcader were in a state of constant conflict that lingered throughout their lives. Abudo Suluho even set up a sort of an opposition party to his ruling cousin, which according to Branquinho, also constituted a different of type a “religious faction”. Perhaps these two Islamic factions symbolized tensions surrounding attempts to convert

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537 Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 32.
538 Pinto Correia “Relatório duma Inspeção às Circunscrições do Distrito de Moçambique”, Vol. 1, p. 84, in AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76; Branquinho “Relatório”, p. 34.
539 Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 32.
matriliny into patriliny, taking place amongst the Fernão Velozo’s 98 per cent Muslim population in the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{542}

On the one hand, Muslim chiefs attempted to reform local conceptions and practices of Islam and render them more ‘orthodox’ by eliminating the institution of the \textit{pia-mwene}, and by abandoning ceremonies related to the ‘traditional’ matrilineal African chieftaincy. On the other, they were compelled to preserve the matrilineal ideology, through which the chiefs’ power and authority were legitimized. Their attempts to change local conceptions and practices, in particular to transform matriliny into an Islamic patriliny were met with strong opposition from the African population, who linked the legitimacy of the chiefly lineage to the spirit world of land and ancestors, believed to guarantee the well-being and the fertility of the land and its people.

Due to this widespread belief, the tariqa attempts to undermine the position of a \textit{mwalimu}, associated with previous conception of Islam failed too. But the \textit{tariqa shaykh} managed to take over some of the \textit{mwalimu} functions, such as Qur’anic education, public and private Islamic celebrations and religious rituals, and even, divination, healing, and the writing of the \textit{hiriz}. In fact, the use of healing, or \textit{tibb} (Ar., medicine) and writing the \textit{hiriz} are the specialty of Muslim scholars within the wider global Islamic tradition.\textsuperscript{543} The old \textit{mwalimu} practices that included consultations with and healing through land and ancestor spirits were denounced as un-Islamic deviations (\textit{haram}). In contrast to the \textit{mwalimu}, the \textit{tariqa shaykh} claimed to use only ‘legitimate’ religious \textit{vitabu} and the intercession of the deceased Sufi saints, through whom his prayers and requests reached the Prophet Muhammad, and ultimately Allah. Despite the tariqa efforts, the \textit{mwalimu} was not eliminated completely, but reduced in status and relegated to the margins of the newly established centre of Islam, the \textit{tariqa shaykh}. The \textit{mwalimu} continued performing

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{542} Branquinho, “Relatório,” Ibid.
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sunnat (male circumcision), boys’ initiation rites, as well as healing and divination practices, and producing the hiriz.\textsuperscript{544}

Finally, Portuguese rule, preoccupied with maintaining the power of the chiefs incorporated into the colonial administrative system, claimed to support only those chiefs who were popularly accepted and whose legitimacy was in harmony with “local traditions and customs.” Thus, the position taken up by the Portuguese rulers in Mozambique contributed to the tariqa-based Muslim chiefs’ obligation to uphold matriliney even if they found it to disagree with their religious beliefs. The controversies and conflicts around the compatibility of the institution of an African chief with the ‘proper’ Islam, made many Muslims from prominent chiefly lineages to regard the chiefly and Islamic authorities to be incompatible. Hence, Abdul Kamal’s relinquishing of the Qadiriyya khalifa-ship when taking up the position of the régulo.

**Tariqa as an Alternative Kinship**

The ruling Muslim clans, who remained mostly in their regions of origin and were left in power by colonialism, adopted the chiefly network and the political discourse of kinship and territory to the tariqa networks. In regions with dense turuq presence, such as Mozambique Island and Mossuril, the choice of a Sufi Order by ordinary Muslims depended on their allegiances to a particular chiefly clan, but in the course of the twentieth century, more often their choice also depended on the tariqa leaders’ prestige derived from their authority both mundane and religious, their Islamic learning and knowledge of the vitabu (Sw., pl., sing., *kitabu*, book).\textsuperscript{545} They changed their tariqa affiliations accordingly. In contrast to the chiefly clans, the ordinary tariqa members, however, were subject to forced labor, arbitrary relocations from their places of origin.

\textsuperscript{544} The majority of Muslim boys in northern Mozambique nowadays undergo their sunnat in hospitals. However the *mwali mu* are called upon later by the family to give sexual and other necessary ‘traditional’ education to the boys, reflecting cultural and ethnic identity and heritage. *Mwali mu*, both women and men, are widespread and sought after for healing in Angoche, Mozambique Island, Nampula city and possibly the rest of northern Mozambique. Nowadays, the Sufi *shaykhs* often send their ‘patients’ to a ‘traditional’ *mwali mu*, when the intervention of the spirits or the knowledge of the local natural environment, such as plants, are needed for healing.

\textsuperscript{545} Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 382.
and even emigration to the nearby countries. In these conditions, they conceived of the turuq primarily as a solidarity network, or even an alternative form of kinship.

Despite the enactment of the 1930 Acto Colonial, Article 18 of which abolished forced labor in theory and endorsed remunerated work, the Portuguese continued practicing compulsory labor and forcibly relocating workers to different regions. In northern Mozambique these processes went hand-in-hand with mounting pauperization of the African population and major industrialization projects, when several large factories and industrial plants, and extensive railways were constructed. Additionally, there were the signs of rapid urbanization. All these endeavors required a considerable number of workers recruited mainly through the imposition of forced labor, which became more brutal after the endorsement of one crucial piece of legislation, Circular No 818/D7 of 1942. This Circular enlarged the scope of the taxes, and besides the tax in work (corvée, theoretically, five days a year in public enterprises, such as road and railway construction, urban building and plantation economy), the old hut tax was replaced by the tax per capita. Most importantly, the Circular required local administrative officials, including régulos, to provide detailed information on the identity and occupation of all men above the age of 16 in order to control the workforce and the movement of Africans in-between different regions. The Circular also demanded local populations to prove that they were earning money through ‘legitimate’ work, otherwise, they were identified as ‘vagrants’, captured and forcibly sent to work in the plantation economy, railway construction, etc. Imposition of cotton production, the degeneration of soil, forced labor and State monopoly over production and prices created a generalized impoverishment of African peasantry, and between the 1930s and 1950s there was a widespread malnourishment in northern Mozambique.

As a consequence, internal migration increased especially from the coast to the hinterland and from northern Mozambique to the south. Many rural people also moved to the cities, such as Nampula and Lourenço Marques. This coupled with the improvement

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of the means of communication, such as newly built roads and railroads intensified the spread of Islam in general and the *turuq* in particular. The *régulo* Umpavara of Namicopo in Nampula City informed us that the tariqa membership increased in the city when considerable numbers of Muslims from Cabo Delgado, Mozambique Island, Niassa and other regions came to work in railway construction between the 1930s and 1950s, and attracted workers from other regions into the Orders.\(^{549}\)

Many northern Mozambicans opted also to emigrate to Tanganyika and Nyasaland in search of better conditions of life and work.\(^{550}\) While some left following traditional kinship ties to Swahili or other ethnic groups, others followed earlier emigrations by immediate family, and some went alone. Most of them preserved strong ties to their places of origin, and a few returned voluntarily after living and working a considerable time abroad, while others were expelled back to their homeland by the British.\(^{551}\) To cite some examples, in July 18, 1938, the Consulate of Portugal in Zanzibar mentioned the death of several Mozambican Muslims, including women, who used to reside in Zanzibar, Nairobi, Mombasa, and other parts of East Africa, and whose relatives were searched for in Mozambique in order to hand them inheritance of the deceased.\(^{552}\) The Consulate also registered some cases of Mozambican (Muslim) workers in East Africa wishing either to return or visit relatives in their natal homeland. One such person was a police worker in Zanzibar named Hamisi. In 1948, the British Regiment Payroll Office in Nairobi contacted the Portuguese Consulate there in order to pay terminal emoluments to northern Mozambican *Askaris* released from the British Army before 1945.\(^{553}\)

Membership of a Sufi Order provided solidarity and a safety network and even an alternative to traditional kinship for Africans who moved or were taken away from their

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\(^{549}\) Interview with Manuel Nupie, the *régulo* Umpavara of Namicopo, Nampula City, June 13, 2000.


\(^{551}\) See AHM, FGG, Caixas entitled “Política Indígena, Emigração Clandestina,” such as for example, Cxs. 887, Cx. 888, 889, 893, 897, 898.

\(^{552}\) Pasta D/3-Processo Geral, 1931-1948, in AHM, FGG, Cx 226, Negócios Indígenas, 1926 a 1948.

\(^{553}\) Pasta D/3-Processo Geral, *Ibid*. 

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homeland. As Shaykh ‘Umar Bishehe, the khalifa of the Qadiriyya Mashiraba in Nampula City, underscored during an interview, the “dikiri members are all family, wherever we go we meet family in dikiri.”

Shaykh Faqih Sayyid Shamakhani recounted that he adhered to the Shadhuliyya Ittifaq while working on the ships of the João Fereira dos Santos (JFS) Company which specialized mainly in cotton production. His colleagues from Mozambique Island invited him to join the Order. Shaykh Faqih, who was a mainlander, mentioned that the fact that he worked and earned money made others, even Muslims from the coast, respect him and seek his friendship. On his part, he joined the tariqa because of its solidarity networks, particularly, as he emphasized, the Order was expected to take care of his funeral, in case he died far away from his own kin.

Conclusion

This Chapter focused on the transformations and transitions which the country in general and northern Mozambique in particular went through in the context of twentieth century colonialism. The colonial government introduced administrative, economic, political and legal changes, and the chiefs were incorporated within the colonial administrative system.

Colonial rule seemed to drag the pre-colonial African political structures into the new administrative system. However, it transformed and changed these structures in several ways. First, it re-structured the territorial arrangement thus unsettling the balance of power between different chiefdoms in pre-colonial times. It also disaggregated bigger chiefdom into smaller ones. And finally, by making chiefs colonial agents and effective administrative employees, it altered the meaning of chiefship itself.

The Portuguese, like other European colonial powers in Africa, upheld a dualistic legal system, according to which Europeans and Africans assimilated to European culture were subject to metropolitan laws, while the vast majority of Africans were conceived of as subject to African ‘customary laws.’ Despite several reforms during the twentieth century, this duality persevered and served as the basis for European racial prejudice.

554 Interview with Shaykh ‘Umar Bishehe, Nampula City, June 8, 2000.

555 Interview with Shaykh Faqih Sayyid Shamakhani, Mozambique Island, November 2, 1999.
towards Africans. Despite several attempts, the customary laws in Mozambique were never codified and their application was left effectively in the hand of the chiefs. Coupled with Portuguese concern to preserve legitimacy and authority of the chiefs in the eyes of Africans, this meant that colonial rule safeguarded the discursive tradition of chiefship, which among northern Mozambican Muslims was related to matriliny and the association of Islam and chiefship.

Though from the outset this process appeared to be a manifestation of respect for and recognition of African culture and ‘traditions’ by colonialism; in reality it represented the only way for the Portuguese colonial administration to secure control, levy taxes and take advantage of the African colonial territories and their labor force. While the Portuguese did in fact take advantage of chiefship, it is also true that many prominent members of the historical Muslim chiefly clans, such as Sayyid Ba Hasan and Abdul Kamal Megama, both khulafa’ of the Qadiriyya, greatly profited from the new colonial context. In particular, Sayyid Ba Hasan’s role in the muta-hano dispute in Quivolane and Lunga demonstrate how he used his dual power, based on the one hand on his chiefly descent and thus, traditional stewardship over the land/territory, and on the other, on his Islamic authority associated with a tariqa sajada position and his sharifian and Shirazi descent. At the same time, Ba Hasan’s proximity to Indian capital and Portuguese colonial officials, as well as his knowledge of the Portuguese language, permitted him to profit from the vicissitudes of the colonial legal system. Despite the fact that his authority was seemingly mired with his involvement in the muta-hano conflict, and the attitudes of African Muslims towards him might have become more ambiguous, nevertheless, in general terms, Sayyid Ba Hasan’s religious and ‘traditional’ positions did not seem to have suffered any significant damage.

Nevertheless, the role of the chiefs as servants of a power which was neither ‘traditional’ nor Muslim made the meaning of chiefship quite contradictory, and caused heated internal Muslim debates about its nature. The spread of Sufi Orders, whose leaders derived their authority from their situation within the tariqa chain (silsila) transmitted to them by a certificate of authorization (ijaza), also represented a challenge to the authority of the Muslim chiefs and contributed to internal debates among Muslims questioning the compatibility of the matrilineal chiefship with Islamic ‘orthodoxy.’
The *tariqa* expansion was facilitated by colonialism, in particular by its economic ‘modernization’ projects, such as urbanization, railways and road building and the dislocation of the African workforce to different regions, which created greater mobility and linkages between various parts of Mozambique. The most important incentive for this expansion however came from the chiefs, who successfully fought for Islamic authority associated with the turuq. From the 1930s onward, the *chiefly* clans appropriated this authority and by occupying themselves the *khalifa* position or by their relatives, transposed the historical Muslim *chiefly* networks onto the *tariqa* networks. With the involvement of the *chiefly* clans in the *turuq* leadership, the spread of Sufism intensified making it gradually the dominant conception of Islam in northern Mozambique. Thus, the regional tradition of Islam linked to chiefship was put to the test, challenged and (re)created in the new context. Simultaneously, it extended legitimacy and authority to the *turuq*. However, this did not end the controversies surrounding chiefship and Islamic authority among Muslims.

While the ruling Muslim clans, who remained mostly in their regions of origin and were left in power by colonialism, adopted the *chiefly* network and the political discourse of kinship and territory to the *tariqa* networks, for ordinary members their choice of a *tariqa* to become affiliated with, depended on their allegiances to a particular *chiefly* clan, and on a *tariqa* leaders’ prestige derived from their authority both mundane and religious, their Islamic learning and knowledge. In contrast to the *chiefly* clans, the ordinary *tariqa* members, however, were subject to forced labor, arbitrary relocations from their places of origin, and even emigration to the nearby countries. In these conditions, they conceived of the *turuq* primarily as a solidarity network, or even an alternative form of kinship, which was expected to undertake in particular funeral rites of their members, in case they died far away from their own kin.
Map 3: The Turuq Expansion

SM-Shashuliyya Madaniyya
QB- Qadiriyya Bagdade
All- all the turuq present
QS-Qadiriyya Sadat
SY- Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya
### Table 4: The Geographic Expansion of the *Turuq* (1960s)

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556 Based on Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 341-42, 346-388; and SCCIM, IAN/TT, Lisbon - “Respostas ao Questionário Estudo da Situação,” Cx. 8, No 12, Processo A/2/2, pp. 28-36; Cx. 9, No 14, Processo A/2/2(1), pp. 55, 304; Cx. 9, No 15, Processo 2/2/(2), pp. 6, 12, 16, 26, 34, 46, 58, 70, 81, 85, 90-96, 101, 103, 12-21, 156, 570; Cx. 14, No 23, Processo A/2/2, pp. 216, 228, 438; Cx. 61, No 409, pp. 196-97, 203-206, 209, 218-19, 228-34, 239-43, 244-46, 248-57, 260-93, 395-400, 413-15; Cx. 65, No 417, pp. 195-202; Cx. 66, No 418, pp. 79-80, 131, 324, 330, 333, 338, 440, 471.
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Chapter Four

Ritual and the Contests over ‘Orthodoxy’

With the advent of the new Sufi Orders, the conception of Islam in northern Mozambique shifted in several ways. As discussed in Chapter Two, the first shift was a geographical one, when the centre of Islam moved from the old Swahili settlements to Mozambique Island. The second shift was of Islamic authority, whereby the highest turuq authorities who were situated abroad could transfer this authority to people not always having kinship ties to the local historical Muslim chiefly lineages. This Chapter concentrates on the shifts in Islamic practices and rituals, which local Muslims debated in similar and parallel ways as they debated other transformations. The debates in northern Mozambique primarily reflected local concerns but they were also embedded in wider regional and global Muslim debates, involving a competition and contest for Islamic authority and the definitions of ‘orthodoxy.’

Individual Muslims acknowledged those people as holding a legitimate Islamic authority whose claims and views are perceived to be in line with ‘orthodoxy’. ‘Orthodoxy’, i.e. perceived ‘truthfulness’ and ‘correctness’ of the doctrine and rituals, however, is in “the eyes of beholder,” and in Mozambique, as elsewhere, Muslim politics are centered on ‘sacred authority’ involving “competition and contest over interpretation of the symbols and the control of institutions”. Like Robert Launay’s approach to the Koko community of Côte D’Ivoire, this Chapter explores “the themes of change and of confrontation between different conceptions of Islam.”


558 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, pp. 5, 46-80.

559 Launay, Beyond the Stream, pp. 13-14.
to marginalize them, the old conceptions and rituals, however, were not eliminated completely. They persist until today, each representing a layer of changes and transformations and a particular conception of Islam in Mozambican Muslim history.

With the emergence of each of the new conceptions, Muslims set upon redefining what constituted locally the *center* and the *margin* of Islam. As Eva E. Rosander points out,

“margins”…indicate being morally inferior or “second-rate” in relation to the center, even if the distance in space or time may be none. The center constitutes the normative and established setting, seen in relation to the margins, which represents those who are not fully recognized, with an aberrant behavior or hidden agendas. The margins lack the legitimacy of the center, which dominated the ideological discourse and the interpretation of social practice.\(^560\)

However, Rosander indicates that it is the dominant or established authority that “defines the margins with reference to its own ideas on what constitutes the norm and subsequently the center.”\(^561\) The conception of Islam that the *turq* brought to northern Mozambique became established and dominant only after the 1930s, when both geographical and numerical following of the *turq* increased significantly. African Muslim ruling clans took over the *tariqa* leadership, which locally legitimized this leadership. With this, the *turq* embarked upon redefining the norm and the centre of local Islam and were able to impact on existing Islamic conceptions and practices.

**The Turq and the Quest for ‘Orthodoxy’**

The founding of the Qadiriyya is attributed to a Hanbalite theologian Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, born in Jilan in Persia in 1077 and buried in Baghdad in 1166. The Shadhiliyya is believed to have been founded by a blind shaykh, Abu l-Hasan al-Shadhili, who was born in Morocco in 1196 and died in Tunis in 1258. In reality, the two Islamic scholars did not create specific Orders during their lifetimes. Their numerous followers developed religious and mystical teachings out of the principles laid down by these two masters and


\(^{561}\) Rosander, “Introduction”, p. 25.
launched the turuq. Both al-Jilani and ash-Shadhili attempted to incorporate the Sunni ‘orthodoxy’ of the Shari’a with the spiritual struggle against the self, jihad an-nafs.\textsuperscript{562} Al-Jilani, in particular, was a noted scholar of fiqh (Ar., Islamic jurisprudence) and hadith (Ar., traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), who argued that in order to gain entry into the esoteric (Ar., al-batin, literally ‘the interior’) realms of the soul, one had to master first the exoteric (Ar., al-zahra) duties of religious observance and learning.\textsuperscript{563}

The new generation of Sufi shuyukh that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries played a pivotal role in the expansion of Sufism, especially in Africa. ‘Ali Nur ad-Din al-Yashruti (1793-1898), the founder of the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya, which stemmed from the Shadhuliyya (Madaniyya), was a Tunisian from the city of Bizerta. He established the centre of his tariqa in ‘Akka (Acre) in northern Palestine in 1849, which was transferred to Beirut after in 1948. In terms of religious doctrine, the Yashrutiyya had a Shari’a-oriented outlook. According to Itzhak Weismann and Anabelle Böttcher, al-Yashruti, “had disciples among the ‘ulama and in particular among the muftis”, and was “a staunch follower of the Shari’a and indignant at those among his disciples who deviated from it.”\textsuperscript{564}

As stated earlier, the founder of the Order in East Africa was Shaykh Muhammad Ma’arouf bin Shaykh Ahmad ibn Abu Bakr (1853-1905) of the Comoro Islands. He accepted the Yashruti silsila from ‘Abdallah b. Hamid b. Darwish, an Arab from Lebanon residing in the Comoros, who was a disciple of ‘Ali Nur ad-Din al-Yashruti.\textsuperscript{565} B. G.


\textsuperscript{565} Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods, p. 154-55; Chanfi Ahmed, Islam et Politique, p. 119; Chanfi Ahmed “Tarîqa, État et enseignement islamique,” p. 54.
Martin points out that Shaykh Muhammad bin Ma’arouf was a social reformer, critical of the Comorian ruling elite for not fulfilling “the religious duty of combating the customs that were hateful in the eyes of God.”566 The Yashrutiyya was conceived as a pan-Islamic tariqa and its centre in the Middle East has continued to maintain ties with the Comorian branch until today.567

The extraordinary expansion of the Qadiriyya in East and central Africa was due primarily to Shaykh Uways ibn Muhammad al-Barawi (1847-1909), the leader of the Qadiriyya branch of Uwaysiyya.568 Born in Barawe in 1847 in Somalia to a family of modest means belonging to a servile client lineage of the Tunni clan, he received the Qadiriyya ijaza and silsila in Baghdad, the centre of the tariqa, from Shaykh Mustafa bin Salman.569 Since his return to Somalia in 1882 and his 1884 Zanzibar visit and until his death in 1909, Shaykh Uways led the expansion of the Qadiriyya in Africa.570 According to Scott S. Reese, like the Shadhuliyiya Yashrutiyya, the Qadiriyya was also a pan-Islamic tariqa with connections to the global Muslim community and broad cognizance of the issues and debates engulfing the wider Muslim world.571 Both Orders attracted followers from every walk of life and social classes, rural, urban, Arabs, Africans, Indians, elites and non-elites alike.

Both Orders also shared the general Muslim abhorrence of European rule, but channeled their sympathies towards the Sultan of Zanzibar.572 Shaykh Ma’arouf, for instance, was a strong opponent of French colonization of the Comoros, and was forced to flee the Grand Comoros in 1886 due to the persecution of the French.573 Like Shaykh

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566 Martin Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 152, 154.


568 Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods, p. 157; Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, p. 65.


572 Martin Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 164.

573 Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods, p. 155.
Uways, he spent a considerable time in Zanzibar and was permitted to return to the Comoros only in 1905.

The Qadiriyya networks, on their side, had propagated a famous *Mecca Letter* among Muslims, which was apprehended by German rule in Tanganyika in 1908. The *Letter* had strong millennial overtones and was directed against Europeans and Christians. It was written by a certain Shaykh Ahmad, the “Servant of the Prophets’ tomb” in Mecca, who received a warning from the Prophet Muhammad to tell his fellow Muslims of God’s exasperation at their abominable behavior which allowed the Christian Europeans to advance onto Muslim lands. Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad was identified as one of the main propagators of the *Letter* in East Africa, and he fled from Tanganyika to Mozambique when Germans wanted to seize him.

All those interviewed during fieldwork in Nampula Province believed unanimously that the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya Orders had an agenda of ‘correcting’ local Islamic practices and conceptions and bringing them in line with ‘true’ ‘orthodoxy.’ In fact, Martin cites Portuguese sources indicating that practicing Islam at the end of the nineteenth century had become stricter, “people started abstaining from wine and certain foods, and began attending mosques assiduously”, and had other “puritanical manifestations” of religious zeal.

Both Orders in Mozambique championed the importance of the *Shari’a*, first by disseminating classical texts of the Shafi‘i *fiqh*, and second, by introducing a position of the *shawriyya* (loca vernacular, person responsible for advising and funeral rites within a *tariqa* hierarchy) in the *tariqa* hierarchy, who acted as advisors in matters of *Shari’a*, *din* (Ar., faith) and *waqf* (Ar., property), and who could deal with *murids’* family and private situations. Also, at least two prominent Qadiri *shaykhs*, Sayyid Ba Hasan and Momade Sayyid Mujabo, claimed the title of the *mufti* (Ar., Islamic legal specialist, a jurisconsult) and were broadly recognized and respected as *shuyukh* with remarkable knowledge of the

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575 Martin *Muslim Brotherhood*, pp. 157.

Shari’a. Frequently, Sufi shuyukh in Mozambique have been mediators of disputes, as elsewhere in the Muslim world. In general, as in other regions, a Sufi shaykh here has played important social roles in the daily lives of the communities, as counselor, benefactor, teacher, healer and spiritual and religious guide.

The Expansion of Islamic Education

That the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya were deeply implicated in proselytizing and the expansion of Islamic education is exemplified by the lives of Shaykh Ma’arouf and Shaykh Uways. Especially, the Qadiriyya Uwaysiyya was known as a missionary tariqa. In Mozambique too, the turuq were responsible for the expansion of Islam and the increase of the Qur’anic schools.

Qur’anic schools in Mozambique are called madrassa and are usually attached to a masjid (Ar., mosque). Corresponding to kuttab or maktab in the Arabic-speaking world, it is characterized by teaching limited to the recitation of the Qur’an, often without understanding the language or meanings of the verses, and within a cognitive system emphasizing memorized transmission of a knowledge understood to be fixed and immutable. With the expansion of the turuq, many shuyukh and female Islamic leaders began maintaining also private Qur’anic schools belonging to specific families, houses of the shuyukh and Sufi Orders. Traditionally, the learning in a Qur’anic school was limited to the transmission of knowledge through a ‘traditional’ manner, principal aim being conclusion of the reading of the Qur’an and memorizing some Surahs (Ar. chapters and verses), the contents and meanings of which are explained and interpreted by a teacher, a mwalimu. In addition, students learned some hadith, the Arabic alphabet and basic tenets


578 See for example, Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, pp. 153-154.

579 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, p. 155.


of Islam. *Mwalimu* did not receive wages, but were offered gifts by parents and the community as a whole on the occasion of the conclusion of the *Qur’an*. Pupils often performed voluntary work on *mwalimu’s machambas* or helped with his/her other personal economic pursuits.

The *Qur’anic* school of a *tariqa* offered besides the above, an esoteric knowledge, by which Sufi Orders are characterized, and which included specific *dw’as* (Ar., prayers) for different occasions (especially for funeral rites, for healing and other treatments called “*calmas*” aimed at calming the spirits), recitation of *mawlid*, including a specific set of the devotional poetry, the *qasaid* (Ar., pl., sing., *qasida*, devotional poetry), *dhikr* and others. Children in a *tariqa*-linked *Qur’anic* school were often required to take part in *mawlid* celebrations together with the adults. Whereas earlier it was limited to the attendance at *Qur’anic* school, Islamic education was now enriched by a life-long commitment of learning from individual Sufi *shuyukh*. Although the scope of Islamic education was broadened, the learning itself continued to be centered on the knowledge of the specific textbook (the *vitabu*), informally transmitted to a disciple from a master, who was identified through a process of “*shaykh*-seeking”. The scope of the *vitabu* was

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582 Collective interview with male members of the *turuq*, Mozambique Island, November 6, 1999. See also, Chanfi Ahmed, *Islam et Politique*, pp. 52-58.
also enlarged. As in previous historical periods, the disciples copied by hand the whole textbook or part of it as given by their masters/teachers. Kept in personal possession throughout their lives, the full titles and names of the authors of these *vitabu* often blurred in memory.

The identification of the religious literature used by Mozambican Muslims requires more profound and detailed research. But among the new *vitabu* introduced by the *turuj* was the al-Barzanji collection, the book by Imam Sayyid Ja’afar ibn Hasan ibn Abdal Karim al-Barzanji (1690-1765) called *Mawlid Sharaf al-Anam* or ‘*Iqd al-Jawahir*. Also mentioned during fieldwork were such Sufi treatises as the Shadhili and Qadiri *manaqib* (Ar., hagiographies), *Ihya’ Ulum ad-Din* (Ar., Revivification of the Religious Sciences) by Abu Hamid al- Ghazzali (1058-1111), and *Tabaqat as-Sufiyya* (Ar., *Categories of the Sufis*) by Abu Abd ar-Rahman as-Sulami (d 1021), and classical textbooks of the Shafi’i *maddhab*, among which the most widely used and known were *Safinat an-Najah* by Salim ibn Abdallah ibn Samir al-Hadrami (mid-19th c.) and *Minhaj al-Talibin* (Ar., *The Path of the Seeker*) by Yahiya ibn Sharaf ad-Din an-Nawawi (1233-1277/8). The stress on these particular books is similar to the Comoros as described by Chanfi Ahmed.583

Also, a book used for talisman writing by northern Mozambican Muslims is likely to be *Ghayat al-Hakim* (the Goals of the Sage, known as *Picatrix* in the West) by Abu al-Qasim Maslama al-Marjiti (950-1007). Divination in northern Mozambique is generally known by the name *ehakko* (Emakhwa, divination), but Muslims also use geomancy which they call *ramuli* and its methodology is similar to the Arabic *khat al-raml*. The manuscripts that the *ramuli mwalimu* use are difficult to identify at the moment because they need to be examined in detail and comparatively. However, they might be derived from the most famous book in the field of geomancy, *Kitab al-fasl fi usul ‘ilm al-ramil* by Muhammad al-Zanati (d. 1200), as Chanfi Ahmed maintains that this was widely used in the Comoros.\(^{584}\)

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Picture 11: A handwritten book used for ramuli, Mozambique Island
The *Turuq* and the Tradition of Chiefship

Historical sources are scant with respect to religious changes that followed the introduction of the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya into Mozambique. As discussed in Chapter Two, with the arrival of the two *turuq*, Islamic authority in northern Mozambique started moving away from the territorial Muslim chiefs to the leadership of the Orders, the khulafa’. In principle, this new type of authority did not need to be linked to the important local Muslim lineages, and in the early twentieth century, people lacking a kinship relationship to those lineages, such as the “Moors,” became the chief *khulafa*’ of the *turuq*. At the time, most of the local African Muslim elites were still focused on the effects of colonial expansion and did not widely contest the power of the “Moors” within the Orders. The influence of the *turuq* and Sufi conceptions of Islam likewise were limited to Mozambique Island with some incursions into Angoche, while the majority of Muslims continued to uphold old ideas and practices. Between the late 1930s and the 1960s, colonial rule was consolidated. Muslims of chiefly clans realized the importance and the opportunities that the Sufi Orders offered in a new historical context and started reclaiming Islamic authority. With the participation of Africans in the *turuq*, the new religious authority centered on the Sufi *shaykh*, gradually turned into a dominant and established one and Sufi ideas and the Sufi Orders expanded beyond Mozambique Island.

However, because the previous conception of Islam had Swahili and African roots, and most of the prominent Sufi *shuyukh* in northern Mozambique, such as Sayyid Ba Hasan incorporated in a single person a *tariqa khalifa*-ship along with belonging to historical Muslim chiefly lineages, the inevitable confrontation between local conceptions of Islam and the one brought by Sufi Orders ensued. It is possible that the competition between “Moors” and African Muslims from chiefly clans over the Orders’ leadership were focused on certain questions that could best reflect this confrontation. For example, the issue of whether an Islamic authority could be linked to African chiefship, and whether it could accept local culture as consistent with an Islamic ‘orthodoxy,’ might have been crucial to this competition and probably have influenced the division of the *turuq*. Unfortunately, neither Muslims interviewed during fieldwork nor Portuguese sources provide straightforward answers with regard to these aspects of the competition.
They identify rather personal interests and abuses of power by the involved shuyukh, besides racial and ethnic cleavages, as the reasons for the split of the Orders.

One of the controversies seems to have been matrilineal ideology. Turuq tried to undermine it, because Sufi doctrinal conceptions of Islamic authority clashed with the old authority linked to the power of the lords of lands (the chiefs) based on matrilineal ideology, the contradiction that was frequently pointed to by the “Moors”. Some African tariqa leaders attempted to eliminate the apia-mwene and transform matriliney into an Islamic patriliny; others tried to abolish practices associated with the institution of a chief, such as chiefly investiture ceremony and the use of drums during the festivities linked to Islamic calendar, and other practices seemingly grounded on local cultural traditions. Often these endeavors were met with strong opposition from the local African population, who linked their wellbeing to the spiritual and ancestral foundations of chiefship.

Though available historical data on religious changes and disputes for early twentieth-century Mozambique is very scarce, the colonial sources in neighboring East Africa and Nyasaland documented these kinds of disputes taking place there. Both of these regions maintained close relationships and reciprocal influence with northern Mozambique and it is likely that the disputes and reforms spilled over onto the Mozambican side of the borders. On the one hand, the presence of Muslims from Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzabar and Nyasaland in northern Mozambique, freely partaking, and even organizing and directing local religious life continued unabated, as Pinto Correia’s 1936-1937 report underscores. The Portuguese Administrative Inspector to Cabo Delgado District, Manuel Metello, observes in his 1944-51 testimony that the numbers of “Mohammedan preachers”, especially from Tanganyika, had “increased significantly in the last several years. He points out that these “preachers” were inculcating “natives” with the idea that “they should rigorously follow only precepts of Mohammedan religion dictated by [these preachers]”, while those practices derived from local African culture

585 Pinto Correia “Relatório”, Vol. 2, p. 173, in AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76.
“were mortal sins and as such would be severely punished by Ala.” On the other hand, northern Mozambicans themselves continued traveling to East African centers of Islam in search of religious education. The fact that the coastal Mozambican Muslims went further north to East Africa for obtaining religious education is well-known, but with the expansion of Sufi Orders, this trend became a widespread phenomenon among the mainland Muslims too. To cite some examples for Muslims beyond the coast, Branquinho mentions that three khulafa’ of the Qadiriyya Sadat in the hinterland (Malema), including the chief khalifa of the region, Macassare Waita, also known as Sabit, had returned in 1942, after studying in Dar Es Salaam.

In a new colonial context, besides East Africa, Muslims also went to Nyasaland in order to escape harsh colonial treatment, such as forced labor and compulsory relocations and to secure better wages or better prices for agricultural produce. Some Mozambicans left following traditional kinship ties to Swahili or other ethnic groups, others followed earlier emigrations by immediate family, and some went alone in which case membership in a Sufi Order provided them with solidarity and safety networks in a foreign country. Most emigrants preserved strong ties to their places of origin, and a few returned voluntarily after living a considerable time abroad, while others were expelled back to their homeland by the British. Consequently and as in previous historical times, northern Mozambican Muslims got actively engaged in regional and global religious debates and Islamic reforms.

The ‘Dufu War’

According to Trimingham, Nimitz, and Pouwels, one of the issues debated by Muslims of East and East Central Africa in the early twentieth century was about the permissibility of drums (Sw., ngoma and dufu) in religious rituals and mosques in general and during the

587 Metello, Ibid.


589 Pinto Correia “Relatório”, Vol. 2, p. 112, in AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76; some of the data with regard to Mozambican emigration to other regions can be found in AHM, FGG, Caixas entitled “Política Indígena, Emigração Clandestina,” such as for example Cxs. 226, 887-89, 893, 897-98 mentioned above.
dhikr and mawlid ceremonies in particular.\textsuperscript{590} Nimtz and Pouwels argue that these debates, called also the ngoma or dufu disputes, mirrored ethnic cleavages, such as Arab/African and mainland Africans versus coastal town-dwellers as well as rivalry between the ‘orthodox’ Alawi Arabs, making up the bulk of the ‘ulama class and Africans, supposedly prone to ‘public entertainment’ forms of Islam, such as mawlid and dhikr.

Anne Bang criticizes both the African-Arab and the wangwana-mainlanders dichotomies which have been made to represent East African Islam and argues instead that, “few things could be further from ‘true Alawi tradition’ than denouncing tariqas and dhikr as such.”\textsuperscript{591} Bang, like Trimingham well before her, rightly argues that these disputes were not centered so much on ethnic controversies or the acceptability of Sufism within supposedly Arab-Alawi ‘ulama-based ‘orthodoxy,’ but engaged primarily Sufis themselves focused on such issues as, whether dhikr should be performed loudly or quietly, with drums or without them, and in mosques or not.\textsuperscript{592} Trimingham also showed that the debate over these questions was so widespread that it involved, besides the East African coast, the Yao in the south and Muslims in Uganda in the north.\textsuperscript{593}

Bang also maintains, following Glassman, that in the late nineteenth century an “excessive” dhikr merged with the more popular un-Islamic forms of the ngoma practices.\textsuperscript{594} This was not true for Mozambique, not least because the Sufi Orders emerged here only at the beginning of the twentieth century and gained a popular African basis only after the 1930s. Besides, the dhikr in Mozambique is much more solemn than in India and Arabic countries, because the drums and other musical instruments are not used.

In northern Mozambique, the debates and changes prior to the 1960s had reflected controversies and conflicts between the old chiefly and the new tariqa conceptions of


\textsuperscript{591} Bang, \textit{Sufis and Scholars}, pp. 6, 32-33, 137, 148-150.


\textsuperscript{593} Trimingham, \textit{Islam in East Africa}, pp. 98-n1, 101.

\textsuperscript{594} Bang, \textit{Sufis and Scholars}, p. 142.
Islam, and were expressed through concerns with such aspects of Sufism as whether a tariqa would be viewed as less ‘orthodox’ if it continued using drums in religious rituals such as dhikr and mawlid, and if the drums were in use in these rituals would the tariqa run a risk of being considered as paralleling or endorsing un-Islamic ngoma. The competition between Islam associated with chiefly tradition and Sufism therefore took a form of disputes about the use of drums in religious rituals, and on the nature of dhikr and mawlid. However, though local religious debates and changes had replicated regional discussions and Islamic reforms, they basically focused on the specific Mozambican historical and cultural contexts.

Despite the scarcity of the documented evidence for the early-twentieth century northern Mozambique, it was striking that all those interviewed during the 1999-2000 fieldwork insisted with great confidence that drumming in dhikr, mawlid and in mosques was haram (Ar., illicit). This suggests that at some point in Mozambican history prior to the 1960s, Muslims here had outlawed the drums. The process itself should have involved a great deal of controversy because drumming during Muslim festivals and funerals was a norm in northern Mozambique before the arrival of the two Sufi Orders, and also because in other African regions and the wider Muslim world, drumming during dhikr or mawlid, which are held sometimes in mosques has been an accepted and common practice both historically and nowadays. If the drums were removed from local performances of dhikr, mawlid, funerals, and other religious rituals, then it is not surprising that when in the early 1930s, a Mozambican Qadiri shaykh, Yussuf Arabi brought the Tufo from Zanzibar, which possibly sprung out of the Mawlid al-Habshi, it was promptly reduced to a ‘dance society’.

595 All the interviewed during the 1999-2000 fieldwork, Sufis and non-Sufis alike in Angoche, Mozambique Island, Maputo and Nampula cities were all unanimous with this regard.


597 Interviews with Muslims in Mozambique Island, November, 1999. See also, Bang Sufis and Scholars, pp. 149-150.
Another dispute in the early twentieth century East Africa and Nyasaland focused on whether *dhikr* could be performed in mosques or not, and this dispute was linked intrinsically to the debate on permissibility of drums in *dhikr*. Tringham emphasizes that in many places *dhikr* was performed in mosques, and “at other places such practices [were] frowned on.”

Nimtz cites various examples involving similar disputes in 1910, 1922, 1934, and 1959 in Lindi, Tabora and Bagamoyo. There is no historical evidence available for Mozambique on this particular dispute, but according to the majority of Muslims interviewed during fieldwork, drums, tambourines or other musical instruments cannot enter under any circumstance either a mosque or *zawiya*. Muslims emphasized this to be a grave *haram*. However, a male *dhikr* in Mozambique takes place in a mosque. It is common until today for each Sufi Order to have its own denominational mosque. Branquinho lists five Mozambique Island mosques existing at the time of his survey, four of which were used by specific Sufi Orders and one by the Indian community of the Island. Probably, once drums were removed from *dhikr*, the *dhikr* could be respectfully performed in mosques. The *turuq* in Mozambique therefore differ from those of East Africa, where besides mosques, the Orders have special buildings for *dhikr*, called *zawiya* or *zawiyani*. In northern Mozambique, only female *turuq* branches have *zawiya*.

Before the coming of the Orders, women and men could be simultaneously present in ritual spaces and religious ceremonies. But in the early twentieth century controversies surrounding female mosque attendance also surfaced in East Africa. Nimtz mentions conflicts of this nature taking place in Lindi in 1910, in Tanga in 1933, and in Tabora in 1934. Though there is no data about analogous disputes in Mozambique, the fact is, until today male *dhikr* is performed in mosques, while the female one is only held

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598 Tringham *Islam in East Africa*, p. 100.

599 Nimtz *Islam and Politics*, pp. 78, 80, 137, 203-n38.

600 Branquinho “Relatório”, p. 373.

601 Tringham *Islam in East Africa*, p. 98; Martin *Muslim Brotherhoods*, pp. 156-58; Chanfi and Von Oppen “Saba Ishirini”, pp. 91-92; Chanfi “Un pélerinage”, p. 407.

in zawiyas. Frequently female zawiyas are attached to or built next to the tariqa mosque, though they might also be situated in different quarters of the town or village.

**Concept of Tariqa**

Related to the drum dispute is a puzzling exclusion of the Rifa’iyya from the ranks of Sufi Orders by local Muslims. This is despite the fact that the Rifa’iyya in Mozambique has all the attributes of a classical tariqa. To start with, it has the same hierarchical structure as any other Sufi Order, including the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiiyya and the Qadiriyya in Mozambique, as depicted by Carvalho, Branquinho and by Mello Machado. The tariqa hierarchy described by these authors is consistent with the findings of the 1999-2000 fieldwork in Mozambique, and is comprised of the chief khalifa, known locally as sajada khadima, a person of great knowledge and respect, who could read, translate and comment on the Qur’an, the Hadith and various vitabu and who is able to appreciate, advise on and solve different cases brought before him, and to orient and indicate what is best for the common good of the community, besides being able to give ijazas. He was the one who inherited the prayer mat (Ar., sajadda) of the previous head of the Order.

The sajada khadima is followed in the tariqa hierarchy by the khalifa, a regional or local delegate. Below him is the naqib, the leader of the dhikr ritual and a teacher and proselytizer. The naqib is followed by theshawriyya, expected to assist the khalifa and the naqib in solving cases and settling local disputes. Last in the tariqa hierarchy are the murshidun or munshidun, singers of dhikr, followed by muridun, ordinary tariqa members, including novices.

Muslims interviewed during fieldwork, including prominent Sufi shuyukh recognized not only that the Rifa’iyya was a tariqa or d/tiqiri in principle, but also that

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603 See also, Carvalho “Notas”, p. 61.

Ahmed b. ‘Ali al-Rifa’i (1106-1182) was one of the “four poles” (al-aqtab al-arba’) of Sufism, along with Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, Ahmad al-Badawi (1200-1276) and Burhan ud-Din Ibrahim al-Dasuqi (1246-1288). Nevertheless they thought that the concepts of tariqa or d/tiqiri were not applicable to it in Mozambique. These concepts, in their understanding, d/tiqiri could only be associated with the Shadhuliyya and the Qadiriyya. It is possible that while people used to referring to the Rifa’iyya as Mawlid, the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya had introduced the notions of tariqa and d/tiqiri, and consequently the latter terms became associated with these Orders. Also, it seems that the words tariqa or d/tiqiri convey a connotation of ‘respectable’ and the Rifa’iyya is not perceived as such. One reason for this might be that the Shadhuli and Qadiri shuyukh undermined the authenticity and legitimacy of the Rifa’iyya ijaza and silsila/isnad, because all the interviewed Sufi shuyukh, with the exception of the members of the Rifa’iyya themselves, were unanimous in that the Rifa’i ijaza/silsila was not legitimate. To make matters worse, in the Comoros too, Muslims attached to other turuq looked down on the Rifa’iyya and their leader.

At the heart of every tariqa is its shaykh. The disciple’s attachment is not so much to an Order as it is to a specific spiritual master, his shaykh. If the shaykh is deemed as not holding a legitimate silsila and ijaza, the Order is doomed. With the passing of the Muslim elite into the leadership of the two new Orders, the Rifa’i shuyukh became viewed as of lower social status with lesser training than the Qadiri and Shadhili shuyukh. Probably the latter shuyukh deliberated at some point that the Rifa’i shuyukh did not hold a legitimate ijaza and silsila, which led to the Rifa’i loss of tariqa status in Mozambique.

605 Collective Interview with the male Sufi shaykhs of Mozambique Island, November 6, 1999. See also, Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, p. 150.

606 The interviewed Sufi shaykhs in Nampula Province, Shaykh Faqui Sayyid Shamakhani of Mozambique Island and members of the Molidi, were unanimous that the Rifa’i ijaza/silsila was not a legitimate in Mozambique.

607 Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods, p. 229-62n.


The loss of the Rifa’iyya tariqa status in Mozambique could have also resulted from the disputes over a ‘proper’ mawlid. Trimingham points out the Rifa’iyya in East Africa, found in Zanzibar and some coastal places, mainly in the country districts, was the only tariqa which sanctioned and used drums, and also chanted many qasaid in Swahili, much more than any other tariqa. He emphasizes that “at the dhikr, which can become very wild, women are allowed to be present, generally behind a curtain or a screen.”

Nimtz underscores the presence of the Rifa’iyya in Zanzibar, in Kaule near Bagamoyo, and in the hinterland towns such as Dodoma. Though Nimtz does not speak about the drums in dhikr, he stresses that “the more flamboyant rituals of the Rifa’is in contrast to the other turuq, were no doubt a source of attraction.”

In Mozambique, as elsewhere, the Rifa’iyya has its own collection of qasaid chanted in Arabic, KiSwahili and frequently, in local languages. As mentioned earlier, the Order itself is known in Mozambique as the Mawlid/Molidi or the Mawlid Naquira. In reality, Mozambican Muslims refer to the Rifa’iyya dhikr accompanied by drums, tambourines and other musical instruments, as mawlid.

As discussed earlier, the Rifa’i dhikr in Mozambique, as elsewhere, is performed with dabushi (from Ar., dabbus, and ‘needle’) and chanting of the Rifai’yya râtib (Ar., a litany consisting of invocations and Qur’anic verse). According to Muslims interviewed during fieldwork, a more solemn mawlid qasaid collection, known locally simply as the barzanji, was introduced by the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya, and it comes from the book by Imam Sayyid Ja’afar al-Barzanji called Mawlid Sharaf al-Anam or ‘Iqd al-Jawahir, mentioned above. Though this collection was translated into Swahili, Muslims interviewed during fieldwork emphasized that a qasida which is not in Arabic is not appropriate for a ‘true’ mawlid, and some even upheld that singing qasida in other languages during the Mawlid un-Nabi was haram. A qasida in KiSwahili or local

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611 Nimtz in Islam and Politics, p. 62.
languages which is usually accompanied by musical instruments is perceived to be intended only for secular festivities, such as weddings, celebrations of births or baby’s first haircut, etc., performed outside the mosque or zawiya. Thus in northern Mozambique, as in Tanzania and Comoros, a distinction is made between a purely religious mawlid, which is reserved exclusively for the initiated followers of the turuq and which is performed on religious occasions in mosques and zawiya and a ‘secular’ or ‘semi-secular’ mawlid, open to everyone during the specific religious ceremonies as well as mundane celebrations.  

The fact that in Mozambique the word mawlid is applied to the Rifa’iyya dhikr with drums, while the actual mawlid ceremony with no drums is called barzanji, presupposes that the Rifa’iyya was probably stripped of its legitimacy due to the use of drums in dhikr. As a consequence of the new Orders’ claims, the Rifa’iyya became relegated to the realm of non-respectable, thus marginal in Rosander’s terms. It was not eliminated completely but became a refuge for the former slaves and the newcomers who through these practices still could affirm their Islamic identities, and also by performing these practices on festive occasions were able to secure their master’s patronage.

In contrast to the Shadhuliyya and the Qadiriyya, the membership of the Rifa’iyya is not closed to anybody affiliated with other Sufi Orders. From colonial times until today, the Rifa’iyya in Mozambique, as in the case of the Tufo, has been considered a cultural association and not a tariqa, and for that reason it is not attached to or owns a specific mosque or zawiya. It has no other attributes of a tariqa, such as raya (Ar., a banner), the wadhifa (Ar., ‘recommendation’ or principals of the tariqa), and the wird (Ar., sing., pl. award, litany, daily prayers), though the Rifa’i râtib could be considered

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617 For awrad see, Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, pp. 127-130.
a *wird*. The Rifa’iyya is viewed by local Muslims as not a legitimate part of Islamic life, but rather a pastime, a ‘dance society’ or a ‘club’. Those who solely practice the Rifa’iyya *dhikr* while abstain from ‘real’ Islamic rituals are understood to be either juniors or of inferior social status.

![Picture 13: A Rifa’i *naqib* performing a *dhikr* using *dabushi* with a *murid*, Mozambique Island](image)

![Picture 14: Rifa’i *dhikr*, Mozambique Island.](image)
However, during the ziyara undertaken by the Qadiriyya or Shadhuliyya, the graves of the deceased founders of Rifa’iyya are visited along those of other important awliyya and religious people. The ziyara is done several times annually in memory of (the birth and death) of global (al-Jilani and al-Shadhili) and local founders of the turuq, when during the collective reading of the Qur’an (khitima) all other deceased important religious people are remembered.\textsuperscript{618} The tombs are viewed as spaces in which the baraka (Ar., grace) of the awliya radiates.\textsuperscript{619}

As in Tanzania and Comoros, in northern Mozambique the relationship between the members of the Qadiriyya and the Shadhuliyya are generally amicable at present in contrast with the earlier colonial period.\textsuperscript{620} In contemporary Mozambique, they invite each other to mutual ziyara and mawlid, and as Valerie Hoffman points out for the case


\textsuperscript{619} Hoffman, \textit{Sufism, Mystics}, pp. 114, 118.

\textsuperscript{620} Collective interview with male members of the turuq, Mozambique Island, November 6, 1999. See also, Ahmed Chanfi, “Un pèlerinage maritime,” p. 408.
of Egypt, “sociability often runs across the boundaries of specific Orders because the respect for shaykhs is rarely confined to a specific Order.”

        Manifestation of saints’ (Ar. awliya) ‘grace’ (Ar., baraka) are their miracles (Ar., karamat), which constitute the proof of their sainthood. In Lamin Sanneh’s words, “the wali was a moral exemplar, the impeccable guarantor of barakah.” Mozambican Muslims recount numerous stories of miracles performed by global Sufi shuyukh, such as ar-Rifa’i, al-Jilani and in particular by Shaykh Uways. But stories of the karamat of local awliya abound too.

**Sukuti vs T/Dikiri (Twaliki) Dispute**

And, finally there were clashes over Islamic funeral rites that continue to be an issue in present-day Mozambique too, though they first started in the early years of the twentieth century. Trimingham indicates that the use of drums in the dhikr, singing and dancing at funerals and other occasions was a point of conflict in East and southern central Africa, and that in particular among the Yao, the adherents of the Qadiriyya were “divided between those who perform the noisy dhikr with drums and the quietists (sukutis)”.

Nimtz describes the 1922 Bagamoyo quarrel, also involving the Qadiri shuyukh who, among other things, were accused of “allowing hand clapping during dhikr and not performing proper ritual for a funeral”. In northern Mozambique, the dispute over Islamic funeral rites was an extension of the dhikr- and drum-related disputes because it was common to use drums during funerals before the arrival of the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya. For example, in 1901, Neves described the Anhapakho of Angoche as having great drumming feasts called maffufuni on the fortieth day after the Sultan’s death. Amorim mentions funeral drums in Angoche hinterland, including the

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kiri, where in case of the death of a chief, the matenga drumming feasts took place and the cavendri war drum was played.626

Amorim, however, also indicates that by 1911, the coastal Angoche Anhapakho performed religious chanting called tiqiri (from dhikr) during funeral feasts, but he does not mention drums.627 As in Angoche at that time, the only tariqa present was the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya it appears that the disputes about the use of drums in funerals concerned mostly the Qadiriyya. The dispute in Angoche, as was the case in Bagamoyo brought up by Nimtz, revolved around the custom of clapping hands at funerals. Nowadays, as before, the funeral dispute in Angoche is called sukuti (Sw., from Ar. sukat, silent) vs. nashidi (from Ar., nashid, clapping hands) in contrast to the sukuti versus stt/dikiri (from dhikr) or twaliki (from tariqa) in other regions of Mozambique, such as Mozambique Island and among the Yao.

Alan Thorold cites Clyde Mitchell’s 1948 informant referring to sukuti/twaliki (from tariqa) dispute which took place in the Jalasi’s Yao chiefdom in 1937.628 In this case, the sukuti faction represented by certain shaykh Ali Bisamu, had adopted the discourse about the primacy of the Qur’an in religious deliberations, and indicated that performing dhikr at funerals was not mentioned in the Holy Book.629 According to Alpers, the dispute was primarily among the Yao, but involved Nkhotakota as well, and was so strong that in 1949 the British colonial government invited to arbitrate a prominent Islamic scholar from Zanzibar Sayyid Abdu’l-Hasan b. Ahmad Jamali Laili (of Alawi-Hadrami Jamal Laili clan of scholars in East Africa).630 Alpers points out that “he held meetings attended by thousands at Mangochi, among the Yao, and at Nkhotakota, though in the end he was unable to resolve their differences.”631

626 Amorim, Relatório, pp. 142, 144, 149.
627 Amorim, Relatório, p. 142.
629 Thorold, Ibid.
631 Alpers, Ibid.
In Angoche, first two sukutis surfaced in 1966, when shaykhs Hasan ‘Ali “Côncaco” and Musa Ibrahimo Siraj, both from the Anhapakho lineage of the Catamoio Island returned home after some years of working and studying in Nyasaland and Tanganyika. A violent conflict around funeral rites between these two shaykhs and a number of tariqa shaykhs broke out in 1968. Disagreements were so acute as to require the intervention of the Portuguese, who solicited Shaykh Momade Sayyid Mujabo of Mozambique Island to issue a fatwa (Ar., legal opinion on the dispute). The fatwa determined that funerals should be celebrated “in a normal voice” as opposed to either shouting or silence.

The Wahhabis

The persistence of the funeral disputes until today was related to the fact that in the 1960s this dispute was transferred from the realm of tariqa-based Islam into the one which set Sufis and the so-called Wahhabis as rivals. However, first, the sukuti group found allies among the shaykhs of southern Mozambique, such as Cassimo Tayob and Abdul Gafur Muhammad Yussufo trained at Dar ul-Ulam Seminary at Deoband, India. But the


635 Monteiro “Sobre a Actuação,” Ibid.

influence of the Deobandi shaykhs was not as tangible in northern Mozambique as of those who studied in Saudi Arabia. In the early 1960s, those who studied in Saudi Arabia were dubbed by ordinary Muslims as the Wahhabi, though they themselves prefer to be called Ahl al-Sunna (Ar., people of Sunna). The earliest known Wahhabi, who upset northern Mozambican Muslim establishment, was Shaykh Momad Yussuf, a grandson of the prominent Qadiriyya Sadat khalifa at Mozambique Island, Haji Ahmad Haji Yussuf, who returned from his studies in Mecca in 1960. He not only abandoned Sufism, of which his grandfather was one of the founders, but stirred up a huge public controversy in 1968 when on the burial of his own mother at Mozambique Island, he manifested little interest in taking part in dhikr and even suggested ‘correcting’ local funeral practices. As he normally resided in Lourenço Marques, Momad Yussuf did not pursue the funeral issue at Mozambique Island further, but continued to express his views from southern Mozambique.

Some of the “Moor” Deobandis, such as Abdulbacar Musa Ismael ‘Mangira’ and Aminuddin Muhammad were able to pursue high Islamic education in Saudi Arabian universities after finishing the course at Dar ul-Ulum. In 1964, Abubacar Musa Ismael ‘Mangira’ from Inharrime region of Inhambane in southern Mozambique returned from Saudi Arabia after completing a Shari’a course at the Medina University. He was the most vocal among the Wahhabis, and he challenged directly the northern Mozambican

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tariqa and chiefly Muslim establishment and found an impressive support from the southern Deobandis and from the northern sukitis.640

The conflict between the Wahhabis and the tariqa-based Muslim leadership soon escalated into direct confrontations, especially after 1971 when Shaykh Abubacar Mangira ridiculed Sayyid Mujabo and Sayyid Bakr during their visit to a Maputo mosque calling them ‘ignorants’ and proponents of bid’a in front of the whole congregation and displaying an anti-Sufi fatwa of the mufti of Karachi.

Encouraged by the bold actions of the Wahhabis, in January of 1972 a group of young Angoche sukitis attacked the tariqa shuyukh, waving machetes at them, and even assaulting physically one shaykh and destroying a Qur’anic school in Angoche City (then António Enes).641 The same year, the Portuguese asked Sayyid ‘Umar b. Ahmad b. Sumayt al-Alawi (1896-1976), who was the chief qadi of Zanzibar in 1942-1960 and a former advisor to Sultan, for a fatwa on the dispute.642 Sayyid ‘Umar b. Ahmad b. Sumayt left Zanzibar following the 1964 Revolution, and settled in his native Grand Comoros, where he was considered as the highest authority in Islam. The Portuguese thought of him as the Mufti of Comoros. His Mozambican fatwa favored the d/tiqiri. Nevertheless, the funeral disputes persisted and the violent conflict between the tariqa shuyukh and the Wahhabis continued to take place until the death of Shaykh ‘Mangira’ in 2000.

Due to their closeness to the sukitis, the Wahhabis are understood by Mozambican Muslims as evolving out of the sukitis. However, as compared to the sukitis, they support a quiet funeral without any dhikr and express their views on dhikr or mawlid using the term bid’a (Ar., abominable religious innovation) rather than sukit or haram. They target saint veneration and tomb visitation, spirit-possession cults, Islamic


641 Monteiro, Ibid.

medicines and magic, and celebrations of the Prophets’ birthday (mawlid), all categorized as jahiliyya (Ar., ignorance), shirk (Ar., polytheism) and bid’a (Ar., abominable religious innovation). The Wahhabi critique therefore is much more comprehensive than that of the sukutis, because they target the Sufi and chiefly conceptions of Islam and of religious authority as a whole. In fact, in the 1960s, Portuguese Secret Services in Mozambique noted that sukutis had little in common with the Wahhabis in terms of their religious doctrine or ideological outlook.

Wahhabism in Mozambique is marked by puritanical scripturalism and tendencies to view Islam as an ideology and a total mode of life. The Wahhabis demand a literal interpretation of the Islamic sources (the Qur’an and the Hadith) and ubiquitous application of the Shari’a (Islamic legal principles), besides denouncing a “blind” imitation of Western lifestyles by Muslims. Although strongly influenced by the Indian Deobandi School and Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia, Mozambican Wahhabis or Ahl al-Sunna can be considered as Islamists, a local brand of a global phenomenon. They represent a radically different conception of Islam as compared to historical Sufi or chiefly conceptions of Islam in northern Mozambique.

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Despite their claims to stand for ‘traditional Islam,’ Islamist groups are an outcome of the colonial (and later, post-colonial) life. They were influenced in particular by the expansion of Western intellectual technologies and political institutions into the Islamic world, which helped to create new ways of conceiving, practicing and passing on the Islamic tradition. Through the awareness of other Muslim and non-Muslim traditions, Islamists have objectified, systematized and disciplined Islam in ways that correspond to the demands of ‘modern science’ and modern concept of ‘religion.’ As Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori put it:

Islamists are Muslims whose consciousness has been objectified in the ways we have described and who are committed to implementing their vision of Islam as a corrective to current “un-Islamic” practices…Islamist authority to remake the world derives from a self-confident appropriations of what they believe to be “tradition.”

Conclusion

The conception of Islam that the turuq brought to northern Mozambique became established and dominant after the 1930s, when the geographical and numerical following of the turuq increased significantly due to the appropriation of the tariqa leadership by the historical Muslim chiefly clans. The Sufi conception of religious authority and rituals differed significantly from the earlier local and regional conceptions of Islam associated with African chiefship, but some of the prominent Sufi shuyukh in northern Mozambique, such as Sayyid Ba Hasan incorporated in a single person a tariqa khalifa-ship along with belonging to historical Muslim chiefly clans. In addition, the claim over Sufi leadership of the people who were not directly related to these historical Muslim chiefly clans of northern Mozambique, such as the Moors, brought the issue of religious authority and


648 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, pp. 39, 42.

‘orthodoxy’ to the centre-stage, which between the 1930s and 1960s, took a form of an intense competition between the old Muslim chiefly clans and the *tariqa shuyukh*. The inevitable confrontation between local conceptions of Islam and the one brought by Sufi Orders ensued, and posed a significant threat to the historical association of Islamic discursive tradition with that of an African chiefship.

Ritual and conceptual transformations and changes engendered by the Sufi Orders also entailed a great deal of internal dispute, debate and competition among Muslims with reference to what they perceived to be an Islamic ‘orthodoxy,’ and who they deemed to have been entitled to have the authority over its interpretation. The questions about the nature of Islamic authority and whether matriliny and ceremonies associated with African chiefship could be incorporated with Islamic tradition, as was the case until then in northern Mozambique, were central to these debates.

These debates in northern Mozambique clearly replicated regional and global debates over Islamic tradition, especially in East Africa and Nyasaland, which indicates that northern Mozambique continued to have strong religious and cultural ties to these regions. However, the debates also largely took local forms and addressed local concerns and contexts. Some *tariqa* leaders attempted to eliminate the *apia-mwene* and transform matriliny into an Islamic patriliny. Others tried to abolish practices associated with the institution of a chief, such as chiefly investiture ceremony and the use of drums during the festivities linked to the Islamic calendar, and other practices seemingly grounded on local culture. Both the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya undertook religious proselytizing and the expansion of Islamic literacy, and they also ultimately influenced the elimination of drums from ‘proper’ religious rituals, such as *mawlid*, *dhikr* and funeral rites, and in reducing the Rifa’iyya to the status of a ‘dance society’. The debates around these changes were expressed as ‘*dufu* wars’ and ‘*sukuti* vs *twaliki*’ disputes. Often the attempts to dislodge the tradition of chiefship from the conceptions of Islam were met with strong opposition from the local African population, who linked their wellbeing to the spiritual and ancestral foundations of chiefship, which historically included Islamic identity as well.

From the 1960s onward, both Muslim chiefly clans and the *tariqa* establishment had to deal with the emerging Islamist group, known in Mozambique as the *Wahhabis*. 

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The Wahhabis symbolized a radical departure from the local historical conceptions of Islam in northern Mozambique and from the one brought by the Sufi Orders. They advocated a universal and ‘modern’ Islam, separated from local historical traditional and cultural influences, in other words, an Islam reduced to a systematized and objectified ‘religion.’ For them, Islam was not a living tradition but rather a textual one limited to the Qur’an and the Hadith. By adopting an essentialized and monolithically static Orientalist conception of Islam and other Western intellectual tools of reasoning, systematizing, disciplining and functionalizing, the Wahhabis in Mozambique, as Isamists elsewhere, also presented Islam as an alternative and an opposition to the West. In that sense, their Islamism was an Orientalism in reverse, or a ‘positive’ Orientalism.650

The Wahhabis (and perhaps later, the Frelimo post-colonial secular Marxism) struck a definite and fatal blow on the claims of the historical Muslim chiefly elites over Islamic authority. Gradually and inevitably, especially during the post-colonial period, the chiefship and Islam were epistemologically separated from each other. The emergence of the Wahhabism in Mozambique thus precipitated the end of the historical longue durée discursive tradition of northern Mozambique, which linked African matrilineal chiefship and Islam.

Chapter Five

The Portuguese and Islam in Northern Mozambique

This Chapter focuses on the ways in which Islam was perceived in Portuguese colonial thought and the kind of politics and policies the Portuguese adopted toward Islam and Muslims in Mozambique during the twentieth century. The agents of “effective occupation,” such as military and administrative officials in northern Mozambique at the turn of the nineteenth century introduced an Orientalist idea that Islam in this region contrasted with the ‘orthodoxy’ of the Middle East and even India in that it ‘syncretized’ African ‘traditions and customs,’ and was not a ‘true’ Islam. To what extent did this idea prevail in colonial attitudes and policies towards Islam in Mozambique?

A second set of questions addressed in this Chapter is related to the concrete political changes that colonial rule adopted during the twentieth century, and how they affected Muslims and the relationship between them and the Portuguese. For example, in 1926, the nationalist Estado Novo came to power in Portugal and adopted the idea of “Portugalizing” (portugalização) colonial subjects and consequently turning them into Portuguese citizens. How did these policies affect Muslims in Mozambique? How did the Concordata agreement, signed between the Portuguese State and the Vatican, influence the colonial policies of Portugal in general, and those directed to Muslim populations, in particular?

In the late 1950s until the end of the colonial era, Portuguese colonial policies changed as a result of international pressures derived from the processes of decolonization elsewhere. The Portuguese, however, insisted on their ‘benign’ colonialism and on the prospect of maintaining it by introducing apparently more democratic political changes by giving citizenship rights to Africans. Portugal officially adopted Gilberte Freyre’s theory of luso-tropicalism. What did these changes mean in Mozambique with regards Muslims and Islam?
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the colonial administration faced the spread of the liberation movements in northern Mozambique, involving besides the Makonde of the Mueda plateau, large portions of Muslim-dominated regions. What kind of policies did Portugal adopt in order to deal with Muslim participation in the liberation movements and curtail the spread of African independence ideology?

At the same time, the Chapter aims to outline how internal Muslim differences, expressed through racial (Africans, Indians and mixed-race population), ideological (between Sufis and Wahhabis), and cultural (Indian, African, Sunni, and Isma’ili) differences were reflected in Portuguese policies and attitudes, and how colonial rule dealt with these differences.

**Islam and Indigenato**

The Portuguese, like other European colonial powers adopted an Orientalist approach to Islam. Orientalism, according to Said, is “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between” the European West and non-European Other, justifying in this way Western domination and authority over this Other. Orientalists viewed Islam as an unchanging, transcendent, textual faith which was a monolithic, immutable, and ultimately a-historical ‘religion.’ Islam was understood with reference only to a set of “classical” principles of ‘orthodoxy’ and not as a living tradition that could be appropriated and given meaning to by people who ‘used’ it. A ‘true’ and ‘orthodox’ Islam was ‘Arabic’ (or ‘Asian’).

As discussed earlier, Portuguese colonialism elaborated a legal system based on a separation of European metropolitan and African indigenous, ‘native’ or ‘customary,’ laws. It assumed that the mass of Africans were not ready to exercise either metropolitan law or Portuguese citizenship, and therefore were left under the jurisdiction of local African ‘traditional customs and usages’ administered by the régulos/regedores, which

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equated with a system called *indigenato*. Islam in northern Mozambique was understood to fall within the *indigenato* system also because of its association with the local Muslim ruling elites and the indigenous culture. The Portuguese regarded it as a particular kind of Islam, ‘Islão Negro’, or ‘Black Islam,’ a part of local African ‘traditions,’ and ‘customs,’ rather than a ‘real’ Islam akin to Islam in the Middle East or India. Some Portuguese thought that African Muslims should be considered as ‘Islamized or ‘slightly touched’ by Islam rather than fully-fledged Muslims.

The notion of a ‘Black’ or ‘African’ Islam was initially influenced by the early twentieth-century agents of ‘effective occupation.’ Ernesto Jardim de Vilhena and Pedro Massano de Amorim, for example, emphasized that in northern Mozambique Islam was “mixed with gross superstitions,” such as fetishism, magic and other practices derived from African culture. Portuguese officials of the 1930s and 1940s, the Administrative Inspector, Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa among them, believed that Islam there was ‘unorthodox’ and ‘syncretistic,’ and “with rare exceptions, superficial: on the first sign of misfortune an [African Muslim] forgets his imam” and “goes to consult the healer and offers sacrifices to his ancestors.”

From the 1950s till the end of colonialism, the influence of the French ‘Islam Noir’ school became perceptible in Portuguese approaches. The leading researchers of Islam in Mozambique, such as Fernando Amaro Monteiro and Frederico José Peirone (see below), graduated from the French colleges. A. J. de Mello Machado forthrightly acknowledged in his book the indebtedness of the Portuguese ‘Islão Negro’ to the French.
Paul Marty and succeeding French colonial officers in West Africa of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries emphasized that Islam was in fact a ‘white’ Arab, often fanatical, ‘nomadic’ religion, while Islam in Africa was an ‘Islam Noir,’ ‘black’ and tolerant, which integrated African ‘traditions.’

Frequently, this particular local form of Islam appeared to be not really Islamic at all, but rather ‘heterodox’ and ‘syncretistic.’ The French colonial views and approaches to Islam and Muslims in West Africa, both theoretical and practical, were adopted by the Portuguese in the late 1950s and until the end of colonialism in Mozambique.

Like the French, the Portuguese thought that Islam was ‘brought’ and ‘imposed’ on Africans by groups of ‘Asian’ Muslims. Persians, Arab sharifs and Indians, all presumably coming from the regions where a ‘true’ ‘orthodox’ Islam was a standard, were credited with the Islamization of Mozambique. The Portuguese underlined that like the Catholics, these ‘Asians’ historically settled on the coast, from where they embarked upon ‘missionary’ activities among Africans by ‘proselytizing’ and ‘evangelizing’ them.

On the African side, Islam was accepted because of its ‘malleability’ which made it accessible to ‘African character’. The ‘malleability’ presumably resulted from ‘biological’ and ‘spiritual’ ‘mixings’ between Africans and Asians. Branquinho, for example, described the ‘mixings’ as of two kinds, and writes: “first there was a physical mixing, a harmonious one,” when Arabs, Indians and Persians by marrying African women had “founded a new improved and nobler race [than mere Africans].”

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661 Harrison, France and Islam, p. 103;
663 Peirone, A tribu ajaua, pp. 183-84, 195-95, and passim; Mello Machado, Entre Macuas, pp. 250-53; Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 415-27; Monteiro, O islão, o poder, pp. 120-124, 195-208; Harrison, France and Islam, p. 4;
there was a “higher spiritual mixing”, when the precepts of ‘orthodox’ Islam became ‘syncretized’ with African ‘traditions and customs.’

The reasons why ‘foreign Muslim missionaries’ succeeded was due to their “exploring psychological weaknesses of the Blacks,” who adopted Islam as means of social mobility and prestige rather than a faith. The resulting Islam was a “Mozambican Islam”, a local brand of a ‘Black Islam,’ which was not ‘real’, but, as in West Africa, it was “superficial”, “bastardized,” and “ignorant.”

Like the French, the Portuguese believed Africans to be incapable of comprehending intellectual or spiritual levels of the ‘true’ Islam, espousing instead only external, instrumental and entertainment features of Muslim culture. Lacking independent historical agency and incapable of generating their own conceptions, meanings and uses, Africans were perceived to be passive recipients of ‘foreign’ ideas. Islam, from French and Portuguese vantage point, was an alternative form of ‘civilization’ to the European one. Africans, viewed as childlike, ‘natural’ creatures in the lower levels of the evolutionary ladder, were easily disorientated by canny ‘foreign Muslim elements’, offering means of becoming ‘civilized’ through Islam rather than ‘Europeanization’.

The Portuguese became particularly alarmed when in 1937 they intercepted leaflets in Nakala depicting the Abyssinian defeat of the Italians at Adwa in 1896. The leaflets circulated in other regions of northern Mozambique too, but in the Nakala case they were brought from Mozambique Island by a certain Ali Tapit, a sharif. As the turuq dominated Mozambique Island at that time, it transpires that the leaflets were distributed through the tariqa networks. Pinto Correia points to the “de-nationalizing” and anti-European character of the leaflets, which were circulated by “exotic” and “foreign” elements, such as coastal sharifs, the descendants of Arabs, who “confused” native

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665 Branquinho, Ibid, Harrison, France and Islam, p. 103.


Africans and instrumentalized them in favor of Islam. Following the discovery of the flyers, some local Portuguese administrators endorsed the 1929 Legislative Diplomas No 167 and 168, requiring educational and cultural institutions to obtain licenses in order to function legally. As many mosques and madrassas did not have such licenses, they were closed, leading to violent clashes between Muslims and local Portuguese administrative officials.

Pinto Correia found these kinds of suppressive measures to be futile, while another Portuguese Administrative Inspector, Manuel Metello pointed out that “the closing of the mosques only served to fanaticize natives.” In order to “nationalize” (or “Portugalize”) African Muslims, according to colonial representatives, they should maintain a ‘pristine purity’ of ‘Black Islam,’ integrated into the indigenato, and be ‘liberated’ from the harmful influences of ‘foreign’ brands of Islam.

In reality, Africans were by no means passive or lacking agency, and as seen earlier, most northern Mozambicans adopted Islam on their own from the eighth century onwards, and especially during the international slave trade era of the nineteenth century. Similarly, Africans have been actively and continually engaged in internal, regional and global debates over the nature of Islamic authority and ‘orthodoxy’ throughout Mozambican history.

Policies of “Portugalization” through Catholic Schooling

The Estado Novo, driven by intense Portuguese nationalism, put forward an agenda of ‘nationalizing’ (nacionalização) and ‘Portugalizing’ (portugalização) African colonial subjects and transforming them gradually into Portuguese citizens, the speakers of the

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669 Pinto Correia, Ibid.


Portuguese language and adherents to Portuguese culture.\textsuperscript{672} The Estado Novo saw the Catholic faith as a crucial marker of Portuguese national identity, and between the 1930s and 1950s, it conceived of the Catholic Church as an adequate tool for ‘Portugalizing’ colonial subjects through mission schooling.\textsuperscript{673} Thus in 1930, the education of the Africans was passed to Catholic missions, expected to “conduct gradually the indigenous people from the state of savagery to the state of the civilized, and form in them the consciousness of Portuguese citizens”.\textsuperscript{674} In 1940, the Estado Novo deepened its commitment to the Catholic Church by signing a Concordata agreement with the Vatican, promoting the Catholic Church in the colonies, followed by the endorsement of the 1941 Estatuto Missionário (Missionary Statutes).\textsuperscript{675} It was declared that education was to be based on Christian values with obligatory teaching of the precepts of Catholicism in schools. As a result of these policies, in 1958, according to colonial reports, there were 2,239 rudimentary schools for Africans run by Catholic missions in Mozambique, which had a total of 2,389 teachers and auxiliary staff, and 299,782 pupils.\textsuperscript{676} 82,109 of these students were studying in schools run by the Nampula and


\textsuperscript{676} “Relatório de Aplicação do Estatuto de Indígenas Portugueses,” Governo-Geral, Província de Moçambique, 1958, pp. 17-20, AHM, FGG, Cx. 2125.
Cabo Delgado (Porto Amélia) Dioceses. However, despite the alliance between the colonial state and Catholic Church, the evangelization of natives was less a goal in itself than a means for “Portugalizing” under a program of revived nationalism.\(^\text{677}\)

The belief that Islam of northern Mozambican Africans was superficial made the Portuguese assume that the advancement of the Catholic missions would lead them to a ‘natural’ and steady disenchantment with Islam. For example, Hortênsio Estêvão de Sousa pointed out in 1948 with respect to the Nakala region that Islam had a stronghold there because of the absence of Christian action, as the only Catholic Mission and the only rudimentary school for Africans could not meet either African aspirations for “civilization and education,” or tackle the influences of Islam effectively.\(^\text{678}\) Like Pinto Correia before him, he suggested increasing the number of Catholic missions and schools in the region. Another Portuguese Administrative Inspector, Manuel Metello in his 1952 report recommended expanding Catholic mission schools as well, arguing that ‘natives’ “wanted to learn” but often had no other alternatives available than the Qur’anic schools.\(^\text{679}\)

Catholic missions, however, were not able to overpower Islam.\(^\text{680}\) Muslim children attending mission schools continued to go to madrassas. Shaykh Yussuf bin Hajji Adam underscored during a fieldwork interview that many northern Mozambican Muslims were reticent about sending their children to Catholic schools because children were baptized without parents’ knowledge, and were obliged to learn the basics of the Christian faith.\(^\text{681}\) Muslims in general and Muslim children in particular, were also frequently given Christian names registered in official identification documents, though

\(^{677}\) Cahen, “L’État nouveaux”, I, pp. 312, 349.


\(^{681}\) Interview with Shaykh Yussuf bin Hajji Adam, April 16, 1996, Maputo. See also, Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 215.
they already had Muslim names.\textsuperscript{682} During his 1936-37 inspection, Pinto Correia was particularly appalled by the overwhelming Muslim names of the régulos and of the students at a rudimentary school at Mozambique Island, and suggested changing at least the names of the students into Christian, i.e., Portuguese ones.\textsuperscript{683}

Despite the spread of mission schools, between the 1930s and 1950s, the conversion to Islam in northern Mozambique increased considerably.\textsuperscript{684} Pinto Correia noted that “those who could not read or write in Swahili were rare” and that this fact resulted from the pervasive presence of the Qur’anic schools, functioning “in simple huts,” which symbolized “their accessibility [to Africans] and to which Portuguese efforts [to launch mission schools] could not match up to date.”\textsuperscript{685} Manuel Metello highlighted that by 1952, Islam had expanded even into the Makonde region of Chai in Cabo Delgado.\textsuperscript{686}

In the late 1950s, the colonial government realized that the Catholic Church was not able to effect either the “Portugalization” or significantly expand European education to Africans.\textsuperscript{687} As Michel Cahen points out, this led the Portuguese to take up measures of “desperate Portugalization” in the 1960s, when all the religious denominations were authorized to operate, and thus a religious diversification was promoted, as long as it contributed to “Portugalizing” of African colonial subjects.\textsuperscript{688}

\textsuperscript{682} Vakil, “Questões Inacabadas,” pp. 268-69.

\textsuperscript{683} Pinto Correia, “Relatório duma Inspecção às Circunscrições do Distrito de Moçambique (1936-1937),” Vol. 1, pp. 36, 38, AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76.


\textsuperscript{685} Pinto Correia, “Relatório duma Inspecção,” Vol. 1, pp. 33, 36, and Vol. 2, pp. 80, 103-104, 173, AHM, ISANI, Cx. 76.


\textsuperscript{687} Mondlane, “Lutar por Moçambique,” pp. 65-69.

\textsuperscript{688} Cahen, “L’État Nouveau”, II.
The Heyday of *Luso-Tropicalism*

After the Second World War, the international context became more hostile to colonialism, especially with the creation of the UN and emergence of the liberation movements. The Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya and coming to power of the Nasserists in Egypt, both in 1952, had a strong bearing on the colonial politics of Portugal. But, while France and Britain gradually came to adopt a decolonizing stance, Portugal insisted on defending the alleged civilizing ‘virtues’ of her colonial project.

Following the 1955 Bandung Conference, the Portuguese political elite steadily appropriated *lusotropicalism*, the theory of a Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987), and turned it into a discourse of integration of the colonies and the *metropole* in a unified Portuguese state. In 1951 and 1952, Freyre visited all the Portuguese colonies, except for East Timor on the invitation of the Portuguese authorities. Following these trips he wrote two books, *Aventura e Rotina* and *Um Brasileiro em Terras Portuguesas*, in which for the first time Freyre used the term *lusotropicalism*, emphasizing a distinctive nature of the Portuguese colonialism compared to the British or Dutch. According to Freyre, as opposed to these, the Portuguese were exceptionally tolerant of diverse cultures and races with whom they miscegenated and lived in harmony without having any racial prejudice. The main reason for that, Freyre believed, was that the Portuguese themselves were of mixed-raced genetic background, including Jewish and Arab ancestry along with the European one. As a result of Portuguese colonialism, a world of essential cultural values and psycho-social dispositions was created in a *lusotropical* civilization, which was bound to exist continually even after the political system itself disintegrated. In this civilization, a shared culture superseded an “ethnic condition”.

Adriano Moreira, an academic and the Minister of Portuguese Overseas in 1961-62, introduced *lusotropicalism* into the curriculum of the *Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarinas* (Higher Institute of Social Sciences and Overseas

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Politics), of which he was the Director from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{691} The studies produced by the researchers of the Instituto, such as José Julio Gonçalves\textsuperscript{692} and Frederico José Peirone\textsuperscript{693}, developed the concept of ‘Black Islam’ further through ethnographic fieldwork.\textsuperscript{694} They were, however, mostly preoccupied with Islamic geopolitics and the influences of ‘non-African’ brands of Islam in Portuguese African colonies. For example, in his 1960 study, a Catholic missionary Albano Mendes Pedro discovered that many Mozambican Muslims were seeking education in East Africa and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{695} He also noticed the circulation of a broad range of Islamic publications from Cairo and Bombay and a widespread interest in acquiring literacy in Arabic. Radio Cairo was broadcast to Mozambique and Arabic and Islamic phonograph records from Egypt were disseminated. Like other studies produced by the Catholic missionaries attached to Moreira’s Instituto, Pedro’s work reveals a strong concern with the influences of ‘foreign’ Muslims, threatening to indoctrinate pan-Islamism and to promote “de-Eupeanizing Islamicization” among Africans. The principal objective of the studies was to find ways of ‘neutralizing’ these trends.

Moreira stressed that \textit{luso-tropicalism} be adopted as an official Portuguese ideology with respect to the colonies. As a result of these political innovations and international pressure, Moreira in his capacity as the Overseas Minister spearheaded the 1961 Overseas Administrative Reform (\textit{Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina}), which abolished the status of \textit{Indígena} and conceded equal legal rights to all citizens to become Portuguese nationals independently of their race, culture or creed.\textsuperscript{696} This did not alter access to political rights, however, because their right to vote was subject to the acquisition of Identity Cards. The ID card could only be given to those who could read

\begin{itemize}
\item Gonçalves, \textit{O Mundo Árabe-islâmico e o Ultramar português.”}
\item Peirone, \textit{A tribu ajaua}.
\end{itemize}
and write in Portuguese and have reasonable means for subsistence or formally employed, which was not the case with the majority of Africans. 697

Following the 1961 Reform, as AbdoolKarim Vakil argues, the challenge for the Portuguese was to recognize Islam, in particular in Africa, as a religion and Muslims as culturally Portuguese. 698 While grappling with these issues, the Portuguese were forced to realize that the growing independence movements in northern Mozambique involved, besides the Makonde of the Mueda plateau, significant proportions of the predominately Muslim regions. This understanding became a turning point in Portuguese colonial politics of Islam between 1965 and 1974.

**Portuguese Politics of Islam in 1960-1974**

In response to the growing independence movements, the Portuguese state created in 1961 a branch of the Secret Services called the Services for Centralization and Coordination of Information (SCCI). 699 Its objective was to centralize, coordinate, study, interpret and distribute knowledge and information about politics, administration and defense of the Portuguese overseas territories. 700 The SCCI concentrated on global socio-political analysis of the colonial situations through studies produced by specific sectors on the ground, such as military field officers, local administrators, PIDE (Secret Police – ‘International Police for the Defense of the State,’ created in 1954) and DGS (General Directorate for Security). The DGS and PIDE were united into DGS/PIDE in 1969.

The strategies elaborated by SCCI for Mozambique (SCCIM) as a response to participation of Africans in general and northern Mozambican Muslims in particular in the liberation movements had four aspects: 701

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700 Monteiro, *O islão, o poder e a guerra*, p. 279.

701 Monteiro, *O islão, o poder e a guerra*, pp. 275-76, 278.
1. The Social aspect, which concentrated on improving the general conditions of life of Africans in general and Muslims in particular.

2. The Politico-administrative aspect, focusing on reformulating administrative policies in response to African participation in liberation movements.

3. The Military aspect, which centered on combating the liberation movements on the ground.

4. The Psychological aspect, which was the most important with regard to Muslims of northern Mozambique, had four phases:
   - First phase, *fase de detecção* (detection phase), aimed at detecting and becoming aware of Islam and Muslims in Mozambique;
   - Second phase, *fase de captação* (captivating phase), aspired at ‘captivating’ Muslims by showing public respect and protection of Islam and Muslims;
   - Third phase, *fase de comprometimento* (compromising phase), sought to compromise Muslims as collaborators of the colonial regime;
   - Fourth phase, *fase de accionamento* (action phase), intended to make Muslims to take action against the liberation movements.

In 1965-1967 the Portuguese through the Secret Police (PIDE) focused on identifying and arresting Africans in northern Mozambique involved in the liberation movements, the events which will be discussed in the next Chapter. They found out that the independence ideology and mobilization for Frelimo among Muslims was undertaken by the Muslim leadership, encompassing both African ‘traditional authority’ and Islamic leadership the same time. At the same period, the SCCIM started the first phase of psychological action concentrating on collecting data on Islam in general and Muslim leaders in particular. The collection was done through field research and intended also to obtain detailed information on Islamic networks and means of communication between various Muslim regions, poles of religious authorities, and on their susceptibility to the ideology of independence.\(^702\) The surveys were carried out by local administrators and

\(^{702}\) SCCIM, IAN-TT, Lisbon, “Respostas ao Questionário Estado de Situação,” H/9, “Islamismo,” including - “Governador de Distrito Cabo Delgado ao Chefe de Repartição de Gabinete, Ofício No 359/SI,
their adjuncts under the supervision of the SCCIM officials, in particular José Alberto Gomes de Melo Branquinho. Simultaneously, the SCCIM distributed a report called *Conquista de Adesão das Populações* (Winning the Adherence of the Populations), which, as Alpers points out, “reflected a kind of psycho-sociological prescription for winning the hearts and minds of various sectors of the Mozambican population against the onslaught of revolutionary African nationalism represented by Frelimo.”

Another important SCCIM official with regard to Islamic issues was Fernando Amaro Monteiro, a graduate in the field of Islamic Africa from the French University of Aix-en-Provence, and who was also a researcher at the Lourenço Marques University (now Eduardo Mondlane University). He collaborated extensively in SCCIM projects and research on Islam in Mozambique and became in 1972 the President of the SCCIM’s *Grupo de Trabalho sobre Assuntos Islâmicos* (Group Working on Islamic Affairs).

Branquinho and especially Monteiro were responsible for delineating most Portuguese policies relating to Islam between 1967 and 1974. One of the main objectives of these policies was to “Portugalize” Islam in Mozambique. As in the 1930s and 1950s, the term “Portugalizing” meant “nationalizing”, this time however, without attempting to eliminate Islam or replace it with Christianity. But it still meant isolating local ‘Black’ Islam from “de-nationalizing” influences of the ‘foreign brands’ coming from East Africa, India, South Africa and the Arabic world. It also meant extending state control

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over Islam by creating a centralized and state-sponsored Islamic organization, a local centre of religious authority, independent and autonomous of the centers of Islam abroad.

SCCIM surveys established that the overwhelming majority, if not all, of African Muslims in three northern Mozambican Districts, Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Mozambique (now Provinces of Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado), adhered to Sufi Orders connected to East Africa and the Comoros. Furthermore, SCCIM focused on whether these Muslims were attached to or under control of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Though the Portuguese discovered that the Sultanate’s Ibadhism had nothing to do with the Sunni-Shafi’i orientation of northern Mozambique, they were surprised to find out that until 1963, the most important Muslim leaders of northern Mozambique were installed in their posts only after receiving a formal investiture confirmation from the Sultan. This was despite the fact that SCCIM surveys took place in 1965-1968, therefore after the deposition of Sultan and the abolition of the Sultanate in 1964. According to Monteiro and Branquinho, even Sayyid Ba Hasan often portrayed himself as the representative of the Sultan. Among interviewed, at least 176 declared that the Sultan was still their Imam. These Muslim leaders probably were not willing to consider living spiritually under the dominance of a non-Muslim entity, such as the Portuguese state. Their responses also demonstrate how tenuous the Portuguese “Catholicization” project of the 1930-1950s among Muslims was. The SCCIM, however, did not pay adequate attention to the links between northern Mozambican Muslim leaders and individual shaykhs in East Africa and other regions, which is probably the most important feature of the tariqa-based Islam, and which certainly influenced the political dispositions of the Sufi-oriented Muslims.

As the extinguished Sultanate did not seem to pose any threat, SCCIM concentrated on the possibility of a ‘central command’ of the turuq in Mozambique, from which a nation-wide Islamic centre of authority could be extrapolated. But it turned out

705 Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 341-405; Monteiro, O Islão, o poder e a guerra, pp. 96-97, 249, 295.


707 Branquinho, “Relatório,” Ibid; Monteiro, O Islão, o poder e a guerra, p. 91.

each tariqa led a quasi-autonomous existence and their respective Khalifas were not willing to obey someone from other tariqa. Many Muslims regarded Sayyid Ba Hasan, Sayyid Bakr, and Sayyid Momade Sayyid Mujabo, of Mozambique Island as enjoying a religious authority similar to a position of a mufti; but many others, even within their own turuq, refused to recognize them as muftis.

After failing to find ways of uniting the turuq into a single organization and falling short of identifying a Mozambican mufti, Monteiro attempted to create a centralized Islamic organization from scratch, which he initially called an ijma but renamed later to Concelho de Notaveis (the Council of the Notables). Despite Monteiro’s massive efforts to launch the Conselho, it did not materialize because the second phase of the psychological action, fase de captação took too much time to implement and ended in 1972 when the war between the Portuguese and Frelimo guerrillas became very intense. Military priorities took the upper hand.

Other ways of “Portugalizing” Islam included implementing the use of the Portuguese language as language of Islam. This meant translating the key Islamic texts into Portuguese and encouraging Qur’anic education and religious services in the Portuguese language. Monteiro led these policies, too. With his direct involvement, in 1968 the Portuguese obtained approval of 21 major Sunni Muslim dignitaries of Mozambique for the publication of the Hadith by al-Bukhari translated into

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710 Sayyid Mujabo was affiliated with the Qadiriyya Bagdad through his family ties to Abdurrazaq Jamú.
713 Monteiro, O Islao, o poder e a Guerra, p. 295.
Between 1969 and 1973, Monteiro was leading the Administration in the direction of sponsoring Qur’anic education in the Portuguese language, as suggested earlier by Branquinho. But the ineffective policies of succeeding Portuguese Governors and the fight that the Nampula Catholic Diocese put up against this project proved to be stronger than Monteiro’s will. The Nampula Diocese lived in an environment of continuous hostilities with Muslims, who not only refused to attend mission schools, but on one occasion, even burned down such a school in Mossuril. The Diocese pointed out that it would not let Islam gain more ground in Mozambique District with the officialization of Qur’anic schools, and the Provincial government decided to halt the project out of fear of aggravating the enmity between the Diocese and Muslims further.

The second phase of the SCCIM psychological action in response to the liberation movements, the *captação* phase took place between 1968 and 1972. It focused on actions aimed at demonstrating that the Portuguese knew and respected Islam and its leaders, and was willing to preserve and protect Islamic culture. This phase involved social and politico-administrative dimensions of the Portuguese counter-independence policies directed at improving living conditions of the African population by building water-pumps, sanitation, roads, and other modern infrastructures, including stone-housed *bairros* (neighborhoods) in some Muslim regions, such as Inguri in Angoche city. The improvement of the conditions in the colonies was also a result of the economic and political decentralization policies, implemented by Portugal in 1971, which effectively

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ended the *Estado Novo* politics of integration between the colonies and *metropole* and permitted to channel local colonial funds into social programs.\(^720\)

In 1968, when Balthazar Rebelo de Sousa became the Governor of Mozambique, a truly Islamic policy was being implemented, among which was the projection of the colonial power as the protector of Islam, expressed through the presence of the higher Portuguese officials in the important festivities of Muslim calendar, in particular, during Ramadan.\(^721\) There were media publications and radio and written addresses of the Portuguese officials underlining positive attitudes of the colonial regime towards Islam and Muslims.\(^722\) The Portuguese also undertook building, restoring and ceremonial public inauguration of the mosques, such as of the important historical Gulamo mosque at Mossuril, and building a mosque at the Catamoio Island of Ancoche by Portuguese general Kaulza de Arriaga.\(^723\) The colonial government began sponsoring *hajj* from 1970, with obligatory stopover in Lisbon *en route* to Mecca and back, where Muslims were wooed by the Portuguese authorities.\(^724\)

The second phase of the SCCIM psychological action was the most consequential one, not only because of the relatively careful Portuguese implementation but also because of the internal skirmishes in Frelimo, involving ethnic and regional contradictions, in particular between northern and southern Mozambicans. Clashes and purges within the Mozambican liberation movements in Tanzania that ensued in 1966-1969, terminating with Mondlane’s assassination and subsequent adoption of Marxist secularist ideology by Frelimo, might have disaffected some Muslims.\(^725\)


\(^{725}\) Monteiro, *O islão, o poder, e a guerra*, pp. 298, 304.
The factors such as the 1965-67 PIDE purges, followed by the colonial actions to improve African living standards, Portuguese public support to Islam, and the threat of the emerging Wahhabis, might have contributed to a partial accommodation of some of the northern Mozambican Muslim leaders, such as Sayyid Bakr to the Portuguese colonial rule. In particular, Monteiro, who claims to have corresponded with Sayyid Bakr until his death in 1989, cites one of the letters in which Sayyid Bakr alluded to his deep-seated discontent with the Frelimo anti-religious policies and sympathy towards the Portuguese.

The third and fourth phases of the SCCIM psychological action, called *fase de comprometimento* (the compromising phase) and *fase de accionamento* (the action phase), aimed at involving Muslims in acts against the liberation movements, such as creating Muslim militia and Muslim military units within the colonial army, did not

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726 Monteiro, *O Islao, o poder e a guerra*, pp. 303-304.

materialize. In part this was due to the unwillingness of Muslims and in part, to the growing impatience of the Portuguese with the advancing liberation movements and political instability in the metropole. The ever-lowering morale of the colonial army terminated in a military coup of April 25, 1974 in Lisbon, signaling the precipitating end of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. The review of the Portuguese Constitution in 1971 and introduction of the new Overseas Law (A Lei Orgânica do Ultramar), which attributed honorific designation of “states” to Angola and Mozambique in 1972, could not halt this process.

Portuguese, Indians and Africans

From the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1930s, the immigration of Indians to northern Mozambique increased, coming primarily from British East Africa, particularly Zanzibar. In 1948, one year after the independence of India and its partition into states of India and Pakistan, the Portuguese still characterized Indians in Mozambique as divided into Indo-British and Indo-Portuguese citizens. To give an idea on the presence of Indians in northern Mozambique, in 1948 in Mossuril there were a total of 60 (31 male and 29 female) Indo-Portuguese and 111 Indo-British citizens (51 male and 60 female), out of the total of 677 non-indigenous population, including Europeans. Indo-British were those who opted for British citizenship after Indian independence, but mostly those with roots in British East Africa. In southern and central Mozambique, some Indians were immigrants from Natal in South Africa.

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728 Monteiro, O Islão, o poder e a guerra, pp. 306-309; 297; Monteiro, “As comunidades islâmicas de Moçambique,” p. 84.

729 Monteiro, O Islão, o poder e a Guerra, p. 304.

730 Neves de Souto “A Administração Colonial,” pp. 188-209.


733 Leite, “Diáspora Indiana em Moçambique.”
Portuguese citizens originated from Goa (mostly Catholic), Diu (mostly Hindu) and Daman (mostly Muslim) in Gujarat, India. Muslim Indians were divided into Sunni Hanafis and Shi’a Isma’ili, with Isma’ili living in major numbers in northern Mozambique than in the south. When in 1961 Portugal surrendered Daman, Diu and Goa to India, the Indo-Portuguese group in Mozambique became Portuguese citizens, but the Indo-British group, basically comprised of the Isma’ili, remained British citizens till the end of the colonial era. In 1973, the Aga Khan instructed them to sell properties and businesses and leave for the UK, Venezuela and Portugal, because the end of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique was imminent.734 The Isma’ili abandoned Mozambique en masse shortly before 1974.

In comparison to the earlier generation of the Gujarati immigrants from Daman, who intermarried with Africans, the more recent Indian Muslims did not mix with Africans. In 1970-1972, despite SCCIM’s repeated and insistent efforts, Sunni Indians at Mozambique Island organized into an association called Associação Sunita Maometana da Ilha de Moçambique refused to accept Africans as members of this association.735 Nevertheless, mostly Sufi-oriented Sunni Indians sponsored ziyara and other public rituals of the African turuq and provided financial support for their mosques and madrasas.736 During fieldwork, many Sufi shaykhs as well as other Muslims underlined that the Indian Sunni community still today paid bills of some tariqa mosques and madrasas and sponsored the annual ziyara processions in Maputo and Nampula cities. In Angoche, the Indian community did not seem to have held any palpable influence over African Muslims, and in Mozambique Island they seem to have sponsored marginal

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736 Interviews with Shaykh Yussuf bin Hajji Adam, Maputo, April 16, 1996; Shaykh Abdul Razaq Rijab Pacheco, Maputo, June 18, 1997; Ali Abudo Amade, Maputo, June 17, 1997; Shaykh Faqih Shamakhani, November 2, 1999, Mozambique Island; Collective interview with members of the Islamic Council, Nampula City, June 11, 2000; Abdul Halim Mohamed, member of the Comunidade Moametana of Maputo, July 16, 1999; Zawria Musa Chitara, the teacher of the Comunidade Moametana school in Maputo, July 9, 1999.
practices, such as Tufo and Mawlid Naquira (the Rifa’i dhikr), rather than those related to the turuq. Documents of the archives of the Department for Religious Affair (DAR) of the Ministry of Justice in Maputo reveal that even nowadays the Indian Comunidade Moametana annually requests permission from the government for the ziyara processions in Maputo City.

Suni Indians had better relationship with the “Moors” than Africans until the 1950s, though the caste and ethnic propensity of Indians would not allow them to consider mixed-race “Moors” as equals to ‘real’ Indians. In Lourenço Marques, Indian Sunnis financially supported Anuaril Isslamo madrassa built by a “Moor” Ahmad Dulla in 1906, which was transformed into an association in 1925. They also sponsored the Afro-Moametan Association of Lourenço Marques founded in 1934, dominated by “Moors” as well. Indians themselves began organizing into specific associations of the Comunidades Moametanas or Muçulmanas from the mid-1930s. For example, the Comunidade Mahometana Indiana de Lourenço Marques was founded in 1934. It was composed mostly by Pakistanis after 1947.

In 1944, two years after Ahmad Dulla became associated with South African Indians, the Comunidade Mahometana stopped sponsoring the Anuaril Isslamo association. Although the Portuguese sources do not specify what kind of South African Indians these were, it is probable that among them was Molwi Ibrahim Miá. In general it seems that the relationship between the Sunni Indians and the “Moors” soured when the “Moors” fell first under Deobandi and later Wahhabi influence. In 1951, the year when Muhammad Cassimo Mahomed Tayob, another Anuaril Isslamo’s “Moor,”

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738 Estatutos da Associação Afro-Moametana de Lourenço Marques, aprovada pela Portaria No 2: 315 de 29 de Agosto de 1934, in AHM, FGG, Cx. 2, Direcção dos Negócios Indígenas.

739 Os Estatutos da Comunidade Mahometana Indiana de Lourenço Marques, aprovados pela Portaria de 16 de Janeiro de 1935, in the archives of DAR, Maputo.

returned from *Dar ul-Ulum* Seminary in Deoband after completing his studies, marked the definite end of collaboration between the two groups. From that time on, Anuaril Isslamo became a centre of nascent Islamism in Mozambique. However, its mosque and madrassa remained formally properties of the *Comunidade Mahometana.*

Despite their racial prejudice towards Africans and “Moors,” Indians themselves suffered from abject discrimination by Europeans. In addition to the long-standing xenophobic Portuguese attitudes of racial and cultural stigmatization, some Indians often felt handicapped by being British citizens amidst militant Portuguese nationalism. The economic positions of Indian traders in rural areas were continuously assaulted by the increasing settlements of the white colonists, subsidized by the Portuguese state. It is not surprising then that on the brink on the expansion of African independence movements into northern Mozambique, the Portuguese noted that some Indians hated the whites and intended to support any movement aiming at their expulsion from Africa.

**Portuguese Choice between ‘Black Islam’ and the Wahhabis**

As mentioned earlier, Cassimo Tayob already started the Islamist trend in Mozambique in 1951. According to the 1966 SCCIM survey in southern Mozambique, Cassimo Tayob

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741 Administração do Concelho de Lourenço Marques, “Respostas ao questionário a que se refere a nota No 164 de 24/2/66 do extinto Gabinete de Zona de Serviço de Acção Psicossocial de Lourenço Marques,” in SCCIM, IAN-TT, Lisbon, Cx. 63, No 413, Pt. 1, pp. 352-59.


was considered the highest Islamic authority of the region.\textsuperscript{747} He had among his strong supporters, Abdul Gafur Muhammad Yussufo, who studied at Deoband too.\textsuperscript{748}

Hassan Assaraje Vital and Sayyid Yussuf Hussein of the Comorian Association, were two other followers of Cassimo Tayob and responsible for transforming the Shadhuliyya Ittifaq mosque (the Baraza mosque) in Lourenço Marques into a Wahhabi-oriented one.\textsuperscript{749} The two Comorians were French citizens.

As discussed earlier, the Wahhabi group as such began emerging in 1960, when Momad Yussuf, a grandson of the prominent Qadiriyya Sadat khalifa at Mozambique Island, Haji Ahmad Haji Yussufo, returned from his studies in Mecca.\textsuperscript{750} He then taught at the madrasa and was imam of the Afro-Mahometan Association in Lourenço Marques, but had soon to leave because of differences with its members. In 1964, he associated himself with another recent Saudi graduate, Abubacar Musa Ismael ‘Mangira’, who completed a course at the Shari’a Department of the Medina University.\textsuperscript{751} ‘Mangira’ became an organizing and motivating force for the Deobandi and Saudi graduates, which included besides those mentioned above, Aminuddin Muhammad, still a student at Dar ul-Ulum, who later graduated from a Saudi Arabian Islamic university too. Ossman Mussa and Said Amir, both from Masjid Nur mosque in Xipamanine, Silex, in Lourenço Marques, were other two active followers of the Wahhabi trend.

Despite their diverse ethnic and regional origins, the Wahhabis were mostly residents in Lourenço Marques. Besides two Comorians, the group consisted of urban-based “Moors,” centered at the Anuaril Islamo association, which was financially

\textsuperscript{747} “Administração do Concelho de Lourenço Marques, Resposta ao questionário a que se refere a nota No 164 de 24/2/1966 do extinto Gabinete de Zona do Serviço de Acção Psicossocial de Lourenço Marques”, in SCCIM, IAN-TT, Lisbon, Cx. 63, No 413, Pt. 1, pp. 352-59.

\textsuperscript{748} “Administração do Concelho de Lourenço Marques,” pp. 308-16.

\textsuperscript{749} “Administração do Concelho de Lourenço Marques,” pp. 328-34.


supported by a South African Indian, Molwi Ibrahim Miá and his commercial agent in Lourenço Marques, Ahmed Miá of the “Bazar Mayet.”

As elsewhere, the Wahhabis in Mozambique amplified anti-Sufi ideology. The conflict between them and the northern Mozambican tariqa-based Muslim leadership soon escalated into direct confrontations, especially because Shaykh Abubacar Mangira was quite an outspoken and provocative person. Following the visit of Sayyid Mujabo and Sayyid Bakr to the Anuaril Islamo mosque, Sufi Muslims complained to the Portuguese provincial government about Abubacar ‘Mangira’ on December 10, 1971. He had ridiculed the two eminent Sufi shaykhs in front of 800-strong congregation, calling them ‘ignorants’ and proponents of the bid’a. ‘Mangira’ then read a fatwa of a Pakistani mufti, stating that mawlid did not exist in Islam, and that the pilgrimage to the Muslim tomb in Sofala, organized by the Indian Associação Muçulmana da Beira had no value and was only for misleading the Portuguese government. The appalled Sufis could not believe that the fatwa was real, but in April 20, 1972, the DGS after examining it, concluded that it was a true fatwa, issued by the mufti of Pakistan in Karachi, Mahd Shafi.

The Wahhabis also contributed to the intensification of violence around the old sukuti/tiqiri disputes over Islamic funeral rites. Finally, in August 15, 1971, Sayyid Bakr declared to the Portuguese that he was fed up with the emotional climate in which Muslims were living due to the controversies surrounding bid’a. He threatened to take action against the Wahhabis, or otherwise orchestrate a simultaneous violent uprising in three Districts of northern Mozambique. The Portuguese took him very seriously, and forced to face a choice between Sufis, consisting mostly of northern Mozambican African


leadership and the southern “Moor” Wahhabis, they chose to support Sufis. As the independence war was already underway in northern Mozambique, and because the SCCIM studies identified Sufi Orders and Sufi shuyukh as holding a significant geographical, numerical and religious power authority in northern Mozambique, they saw this as the best choice possible.\textsuperscript{756} The Portuguese were determined to co-opt northern Mozambican Sufi leadership politically and gain its alliance against the liberation movements. Like the French colonialists of West Africa, they considered Wahhabis as upholding a globalist and universalist view of Islam with deep-rooted pan-Islamic solidarity, and thus “difficult to compromise by European rule”.\textsuperscript{757}

‘Mangira,’ however, sought recognition and collaboration with the colonial state, claiming that he was better educated, more modern than ‘ignorant’ Sufi Muslims and therefore well-suited to be a nation-wide Islamic authority associated with Portuguese rule. He suggested the Portuguese to organize a ‘round-table’ with Sufi suyukh, in which once and for all it could be logically and manifestly proved who was wrong and who was right.\textsuperscript{758} As Monteiro points out, ‘Mangira’ “insinuated that the leaders of the turuq were incompetent”, and were not “prepared or capable of making just and correct decisions in the field of Islamic religion.”\textsuperscript{759} Knowing that the Portuguese were thinking of sponsoring Qur’anic education in Portuguese, ‘Mangira’ suggested opening a “new Islamic college for girls and boys in separate blocks,” where the Portuguese language and Islamic doctrine in Arabic would be taught.\textsuperscript{760} But to no avail. During the last years of colonialism the Portuguese showed public support to Sufis as opposed to the Islamists, such as Abubacar ‘Mangira’. Despite this seeming collaboration with the colonial rule, Muslim chiefs and Sufi shuyukh in northern Mozambique played important roles in the liberation movements and independence war.

\textsuperscript{756} Monteiro “Sobre a actuação,” pp. 89-94; Monteiro, O Islão, o poder, e a guerra, pp. 303-311.

\textsuperscript{757} Harrison, France and Islam, p. 117; Brenner, Controlling Knowledge, p. 164; Monteiro, “Sobre a actuação,” p. 89, 90.

\textsuperscript{758} Monteiro, “Sobre a actuação,” p. 93.

\textsuperscript{759} Monteiro, “Sobre a actuação,” pp. 93-95.

\textsuperscript{760} Monteiro, O Islão, o poder, e a guerra, p. 411.
Conclusion

During the twentieth century, Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique implemented diverse policies toward Islam and Muslims. These ranged from the initial hostilities of the ‘effective occupation’ period to a certain disregard of the 1920s, which allowed Islam to be incorporated into the indigenato system. However, throughout the twentieth-century policy changes, what remained constant was the Orientalist stance of the Portuguese towards Islam. Like other European powers, the Portuguese assumed Islam to be an ‘Oriental fact’, the essential ‘orthodox’ tenets of which remained unchanged since the time of revelation in medieval Arabia. African Islamic conceptions and practices were compared unfavorably to these tenets and led the Portuguese to view them as rather an aberration peculiar to the ‘Blacks’. In the later years of colonial rule, the Portuguese came to be inspired by the French school of ‘Islam Noir’ in West Africa. Like the French, the Portuguese upheld that Islam in Africa contrasted with the ‘orthodoxy’ of the Middle East and even India in that it ‘syncretized’ African ‘traditions and customs,’ and turned into a ‘Black Islam’ or ‘Islão Negro’. This approach influenced their views of Islam in northern Mozambique as part of the indigenato system rather than an organized faith similar to Christianity.

The second part of the Chapter dealt with the Portuguese policies toward Islam between 1930 and the late 1950s, when the nationalist Estado Novo came to power and adopted the idea of “Portugalizing” (portugalização) colonial subjects and consequently turning them into Portuguese citizens. They envisioned Africans adopting Portuguese culture and language. As the Catholic faith was perceived to be one of the basic features of Portuguese national identity, the colonial state made an agreement with the Catholic Church, which was expected to undertake “Portugalization” of Africans through mission schooling. The basic assumption with respect to northern Mozambican Muslims was that Islam there was not ‘true’ and serious, so that when Africans were given means for “civilizing” themselves through European education they would automatically opt for Catholicism rather than Islam. However, these policies did not have much success where Muslims were concerned, who often fiercely resisted the attempts to convert them forcefully into Christianity.
In the late 1950s until the end of the colonial era, Portuguese were under policies international pressures to change their policies and give way to decolonization, taking place elsewhere. The Portuguese were not ready, however, and persisted on the prospect of maintaining colonial rule. They outlined alleged ‘benign’ character of their colonialism as compared to French, British or Duct, the idea which found its ideological basis in Gilberto Freyre’s *lusotropicalism* theory. They consequently introduced apparently more democratic political changes by giving citizenship rights to Africans. At the same time, realizing that the project of “Portugalization” through Catholic education failed, they switched from converting Africans to Christianity to impeding the spread of “de-Europeanizing” and “de-nationalizing” effects of pan-Islamism and the influences of the ‘foreign brands’ of Islam in Africa. Especially Indians and East African Muslims were targeted with the purpose of curtailing the influence of their ‘foreign brands of Islam’ in Mozambique.

Though, in general, northern Mozambican Muslims continued supporting the idea of independence, in the last few years of the colonial presence, some religious leaders of the region openly accommodated Portuguese rule. The skirmishes within the liberation movements in the late 1960s, the adoption of Marxist secularism by Frelimo, the threat from Wahhabis, and the success of the Portuguese policies toward Islam at that time, seem to have influenced this partial accommodation.

The Chapter also outlined how the Portuguese dealt with the internal Muslim diversity in Mozambique. There were racial and cultural differences between Muslims, as besides local Africans and Comorian immigrants there were Sunni and Isma’ili Indians, and a mixed-race Indian-African historical group of the *Moors*. The relationships between these groups were not always cordial and Islam in Mozambique, from the racial and cultural standpoints, was in no way uniform or monolithic. The more recent Indian immigrants did not mix with both African Muslims and the *Moors*. While Indian Sunnis continued to sponsor Sufi rituals and religious institutions of Africans, their attitudes towards the *Moors* soured gradually when the latter group first adopted the Deobandi and later Wahhabi stand.

The Sufi-Wahhabi divide was the most consequential ideological cleavages among Muslims of Mozambique. It affected racial relationships between Muslims, as
well as influenced Portuguese colonial policies toward Islam. The Portuguese rule was confronted with a choice between southern, urban-based and Moor-dominated Wahhabism, which on the surface better suited modernist and control-driven Portuguese policies of Islam, and the more ‘traditional’ and ‘backward-looking’ ‘African Islam. In particular, when from the early 1960s up to the end of colonialism in 1974, the colonial administration faced the spread of the liberation movements in northern Mozambique, involving besides the Makonde of the Mueda plateau, large portions of Muslim-dominated region, the Portuguese realized that the majority of these Muslims were adherents of ‘Islão Negro’ and Sufism. This realization compelled the Portuguese state to display public support to Sufis in detriment to Wahhabis, and to introduce social policies aimed at co-opting Muslims in general, but especially African Muslims of northern Mozambique to their side. After violently suppressing those who took part in the liberation movements, Muslims in Mozambique for the first time in history were surveyed, intensively studied, and wooed by the Portuguese through various public means. Thus, seemingly friendly and informed policies of the last decade of the colonial era, especially with respect to African Muslims and Sufi Islam of northern Mozambique were primarily dictated by a necessity to counteract the advancing liberation movements and prevent or delay as far as possible the independence of Mozambique.
Chapter Six

Muslims and Liberation Movements

This Chapter focuses on the participation of northern Mozambican Muslims in the liberation movements, by addressing primarily the reasons for Muslim involvement in these movements. Why did Muslims support independence ideology, how and in what ways did they take part in the liberation movements? To what extent did their religious identity contribute to their anti-colonial stance? What was the meaning of African nationalism for Muslims of Mozambique? To what extent were the historical experiences of northern Mozambican Muslims, such as for example their resistance to the “effective occupation”, and their cultural understandings related both to African chiefship and Shirazi Swahili Islamic tradition, important for their adherence to the liberation process?

The other questions that this Chapter intends to address are related to the historical ties between northern Mozambican Muslims and East Africa. Whether or not the kinship, religious and cultural ties that northern Mozambican Muslims have had with East Africa influenced their integration in the African liberation movements? What was the influence of TANU and the developments in Tanganyika and Zanzibar on northern Mozambican Muslims political choices and attitudes? How Mozambican immigrant Muslim communities in these regions affected political attitudes of Muslims back home?

The Chapter also intends to concentrate on the responses of northern Mozambican Muslims to the changes within the Mozambique liberation movements, in particular MANU and later Frelimo. How did Muslims respond to MANU and Frelimo mobilization strategies and in which ways did they carry them out in northern Mozambique? How did internal conflicts within the liberation movements affect Muslims?

The Chapter will also outline the effect of the Portuguese policies, such as forced labor and administrative abuses, the harsh anti-Islamic stance of local administrators, the
1964-68 PIDE purges and the SCCIM policies of the last colonial decade, on Muslim political dispositions and on their integration and support of the liberation movements.

Besides PIDE and SCCIM records, this Chapter relies on the story of Shaykh Yussuf Arabi, who was arrested by PIDE in 1964 and gave an account of his dealings with political parties and independence movements in Tanganyika and Zanzibar during his depositions.\textsuperscript{761} He was a Makua-speaker born in 1925 in the Chai region of Macomia in Cabo Delgado. Between 1942 and 1946, he studied in Mocimboa da Praia with Shaykh Omari Macama, a former student of Shaykh Husayn b. Ramadhani (1880-1978).\textsuperscript{762} In 1947, Shaykh Yussuf Arabi left for Zanzibar to continue his education with Shaykh Ramadhani on the advice of Shaykh Omari. He spent a total of nine years in Zanzibar (1947-1956) pursuing religious training while simultaneously working as a tailor. On his return to Chai in 1957 he found the Portuguese administrators to be particularly hostile to Islam, persecuting \textit{mwali}mu and other Islamic leaders, forbidding mosque prayers, closing down \textit{Qur'anic} schools and burning “Muslim flags” (most likely the Qadiri banners).\textsuperscript{763} After the Portuguese destroyed his \textit{madrasa} and impeded the launch of other religious activities, Shaykh Yussuf felt threatened and decided to return to Zanzibar in February 1962 to guarantee his own and his family’s safety. During the following two years (1962-1964), Shaykh Yussuf was an active member of MANU and Frelimo, within which he rose to the position of leadership. He interacted with members of the Mozambican liberation movements in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar and witnessed firsthand their political activities and the changes within them. His testimony provides a unique insight into this period of Mozambican history, in particular with regard to the relationships between Muslims of northern Mozambique and the liberation movements.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações havidas em Porto Amélia, de 1 de Junho de 1964 à 7 de Junho de 1964, entre um dos adjuntos dos SCII e Yussuf Árabe” (78 pages), in SCCIM, Cx. 60, No 408, IAN-TT, Lisbon.
\item SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” p. 132. Shaykh Ramadhani was one of the renowned Qadiri \textit{khalifas} of African origin, born in Zanzibar by Zigua parents from mainland Tanganyika. He received his \textit{ijaza} from another Zanzibari \textit{Qadiri} of African origin, Shaykh Abdallah Mjankeri ‘Abd al- Khayr. Shaykh Abdallah Mjankeri was regarded as the successor of Shaykh ‘Uways, who spread the Qadiriyya into rural areas of Zanzibar and Pemba, attracting many Africans of slave and servile status. Shaykh Husayn Ramadhani had his own \textit{Qur'anic} school and a Qadiriyya centre in Zanzibar since 1910. See, Issa, “The Legacy of Qadiri Scholars in Zanzibar.”
\item SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” \textit{Ibid}.
\end{enumerate}
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Muslims and MANU (1958-1962)

As mentioned in the previous Chapter, northern Mozambican Muslims interacted with Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Nyasaland through kinship and religious ties. Many also lived, worked, studied or had relatives in these regions. Northern Mozambicans were already drawn into debates over uhuru (Sw., independence), the independence of Africa from European colonialism, by TAA (Tanganyika African Association) and, in particular by TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), formed in 1954 by Julius Nyerere.

John Iliffe points out that Muslim reaction to TANU in Tanganyika and Zanzibar were probably more positive than those of Christians. Iliffe holds that almost every kind of Muslim supported nationalism. He remarks that Muslim townsmen had been prominent in the TAA, Muslim activists like Kandoro and the Sykes brothers helped to create TANU, Muslim trader-politicians were at first among its most influential leaders, and TANU’s coastal origins and the Swahili language attracted some prestige among Muslims, and the use of Swahili gave its ideology many Islamic overtones to balance those which its western-educated leaders derived from Christianity. Sufi Orders also contributed greatly to the independence movement in Tanganyika. Their predominantly African membership, regional influence, and hierarchical structures enabled a determined khalifa, like Muhammad bin Ramiya of the Qadiriyya to throw his whole following behind TANU.

In the 1950s, significant numbers of northern Mozambican immigrants lived in Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Kenya and Nyasaland. Many went there to work in rural sisal plantations, but some were already second-generation immigrants established in urban areas. After the 1954 British Societies Ordinance on “social societies”, these immigrants created several Maconde Clubs and Macua and Maconde Clubs in Dar Es Salaam, Tanga, Zanzibar, Pemba, Mogororo and Mombassa, etc. The Mozambique Makonde Union

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765 Iliffe, A Modern History, Ibid.


(TMMU) in Dar es Salaam, founded in 1958, had close ties to TANU.\footnote{João M. Cabrita, Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy (Hampshire, and New York, Palgrave, 2000), p. 8.} Almost all of its founders had the membership card of TANU, called \textit{Cadi Chama Tanu}. According to Michel Cahen, the TMMU envisioned becoming an all-Mozambican political party similar to TANU, and in 1960, decided to change its name to MANU (Mozambique African National Union).\footnote{Cahen, The Mueda Case,” pp. 37-38.} Before they could be officially registered, TANU recognized Matheus Mmole, a 25–year-old Makonde from Tanganyika as president of MANU. The same year, \textit{Zanzibar Makondes and Makua Union} became affiliated with MANU, as Z-MANU. After the proclamation of Tanganyikan independence under the leadership of Julius Nyerere and TANU on December 9, 1961, MANU’s role as a political party seeking the independence of Mozambique intensified.

Besides having close ties and TANU membership cards, MANU also used TANU’s methods of popular mobilization. According to Nimtz, the TANU branch leaders spent ten days to two weeks each month in the rural areas, holding mass meetings with the purpose of getting people to join the party and to persuade them that self-determination was both desirable and possible.\footnote{Nimtz, Islam and Politics, p. 155.} MANU also imitated TANU’s structural organization, consisting of District Secretary, Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Treasurer.

As a result of MANU’s mobilization activities, between 1959 and 1961, the Portuguese detected persistent rumors among Muslims in Memba and Pebane regions of Mozambique about a “war against the Whites,” and that “Nyerere was planning to come to Mozambique.”\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 398.} In the case of Memba, in 1959 in Mazua and Lúrio regions, a number of Muslim \textit{shuyukh} from Tanganyika discussed in local mosques the possible end of Portuguese colonialism.\footnote{Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 398-99.} Régulo Saide of the Eráti region of Alua was involved in
the debates with the Memba régulos and shuyukh, who all had kinship and religious ties to Muslim régulos and shuyukh of Cabo Delgado.\textsuperscript{773}

In 1960, the Portuguese arrested shaykh Mussagy Bwana of Mazua, accusing him of reading ‘subversive news’ from Tanganyika in a mosque under the oath of secrecy taken on the Qur’an.\textsuperscript{774} Among the ‘news’ was a letter from Tanganyikan Muslims of the Maca region, stating that “God was angry with Whites for ruling in the land of Blacks, and for collecting taxes and forcing Blacks to work in cotton fields.” Mussagy Bwana was arrested and subsequently exiled by the Portuguese to São Tomé. He was a Qadiri shaykh. Branquinho’s survey reveals that the majority of Mazua Muslims were members of the Qadiriyya (Qadiriyya Sadat) under Sayyid Ba Hasan’s influence.\textsuperscript{775} The most important Qadiri khalīfa of the Memba region as a whole was Abdurrahman Warruma, a former student of Shaykh Abdul Magid’s, but the authority of Shaykh Abdul Magid’s son, Attuman Abdul Magid was enormous.

In 1961, PIDE arrested mwali\textsuperscript{m} Amade Ali\textsuperscript{o} in Macomia, Cabo Delgado and Bwana Abdallah in Ancoche for distributing anti-Portuguese pamphlets from Tanganyika along with selling protective hiriz against bullets and wild animals.\textsuperscript{776} The Yao Muslim chief Selemane Mataka and several others in Niassa District were put under PIDE surveillance in 1961, because they listened to Tanganyika and Nyasaland radio stations, and maintained regular correspondence with Muslims in those regions.\textsuperscript{777} Some years earlier, Mataka had lived in Tanganyika for three years and in Nyasaland for four years.

\textsuperscript{773} Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 147.


\textsuperscript{775} Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 351.


In the beginning of the 1960s, selling and seeking protective amulets, *hiriz*, in particular, against bullets, among northern Mozambican Africans increased considerably. As in previous times, the circulation of ‘anti-bullet’ *hiriz* was an indication that Muslims were preparing for warfare. In 1962-63, in the Ngunga region of the then Niassa District, the Quissanga and Macomia regions of the then Cabo Delgado District, and the Angoche region of the then Mozambique District, several *mwalimu* and Muslim *régulos*, often traveled to and received visitors from Tanganyika and Nyasaland, were apprehended acquiring and selling ‘anti-bullet’ *hiriz*. The money from *hiriz* sales reportedly went to Tanganyika for buying weapons. Some of the arrested also had anti-Portuguese pamphlets and other propaganda literature.

**Shaykh Yussuf Arabi and MANU**

Due to the persecution Shaykh Yussuf Arabi suffered at the hands of the local Portuguese administrator, he evidently left Mozambique an angry man and it seems that he intended to react to Portuguese repression. On his way to Zanzibar, he stopped in Lindi and contacted the MANU branch there. He told the MANU Secretary, Mateus Shauli, a Makonde from Mueda, about his ordeals in Mozambique. Shauli gave him a letter to the MANU headquarters in Dar es Salaam, where Shaykh Yussuf met Mathews Mmole and Lawrence Millinga Millinga. Millinga explained that MANU was working towards a general *uhuru* of Mozambique but its efforts were being eroded by popular perceptions that MANU was basically a Christian Makonde organization. Because Shaykh Yussuf was a prominent *shaykh* and a Muslim Makua who suffered Portuguese persecutions Millinga suggested telling his story in order to attract other Makua-speakers and Muslims

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to MANU. Shaykh Yussuf’s story was read to two African journalists in March, 1962, and broadcast by the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation radio.

Shaykh Yussuf then tried to acquire legal status in Tanganyika, but could not manage. On March 15, 1962, he went to TMA, where he was received by Shaykh Abbas Sykes. On his recommendation, Shaykh Yussuf and his family were taken into the home of Shaykh Ali Muwingi. TMA also gave him a considerable amount of money collected from local Muslim traders. At this instance, Shaykh Yussuf wrote to Shaykh Husayn Ramadhani expressing his desire to come to Zanzibar. With the help of TMA, he obtained a travel permit and local Muslims provided him with money again. He arrived in Zanzibar on April 18, 1962, where he met with his teacher, Shaykh Ramadhani and former colleagues. He also met his brother, Ibrahim Arabi and various Mozambican Makua immigrants living in the Makadara zone of Zanzibar. Among them were Mohammad Mbwana Kaka, Issa Cumpuni from the regedoria Malane of Chai, and his brother, Abubacr Narani from the regedoria Mataca of Macomia also in Chai, Bakar Abdallah and, Ibrahim Huntango. Mozambican Muslim immigrants in Zanzibar were politically active and were affiliated with MANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party, except for Ibrahim Huntango who was a Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) member. Shaykh Yussuf was also affiliated with the Afro-Shirazi Party, because, as he explained, it was “obligatory” for African Muslim immigrants, but he also did so to secure his position within Zanzibar Muslim society.

Some days later, Shaykh Yussuf met with the Regional Secretary of the Zanzibar MANU branch, Lucas Nchucha, a Makonde from Muatide, who introduced him to other MANU leaders and its Youth League. Mwewa Mfaume, the Zanzibar and Pemba Regional Chairman, convinced Shaykh Yussuf to formally join MANU. Lucas Nchucha gave details on political parties in Zanzibar, describing in particular MANU as a party of the northern Mozambicans and UDENAMO (União Democrática de Moçambique,

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Mozambique Democratic Union) as of “arrogant landins” (Port., Africans from southern Mozambique).  

Most historians believe that UDENAMO was founded in 1960 in Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia by Adelino Gwambe from Inhambane, who was close to Joshua Nkomo and National Democratic Party. However, Michel Cahen maintains that Gwambe created UDENAMO in Tanganyika in 1961 only after his participation with the Chairman of MANU, Mathews Mmole as MANU representatives at the Casablanca meeting of CONCP (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas, Conference of Portuguese Colonies Nationalist Organizations) in April 1961. According to Cahen, Gwambe used MANU credentials to boost his own political and UDENAMO’s stance. Judging from Shaykh Yussuf’s account, this hypothesis seems probable. Only after that, Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and Eduardo Mondlane also became UDENAMO members. But Barnabé Lucas Ncomo mentions that Uria Simango was a prominent member of UDENAMO since his time in Rhodesia and that Gwambe was introduced by Marcelino dos Santos, the Secretary-General of CONCP at the time.

Nchucha told Shaykh Yussuf that many Makua were changing from MANU to UDENAMO because of their misled understanding that MANU was a Makonde Christian party. In words similar to those of Millinga, Nchucha described how Shaykh Yussuf’s story of an important Muslim shaykh and a Makua-speaker harassed by the Portuguese could be useful for MANU’s objective of unifying people of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds (and not only the Makonde) for the uhuru of Mozambique. On May 6, 1962,

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783 SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” p. 138. Barnabé Lucas Ncomo mentions that relationships between MANU and UDENAMO were not good, because MANU had a very limited ethnic Maconde-orientation. Barnabé Lucas Ncomo, Uria Simango: Um Homem, Uma Causa (2nd ed, Maputo: Edições Novafrica, 2004), pp. 86-87.


786 Ncomo, Uria Simango, p. 85.
Shaykh Yussuf recounted his story at a meeting at the MANU Club, attended by more than a hundred Mozambicans.

In the late 1950s until 1961, when UDENAMO also came to the fore, popular mobilization for Mozambique’s independence was done mostly by MANU (former TMMU), linked to TANU. As Shaykh Yussuf’s story demonstrates, contrary to the widespread belief, as expressed by Ncomo and João M. Cabrita\(^787\), MANU wished to become a political party of all Mozambicans with a broad ethnic and social basis but not of the Makonde alone. MANU sought to use the influence of the relevant representatives of different ethnic and social groups in a mass mobilization campaign for a nationalist cause. The example of Shaykh Yussuf Arabi, a Makua-speaker and a khalifa of the Qadiriyya tariqa, illustrates this point.

**Muslims and Frelimo**

In 1962, when Shaykh Yussuf met MANU leaders, there were already two other Mozambican liberation movements present in Tanganyika. One was UDENAMO, which besides the Makua was also attracting many Makonde to its ranks because, as Nchucha explained to Shaykh Yussuf, this party favored an all out war against Portugal in Mozambique.\(^788\)

Some Makonde became discontented with their leaders because of the change of TMMU’s name into MANU sounding now like a nationalist party similar to TANU and KANU (Kenyan African National Union). These Makonde wanted to maintain an ethnic ‘club’ designation instead of a political party, which would enable it to negotiate with the Portuguese for their peaceful return to Mozambique. Despite being a Makonde himself, Nchucha opposed those who did not want the uhuru of Mozambique as a whole, but only of their “own particular homeland.” After the 1960 Mueda massacre,\(^789\) however, many


Makonde wanted to go to war, while the MANU leaders were still considering a peaceful transition to independence through negotiations with Portugal. Cahen believes that these factors along with the perception that Portuguese-speaking Gwambe was more “Mozambican” as compared to Anglophone Mmole played a decisive role in the process of Makonde transition from MANU to UDENAMO.\footnote{Cahen, “The Mueda Case,” pp. 38-40.}


On June 25, 1962, these three Mozambican movements were united into a common front, FRELIMO (\textit{Frente de Libertação de Moçambique}, Mozambican Liberation Front).\footnote{Brito, “Le Frelimo et la construction de l’état national.” pp. 56-60; Harry West, \textit{Kupilikula: Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique} (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 139; William Finnegan, \textit{A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique}. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1992), p. 106; Ncomo, \textit{Uria Simango}, pp. 87-98; Henriksen, \textit{Revolution and Counterrevolution}, p. 20; Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, pp. 9, 11-13; Manghezi, \textit{O Meu Coração}, pp. 219-23.} The decision was influenced by Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah. Gwambe opposed the unification because he did not support Eduardo Mondlane, whom he considered to be close to the USA interests.\footnote{Cahen, “The Mueda Case,” pp. 43-44; Manghezi, \textit{O Meu Coração}, pp. 244-46; Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, pp. 9-10.} He also rejected the idea of peaceful transition to independence through negotiating with Portugal. He subsequently was expelled from Frelimo. Mmole followed the TANU instructions and joined Frelimo, even though he did not consult anybody within MANU.\footnote{SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” pp. 165-66; Cahen, “The Mueda Case,” p. 42; Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, p. 17, 20.} He was expelled from Frelimo in 1963 because of his associations with Gwambe. Chagonga left
Frelimo on his own volition also in 1963. However, Ncomo mentions that the three leaders were expelled from Frelimo owing to opposition from Marcelino dos Santos.\footnote{Ncomo, \textit{Uria Simango}, pp. 102-106, 114-29.}

Shaykh Yussuf Arabi recalled that in 1962, Mmole proclaimed the news about the foundation of Frelimo at MANU Club of Zanzibar, saying that “Africa was for Africans and not for the Whites.”\footnote{SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” pp. 165-66.} The meeting, attended by about 800 MANU members of Zanzibar and Pemba, almost all Makonde, deliberated that the local MANU branch was a Regional Committee of the Frelimo from now on. Mwewa Mfaume became Regional Chairman, with Sadiki Ntanga, a Vice-Chairman, Lucas Nchucha, a Regional Secretary and Rafael Ntuma, a Treasurer. All were Makonde. According to Shaykh Yussuf, they invited afterwards other Mozambican immigrants, such as Angoni, Makua, Nyasa and Yao, but almost no one appeared. Besides the Makonde dominance of the Committee, it seems that the fact that they were not consulted on the dissolution of the MANU branch and foundation of a Frelimo Committee in its place had alienated these immigrants.

The Zanzibari Committee informed the Central Committee of Frelimo in Dar-Es-Salaam about the prevailing situation. In 1963, the Central Committee sent Uria Simango to solve the problem. Simango arrived in April, 1963, and went first to talk to the Afro-Shirazi Party which had many Makua, Yao and other Mozambican Muslim immigrants in its ranks, asking why Frelimo could not appeal to anybody but the Makonde so far. The explanation given was that the Makonde were people of “a lower race, who did not want to accept Islam, know nothing about hygiene, tattooed their faces and used only a cloth to cover their privates,” though there were many non-tattooed Muslim Makonde in Tanganyika and Zanzibar.\footnote{SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” p. 166-67.} Muslims, who viewed the local Frelimo Committee as a kind of “Makonde Club,” did not want to join it. This situation seems to reflect pre-Revolutionary atmosphere in Zanzibar, which pitted Indian and Arab Muslims against African Muslims and non-Muslims. Coastal and Makua-speaking Muslim immigrants from northern Mozambique, with long Islamic historical association with Zanzibar, were
better integrated in Zanzibari Muslim society than recent Makonde Muslims or non-Muslims.

Uria Simango then invited all Mozambican immigrants for a meeting at the radio Raleho Hall building. Among other things, he said that they should leave their religious and “tribal” differences aside and unite for a common purpose of uhuru and jamhuri (Sw., liberation) of Mozambique. But after he left, the situation maintained unaltered.

In June 1963, the Frelimo Central Committee in Dar-Es-Salaam sent to Zanzibar Paulo J. Bayeke, a Makua-speaker from Massassi, to develop intense propaganda campaign among Mozambicans and to prepare for Eduardo Mondlane’s visit in October, 1963. Many residents of Zanzibar along with Mozambican immigrants went to greet him at the airport. Several Muslims considered important by Frelimo were invited to a meeting held in local Frelimo Committee office. Among them were Shaykh Yussuf and his wife, Mariamo Omar, and other Makua-speakers, such as Attumane Abdallah, Omari Abdallah, Ali Mussa, Shangama, Mijai Abdallah, and Yussuf Mikidado.

Mondlane said right away that they should join Frelimo. Later, a Makonde named Ntalama and Eduardo Mondlane got into an argument, which illustrates how some Makonde’s felt about Frelimo and its leader. In particular, Ntalama expressed his impatience about starting of the independence war as quickly as possible. Mondlane called for patience and calm in order to avert the repetition of the events like the 1960 Mueda massacre. He concluded his conversation with an agitated Makonde, saying that the land was Mozambican but there was a place there for everyone, Blacks, Whites, Arabs, Indians and others. When shortly after Mondlane left for a meeting with the Afro-Shirazi Party, Ntalama commented: “this one is not an African anymore, he is White; married to a White, he is probably a Portuguese government spy.”

Following Mondlane’s visit, Mwewa Mfaume asked Shaykh Yussuf and his wife to join Frelimo, telling them that they, as important Muslims and Makua-speakers, were very valuable to the movements. Having agreed, Shaykh Yussuf became a District

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798 SCCIM, “‘Relatório das conversações,’” Ibid.

799 SCCIM, “‘Relatório das conversações,’” pp. 170-71.

800 Ibid.
Chairman and his wife, the President of the Women’s League. As Shaykh Yussuf pointed out, they worked hard for mobilizing northern Mozambican Muslims and waging a propaganda war against the Portuguese. The news about the Portuguese burning down mosques, madrassas and religious literature, and harassing and persecuting Muslims in northern Mozambique were brought to Zanzibar along religious and ethnic networks. The stories were then broadcast on radio, and written in pamphlets and letters to be sent back to northern Mozambique calling Muslims to join Frelimo. In fact, one of Shaykh Yussuf’s letters was intercepted by PIDE in April 1964. In it Shaykh Yussuf addressed fellow Muslims as a khalifa of the Qadiriyya and a Frelimo official, describing Muslim grievances under Portuguese rule and inviting them to join the liberation movements because it was “God’s will.”

In Zanzibar, he and his wife, like many other Mozambicans, grew frustrated with the Makonde, who being mostly Christians, mistrusted Muslims in Frelimo. Makonde were also annoyed by payments of the monthly quota to Frelimo while “nothing was happening,” and caused instability by continually questioning the party leadership’s political capacities. Consequently, some Makonde left Frelimo and joined the re-launched MANU in Mombassa; others entered a new Makonde Afro-Shirazi Union in Zanzibar.

More than historical animosities between slave-raiding Muslims and victimized non-Muslim Makonde since the nineteenth-century, it seems that the political atmosphere in Zanzibar contributed to mutual Muslim-Makonde apprehensiveness and fed into Makonde anxieties. The 1961 elections and the 1963 British concession of Zanzibar autonomy both perpetuated the Arab Sultanate and political superiority of Arabs, Indians, and coastal Muslims as opposed to African non-Muslim immigrants

802 SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” pp. 177-79.
803 SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,” Ibid. See also, Cabrita, Mozambique, p. 29; Cahen, “The Mueda Case,” pp. 44-45.
from mainland, such as the Makonde. The Makonde got involved in the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution. Shaykh Yussuf Arabi mentioned that John Okello, a Ugandan mercenary and one of the former leaders of the Mau Mau revolt, instigated immigrant workers, including hundreds of Mozambican Makonde, to join the Revolution.\textsuperscript{806} According to Shaykh Yussuf, Okello had a personal Makonde paramilitary group. The Makonde were promised material assistance in Zanzibar and for the \textit{uhuru} of their homeland in Mozambique in case of revolutionary victory.

In January 12, 1964, the Sultan was deposed and Abeid Amani Karume was proclaimed the President of the newly-born Zanzibar Republic. The ‘revolutionaries’ committed atrocities against the population, such as rape, murder, and sacking and looting of the Island.\textsuperscript{807} After the arrival of the police troops from Tanganyika and a return to relative calm, John Okello was declared \textit{persona non grata} and returned to Uganda. The Makonde, who along with other Zanzibari lower classes had occupied Arab properties during the Revolution, lands in particular, were expelled from those properties by the new government.\textsuperscript{808} Shaykh Yussuf did not know whether the Makonde received anything from Karume, but they went to see Abdurrahman Muhammad Babu to ask for jobs and assistance. Babu said that at the moment there were no jobs except in police or army, but until the end of March, 1964, the situation of the Makonde continued to be dire. Then they asked for a camp for military training for the \textit{uhuru} of their homeland, which though promised was soon forgotten by the new government. The majority of the Makonde gradually became disillusioned and began leaving for Mozambique. The PIDE noticed that a significant number of Makonde were returning from Tanganyika to Mozambique already in 1963.\textsuperscript{809} In August, 1964, Makonde loyal to MANU decided to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{806} SCCIM, ““Relatório das conversações,”” p. 153.
\item \textsuperscript{807} Crozon, “Les Arabes à Zanzibar,” pp. 179, 183-84.
\item \textsuperscript{808} SCCIM, “Relatório das conversações,”” pp. 162-63.
\item \textsuperscript{809} “Extracto de (BI) Boletim Informativo No 27/63, de 25/9/63, Palma”, in SCCIM, IAN-TT, Lisbon, Cx. 60, No 418, Processos 02/11/1959-28/01/1965, pp. 282-84.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
start the independence war in Mozambique on their own by raiding the Nangololo Catholic Mission in Cabo Delgado, where they killed a Dutch missionary.\textsuperscript{810}

After the Revolution, foreign immigrants were forbidden to hold political meetings in Zanzibar, and Frelimo activities were stalled. Finally, Shaykh Yussuf decided to leave the Island. In February 17, 1964, he arrived at the Frelimo headquarters in Dar-Es-Salaam, and spoke to Uria Simango, who arranged for him to be sent to Mtwara. Simango introduced him to Mtwara District Chairman, Lazaro Nkavandame.

When Shaykh Yussuf arrived at Mtwara, he and his family were welcomed in a home of a Makonde, Ali Madebe Tomo, who had the same \textit{nihimo} as Shaykh Yussuf’s mother. The Regional Frelimo Vice-Chairman, Shariki bin Saidi, who was a Makua-speaker and a \textit{mwalimu} from the \textit{regedoria} Mataka in Macomia, introduced Shaykh Yussuf to Frelimo Muslims during the \textit{juma} prayer at a mosque. Among other things, Shariki mentioned that it was a shame that such an important \textit{shaykh} was staying with a Makonde. Shaykh Yussuf then moved to a house of Hasim Habibu, a Frelimo Makua member from Mataka in Macomia.\textsuperscript{811}

During his stay at Mtwara, Shaykh Yussuf saw many people coming from Mozambique to the Frelimo office, including at least twelve Makonde students from various Christian Missions, some southerners and Makua-speakers. Shaykh Yussuf was asked to write a letter targeting in particular those Muslims who collaborated with the Portuguese and denounced Frelimo mobilizers. The mobilizers then took the letter to Mozambique and used it for convincing Muslims to support the independence movement.

Shaykh Yussuf however increasingly grew tired and wanted to leave for Mozambique because he could not find a job and had no money to support his family. The environment in Tanganyika and Zanzibar became difficult for Mozambican immigrants. He asked Nkavandame for money but was taken aback when Nkavandame accused him of being a PIDE spy. Shaykh Yussuf complained to various \textit{shuyukh}, saying that he did not understand why Frelimo invited him and now accused him of being a spy. He asked for money from Muslims, but could not get any. Nevertheless, he left for


\textsuperscript{811} Ibid.
Mozambique, staying in homes of various shuyukh and mwalimu along the way. At Mocimboa da Praia, he and his family stopped at his uncle’s, and he went to the Portuguese Administration to ask for a travel permit to Chai. That afternoon, the PIDE arrested Shaykh Yussuf with loads of Frelimo paperwork, including a party bulletin in Swahili and Portuguese, pamphlets, letters, and other documents in his possession. Unfortunately, his trail is lost afterwards in the documents, and the fieldwork is still needed to be done on his fate. But it seems he survived and died in the early 2000s in Maputo.

The beginning of the war at Nangololo, which was spearheaded by the MANU Makonde, precipitated the Frelimo declaration of “general armed insurrection of the Mozambican people against Portuguese colonialism for the total and complete gain of Mozambique’s independence” in September 25, 1964.812

**Muslim Response to Frelimo in Northern Mozambique**

The recruitment of important religious leaders, such as Shaykh Yussuf by MANU and later by Frelimo, paved the way for Muslim popular acceptance of these movements’ political messages. Shaykh Yussuf’s story also demonstrates that Frelimo picked up on MANU’s previous clandestine networks of mobilization, and the mobilizers tapped into existing social networks in order to broaden the movement’s popular support base.813 The existing social networks among northern Mozambican Africans revolved around ‘traditional authorities,’ including Islam and régulos and their entourage of apia-mwene, mahumu, cabos and healers. The Maka chiefly networks and the ideology of kinship and territory upon which the ‘traditional authority’ was legitimized, were transposed from the 1930s onwards onto the turiqa networks, within which mwalimu and Sufi shuyukh appeared as powerful healers, in possession of esoteric Islamic knowledge and able to deal with spirit world of land and ancestors simultaneously. Both the chiefly and the Qadiriyya networks extended to Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

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Qadiriyya Networks

As discussed earlier, the northern Mozambican tariqa networks, especially of the Qadiriyya Sadat were linked with their branches in Tanganyika and specifically to Zanzibar. The reports by PIDE, SCCIM and Branquinho illustrate that the majority of Muslims of northern Mozambique involved in the liberation were in fact primarily affiliated with the Qadiriyya Sadat. Branquinho also points out that the mobilization occurred along routes previously approved by Islamic leaders of northern Mozambique in coordination with those residing in Tanganyika and Zanzibar, where Muslims in general and the Qadiriyya in particular, supported independence and an African nationalist agenda. In addition, Shaykh Yussuf Arabi was also a Qadiri khalifa. As mentioned earlier, the involvement of northern Mozambican Muslims in the liberation movements through MANU and the Qadiriyya networks had been detected in Membra and other regions already in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Some of these Muslims were imprisoned, tortured, killed and exiled, the methods which PIDE applied even more ruthlessly in the mid and late 1960s.

The religious center of authority in Cabo Delgado was situated in Mecúfi at the coast where Attuman Abdul Magid, the chief khalifa of the Qadiriyya in the region, constituted the center of the Islamic hierarchy. Portuguese officials in Cabo Delgado in 1962 pointed out that Attuman Abdul Magid had “more authority than regedores and chiefs, who frequently consulted with him and obeyed his decisions.” Magid’s assistant and successor to the position of the Qadiri chief khalifa in Cabo Delgado was his brother, Atoa Abdul Magid.

As discussed earlier, Sayyid Ba Hasan took over the leadership of the Qadiriyya in Cabo Delgado when Shaykh Abdul Magid died in the 1940s. But Shaykh Ba Hasan himself died in 1963 after being ill for some time. When Sayyid Bakr ascended to the tariqa leadership in 1964, northern Mozambique Muslims were already involved in the

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815 Monteiro, O Islão, o poder e a guerra, p. 113.
liberation movements. According to Branquinho and SCCIM surveys, four years following Sayyid Ba Hasan’s death, he was still viewed as the chief khalifa of the Qadiriyya by many Muslims, including in Cabo Delgado, though some already knew about Sayyid Bakr. At the same time, because Sayyid Bakr was young and formally under Shaykh Selemmanji, the older Qadiri leaders, such as Abdul Magid’s sons, Shaykh Yussuf Arabi and others enjoyed a greater authority and legitimacy than him.

One of the Frelimo mobilizing groups led by Shaykh Chibuane Namanga, accompanied by mwali mu Suede Imenda and shuyuk Matora and Matiquito, all residents in Tanganyika with ties to a Muslim régulo Teleué of Marrupa in Niassa District, arrived in 1963.817 Through Teleué, the group met other régulos, such as Mutaparata of the same region, from where they went to Montepuez and Mecúfi in Cabo Delgado. After accepting the independence messages, régulos assisted the group in mobilizing local people and selling Frelimo membership cards. In 1964, the same group returned to northern Mozambique and contacted Muslim régulos of Nairoto and Balama in Cabo Delgado, who helped them to undertake popular mobilization further south. By the time Shaykh Chibuane’s group was in Nampula City, PIDE had detected them and subsequently, the shaykh was arrested.818

The group returned a third time at the end of 1964, led by Antonio Saide Assane, but régulos Tomá and Mwalia, and their sub-chiefs Gincore and Intiquita were shot dead by PIDE. This time, the group received assistance from régulo Abdul Kamal Megama, who organized meetings in the areas under his control and even among the Makonde.819 Abdul Kamal was aided by régulos Meleca and Mtonda and their sub-chiefs Nilule and Lopue. He afterward welcomed three more Frelimo groups from Tanganyika.

In 1964, mwali mu Cuerera (Abudo Carimo) of Namuno of Cabo Delgado together with another unidentified by PIDE mwali mu, traveled to Muíte in Mozambique District, where he organized meetings on behalf of Frelimo and distributed hiriz.820

819 PIDE, Informação No 2797/71 de 30/9/71, L/40/2/2, in SCCIM, IAN-TT, Lisbon, Cx. 63, No 413, Pt. 2, p. 635.
Between 1964 and 1967, the PIDE detained a significant number of Muslim leaders of northern Mozambique, including Shaykh Attuman Abdul Magid and Abdul Kamal Megama in 1965. Many were brutally tortured and murdered, and a few were exiled to São Tomé and other places, though some, very few, were later released for the lack of evidence. Abdul Kamal’s fate is known from the literature; he was imprisoned at Ibo Island’s fort, where he was sadistically tortured and murdered.

Just to illustrate the scope of the arrests - only in one area, Lalaua region (Ribaué) in Mozambique District, more than thirty shuyukh and mwalimu were imprisoned, many murdered. Mosques, madrasas and religious literature were burned down; the remaining mwalimu and shuyukh were forced to eat pork and renounce their faith; Islamic religious activities were forbidden. In Muíte region (Mecubúri) of the same District, in 1965, PIDE tortured and killed a total of fifteen representatives of the Islamic religious elite, including Shaykh Bwanamire, the chief khalifa of the Qadiriyya Sadat in the region. In both Lalaua and Muíte, Muslims belonged to Qadiriyya Sadat, under formal control of Sayyid Ba Hasan, but linked to Attuman Abdul Magid through Shaykh Ali Osseman of Nampula city.

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823 Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 388


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabo Delgado District</th>
<th>Shaykus and Mwalimu</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balama</td>
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<td>Mocimboa da Praia</td>
<td>Fazila Yussuf</td>
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<td>Montepuez</td>
<td>Muhumpa; Sabit; Abujatio; Mengeuzia;</td>
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<td>Mecúfi</td>
<td>Attuman Abdul Magid;</td>
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<td>Macomia</td>
<td>Amade Alifo; Yussuf Arabi;</td>
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<td>Chiúre</td>
<td>Abdul Kamal Megama;</td>
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<td>Bwana Abdallah</td>
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<td>Sabite (Macassare Waita)</td>
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<td>Mussagy Bwana</td>
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<td>Moma</td>
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<td>Muecate</td>
<td>Amissie; Martinho Sande;</td>
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<td>Namapa</td>
<td>Muherussi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lalaua</td>
<td>Ibrahimo (Buraine); Niquisse Mussa Mirasse ‘Mucomane’; Pedro Limua Mustafa; Assoliane Avuleque;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chiefly Networks

The most important basis for northern Mozambican Muslim participation came from Muslim chiefly networks. The Frelimo agents in the early stages of the popular mobilization recruited from ethnic, linguistic and religious groups in which they subsequently worked, knew that the most effective way of popular mobilization in northern Mozambique would be through ‘traditional’ and Islamic religious authorities.828

Modern scholarship tends to view Islam and ‘traditional authorities’ in northern Mozambique as two separate and autonomous domains. West and Kloeck-Jenson, Paula G. Meneses and Rafael da Conceição acknowledge that the response by ‘traditional authorities’ to Frelimo mobilization was not monolithic; some sided with Frelimo, while others collaborated with the Portuguese against Frelimo.829 Rafael da Conceição, however, whose research focuses on Muslims of Cabo Delgado, finds that while attitudes of the ‘traditional authorities’ can be traced relatively easily, that of Islamic religious leaders remains “ambiguous.”830 Similarly, the Portuguese Secret Services wondered in the early 1960s about whether northern Mozambican Muslims got involved in the liberation movements through Islam or through kinship connections. But Monteiro, the leading Portuguese expert on Islam at the time, recognized that in Muslim regions supporting Frelimo, “the Islamic hierarchy coincided with the traditional socio-religious hierarchy.”831 Islam and ‘traditional authorities’ here were linked to each other.

The Portuguese thought that the Ekoni-speaking Makua (Muikoni) chiefs were dragging other Muikoni into the liberation movements. But it is clear that the ethnic identity of those involved was diverse, first because the formation of the chiefdoms in the regions of Muikoni influence during the height of the international slave trade at the second half of the nineteenth century involved absorbing different ethnic groups and establishing of kinship ties with Muslim chiefs of other ethnic groups, including Marave,

829 West and Kloeck-Jenson, “Betwixt and Between,” pp. 472-72; Meneses, “Traditional Authorities,” p. 100-n24; Conceição, Entre o mar e a terra, p. 188.
830 Conceição, Entre o mar e a terra, Ibid.
831 Monteiro, O Islão, o poder e a guerra, pp. 113, 151.
Makua, Yao, Niassa, Nianja, etc. Most Muslim chiefs of northern Mozambique were perceived to be kin to each other both by Africans themselves and by the Portuguese. Second, Monteiro attempts to classify ethnically the Muslim participants in the liberation movements and comes to conclusions that the Yao dominated the movements in Mecula, the Meto, the Lomwé and Makua in Maúá, the Mwani Swahili in Mocimboa da Praia and Mecúfi, even Muslim Makonde in Chai, and the list goes on. The important thing is that they were part of the Maka chiefly networks with a common religious identity.

As Feierman points out, the great appeal of the African nationalists of the period, such as Nyerere, was that they “said openly what many common people knew, but what other leaders feared to say:” that the European rule needed to end so that Africans could govern themselves. Mozambicans also joined the liberations movements because they wanted the end of colonialism. Africans in general but chiefs, due to their relationship to land, in particular, upheld a grassroots culturally-based nationalism, which provided an ideological basis for their support of the liberation movement. For they perceived that “the land was theirs and not of the whites,” and that “people from Tanganyika would come to wage a war against Whites to liberate us and our land.”

The recruitment or mobilization led by régulos and apia-mwene as a rule occurred in a banja (Bantu, also b’andlha, the assembly of the prominent members of the community) when mobilizers from Tanganyika arrived. The banja was accompanied by rituals providing the process of recruitment with a ‘traditional’ legitimacy. One of these

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833 Monteiro, O Islão, o poder e a guerra, pp. 100-101, 113.
834 Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, p. 212.
rituals was of ancestral sacrifice, *asvane mbumba*, performed by *apia-mwene* in order to extend the blessing and protection of the ancestor spirits upon the armed insurgence groups.\(^{837}\) Another ritual was the oath of secrecy on the *Qur’an* and reading of the Sura *Yassín*, followed by a distribution of *hiriz* in exchange for payment of membership quota (ranging from 20 to 100 Escudos) and the Frelimo cards. The *hiriz* were prepared by *shuyukh* and the *mwalimu* and were intended to inculcate bravery and eradicate fear and to protect the owners from bullets and other weaponry, from the Portuguese, malevolent spirits, and wild animals. When an authoritative *shaykh* of the region or a visiting one from Tanganyika was involved, or when a *régulo* or a *pia-mwene* was a *tariqa khalifa*, the whole ceremony took place in a mosque following regular prayers, or after *dhikr, ziyara* or *mawlid*.\(^{838}\) After the first *banja* with mobilizers, the *régulos, apia-mwene* and Islamic religious leaders, Frelimo expected them to continue mobilization on their own as well as to collect material and intelligence assistance for Frelimo.

One such *banja*, organized by Antonio Assane Saide and described by PIDE, involving all Balama *régulos*, took place in 1966.\(^{839}\) At that meeting, Saide instructed the *mahumu* (the advisors to *régulos*) to take away the population at once when the armed violence starts in the region. The *banja* ended with the prayers led by the most important *mwalimu*, and the oath of secrecy was taken on the *Qur’an* by all present.

A considerable number of *apia-mwene* were involved in the liberation movements. In particular, a Muslim *pia-mwene* Omacage of Balama was very active. She managed to escape PIDE and was never arrested. When almost all major *régulos, apia-mwene* and *shaykhs* were annihilated in 1964–65, she commanded the remaining lower-degree ‘traditional authority,’ such as *cabos* and *mahumu*, to take over the Frelimo support and recruitment in 1966.\(^{840}\)

\(^{837}\) Monteiro, *O Islão, o poder e a guerra*, p. 151.

\(^{838}\) Ibid.


Table 6: Muslim *Apia-mwene*, collaborating with Frelimo\(^\text{841}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>Omacage (escaped PIDE)</td>
<td>Gulué</td>
<td>Balama (Cabo Delgado District)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amina (arrested in 1965)</td>
<td>Mepera</td>
<td>Eráti (Mozambique District)</td>
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<td>Napaua (arrested in 1965)</td>
<td>herself</td>
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<td>Quimuiuora (arrested in 1966)</td>
<td>Nampa</td>
<td>Muíte (Mozambique District)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incuecuete (escaped PIDE)</td>
<td>Mwalia</td>
<td>Montepuez (Cabo Delgado District)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuncué</td>
<td>Teleué</td>
<td>Marrupa (Cabo Delgado District)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhantohó</td>
<td>Muere</td>
<td>Montepuez (Cabo Delgado)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maitassa</td>
<td>Metarrumo</td>
<td>Lúrio (Mozambique District)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima</td>
<td>Mwapala</td>
<td>Angoche (Mozambique District)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munlelia</td>
<td>Mucalava</td>
<td>Namapa (Mozambique District)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquiwa</td>
<td>Namecoco</td>
<td>Lalaua (Mozambique District)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**PIDE Purges of 1965-1968**

As mentioned earlier, between 1965 and 1968, the PIDE squadrons together with local administrators undertook arrests of those who participated in the liberation movements. The list of the *régulos* and sub-chiefs imprisoned and murdered at this time are given in the tables at the end of this Chapter. The replacement of these *régulos* often depended on the will of the local administrator. When he had sympathy or cultural sensitivity to Africans, he would replace them with former *régulo’s* kin; when he was hostile, then, with someone completely unrelated and from another religious denomination. The tables indicate such cases clearly, but they also show that many Christian *régulos* were installed at this time as substitutes for the arrested Muslim ones.

While many local administrators and PIDE manifested no mercy to those apprehended, Branquinho, Monteiro and other SCCIM officials reflected on why Muslims of particular regions were drawn faster than others into liberation movements. As discussed earlier, Monteiro as well as Branquinho point out that these regions in all three Northern Mozambican Districts (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Mozambique), were dominated by the Ekonispeaking Makua chiefs, who were kin to each other, and who

pulled their subjects into the liberation movements and war. This is accurate to some extent. However, it does not explain why some other Muikoni at the coast, such as Abdulcader Nuruddin of Fernão Veloz were not involved.

As in the case of the Makonde at Mueda Plateau, the most spectacular involvement in liberation movement occurred in those in regions where forced labor and cotton production were brutally imposed. When explaining the quasi-total adherence to Frelimo of the ‘traditional’ and Islamic authorities in Eráti, Malema, Ribaué and Mecubúri of Mozambique District, Branquinho points out that local administrators applied ruthless corporal violence against the plantation laborers.\textsuperscript{842} Some administrators also forced Africans to buy goods in the shops run by the administrators or their accomplices, and prohibited them from buying in other shops.\textsuperscript{843} In those cases, administrators frequently compelled Africans to purchase additionally produce from plantations or from administrators’ own machambas. In Eráti, for example Africans were coerced to buy 10 kg of peanuts each.\textsuperscript{844} Other reasons that Branquinho indicated were the replacement of the ‘legitimate’ régulos by ‘illegitimate’ ones, and forceful resettlement of the population in villages along the roads, far from ancestral homes, family lands and water resources.\textsuperscript{845}

The 1965-1967 PIDE purges might have spread fear among Muslim and curbed their involvement in the liberation movement to some extent. Certain areas like Muíte and Lalaua were left without any Islamic leader and with religious life completely frozen. At the same time, the Portuguese military undertook operations which prevented Frelimo from moving further south, pushing the guerillas back in some areas.\textsuperscript{846} The construction of the strategic hamlets, aldeamentos, especially south of Messalo River in 1965, curtailed guerilla contact with the local population.\textsuperscript{847} In Niassa, guerillas were pushed to

\textsuperscript{842} Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 132.

\textsuperscript{843} Branquinho, “Relatório,” p. 118.

\textsuperscript{844} Branquinho, “Relatório,” \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{845} Branquinho, “Relatório,” pp. 115-17.

\textsuperscript{846} Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, p. 30-31.

the north bank of Lugenda River, when the Portuguese reclaimed Catur and Lichinga regions.

Simultaneously, the SCCIM’s 1965-67 fieldwork research on Islam helped to elaborate strategies aimed at co-opting Muslims for the side of colonial rule. As discussed in the previous Chapter, from 1968 to 1972, the Portuguese undertook psychological actions for winning the hearts and minds of Muslims against the onslaught of African nationalism. Colonial authorities displayed public respect to Islam and Muslim leaders, facilitated Islamic practices and rites, and took steps to improve living conditions of Africans.848

Frelimo’s internal skirmishes from 1966 onward might have also contributed to the alienation of northern Mozambican Muslims from the liberation movements. The clashes within Frelimo involved ethnic and regional contradictions, in particular between northern Mozambicans representing mostly interests of rural peasantry and the southern urban assimilados; and there were also clashes and the unexplained elimination of the movement’s members and as well as Mondlane’s assassination in 1969.849 Frelimo also started envisioning post-independence Mozambique in a Marxist vein as of ‘collective production’ and building of a socialist country.850 It put forward an agenda of creating a completely new society from scratch, a new man and a new nation, which would discard ‘tribalism’ and the old colonial structures centered on chiefs, who cling to ‘traditions’ in order to maintain their power as servants of the colonial rule.851

Colin Darch and David Hedges maintain that these changes within Frelimo were dictated by the aggravating military situation and the abuses of power for personal enrichment on the part of Frelimo officials with strong ‘traditional’ credentials, such as

848 Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, pp. 166-67.


Lazaro Nkavandame.⁸⁵² The militarization of the regions that Frelimo liberated from the Portuguese (the’ liberated zones’) meant that military cadres were given control of food and logistical supplies in these regions to the detriment of the ‘traditional’ structures undertaking these activities before 1969.⁸⁵³ Though Frelimo continued to rely on ‘traditional’ structures to facilitate these processes, the distrust towards them was already in place. Frelimo viewed its dealings with the ‘traditional structures’ as a temporary measure shaped by the war situation. In post-independence Mozambique of ‘national unity’ and common ‘citizenship,’ the affiliations of ‘tribes’ and ‘region’ associated with the ‘traditional structures’ would have no place. These ideas were promoted by Frelimo cadres in the ‘liberated zones,’ and therefore became known among régulos and their entourage.

The Frelimo mobilization groups also abandoned the TANU-inspired structure and methods, and integrated instead a socialist single military command hierarchy, led by Party Secretaries.⁸⁵⁴ Local delegates of Frelimo departments of Health, Education, Culture, Production and Commerce formed various Councils and Committees, to which members were centrally appointed by the Party leadership. To prevent easy identification by PIDE/DGS of the members, Frelimo suspended the issuance of the cards in some locations.⁸⁵⁵ Though not always as unequivocal as in 1964-66, nevertheless Muslim mobilization and involvement in the independence war in northern Mozambique continued.

**Conclusion**

This Chapter focused on the participation of the northern Mozambican Muslims in the liberation movements, first led by MANU and later by Frelimo. It demonstrated that the

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⁸⁵² Darch and Hedges, “‘Não temos a possibiidade,’ pp. 139-41.

⁸⁵³ Darch and Hedges, ‘‘‘Não temos a possibiidade,’ Ibib; Brito, “Le Frelimo et la construction de l’état national,” p. 123; Ncomo, Uria Simango, pp. 242-65; Monteiro, O islão, o poder, e a guerra, pp. 298, 304; Cabrita, Mozambique, p. 63; Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, p. 73.

⁸⁵⁴ West, Kuplikula, pp. 141-42.

⁸⁵⁵ Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, 73.
idea prevailing in scholarship about Makua-speakers’ and Nampula province’s aloofness from the independence struggle is unjustified.\textsuperscript{856}

Muslim support and participation in the liberation movements stemmed primarily from the African grassroots and historically and culturally-rooted nationalism. Like Africans in general, Muslims wished to end colonialism and recover their land from the Portuguese. African Muslims of northern Mozambique were well-suited to support these movements, because Islam and chiefship here were linked to each other. Chiefs were believed to be the ‘owners’ and ‘stewards’ of the land, and the majority of Muslim leaders be they régulos or the tariqa khulafa’, were from the chiefly clans. They perceived the land to be theirs as Africans, and not Portuguese.

Second, Muslims of northern Mozambique had a tradition of resistance to colonialism. In particular, they were active in the resistance against the “effective occupation” and Portuguese colonization until the 1930s. Third, Muslim chiefs and shuyukh who were the most active in the liberation movements were from the regions of intense forced labor, and especially of compulsory cotton production. The abuses of local administrators in these regions included physical violence against Africans and the persecution of Islam and Muslims, which served as one of the motives for Muslim participation in the liberation movements.

Fourth, Muslims of northern Mozambique had close historical-cultural, kinship and religious ties to Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and the involvement of Muslims in those regions in the liberation movements, in particular in TANU, inspired and encouraged the participation of the northern Mozambican Muslims. Fifth, the presence and the launching of the Mozambican liberation movements, such as MANU and later, Frelimo in Tanganyika and Zanzibar with links to and support from TANU, as well as with the participation of Muslim immigrants from northern Mozambique, influenced their brethren back home to join the liberation movements. In addition, the Qadiriyya was active in TANU, which expanded the nationalist ideology to its branches in northern Mozambique. The story of Shaykh Yussuf Arabi, described in this Chapter, provided a concrete human story and a firsthand account of these observations.

\textsuperscript{856} For example, Henriksen, \textit{Mozambique’s War of Independence}, p. 79.
From the late 1950s until 1968, Muslims were active in popular mobilization and support of the liberation movements in northern Mozambique. However, from 1969 onward, their support became less visible. In part this was due to the 1965-68 PIDE purges of Muslims involved in the liberation movements, which ended with massive arrests, torture, brutal murder and exile of numerous prominent Islamic leaders and Muslim chiefs participating and supporting the liberation movements, which might have deterred some from taking part in the liberation movements. The SCCIM-led colonial policies of Muslim co-option might have contributed to this process as well. But the most important factor seems to have been Frelimo’s adoption of an almost doctrinaire and radical Marxism in the period after 1969 and militarization of its cadres in the liberated zones, where though Frelimo still relied on ‘traditional’ leadership it also began manifesting distrust towards this leadership. Those who survived PIDE tortures and were released from prison not always were reconsidered by Frelimo, which suspected them of being co-opted and recruited by the Portuguese Secret Services as comprometidos.857 Harry G. West points out that “even those former political prisoners who had remained in prison until the end of the independence war were treated with suspicion by the post-independence Frelimo state.”858 They were denied a place in the history of the independence war and even erased altogether from “Frelimo’s triumphant historical portrait.”859 But also groups who did not fit the portrait of secular and militant Marxist revolutionaries, such as régulos and apiawene were excluded from this history.

Consequently, the participation of the northern Mozambican Muslims in the liberation movements and Frelimo tended to be officially forgotten. This Chapter attempted to recover important aspects of the history of their participation in the struggle against colonialism.

Map 4: Liberation Movements Expansion (1962-69)
Table 7: Chiefs of Northern Mozambique, involved in the liberation movements as identified by PIDE between 1965 and 1968

Cabo Delgado District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total régulos</th>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Regúlos, arrested by PIDE</th>
<th>‘Ethnic’ affiliation</th>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Year of arrest</th>
<th>By whom replaced</th>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
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<td>1) Muage (Assupa N’djojo, former mwalimu) 2) Namwando (Namadum N’dida) 3) Mataka (Malique Urratarume)</td>
<td>1) Makua 2) Makua 3) Yao</td>
<td>1) Muslim 2) African 3) Muslim</td>
<td>1) 1967 2) 1968 3) 1969, runaway</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Incoco (Magundula Incoco)</td>
<td>Muikoni (Makua)</td>
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<td>1967</td>
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<td>Muslim</td>
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<tr>
<td>Circ. Macondes (Mueda Plateau)</td>
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<td>Makua Meto</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<th>Circ. Mecúfi, Central Post</th>
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<th>Maroro (name n/a)</th>
<th>Yao</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>nephew (Ussene Amisse)</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Sub-chiefs: Nilule, Lopue</td>
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<td>1) Makua;</td>
<td>1) Catholic</td>
<td>All 1965</td>
<td>1) nephew (Casimiro Puchare)</td>
<td>All Muslim</td>
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<td>2) nephew (Murima Mujaira);</td>
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<td>3) Megama (Abdul Kamal)</td>
<td>3) Muikoni (Makua)</td>
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<td>3) nephew (Mussa Malcate);</td>
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<td>4) Meleca (name n/a)</td>
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<td>1) Makua</td>
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<td>6) African</td>
<td>6) 1966</td>
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<td>7) Natábuè (n/a)</td>
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<td>1) Makua 2) Makua 3) Makua 4) Maravi 5) Makua 6) Makua 7) Mwikoni 8) Maravi</td>
<td>All Muslim</td>
<td>1) 1965</td>
<td>1) nephew</td>
<td>2) nephew 2) nephew 3) nephew 4) cousin 5) brother 6) grandson 7) nephew 8) cousin</td>
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Porto Amélia, Metuge Post

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<td>1) 1965</td>
<td>1) nephew</td>
<td>2) nephew 2) nephew 3) nephew 4) cousin 5) brother 6) grandson 7) nephew 8) cousin</td>
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Porto Amélia, Murrébué Post

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<td>1) 1965</td>
<td>1) nephew</td>
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<td>Regúlos, arrested by PIDE</td>
<td>‘Ethnic’ affiliation</td>
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<td>Year of arrest</td>
<td>By whom replaced</td>
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| Circ. Marrupa, Central Post    | 2             | All Muslim            | 1) Téléué (Marinho Laire Issa)  
2) Mutaparata (Buanassa Chuerira)  
**Sub-Chiefs:** Inquita, Gincore | 1) Chopa (Makua)      | All Muslim                          | 1) 1965         | 1) nephew (Buanarn’Teca) | 1) Muslim           |
| Cir. Marrupa, Maúa Post        | 4             | All Muslim            | 1) Vatiua (n/a)  
2) Maúa (n/a)  
3) Vahiua (Taire Macanga)  
4) Muela (Muehia Massope)  
**Sub-chief:** Cuvir         | 1) Makua          | All Muslim                          | 1) 1965?        | 2) nephew              | All Muslim         |
| Cir. Marrupa, Nipepe Post      | 2             | All Muslim            | 1) Muluco  
2) Nipepe  
**Sub-chief:** Murrohia    | 1) Makua          | All Muslim                          | 1) n/a          | 1) cousin              | All Muslim         |
| Cir. Marrupa, Nungo Post       | n/a           | n/a                   | Manguaia (n/a)                         | Makua              | Muslim                              | 1965            | Nephew (Luis Matope) | Muslim               |
| Mecula, Central post           | n/a           | Nanguare (Achimo Ali Mataka) | Makua                                    | Musim              | n/a                                 | n/a              | n/a               | Musim                |
| Valadim, Central Post          | n/a           | Mataka (Salange Chitemue) | Yao                                      | Musim              | n/a, run away with subjects | n/a              | n/a               | n/a                  |
| Chiconono, Mavago              | n/a           | N/A                   | Mataka (Selemane Mataka)                | Yao                | Muslim                              | joined liberation movement | n/a              | n/a                  |
| Lago, Central Post             | n/a           | n/a                   | 1) Maendaenda  
2) Tandamula                           | 1) n/a          | 1) Anglic                           | Both runaway to Frelimo | 1) nephew              | 1) Anglic            |
| Amaramba Central Post          | n/a           | n/a                   | 1) Matia (n/a)  
2) Mecanhelas (Ali Culabo)          | 1) n/a          | 1) Christ.                           | 1967              | 1) nephew              | 1) Christ.           |

**Note:** The table represents the arrest of religious leaders by PIDE, including information on their 'ethnic' affiliation, year of arrest, by whom replaced, and religious affiliation.
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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total régulos</th>
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<th>Regúlos, arrested by PIDE</th>
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<th>By whom replaced</th>
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<td>1) Mepera (Mepera Mavira)</td>
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<td>3) Manahumo (Manahumo Maviha)</td>
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<td>Makua Meto</td>
<td>Christ.</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>4 Muslim, 1 African</td>
<td>Wantera (Artur Rocha Mupape)</td>
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<td>1965/6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Sub-Chiefs: Mahamo, Muipita, Nantope, Nanticua, Alua, Murrecule, Nicapa, Tapuara, Ramos, Puepué, Momola</td>
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<td>All 1965</td>
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<td>Namacorro (Saguate Mutucha)</td>
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<td>1965/6</td>
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<td>1965/6</td>
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Conclusion

Muslim chiefship of northern Mozambique has never represented only a ‘traditional’ African leadership. Rather, it encompassed at once both Islamic leadership and African chiefship. Through an analysis of historical transitions of continuities and changes, the thesis focused on the tradition of Muslim chiefship in northern Mozambique between ca. 1850 and 1974. Within this tradition Islam and African chiefship converged, though both Islam and African chiefship represented an independent regional tradition of the longue durée. The focus of this study was on how local African people, particularly Muslim ruling elites or chiefly clans of northern Mozambique, deployed and actively (re-)created these traditions as well as maintained them interrelated despite internal and external pressures - colonial rule, the wider Muslim world, and African liberation movements.

Colonial archival sources, ethnographic and historical literature as well as fieldwork findings revealed that the institution of African chiefship of northern Mozambique, as in other regions of Africa, has continued to be a longue durée historically grounded discursive tradition throughout the colonial period and until today. It has revolved around the political discourse of matriliny, land/territory, kinship and the foundational myths of the ruling clans establishing the rights and obligations of the putative first-comers and late-comers to the territory.

Islam, on the other hand, has been also a longue durée living and discursive tradition, centered on historical agency and the relations of power whose social core is the discourse over the ‘correct’ knowledge of Islam or ‘orthodoxy’. ‘Orthodoxy’ is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship of power, and it is not the finished product of ‘orthodoxy’ that is at stake, but rather the process of creating relationships of ‘orthodoxy’. The Islamic tradition is thus composed of those unequal relationships of

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861 Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences: the Longue Durée”; Vansina, Paths in the Rain forests; Feierman Peasant Intellectuals, Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order.


863 Starrett, Putting Islam to Work, pp. 8, 13; Asad, Genealogies of Religion, pp. 210-211.
authority and compliance that are constructed around and through specific discourses that constitute the social core of religious traditions.\textsuperscript{864}

The link between Islam and chiefly clans existed since the eighth century when Islam made inroads into northern Mozambique and became associated with the coastal ruling Shirazi elites. In the First Chapter, the thesis outlined in particular the course of historical relationships between northern Mozambique and the East African coast of Kenya, Tanzania and the Comoros, with shared culture, economic networks, kinship and religious ties, and language influences. The discursive tradition of religious and political leadership, with common Shirazi Islamic identity, established coastal Muslim ruling elites of these regions as kin to each other.

This political conception also included a notion of a matrilineal chiefship shared at a regional level along the matrilineal belt of southern Africa, which dominated pre-Arabic and pre-colonial northern coastal Swahili regions of Kenya and Tanzania, but where it was challenged and replaced by patriliney with the increasing presence of Arabs, and later Europeans. The discursive tradition of a matrilineal chiefship, however, persevered at the northern Mozambican Swahili coast, where it was shared not only by the political elite but also at many levels in their respective societies mainly because of the perceived spiritual foundation of this political leadership. As putative first-comers to the territory, the chiefly clans were responsible for the well-being of the people and the land incorporated within chiefdom. In a matrilineal tradition, the \textit{pia-mwene}, the elder sister of a chief or a chief herself, was a carrier of the ancestral essence (\textit{nihimo}) of the first-comers, which enabled them to deal with the spirit world of the physical and natural environment and of previous human settlers of the land/territory. By bestowing their ancestral blessing on the territory, the putative first-comers provided protection and prosperity to their people and the land.

That women’s position a matrilineal society is considerably higher than in patrilineal societies, is exemplified by the history of northern Mozambique. Only a woman, a \textit{pia-mwene} can carry and bestow the ancestral blessing of \textit{nihimo}. A woman also could be and, in many cases was, the first-comer to the territory, and therefore, a chief herself. Even when the actual first-comer was considered a male, he was required to

be accompanied by a *pia-mwene*. In northern Mozambique the female and male domains of political leadership co-existed simultaneously and were parallel to each other, and the position of chiefship in principle was not denied on the basis of gender. During the nineteenth century, many female chiefs of northern Mozambique, such as for example, Naguema of the Namarral, Mwana Saiemo of M’tumalapa, Maziza of Meze, and Salima of Nakala, were actively involved in and profited from the international slave trade.

In the context of the rapid and violent change in the nineteenth century, which was associated with the involvement of northern Mozambique in the international slave trade and significant population migrations from the mainland to the coast, northern Mozambican Shirazi ruling elites of the coast, in particular Mussa Quanto of Angoche, advanced to the mainland in search of slave supplies and control of the caravan routes. Military conquests affected this expansion to the mainland; however the deployment and (re)creation of the shared discursive tradition of chiefship was much more consequential, as the coastal ruling elites established kinship relationships with the important mainland chiefs. As a result, the connection between the two discursive traditions - that of matrilineal chiefship and of Shirazi Islam - was further expanded into the mainland, and a Muslim *chiefly* network of northern Mozambique, a network of the *Maka*, was launched. Africans, in particular, the *chiefly* clans of northern Mozambique were the principal agents and actors of Islamization of the region and Islam was transformed into one of their *chiefly* domains.

The association between Islam and chiefship was challenged at the turn of the nineteenth century with the arrival of two Sufi Orders, which came through the traditional Swahili routes and brought to northern Mozambique practically by the same people as in other East African regions. However, the socio-political context of northern Mozambique was radically different from the previous historical times. The region was under the siege from the Portuguese and their military campaigns of “effective occupation.” Most of the Muslim *chiefly* leadership of the region was involved in a resistance against the colonial encroachment onto their territories, and could not focus on preserving and maintaining their hold over an Islamic authority as in earlier times, except for Angoche and Mozambique Island whose *chiefly* elites were the first to receive and to adopt the new Sufi conception of Islam. On the one hand, the Sufi Orders did not expand beyond these
regions until the early 1930s, when colonial rule was consolidated. On the other, the fact that the Muslim chiefly clans were concerned with their political independence when the Orders first came, had provided a mixed-race Indian-African group of people, the Moors, who traditionally lived under the Portuguese rule, separate from the bulk of the African population, with an opportunity to lay claims to Islamic authority. In 1896, when the first tariqa, the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyyya, arrived in northern Mozambique, some Muslim chiefly clans could still secure control over Sufism to a certain extent. The Qadiriyya, however, which arrived in 1904/05, was appropriated by the Moors, who threatened the traditional hold of the local chiefly elites over Islam.

With the consolidation of colonialism in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and the integration of the chiefs within the colonial administrative and politico-legal system, Muslim chiefly clans began reclaiming their traditional Islamic domain, now centered on Sufi Orders. Shaykh Sayyid Ba Hasan, a quintessential representative of the historical Muslim chiefly elites of northern Mozambique, recovered Islam, associated this time with Sufism, and brought it back to the Muslim chiefly clans by accumulating strong silsilas and khalifa-ships of the Orders in his own hands.

However, Islamic authority which was previously grounded on the link between regional tradition of chiefship and Shirazi Swahili Islamic tradition and now associated with Sufi Orders, continued to be a focus of competition between the old chiefly clans and the new racial and ethnic elements throughout the colonial period. These tensions contributed to the split of the turuq in Mozambique, the turuq leadership, in principle having no relation to chiefship. The tariqa’s authority was derived from its situation within the chain of transmission (silsila/isnad) passed on to its leaders by a certificate of authorization (ijaza). Both the silsila/isnad and ijaza represented a challenge to the authority of the Muslim chiefs and contributed to internal debates among Muslims questioning the compatibility of matrilineal chiefship with Islamic ‘orthodoxy.’ But the chiefs successfully fought for Islamic authority associated with the turuq, and from the 1930s onward, the chiefly clans appropriated this authority, and by occupying, themselves or their relatives, the khalifa position, they transposed the historical Muslim chiefly networks onto the tariqa networks. With the involvement of the chiefly clans in the turuq leadership, the spread of Sufism intensified making it gradually the dominant conception
of Islam in northern Mozambique. Thus, the regional tradition of Islam linked to chiefship was put to the test, challenged and (re)created in the new context. Simultaneously, it extended legitimacy and authority to the turuq. However, this did not end the controversies surrounding chiefship and Islamic authority among Muslims.

As in previous historical periods, female elite women from Muslim chiefly clans of northern Mozambique took an active part in the religious life of the regions, and many of them were initiated into Sufi Orders. With this, the turuq acquired a parallel female structure mirroring its male counterpart. Sufi female leadership, like male, was involved in religious proselytizing, and sponsored lower class and non-Muslim women’s Islamic education.

Colonial rule was instrumental in preserving the discursive tradition of chiefship during the twentieth century. The Portuguese colonial government introduced administrative, economic, political and legal changes in Mozambique. As the chiefs were incorporated within the colonial administrative system, it appeared as if colonial rule dragged the pre-colonial African political structures and conceptions into new political and social context. However, in reality it transformed and changed an African chiefship, in particular by re-structuring territorial arrangements and the balance of power between different chiefdoms; by making chiefs colonial agents and effective administrative employees, it altered the meaning of chiefship itself. But like other European colonial powers in Africa, the Portuguese upheld a dualistic legal system, according to which Europeans and Africans assimilated to European culture were subject to metropolitan laws, while the vast majority of Africans were conceived of as subject to African ‘customary laws.’ As customary laws in Mozambique were not codified, their application was left effectively in the hand of the chiefs. This, together with the Portuguese concern to preserve legitimacy and authority of the chiefs in the eyes of Africans, resulted in the colonial rule in effect safeguarding the discursive tradition of chiefship.

While the Portuguese took advantage of African tradition of chiefship in order to exert control and make the most of the African labor force, many prominent members of the historical Muslim chiefly clans, such as Sayyid Ba Hasan and Abdul Kamal Megama, both khulafa’ of the Qadiriyya, greatly profited from the new colonial context as well. In particular, Sayyid Ba Hasan’s role in the muta-hano dispute in Quivolane and Lunga
demonstrate how he used his dual power, based on the one hand on his chiefly descent and thus, traditional stewardship over the land/territory, and on the other, on his Islamic authority associated with a tariqa sajada position and his sharifian and Shirazi descent. At the same time, Ba Hasan’s proximity to Indian capital and European officials, as well as his knowledge of the Portuguese language, permitted him to take advantage of the vicissitudes of the new colonial legal system.

Despite all that above, the role of the chiefs as servants of a power which was neither ‘traditional’ nor Muslim made the meaning of chiefship for the majority of Africans quite contradictory, and caused heated internal Muslim debates about its nature and its compatibility with an Islamic ‘orthodoxy’. These debates took the form of ‘dufu wars’ and ‘sukuti vs twaliki’ disputes revolved around the rituals that were associated with the institution of chiefship and those associated with Sufism, such as mawlid and dhikr. The questions about the nature of Islamic authority and whether matriliny and ceremonies associated with African chiefship could be incorporated with Islamic tradition, as was the case until then in northern Mozambique, were central to these debates. The debates though clearly replicated regional and global debates over Islamic tradition, especially in East Africa and Nyasaland, were largely focused on local concerns and contexts, in particular on the compatibility of the institution of the pia-mwene and matriliny with an Islamic patriliny, on rightfulness or not of the chiefly investiture ceremonies and the use of drums during the festivities linked to the Islamic calendar.

Both the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya and the Qadiriyya undertook religious proselytizing and ultimately influenced the elimination of drums from ‘proper’ religious rituals, such as mawlid, dhikr and funeral rites. They also influenced the reducing of the Rifa’iyya Order to the status of a mere ‘dance society’. Nevertheless, the attempts to dislodge the tradition of chiefship from the conceptions of Islam were often confronted by strong opposition from the local African Muslim population, who linked their wellbeing to the spiritual and ancestral foundations of chiefship, linked historically to Islam.

From the 1960s onward, both Muslim chiefly and the tariqa establishment had to deal with the emerging Islamist group, known in Mozambique as the Wahhabis. The Wahhabis symbolized a radical departure from local historical conceptions of Islam in
northern Mozambique and from that brought by the Sufi Orders. They advocated a universal and ‘modern’ Islam, separated from local historical traditional and cultural influences, in other words, an Islam reduced to a systematized and objectified textual ‘religion’, limited to the Qur’an and the Hadith. The Wahhabis (and perhaps later, Frelimo post-colonial secular Marxism) struck a definite and fatal blow on the claims of the historical Muslim chiefly elites over Islamic authority, and ultimately influenced the gradual epistemological separation of the tradition of chiefship from the Islamic tradition, and thus precipitated the end of the historical longue durée discursive tradition of northern Mozambique, in which African matrilineal chiefship and Islam were interlinked.

The thesis also examined the ways in which Portuguese colonialism perceived of Islam and the kind of approaches, politics and policies it adopted toward Islam and Muslims in Mozambique during the twentieth century. Throughout twentieth-century policy changes, however, the Portuguese continued to uphold an Orientalist approach towards Islam in northern Mozambique. Like other European powers, the Portuguese assumed Islam to be an ‘Oriental fact’, the essential ‘orthodox’ tenets of which remained unchanged since the time of revelation in medieval Arabia. African Islamic conceptions and practices were viewed by the Portuguese as rather an aberration peculiar to the ‘Blacks’. In the later years of colonial rule, the Portuguese came to be inspired by the French school of ‘Islam Noir’ in West Africa, and like the French, the Portuguese believed Islam in Africa to be far removed from its alleged ‘orthodoxy’ in the Middle East and even India. By ‘syncreticizing’ local African ‘traditions and customs,’ Islam in Mozambique was viewed as a particular kind of Islam, the ‘Black Islam’ or ‘Islão Negro’. This approach influenced the Portuguese assumptions that Islam in northern Mozambique was rather a part of the indigenato system than an organized faith similar to Christianity.

Between 1930 and the late 1950s, the nationalist Estado Novo came to power and put forward a project of “Portugalizing” (portugalização) colonial subjects and consequently turning them into Portuguese citizens. They envisioned Africans adopting Portuguese culture and language. As the Catholic faith was perceived to be one of the cornerstones of Portuguese national identity, the colonial state made an agreement with the Catholic Church, expected to undertake “Portugalization” of Africans through mission schooling. The basic assumption with respect to northern Mozambican Muslims
was that Islam there was neither ‘true’ nor serious, so that when Africans were given means for “civilizing” themselves through European education would they automatically opt for Catholicism rather than Islam. However, despite all the efforts, the “Portugalization” policies did not bear much success where Muslims were concerned, who often fiercely resisted the attempts to convert them forcefully into Christianity.

In the late 1950s until the end of the colonial era, Portuguese policies changed as a result of international pressures derived from the processes of decolonization elsewhere. The Portuguese, however, insisted on the alleged ‘benign’ character of their colonialism, as compared to the French, British and Dutc, the idea which found its ideological basis in Gilberto Freyre’s *luso-tropicalism* theory. The Portuguese persisted on the prospect of maintaining their colonialism by introducing apparently more democratic political changes by giving citizenship rights to Africans. At the same time, realizing that the project of “Portugalization” through Catholic education had failed, they switched from converting Africans to Christianity to impeding the spread of “de-Europeanizing” and “de-nationalizing” effects of pan-Islamism and the influences of the ‘foreign brands’ of Islam in Africa. Especially Indians and East African Muslims were targeted with the purpose of curtailing the influences of their ‘foreign brands of Islam’ in Mozambique.

The tension between Sufism and *Wahhabis* was the most consequential ideological divide among Muslims of Mozambique. It affected racial relationships between Muslims, and influenced Portuguese colonial policies toward Islam. In particular, when from the early 1960s up to the end of colonialism in 1974, the Portuguese administration faced the spread of the liberation movements in northern Mozambique, involving besides the Makonde of the Mueda plateau, large portions of Muslim-dominated region, the Portuguese perceived that the majority of these Muslims were adherents of ‘Islão Negro’ and Sufism. Thus, they confronted a choice between southern, urban-based and Moor-dominated *Wahhabism*, which on the surface better suited modernist and control-driven Portuguese policies of Islam, and the more ‘traditional’ and ‘backward-looking’ ‘African’ Islam. This realization compelled the Portuguese state to display public support to Sufis in detriment to *Wahhabis*, and to introduce social policies aimed at co-opting Muslims in general, but especially African Muslims of northern Mozambique to their side. After violently suppressing those who
took part in the liberation movements, Muslims in Mozambique for the first time in history were surveyed, intensively studied, and wooed by the Portuguese through various public means. However, the seemingly friendly and informed policies of the last decade of the colonial era, especially with respect to African Muslims and Sufi Islam of northern Mozambique were primarily dictated by a necessity to counter-act the advancing liberation movements and prevent or delay as far as possible the independence of Mozambique.

The participation of the northern Mozambican Muslims in the liberation movements, first led by MANU and later by Frelimo, demonstrated that the idea prevailing in scholarship about Makua-speakers’ and Nampula province’s aloofness from the independence struggle is unjustified. Muslim support of the liberation movements stemmed primarily from African grassroots and historically and culturally-grounded nationalism and their wish to end colonialism and recover their land from the Portuguese. The memories of Muslim resistance against the “effective occupation” and the Portuguese colonization before the 1930s, were revived during the 1960s and the early 1970s struggle against colonialism. The abuses of Portuguese local administrators against Africans and the persecution of Islam also provided northern Mozambican Muslims with strong incentives to participate in the liberation movements.

Close historical, cultural, kinship and religious ties of the northern Mozambicans to Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and the involvement of Muslims in those regions in the liberation movements as well as the presence and the launching of the Mozambican liberation movements, such as MANU and later, Frelimo, from those regions where they were supported by TANU, inspired and encouraged the participation of the northern Mozambican Muslims. The fact that Muslims in general and Sufi Orders and the Qadiriyya in particular were active in TANU also positively influenced this participation. The story of Shaykh Yussuf Arabi, described in the last Chapter of thesis, provided a concrete firsthand account to these observations.

The historical analysis in this thesis has challenged several notions with respect to northern Mozambican Muslim chiefship persisting in the scholarship, in particular the idea that kinship ideology in general, and matriliny in particular came under a great deal of pressure from the expansion of Islam, which transformed it into patriliny and
patriarchy. This study has shown that the chiefly network of the nineteenth century, which as a discursive tradition persisted throughout the colonial period, was embedded in matrilineal kinship ideology shared by both the coast and the mainland, and the integration of the chiefs into the colonial system of indigenato and the expansion of the capitalist economy and modernization between the 1930s and 1970s did not halt the expansion of Islam or perseverance of matriliny in northern Mozambique either. Individual files of the chiefs of the three northern Mozambican Districts (Niassa, Cape Delgado and Mozambique) collected by the Portuguese between 1954 and 1974, indicate that the majority of the chiefs were Muslims and had mostly inherited their positions and title from their maternal side, as a rule from a maternal uncle.

This study has also challenged a still widespread Orientalist assumption with regard to Islam in northern Mozambique, maintaining that it is not a ‘true’ Islam akin to Middle Eastern versions, but one which is synchretized with African ‘customs’ and culture. The thesis’ approach to Islam was influenced by Talal Asad who has argued that Islam should be viewed “neither as a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of beliefs, artifacts, and morals, but as a discursive tradition that links past, present and future in a variety of ways”. The thesis focuses on how with the emergence of the new conceptions of Islam, Muslims revived internal debates about the nature of the Islamic tradition, and set about delineating what constituted locally the centre and the margin of this tradition. Each time, they questioned the compatibility of the tradition of chiefship and associated rituals and conceptions, such as matriliny, chiefly installation ceremonies and African healing with an Islamic ‘orthodoxy’.

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I. Interviews

I.1. Interviews in Maputo City

- Shaykh Yussuf bin Haji Adam, Abril, 16, 1996.
- Shaykh Abdul Razaq Rajabo Pacheco, June 18, 1997.
- Abdul Halimo Mohamed, July 6, 1999.
- Shaykh Aminuddin Mohamad Ibrahimo, March 30, 2004

I.2. Interviews in Nampula City

- Shaykh ‘Umar Bisheikh, Nampula City, June 8, 2000.
- Shaykh Charamo Attumane, June 8, 2000
- Shaykh Ibrahimo Abdallah, June 9, 2000

Collective interview with female Sufi khulafa’, June 26, 2000
  Sifa Lugar
  Madina Daudo
  Aziza Munagude
  Khatija Abdallah
  Zaki Yussufo
  Zenha Kanapenha

Collective Interview with male Sufi Shaykhs, June 21, 2000
  Hussein Fakira
  Abakar Juma
  Suanene Mekua
  Absulhashim Tuakal
  Swalehe Mziwa

Collective Discussion with the Islamic Council, June 19, 2000
  Selemanji Momade Hanifo
  Habino Amade
  Abdulwahab Qasim
  Hasam Ibrahimo Arbi
  Aicha Abdallah
  Abdullatifo Mussaji
I.3. Interviews in Angoche District, Nampula Province

Qatamoio Island:
- Hasan Bashir, the régulo and the ruling Nhapakho, May 14, 2000
- Shaykh Adamji Karhila, May 14, 2000
- Sayyid Hassan, May 14, 2000

Angoche City:
- Khalifa Zainab Swaleh ‘Macandinha’, May 9, 2000
- Shayk Sayyid Khaled ‘Nakapa’, May 10, 2000
- Shaykh Mamade Abdallah, May 11, 2000
- Shaykh Musa Ibrahim Siraj, May 13, 2000
- Chale Abdallah Yussuf, régulo Licuaro of Inguri, May 14, 2000
- Amina Hasan, May 13, 2000
- Amina Musa Ussene, Maimuna Musa Piloto, Muizala Ma’ruf, May 12, 2000.
- Haji Fatima Namuali, May 9, 2000
- Shaykhs Echtar Shurtiyya and Bramgi Mamade, May 17, 2000
- Shaykh Ali Ussene, May 18, 2000
- Shamsi Ossufo, May 17, 2000
- Collective interview with male Sufi khulafa’, May 11, 2000
  Mussa Piloto
  Sayyid Hasan Abakar
  Ussene Suleiman
  Amade Swaleh
  Sharifo Terno
- Collective interview with female Sufi khulafa’, May 16, 2000
  Muantimo Chamo
  Muaisha Yussufo
  Fatima Abdallah
  Mwaneima Mandiha
  Faida Husein
- Collective interview with the members of the Angoche Community Court, May 13, 2000
  Florêncio Manuel
  Raúl Cardoso
  Fatima Amusse
  Jamal Chale
  Alberto Uhanhoboa

Angoche District:
- Ayyuba Demeia, régulo Mutulema of Namikulo, Namaponda, May 16, 2000
- Amaral Muhilole, régulo Mipaco of Namaponda, May 16, 2000
I.4. Interviews in Mozambique Island:

- Shaykh Muhammad Sandique, November 1, 1999
- Shaykh Shaban Muzé, November 2, 1999.
- Shaykh Abdurrahman Amuri bin Jimba, November 2, 1999.
- Shaykh Faqui Sayyid Shamakhani, November 2, 1999
- Khalifa Nzima Bilale and Khalifa Chifa Yussufo, November 5, 1999.
- Shaykh Ali Daudo, November 5, 1999
- Shaykh Ahmad Ali Musa, November 6, 1999.

- Collective interview with female members of the turuq, November 3, 1999
  Mariamo Abudo
  Waké Mutualibo
  Muaziza Ali

- Collective interview with male members of the turuq, November 6, 1999
  Yussuf Amade Swaleh
  Mohammad Abubakar
  Fadil Abakar
  Arafal Ali
  Salim Shamo
  Asan Rashid
  Attumane Bin Hussein

I.5. Interviews in other districts of Nampula Province:

- Afonço Chicoche, régulo Rainha of Muecate, Meconta District, October 26, 27, 1999
- Fernando Abel, régulo Mucapera of Corrane, Meconta District, May 31, 2000
- Jacinta Unromora, apyamwene of the régulo Mucapera of Corrane, Meconta District, May 31, 2000
- André Trato, régulo Napita of Corrane, Meconta District, June 3, 2000
- Luís Ernesto Umbechuia, régulo Umbechuia of Anchilo, Nampula City District, June 28, 2000
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IV.4. Dissertations


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