The Impact of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration on Post-Conflict Elections
The case of Mozambique and Angola

Master Thesis
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Abstract

Building peace after civil war has been one of the greatest challenges of the last decades. The transitional period plays a vital role in the outcome of the post-conflict elections, which is related to the processes of peacebuilding and democratization. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has emerged as a crucial mechanism in the peace processes since the nineties. This research investigates the impact of DDR on the peace process and more specifically the effect of DDR on the outcome of post-conflict elections. In order to answer the research question I have analyzed empirical evidence for the various arguments of two different approaches. The first is the theory of Lyons, which focuses on the influence of ‘demobilization’ on post-conflict elections. Lyons argues that specific processes and policies that support the twin goals of peacebuilding and democratization are essential in the success of post-conflict elections. In order to investigate Lyons’ argument, I have used the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis. The theory contains six mechanisms to analyze the impact of DDR programs on the peace process. This research has investigated and compared the cases of Mozambique and Angola. The conclusion is that DDR programs have a large impact on the outcome of post-conflict elections in Sub-Sahara Africa. DDR-programs should be given priority over post-conflict elections. The failure to demobilize combatants and to take away the military capacity of commanders during the transitional period strongly increases the chance of failing post-conflict elections. Furthermore, reintegration programs are necessary tools for giving ex-combatants the incentives to demobilize and reintegrate, as well as to adhere to peace and democracy.
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Acronyms
AA - Assembly Area
AI - Amnesty International
AMODEG - Association of War Demobilised Soldiers
CCF - Cease-fire Commission
CNE - National Election Commission
CORE - Commission for Re-integration
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
FAA - Angolan Armed Forces
FADM - Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique
FAPLA - Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO - Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GNP - Gross National Product
GPA - General Peace Agreement
HRW - Human Rights Watch
ICG - International Crisis Group
IDP - Internally Displaced Person
IO - International Organization
IRS - Information and Referral Service
JPMC - Joint Political-Military Commission
JVMC - Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
ONUMOZ - United Nations Mission in Mozambique
OSD - Occupational Skills Development
RAD - Regional Arms Depot
RENAMO - Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
RSS - Reintegration and Support Scheme
TCP - Towards Collaborative Peace
TU - Technical Unit
UN - United Nations
UNAVEM - United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNIDIR - United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNOHAC - United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
US - United States
SALW - small arms and light weapons
STEA - Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration
SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary-General
1. Introduction

1.1 Identification of the problem and the research question

One of the most important challenges of the last decades is the creation of sustainable peace after civil war. Building peace is a long-term process that starts with the signing of a peace agreement between the warring parties. Since the nineties a common pattern in peace processes can be distinguished. The peace agreements have called for a transitional period which should lead to elections and the installment of a new democratic government. This idea of ending civil conflict through the democratic mechanism of post-conflict elections characterized the peace processes in countries such as Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Angola (Lyons, 2004: 36). The transitional period marks the stage between the peace agreement and post-conflict elections, and plays a vital role in the outcome of the intertwined processes of democratization and peacebuilding. This phase is essential because post-conflict societies start to construct legitimate political structures, set transitional justice through judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, demobilize combatants and resettle displaced people, and rebuild the economy (Lyons, 2005: 1). These mechanisms also influence the success of the post-conflict elections, which has become an essential and integral part of peacebuilding programs (Reilly, 2006: 1). Democratic post-conflict elections are believed to have an important contribution to war termination, marking the formal end of military/one-party rule, providing national and international legitimacy to post-conflict governments (Obi, 2007: 3; Lyons, 2002), and these kind of elections act as a strategy for conflict resolution and management (Sisk and Reynolds, 1998).

However, an increasing number of politicians and scholars point to the dangers of democratic elections in an early stage of democratization and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies (Snyder, 2000). Reilly argues that post-conflict elections could “themselves become the focus of increasing tension and renewed violence” (2006: 1). Furthermore, it is argued that post-conflict elections have a high chance of electoral violence. It could even result in a restart of violent conflict, which would negatively influence the process of peacebuilding and democratization (Höglund, 2009: 413). This latter critical point is significant for this research. It focuses on the important debate why in some cases post-conflict elections are successful in achieving the goals of democratization and peacebuilding, whilst in other cases they are not.

This thesis looks at the transitional period in post-conflict countries, which is essential for the processes of peacebuilding and democratization. Both processes are complex and hard to investigate in detail in this research due to time and space constraints. Therefore, this thesis will more specifically analyze the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), which has emerged as a crucial mechanism in peacebuilding since the nineties (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007: 531). Important questions are: what is the impact of DDR programs on the peace process? Were these programs completed before or after the post-conflict elections took place? How have DDR programs influenced the outcome of the post-conflict elections? Should post-conflict elections, as an essential democratic mechanism, be given priority over completing DDR programs?

In this research I will focus on the impact of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration on the peace process and more specifically their effect on the post-conflict elections in two different cases in Africa, namely Mozambique and Angola. This research will try to answer the following research question: to what extent have disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs led to successful post-conflict elections in Mozambique and Angola?
1.2 Methodology

I will try to answer the research question by looking at empirical evidence for the various arguments of two different approaches. At first I will use the theory of Terrence Lyons (2002a; 2004; 2005a; 2005b). He developed a theory which focuses on post-conflict elections and the relationship between peacebuilding and democratization. The post-conflict elections are a significant part of these deeper and longer-term processes (2002a: 5). Lyons uses ‘demilitarizing politics’ as the concept that captures elements of both peacebuilding and democratization, and focuses on the “importance of specific processes and policies that support the twin goals of war termination and democratization” (ibid.). More specifically, the author looks at two specific and, as he argues, the most important issues of peacebuilding and democratization: the first is demobilization and the second is the creation of democratic institutions.¹ This research will focus only on the concept ‘demobilization’ from the theoretical framework of Lyons because investigating the creation of democratic institutions as well would be too complex and not feasible within the given limited time and space.²

Secondly, in order to investigate in detail the impact of DDR programs on the peace process and post-conflict elections, I will use the theoretical framework of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010). These scientists give a framework to analyze and investigate the effectiveness of the goals of DDR programs and focus on the impact of DDR programs in terms of peacebuilding. They come up with six mechanisms to measure DDR within a specific case: war recurrence and the conflict-development nexus; violence and crime prevention; civic and political participation; healing wartime trauma; sequencing; and adverse effects (ibid.: 27). I will investigate these six mechanisms of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, which are connected to the concept ‘demobilization’ of Lyons, in order to find answers to the research question.

In order to find evidence for the six mechanisms of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010) I will use both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources will contain official reports, documents and statements of various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), the governments of Mozambique and Angola, the United Nations (UN) and other International Organizations (IO’s). Many NGO’s have executed extensive fieldwork and their reports are consequently important to find empirical evidence. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Crisis Group (ICG) investigate the situation in African countries in detail annually, which provides important information for my research. Official statements, documents and reports from the national governments and international organizations such as the UN are also significant sources. Especially the strong involvement of the UN in the peacebuilding and democratization process in post-conflict countries has produced a lot of qualitative and quantitative information about DDR. The secondary sources will consist of articles from academic journals and books. Furthermore, I have taken interviews from three persons with personal experience in the field of DDR programs and post-conflict elections in Mozambique or Angola. This adds quality to the level of information that is analyzed in this research.

I will use the method of process tracing for the data-analyses. This means “close examination of the observable implications of alternative hypothesized explanations” (Bennett and Elman, 2008: 502). The method of process tracing helps me analyzing the evidence I have obtained from various sources in order to reject or affirm certain explanations or hypotheses, which fits in the purpose of this research.

¹ The theory and concepts of Terrence Lyons will be explained more in detail in the next chapter concerning the theoretical framework.
² The concept ‘demobilization’ is used by Terrence Lyons in a broad sense and is approached as what the common literature about this topic would call Disarmament, Demobilization and Repatration’. This will be elaborated in the next chapter.
1.3 Research relevance

Post-conflict elections have led to renewed violent conflict in various African countries in the past twenty years. However, there is a lack of (comparative) case-studies on this topic in Sub-Saharan African countries. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010: 4) also argue that there is an important gap to fill in the literature. Firstly, current research on DDR programs focuses only on technical details and implementation issues. Secondly, the conclusions reflect common sense and lack the solid basis of empirical assessments of different programs. Thirdly, the authors argue that “there is a large conceptual gap in understanding the relationship between DDR effectiveness at the individual level and the broader impact of these programs of the risk of war recurrence” (ibid.). The existing studies on DDR are often not able to explain the effects on the peace process after violent conflict (ibid.: 5). This thesis fills this empirical gap by focusing on how and whether DDR help or hinder the peace process in post-conflict countries. Also, this research makes a contribution in understanding why some post-conflict elections fail whilst others succeed.

The outcome of this research could also have societal implications. It could make an important contribution in determining the right policy decisions for policy makers and politicians from national governments or international organizations, such as the UN, in the current or future post-conflict cases in Sub-Sahara Africa. A better understanding of the DDR processes during the transitional period could inform policymakers dealing with the promotion of democracy and conflict resolution (Lyons, 2004: 37). Furthermore, a better knowledge of why post-conflict elections fail or succeed could lead to a smaller chance of renewed violence in future cases. This is of high importance because failing post-conflict elections puts a country a few steps back in the process of peacebuilding and democratization.

1.4 Threats to validity

It is also important to measure and look at the validity of the research. Regarding the content validity, we should keep in mind that the chosen indicators are part of a particular theory with related concepts (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 538). The concepts are defined and bordered well in order to represent them at its best and to increase the validity. Through the chosen indicators I should be able to measure the concepts.³ It is also important to keep in mind that the research looks at long term social processes, which are very hard to measure. Furthermore, the research is limited due to time, money and space constraints.

1.5 Case-study

The described limitations of this research are also the reason why I will only analyze two cases to test the hypotheses and find answers to the research question. This research is a comparative case-study. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis argue that it is important to study individual programs or countries and that “a comparative approach should be central to future research on DDR” (2010: 42). A comparative case-study is a method to analyze empirical relations between variables. At first the variables in both cases are measured separately and thereafter the comparative method will be applied. This study is limited to two case-studies. A detailed comparative case-study could provide, however, more significant information than a quantitative analysis in the case of DDR programs and post-conflict elections.

This research applies a most similar systems design, which means that highly similar cases with a variation in the dependent variable are compared, in order to find the independent variable which explains the differences in dependent variable. Post-conflict countries are the unit of analysis in this study. The units of observation are Mozambique and Angola. The first reason why these particular

³ The indicators are described and explained in the next chapter.
cases are chosen, instead of two others, is that both countries are located in Southern Africa. They both also have experienced years of devastating violent conflict between rebel forces and government troops. Furthermore, in both cases a peace agreement between the warring factions was signed and a transitional period started in which DDR programs were installed with the assistance of the international community. Another criterion is that in both countries post-conflict elections took place. Angola and Mozambique also share a similar history of Portuguese colonization, influence of the Cold War, changing political situation in southern power South-Africa. Furthermore, the time period of conflict, transition and post-conflict elections is similar in both countries. Another similarity is that the conflicts in both countries were not related to each other. That is why I, for example, have not chosen to look at countries where conflicts have strongly been interlinked to neighboring countries and have infected the whole region, such as in Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone, or in the Great Lake Region.4 Furthermore, the UN often plays an important role in the processes of peacebuilding and democratization, as well as DDR programs. Therefore, I selected two cases where these processes after violent conflict were actively supported by the UN, which increases the internal validity of the research. The above stated arguments explain why the cases of Mozambique and Angola are interesting and relevant for this research.

1.6 Roadmap

The outline of this chapter is as follows: chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework which is necessary to answer the research question. Firstly, the general literature about peacebuilding, democratization and post-conflict elections will briefly be described. Secondly, the arguments and concepts of the theory of ‘demilitarizing politics’ of Lyons (2002a; 2004; 2005a; 2004b) will be explained. Thirdly, the six mechanisms of the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010) will be described, followed by the hypotheses. Chapter 3 will test these hypotheses by analyzing in detail the case of Mozambique. Chapter 4 will do the same for Angola. Chapter 5 contains the comparison of the findings of the analyses of Mozambique and Angola. The final chapter gives the answers to the hypotheses and research question, and also contains the conclusions. Furthermore, this chapter provides suggestions for future research and policy advice.

In the next chapter the theoretical framework with the relevant concepts and theories will be presented.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction
There is a wide range of scientific literature about peacebuilding, democratization, post-conflict elections and DDR programs in post-conflict situations. In this chapter I will firstly give a general literature review on peacebuilding and democratization in post-conflict countries. Secondly, I will illustrate in more detail the literature regarding post-conflict elections and DDR programs. Good background knowledge of both concepts is significant because they are leading during this research. Thirdly, I will explain the various concepts and arguments of the theory of Lyons (2002a; 2004; 2005a; 2005b) and the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010), which will lead to the related hypotheses. Both function as theoretical framework for this research. The explanation of the two theories is important because it provides the framework for chapter 3 and 4 in order to find and analyze the empirical evidence, which will in the end lead to my conclusions. In the last section of this chapter I will give the research question and variables.

2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Peacebuilding and democratization
In order to understand the theoretical framework and answer the research question, it is necessary to look at the related academic literature. The literature concerns the theoretical and empirical insights from the peacebuilding and democracy literature. The latter has focused extensively on elections, while there is a growing interest in studying peace and conflict in order to understand the challenges and promises of elections in post-conflict societies (Höglund, 2009: 414). I will now briefly explain what the current state is of the academic literature of peacebuilding, democracy and their relation.

Peacebuilding, as a concept in the academic literature, gained attention since the 1990’s. The literature is divergent and is roughly divided into three fields. The first focuses on the idea of avoiding a relapse into conflict (Call and Cook, 2003: 235). This is based on the conceptualization of Boutros Boutros-Ghali who brought the concept peacebuilding in the official discourse at the UN through his An Agenda for Peace in 1992 (Knight, 2008: 26). Boutros-Ghali proposed a holistic but explicit process with various steps between different sectors in order to establish sustainable peace (Knight and Özerdam, 2004: 501). The report defines peacebuilding as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 11). The second field of peacebuilding literature emphasizes the prevention of conflict and searching for resolutions on levels below or beyond the state (2003: 235). This is based on the field of peace studies and the pioneering work of Johan Galtung (1975). It focuses more on non-elite processes which differs from the more elite emphasis of the first peacebuilding field. Religious, psychological and social dimensions are important in this second approach (2003: 235). The final field has a broader focus on issues of peacekeeping, peacemaking and conflict prevention. The idea that there is a systematic difference between post-conflict and other societies regarding the processes of conflict prevention and ending violent war is perceived as wrong (ibid.). The concept ‘peace’ is in general divided in positive and negative peace. The latter is the absence of violence, which is one of

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5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali was a politician and diplomat from Egypt. He was Secretary-General of the UN from 1992 to 1996 and wrote the report An Agenda for Peace in 1992. He described in this report how the UN should react on violent conflicts in the post-Cold War period.

6 The term ‘peacebuilding’ originates from the peacebuilding literature from Johan Galtung who wrote the pioneering article “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding”. In this article he argues to build peace by addressing the root causes of the war and use local and indigenous capacities to find solutions and manage peace.
the first goals after a ceasefire. This concerns stopping the violence and ending oppression. The former also contains restorations of relationships and the ‘integration of human society’ (Galtung, 1964: 2).

The literature on democracy is surrounded by less debate by scholars and is less varied than the literature on peacebuilding. Anna Jarstad refers to the process democratization as “opening up political space, including improvements regarding contestation, participation, and human rights” (2008: 17). Call and Cook argue that two main definitions can be distinguished in the academic literature. On the one hand there is the notion of political democracy, which sees democracy as “free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees” (2003: 236). This has emerged as the leading definition in academic analyses. On the other hand, there are advocates of a broader definition that includes economic and social factors (ibid.: 235). Assistance to the democratization process in post-conflict countries consists of five main areas. Firstly, political parties, especially the opposition, are assisted in order to have fair competition between the parties. Secondly, improvement of the human rights situation is promoted and supported. Thirdly, the growth of independent and free media is assisted. Fourthly, aid is given to the civil society organizations on the national and local level with financial support, technical advice and training. The final and most important area for this research is the support to free, fair and competitive post-conflict elections. This consists of technical and financial assistance (2008: 9-12).

As argued, peacebuilding and democratization are strongly related. Since the 1990’s there has been almost an universal demand for post-conflict countries to establish democracy. The democratization process is therefore essential in peacebuilding. It is also urgent in order to form governments with national and international legitimacy. Furthermore, the international community strongly believes that democracy offers the best chance to establish peace, provides mechanisms to overcome problems from the past in a peaceful way, and achieves economic growth and social development (Kumar and De Zeeuw, 2006: 5-7). An underlying presumption in the literature of both peacebuilding and democracy is the preference of liberal characteristics over non-liberal and the idea that the positive effects of both processes go together. However, there are contradictions and tensions between both processes, which have received little attention in the academic literature (2003: 236-237). Mansfield and Snyder argue that transitional democracies are in more danger to return to conflict than mature democracies. These ‘incomplete democratizing states’ lack strong democratic institutions such as rule of law, free media, and political opposition parties, which could lead to a break of violent conflict again (2005: 2). Anna Jarstad points to the dangers and trade-offs which could result in negative effects of democratization on peacebuilding or vice versa. She mentions four trade-offs where the choice is to prioritize democracy or peacebuilding (ibid.: 18). The first is the horizontal dilemma, which concerns inclusion and exclusion, and the question “which groups should be represented in the processes of peace and democratization” (2008: 21). The second is the vertical dilemma, in which the difficult choice between legitimacy and efficiency must be made. Thirdly, the systematic dilemma concerns the question who will be in control of the peacebuilding and democratization processes, namely the international or local community (ibid.: 19). And last but not least, the temporal dilemma regards the short-term and long-term effects of both processes: “Efforts to support democratization may in the short run increase the risk of violence, and thereby in the long run undermine the chances for democracy to take root. Likewise, peacebuilding may involve restrictions on democratic freedoms such as freedom of press and mass demonstrations. In the long run, such constraints may cause unrest and turn into an obstacle for the implementation of the peace agreement” (ibid.: 25). Especially the last trade-off is important for this research because it focuses on giving priority of democracy over peace or vice versa. I will now continue to explain the concept ‘post-conflict elections’.
2.2.2 Post-conflict elections

Post-conflict elections are nowadays a feature of almost all efforts to democratize countries which previously were in some kind of violent conflict. It has become an integral part of peacebuilding programs, often supervised or supported by the international community (Reilly, 2006: 1). However, the literature shows some competing discourses in the academic and policy fields about the effects of post-conflict elections on post-conflict countries. On the one hand theorists argue that democratic competition, and thus elections, is a form of managing the tensions in post-conflict countries and an essential part of peacebuilding. On the other hand, an increasing number of academics argue that post-conflict elections organized in an early stage might have negative consequences for democratization and peacebuilding, and could lead to a return of violent conflict (Snyder, 2011: 471).

Post-conflict elections have multiple goals. The first goal is related to peacebuilding and concerns the termination of war and violence. The success or failure of post-conflict elections is often measured in the presence of violence during or after the post-conflict elections (Lyons, 2002b: 216). The second goal, which is connected to the process of democratization, is that post-conflict elections serve as the initiation of the long-term process of “democratic consolidation through which new rules of the political game are institutionalized” (ibid.: 214). The elections are not meant as a one-time event, but as the stepping stone towards full democracy in the long run (Kumar, 1998: 6). The third objective, which is strongly linked to the second goal, is to “transfer power to a democratically installed government that enjoys national and international legitimacy” (ibid.). This is important to initiate the process of state-building. There is an increasing consensus in the international community that democratic elections are necessary to choose new governments and create new constitutions. It is also often perceived as a necessary condition in order to receive international support (ibid.). This concerns support from states or international institutions which is for example important in order to receive loans to stimulate economic development (Woodward, 2002: 218). The fourth goal of post-conflict elections is to achieve reconciliation between former warring parties. Elections give the different groups an opportunity to present themselves to the citizens with political programs in a peaceful way. In other words: “Ballots take the place of bullets” (1998: 7).

Unfortunately, the reality is that these objectives are not always compatible in post-conflict countries and that several obstacles are on the road to peace and democracy. Post-conflict countries often lack the right conditions such as economic stability, institutional infrastructure, and political will or climate to achieve successful post-conflict elections. The level of security is low and ex-combatants could pose a threat. Additionally, the return of refugees could lead to political and logistic problems. Furthermore, post-conflict countries often lack the institutional and technical capacity, as well as the human and economic resources to organize free, fair and competitive elections (1998: 7-8; 2002b: 216-219). The international community is of vital importance to overcome these obstacles on the road to peace and democracy.

Post-conflict elections have had mixed results in achieving the multiple goals. There are examples of relative success such as in Sierra Leone (in 2002) and El Salvador (in 1994), but also of renewed conflict such as in Côte d’Ivoire (in 2010). Several studies have been executed to look at post-conflict elections and the goals of democratization and peacebuilding (Lyons, 2004: 38). Some scholars, such as in the edited volume by Kumar (1998), have studied how post-conflict elections could promote more efficiency and effectiveness to sustainable democracy from the perspective of donors. Others have examined how conflict resolution is related to the electoral system or to what extent the timing of post-conflict elections critical is for the outcome (Reilly and Reynolds, 1999; Harris and Reilly, 1998). In contrast to these approaches, the theory of Lyons (2002a; 2004; 2005a; 2005b), which will be used as theoretical framework in this research, focuses more on the internal processes during the transition period between the signed peace agreement and the post-conflict elections.
One of these processes, and the one this research will focus on in detail, is Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). In the next section I will elaborate on the DDR literature.

2.2.3 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs have become one of the most important and ambitious components of UN peacebuilding programs since 1989 (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007: 531). During civil wars large numbers of men, women and children are recruited to fight and they consequently possess various types of weapons. The presence of weapons has increasingly become problematic since the end of the Cold War. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is often mentioned as an important reason for violent conflict in Africa where most of the weapons have been transported (Knight, 2010: 32). Knight and Özerdem (2004) identify two types of DDR programs: demilitarization and the programs in transitional periods during peacebuilding. The former concerns the decrease of the number of militaries personnel after a victory of one of the warring parties. The latter takes place when no clear victory emerges and DDR programs are part of the peace agreement and peacebuilding process (ibid.: 500). The large number of ex-combatants still possessing weapons is a major threat to the stability, peace and democratization process in post-conflict countries. DDR programs are meant to remove this threat by helping to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants into the society. According to Ball and Van der Goor, DDR is the process of “demilitarizing official and unofficial armed groups by controlling and reducing the possession and use of arms, disbanding non-state armed groups, and; assisting former combatants to reintegrate into civilian life” (2006: 2). I will now continue by explaining disarmament, demobilization and reintegration separately.

The term disarmament refers to the “collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and groups within the civilian population in a conflict zone” (2010: 32). Furthermore, the term involves the storage or destruction of collected weapons, and de-mining (ibid.). Joanna Spear (2002) distinguishes two types of disarmament. The first is cooperative disarmament which is often the case when a peace agreement has taken place. The second is coercive disarmament which is practiced by clear victors in violent conflict or by international troops. Furthermore, the author argues that disarmament has two related goals, being the removal of the means of making war and thus preventing a restart of conflict, and shaping a stable environment which leads to an increase in confidence and security among (ex-)combatants (ibid.: 142). Spears also points to the socio-cultural role that certain weapons play in societies and the necessity to take that into account during the disarmament process (ibid.: 143). An often used strategy to disarm ex-combatants is weapons-for-cash programs. The UN has for example applied this approach in El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia and Nicaragua. Other methods are ‘weapons in exchange for development’ or strengthening the national socio-cultural norm against weapons (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 505).

Demobilization is defined as “the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the individual level, as the process of releasing combatants from a mobilized state” (Berdal, 1996: 39). The term implicates the complete disbanding or decreasing the size of armed units, and the shift from ‘combatant’ to ‘civilian’ (Knight, 2010: 32). The difficulty is that ex-combatants are often semi-literate and have no work skills or experience, because all they did during their mature years was fighting. Special attention should be given to specific groups, such as child soldiers or women who are often stigmatized which leads to reintegration problems into society. Ex-combatants with physical or psychological disabilities are also of particular concern (Spears, 1999: 6). The creation of a new single national armed force is often part of the peace agreement and demobilization process (2002: 147). The demobilization process could be roughly divided into three stages. The first stage involves registration and acquiring information of ex-combatants, often executed during cantonment. Cantonments are
presented in the literature as highly significant in demobilization. Former combatants have to wait in cantonments for a certain period before they are transported back to their communities in phased-out stages so that villages have time to absorb the former combatants. It is also important for the separation of child soldiers and mature soldiers. The second stage concerns pre-discharge orientation sessions to inform former combatants and their families about the changing situation, the DDR programs and the opportunities this creates. The third stage is more political and concerns the demonstration of the willingness to demobilize forces, which is an important process of confidence building (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 507).

The literature of DDR often mentions **reinsertion** as the crucial bridge between demobilization and reintegration. This is also in line with the view of the UN which approaches the long-term reintegration as a separate phase of DDR programs (Ball and Van der Goor, 2006: 2-3). During the DDR process ex-combatants lose their formal or informal income and therefore need special assistance to cover basic needs such as food, cloths, health care, children’s education, shelter or agricultural tools. Reinsertion is connected to demobilization and concerns assisting ex-combatants and their families with cash or material packages (2004: 510).

The last component is **reintegration** which is the longer-term social and economic process where former combatants obtain the status of ‘civilian’ in society (2006: 2). This involves the creation of jobs or provision of career training, repatriate refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP’s), and starts the process for truth and reconciliation (2010: 32). Scientists often place reinsertion under the label of reintegration. To avoid confusion, I will approach reintegration as the concept that also encompasses reinsertion.

In the next section I will elaborate on the theoretical framework. At first, I will explain the theory of Lyons (2002a; 2004; 2005a; 2005b) and secondly the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010) which will lead to the hypotheses.

### Theoretical framework

#### 2.3.1 Theory of Terrence Lyons: Demilitarizing Politics

In order to answer the research question I will use the theory of Lyons (2002a; 2002b; 2004; 2005a; 2005b). He developed a theory which focuses on post-conflict elections and the relationship between peacebuilding and democratization. Post-conflict elections are a significant part of these two deeper and longer-term processes (2002a: 5). The author uses ‘demilitarizing politics’ as the concept that captures elements of both peacebuilding and democratization, and focuses on the “importance of specific processes and policies that support the twin goals of war termination and democratization” (ibid.). The theory helps to explain the dualistic nature of post-conflict elections and looks at which processes support the demilitarizing of politics in order to achieve peaceful and democratic post-conflict elections. Lyons argues that it is more useful to look at the interrelated agendas of peacebuilding and democratization, than to focus on the preconditions for successful post-conflict elections which have been the focus of scholars such as Reilly (2002; 2006). Post-conflict situations concern the managing of the security and political dilemmas and dimensions through the process of demilitarizing politics. The peace agreement marks the start of the interrelated processes of peacebuilding and democratization. The role of the interim government or regime is critical in order to establish the right conditions for the elections, such as providing democratic institutions and support processes of demobilization. This is executed by the interim institutions in the post-conflict country, often established with the assistance of the international community (2002b: 221-222). While demilitarizing of politics takes time, it is also the crucial initial step to peacebuilding and democratization on short term. Lyons argues that “to the extent that politics can be demilitarized during the interregnum between the cease-fire and the postsettlement election, such elections are more likely to advance the goals of conflict resolution and democratization” (ibid.: 223). The process of
demilitarizing politics entails the creation of institutions and norms which are able to overcome the structures of war based on fear and insecurity. This is critical in order to achieve successful post-conflict elections (2002a: 13). The theory of demilitarizing politics consists of two main concepts: building democratic institutions and demobilization.

The transitional period between the peace agreements and post-conflict elections is the period when the creation of new democratic institutions starts. This is a difficult process because militias have to start playing a new role in society as political party in a democratic system and they also have to change their behavior and organization. Building democratic institutions includes the transformation of single party organizations and militias into political parties that know how to work in a multiparty competitive system. This transformation is also part of ‘demobilization’ which shows an overlap of the two concepts in this theory. Also, the creation of a new electoral commission is important to build confidence. Furthermore, the process entails the first steps to a liberal political order with independent courts, civil society and free media. Creating democratic institutions is a long-term process, however, it is crucial that the initial steps are taken in the transitional period which helps demilitarize politics (ibid.: 23-29).

The second concept is ‘demobilization’. Lyons uses the concept to capture the broader term DDR. He argues that whether post-conflict elections succeed depends on to what extent security dilemmas and threats of spoilers to the peace process can be managed in the short run. Demobilization helps to develop new institutions and norms, and build confidence among the parties, which contribute to democratization and reducing the threats to security (2002b: 226). Building confidence encourages combatants to take a personal risk and abandon their military capacity (2002a: 12). Lyons clarifies that the “rationale for demobilization and disarmament is the exchange of military capacity for political benefits” (2002a: 23). Military leaders lose their military capacity and consequently try reaching their goals and protecting their interests through a peaceful and political process (ibid.: 22). Lyons also points to the importance of DDR: “On the one hand, demobilization and related activities reduce the means by which civil wars are prosecuted and thereby reduce the chances that war will be rekindled. At the same time and perhaps more importantly, demobilization helps create an environment for confidence- and security-building and for the development of institutions and norms for nonviolent political competition” (2002b: 226-227).

This thesis builds on the theory of demilitarizing politics and explores ‘demobilization’, which captures the broader term of DDR, in the transitional period between the peace agreement and post-conflict elections in order to answer the research question and draw conclusions. I will now continue with explaining the DDR-theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010) which will result in testable hypotheses.

2.3.3 Theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis: DDR programs
Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis argue that we need to move away from the main focus of researchers on the performance of DDR, or whether all parts of the DDR programs are well implemented, to a focus on the impact of DDR in terms of building peace (2010: IX). The theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis gives a framework for how to measure “mechanisms leading from DDR to peacebuilding outcomes of interest” (ibid.: 39). This idea fits ideally in the purpose of this thesis. The framework is developed to analyze in detail the impact of DDR programs on the peace process and measure the effectiveness and implementation of the goals of the DDR programs (ibid.: 2). This is connected to the theory of ‘demilitarizing politics’ and the related concept ‘demobilization’ of Lyons.

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7 The term DDR is explained in detail in the previous pages.
8 The peace process entails the concepts peacebuilding and democratization which were discussed in the first pages of this chapter.
which focuses on the impact of DDR on post-conflict elections and its twin goals, namely peacebuilding and democratization. The theoretical framework of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis allows me to measure DDR programs in a specific case and investigate why this has eventually resulted into failed or successful post-conflict elections and thus obstructed or contributed to both peacebuilding and democratization. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis come up with six, sometimes overlapping, areas or mechanisms to investigate the impact of DDR on the processes of peacebuilding and democratization, which is captured by the mechanism of post-conflict elections. By identifying these mechanisms, they argue that they are more able to grasp and understand the complex issues at play better and answer the difficult question of ‘how does it work?’ instead of ‘does it work?’ (ibid.: 43). The six mechanisms to investigate are: war recurrence and the conflict-development nexus; violence and crime prevention; civic and political participation; healing wartime trauma; sequencing; and adverse effects (ibid.: 27). The first four mechanisms concern the effectiveness of DDR programs in achieving their various goals, while the last two mechanisms focus on what the best way is to implement the programs to achieve these goals. I will now explain the six mechanisms and give the related hypotheses and subdivisions which will be measured in the two case-studies.

The first mechanism is War Recurrence and the Conflict-Development Nexus (ibid.: 7-9; 28-30). The main goal of DDR programs is reducing the risk of war recurrence which is based on the idea of “the individual-level opportunity costs of war, and bargaining models emphasizing the importance of overcoming commitment problems to end conflict” (ibid.: 7). This mechanism focuses first on the risks of renewed civil war and the absence of violence between formerly fighting parties or combatants. This could be measured by the following indicators: recurrence of the same conflict, start of a new war in the same country, participation of former combatants in violent conflicts in other and often neighboring countries. Secondly, the mechanism looks at the increase in economic opportunities. Scholars argue that DDR “raises individuals’ opportunity costs to participating in conflict, thereby lowering the risk of war recurrence” (ibid.: 28). This implies that DDR for example leads to lower unemployment rates and rising incomes. Other indicators are (local) economic growth, level of infrastructure, educational enrollment and the level of doing business. A third focus of this mechanism is the potential of (re-)mobilization. Disarmament reduces the amount of weapons available in the country which makes it more difficult to remobilize and start a violent conflict. Indicators are the availability of weapons and ammunition, and reports of weapon ownership or access to these weapons by former combatants. Furthermore, demobilization concerns breaking the structure of armed groups and transform former combatants into civilians. The first mechanism of the theory, which is war recurrence and the conflict-development nexus, leads to the following hypothesis: \( H_1 \): DDR programs lead to a lower risk of war recurrence and therefore to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. The subdivisions are: (a) No violence is present between the formerly warring combatants or parties; (b) Economic opportunities and activities have increased; (c) The risk of (re-)mobilization has decreased.

The second mechanism is Violence and Crime Prevention (ibid.: 9-13; 31). The rationale is that DDR programs lead to reduced levels of crime and violence. This mechanism looks more at the micro-disarmament initiatives of DDR programs. Former combatants are often active in criminality after violent conflict. They still possess the needed weapons while alternatives to get basic needs are barely present. DDR programs try to improve the economic opportunities of former combatants. They also try to destroy weapons in order to reduce the number of weapons in the country. Burning weapons might have a psychological effect of moving away from a culture of weapons usage. Buy-back programs for weapons could also mean economic benefits for ex-combatants (ibid.: 10). Measuring

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\(^9\) The individual opportunity costs of civil war is a leading concept in the civil war theory of David Collier and Anke Hoeffler in their article ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’ (2000).
the crime rate could be done by looking at statistics on crime, imprisoned ex-combatants and the presence of violent behavior. An indicator for insecurity is the availability of small arms and the number of people killed (ibid.: 35). The second mechanism of the theory results in the following hypothesis: \( H^2: \) DDR programs reduce the level of post-war violence as well as criminal activity and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. The mechanism has two subdivisions: (a) DDR programs lead to lower crime rates; (b) DDR programs lead to a lower insecurity level.

**Civic and Political Participation** is the third mechanism of the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010: 13-17; 31-32). Measuring the effects of DDR on civic and political participation is to investigate “whether political incorporation of armed groups and individual ex-combatants reduces the likelihood that they will resort to arms in the future” (ibid.: 31). The third mechanism has naturally become a goal of DDR, however, not as obvious as preventing war recurrence as well as reducing violence and crime. Especially the elements demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration can influence the participation through three mechanisms. On the meso-level DDR programs could influence political incorporation and opportunities by, for example, converting armed groups into political organizations. On the micro-level, DDR could stimulate political engagement by creating skill-development and resources for civilians and ex-combatants. Indicators are voter turnout, political party membership or participation in civic associations. On the macro-level DDR programs could increase the legitimacy of a new post-war political order by facilitating the exchange of information between authorities, citizens and former combatants about post-conflict policies. This contributes to the transparency regarding the new policies and the post-conflict process as a whole, which increases confidence in and the legitimacy of the government. This mechanism leads to the third hypothesis: \( H^3: \) DDR programs increase civic and political participation of former armed groups as well as combatants and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. The three subdivisions are: (a) DDR increases the political opportunities and incorporation; (b) DDR increases the political engagement; (c) DDR increases the legitimacy of the government.

The fourth mechanism is **Healing Wartime Trauma**. The violence and horrors experienced by both civilians and combatants during civil war might lead to profound trauma with long-term effects. It has negative psychological effects as well as negative consequences for the society and economic development. Furthermore, the traumas have the potential for recurrence of violence or even war (ibid.: 17). DDR programs could reduce wartime trauma in several ways. It can support a cognitive break with the violent past by for example destroy arms and organize demobilization ceremonies which gives ex-combatants the possibility to step away from experienced or committed war abuses. It could also lead to a greater acceptance of returning ex-combatants by civilians. Also, specific educational programs could result in a break with the past. Measuring this mechanism is difficult, especially when fieldwork is not possible due to time, space and money constraints. Healing wartime trauma is often a long term process. However, the DDR programs should make the first step to overcome the trauma and give confidence to ex-combatants and civilians that peace will remain in the country. According to Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis healing wartime trauma could be measured by looking at, for example, the presence and success of social reintegration programs. Indicators for reconciliation are civilian acceptance of ex-combatants, ex-combatant acceptance of former enemies, and interaction between former enemies. Furthermore, disarmament, demobilization and the opinion of ex-combatants and civilians are indicators of breaking with the past. This mechanism leads to the following hypothesis: \( H^4: \) DDR programs contribute to healing wartime trauma and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. The subdivisions are: (a) DDR supports the process of breaking with the past; (b) DDR contributes positively to reconciliation; (c) DDR leads to social reintegration.
The fifth mechanism is not so much about the goals of DDR programs, but rather the sequencing within the process. An important question here is whether the components of the DDR programs with security goals should be given priority over the components with development goals (ibid.: 20). On which component should policy makers concentrate their resources? On improving the security conditions in order to increase economic growth which reduces the risk of violent conflict, or on improving the development conditions in order to establish a basis for improving security conditions (ibid.: 21)? So should disarmament, as an important component to increase the security level, be a precondition for successful demobilization and subsequently reintegration? Some scholars argue that disarmament could be problematic and pose a threat to the stability of peace, because disarmed groups become vulnerable to attacks. Another explanatory factor is that the chance of a withdrawal of the peace agreement by the opposition increases because the disarmed group has lost its threat of violence. The argument here is that disarming and removing command and control structures of armed groups must not be a pre-condition, because the presence of armed and mobilized groups might create a balance of power and “may force incumbents to comply peacefully with transitions they would otherwise seek to reverse” (ibid.: 22). This ‘development-first’ approach believes that reintegration must be executed alongside or before disarmament and demobilization (ibid.: 33). An opposite argument is that groups in post-war situations have low mutual trust and when weapons are still available, it becomes relative easy to start a renewed conflict. This ‘security-first’ logic embraces the approach that disarmament and demobilization give opportunities to build confidence between the warring parties which eventually leads to peace (ibid.). So the question here is whether DDR programs should focus first on security and secondly on development or vice versa. Sequencing could be measured by looking at which sequence was executed in a particular case and what the result of this was. Another indicator is the level of confidence or trust of commanders, politicians and armed groups (ibid.: 33-34). This is divided firstly in confidence building, which is “level of trust that principal commanders and politicians linked to the armed groups have in their opponents”, and secondly the stakes in peace, which is defined by Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis as the “level of trust in relation to politicians and commanders commitment to the peace process” (ibid.) This fifth mechanism leads to the following hypothesis: $H^5$: DDR programs that focus firstly on security and secondly on development, lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. The subdivisions are: (a) Sequence and outcome; (b) Level of confidence.

The sixth and last mechanism of the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis is called Adverse Effects. In order to investigate the impact of DDR programs and its assumed relation with peacebuilding, it is important to take the possible positive aspects of armed groups into account and look at the adverse effects of the DDR programs (ibid.: 25). The authors mention four possible adverse effects. First, there is a tendency that all things related to armed groups are negative. However, this overlooks the potential positive impacts these groups could have in for example the fields of providing security or other services. Disarmament and demobilization could lead to lower levels of security because the armed groups took care of this before the program. Furthermore, combatants from the same group may trust each other much more than DDR program personnel or civilians. The social capital of armed groups may be helpful in re-integrating combatants. Disarmament and demobilization might lead to a lower security level and loss of social capital (ibid.: 23-24). Secondly, DDR programs could create instability on the macro-level, especially if DDR is executed incompletely. The level of trust in opponent groups, former-combatants and the DDR process in general is important here, because combatants have to abandon their weapons and ‘safe’ group which contributes to a feeling of insecurity. A solution is the presence of a third party, often the UN, to control the process (ibid.). Thirdly, DDR programs have the potential to activate certain tensions between civilians and ex-combatants. Civilians often fear possible abuse of re-integrated ex-combatants. This could be enlarged when civilians are included in disarming programs. Furthermore, the material benefits provided to ex-
combatants might lead to negative perceptions of the civilians to the peace process because they argue that ex-combatants have a privileged position. This could “undermine the legitimacy of the peace process and the post-war government as a whole” (ibid.: 25). Fourthly, and most importantly, “DDR programs could unwittingly create incentives for groups and individuals to engage in violence or other actions undermining the peace, or in behaviors detrimental to development” (ibid.). This could count for civilians and ex-combatants. They could take advantage of the certain components of the program to enrich themselves, with money or weapons, which could lead to new violence and instability (ibid.: 23). The sixth hypothesis is: 

\[ H^6: \text{The adverse effects of DDR programs lead to a lower chance of successful post-conflict elections.} \]

The subdivisions are: (a) DDR programs eliminate the positive effects of armed groups regarding the security level and their potential of social capital; (b) DDR programs lead to instability on the macro-level; (c) DDR programs lead to tensions between civilians and ex-combatants; (d) DDR programs generate perverse incentives which leads to violence and instability on the short and long term.

Now that the mechanisms and hypotheses are known I will give a short summary of the variables and theoretical framework that will be used in this research.

2.4 Conclusion: research question and variables

This research will test six hypotheses in order to answer the following research question: To what extent have disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs led to successful post-conflict elections in Mozambique and Angola?

The research question will be investigated by applying the theory of ‘demilitarizing politics’ of Lyons (2002a; 2004; 2005a; 2005b). He argues that politics, to a certain extent, can be demilitarized during the interregnium between the cease-fire and the post-settlement elections. Such elections are more likely to advance the interlinked goals of peacebuilding and democratization. Demobilization, which captures the elements of DDR, is the leading concept in the theory as well as in this research. Lyons argues that whether post-conflict elections succeed depends on to what extent security dilemmas and threats of spoilers to the peace process can be managed in the short run. This research will investigate ‘demobilization’ which is the independent variable. It influences the dependent variable which is successful post-conflict elections and is defined as ‘the first elections after civil war that achieves the goals of peacebuilding and democratization’. The goal peacebuilding is defined as ‘to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’. Peace will be approached as the ‘absence of violence’. The goal of democratization is defined as ‘free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees’. To measure the dependent variable I will look at to what extent the post-conflict goals of peacebuilding and democratization were reached in the time-period until five years after the elections.

The independent variable will be investigated through the six mechanisms of DDR described by Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010) in the transitional period between the peace agreement and post-conflict elections in order to answer the research question and draw the conclusions. The hypotheses are related to these mechanisms which will allow me to measure to what extent and how DDR programs impact the peace process in post-conflict countries as well as the successfulness of the post-conflict elections. The following chapters will deal with the case-studies beginning with the case of Mozambique in the next chapter.

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10 The approach of peace as ‘absence of violence’ comes from the concept negative peace from Johan Galtung. I use negative instead of positive peace because after a civil war it lasts many years before positive peace could be settled. It would not be realistic to approach peace in this research as positive peace.
3. Mozambique

3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will investigate the case of Mozambique. I will start by giving a general background of Mozambique, including the period of civil war. Secondly, I will briefly explain the role of the UN and ONUMOZ during the transitional phase. Next, I will analyze the found evidence for the six mechanisms which will lead to the verification or falsification of the hypotheses. Furthermore, I will analyze the post-conflict elections and the period five years thereafter in order to measure to what extent the post-conflict elections failed or succeeded. The final section of this chapter will contain the conclusion.

3.2 Background Mozambique
3.2.1 General background
Mozambique is located north of South-Africa, east of Zimbabwe and west of the Indian Ocean. Portugal arrived five hundred years ago in Mozambique and officially ‘received’ the country at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 (Berman, 1996: 7). In 1964, the nationalist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed a group in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and fought during ten years against Portugal for the Mozambican independence. In early 1974 there was a coup d’état in Lisbon, the capital of Portugal, which speeded up the decolonization process, and a few months later, in 1975, Mozambique was declared independent (HRW, 1992: 19-20). Thereafter, FRELIMO set up a single-party regime in Mozambique (Manning and Malbrough, 2009: 78). Samora Machel became the President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique and ruled the country in a strict and violent way. He attempted to implement Marxist-Leninist policies which led to widespread dissatisfaction, especially in the rural areas (Tollenaere, 2006: 2). He banned traditional authorities, like chiefs, and sent ‘unproductive’ residents from the cities to re-education camps. The secret police ensured that anyone who was suspected of anti-government feelings or activities was sent to the re-education camps as well (1992: 21). An important factor for the further course of Mozambican history was the measures that Machel undertook against the white-rule in Rhodesia. He implemented an embargo in Mozambique on trade to and from landlocked Rhodesia. This affected the Ian Smith regime, but also the tens of thousands Mozambicans who relied on the trade with Rhodesia (1996: 13). Machel also supported ZANLA, a guerrilla group that fought against the Rhodesian government, and allowed them to operate from Mozambican territory. However, the Ian Smith regime started to use the disgruntled Mozambicans to stop the ZANLA insurgency. This was the first step of the creation of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAIMO) and the start of the Mozambican Civil War (2006: 2).

3.2.2 Mozambican civil war
The Ian Smith regime encouraged and supported the guerilla movement RENAMO until Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. South Africa took over the task to support RENAMO which was part of the apartheids regimes program to destabilize the black ruled neighboring countries. This became a

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11 ONUMOZ: United Nations Mission in Mozambique
12 See page 19 for the map of Mozambique.
13 Rhodesia was ruled by a white minority under the lead of Prime Minister Ian Smith until 1979 when Robert Mugabe took power and changed the name of the country into the Republic Zimbabwe. Mugabe is currently still the President of Zimbabwe.
14 ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) was the guerrilla movement of Robert Mugabe, who later defeated the Ian Smith regime and became the new president of Rhodesia or Republic Zimbabwe.
15 The support of South-Africa included for example the supply of weapons, payment of RENAMO commanders, and training of RENAMO troops by South-African Special Forces in South-African military bases.
public and more structural problem to FRELIMO than the former back up of Rhodesia (Manning and Malbrough, 2009: 79). The external support to RENAMO was important. However, the guerrilla group also received increasing internal support due to widespread popular dissatisfaction with the FRELIMO rule (Hall and Young, 1997: 126). Afonso Dhlakama became the new leader of RENAMO in 1980. In two years the guerrilla group had grown from five hundred to eight thousand combatants who were better equipped than the Mozambican army and were fighting in ten provinces. Dhlakama started a political program in 1981 and argued to be fighting for a multi-party democracy and privatized liberal economy (HRW, 1992: 27). In 1986, FRELIMO signed the Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact with South-Africa, in which was stated that Mozambican support to the opposition party in South-Africa and South-African support to RENAMO had to be abandoned (Tollenaere, 2006: 2). However, still many wealthy individuals from South-Africa supported RENAMO financially and logistically (2009: 80).

President Machel died in a suspicious plane crash in 1986 and was succeeded by former Prime Minister Joaquim Chissano, who was more diplomatic and pragmatic than his predecessor. He was willing to change the policy (Newitt, 2002: 216) and offered RENAMO combatants amnesty which resulted in the turnover of weapons to the government by 3000 combatants. However, still approximately 20,000 combatants remained active in the guerilla group (Berman, 1996: 18).

The strategy of RENAMO was to “destroy or undermine whatever could be perceived as a government effort to provide products and services to the population” (2006: 2). In order to reach this goal they used widespread violence, including sexual violence, and committed atrocities (ibid.). They became notorious because of their policy of mutilating civilian victims, including children, in order to show RENAMO’s strength and weaken the power of FRELIMO symbolically (1992: 28). On the other hand RENAMO gained legitimacy by reinstalling traditional and religious leaders (2006: 2). Also, FRELIMO acted brutally upon the population and used arbitrary violence against those who were suspected of collaborating with RENAMO (ibid.). Approximately one million people lost their lives due to the Mozambican civil war, it caused 4.5 million displaced persons within the country and 1.5 million refugees who went to neighboring countries (Francisco and Connerley, 2005: 200). Furthermore, the economic and social infrastructure were totally destroyed and the country went bankrupt (1992: 41).

Various factors contributed to the start of the peace negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Firstly, international support to either FRELIMO or RENAMO became political unacceptable due to the brutal operation methods of both groups. Also, the end of the apartheid regime, which was in support of RENAMO, was important as well as the end of the Cold War and the influence of the Soviet Union, which supported FRELIMO. Together with the positive response on offered amnesty, and a devastating famine and drought, these factors led to the end of the immediate violent threat of RENAMO. The increasing focus of FRELIMO on private capital instead of socialist policies, the increasing pressure of the international community on President Chissano to establish a political accord and the decreasing threat by RENAMO combatants resulted into the GPA (1996: 21).

The peace negotiations started in Rome in 1990. Chissano received support from the Party Congress to further liberalize the economy, increase freedom in politics and religion, and start a dialogue with RENAMO. Furthermore, Dhlakama started the peace talks with support of the RENAMO Party Congress (ibid.: 22). On 4 October 1992 both parties signed the GPA which included among others the formation of a new army, DDR programs and multiparty elections. The elections

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16 Dhlakama was a Catholic-educated son of a traditional chief.
17 FRELIMO supported the African National Congress (ANC) in their battle against the apartheid regime in South-Africa.
18 The mutilation included cutting of ears, lips, noses and sexual organs.
19 The peace agreements are often called ‘Rome accord’.
were supposed to be held in October 1993 but were eventually extended to October 1994 (2009: 81). Both sides had to make compromises, but also obtained their most important goal: RENAMO was recognized as a formal political party and FRELIMO was recognized as the formal legitimate government of Mozambique (2002: 222).

3.3 ONUMOZ

3.3.1 The mission

The UN and international donors played a crucial role in the implementation and monitoring of the GPA. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established ONUMOZ by Resolution 797 in December 1992. The ONUMOZ mandate was as followed:

Table I: ONUMOZ Mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-To facilitate impartially the implementation of the agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subordinate commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>-To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>-To authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures</td>
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<tr>
<td>-To provide security for the UN and other international activities in support of the peace process, especially in the appointed corridors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-To coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized personnel and the affected local population, and, in this context, to chair the Humanitarian Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The operation consisted of a 6800-soldiers strong peacekeeping force and an observation mission with extensive financial support from the international community (Manning and Malbrough, 2009: 82). However, it took the UN eight months after the signing of the GPA to get the full military component on the ground which resulted, together with many other factors, into one year delay of the DDR process and post-conflict elections (Berman, 1996: 30). The ONUMOZ mandate formally ended on 9 December 1994, two months after the elections.

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3.3.2 DDR component

DDR was seen as the most important and a crucial component of ONUMOZ. More than 80,000 armed combatants and many more weapons were spread across the country at the moment that the GPA was signed (Alden, 2002: 341). The day that the GPA was incorporated in the Mozambican law is known as ‘E-Day’. This day was marked as the first day of the DDR process and the following steps had to be taken. First, the two armed groups had to be separated. Secondly, the locations for disarmament and demobilization had to be selected. 29 FRELIMO assembly areas (AAs) and twenty RENAMO AAs were established. The combatants from both groups had to register with the UN at one of the selected AAs or, as an exception, in non-assembly areas, known as CTNAs (Berman, 1996: 59-61). The AAs were meant to provide the soldiers shelter and provisions for a few weeks and to start basic classes in civic and literacy education (2002: 343). The choice was either to join the Mozambique Defense Force (FADM), which became the new integrated national army, or to be demobilized and start a new life in society as civilian (1996: 59-61). The Cease-fire Commission (CCF) played an essential role in cantonment and demobilization of the troops (UN, 1995: 38). The CCF had thirty days after E-Day to define who would be demobilized. The goal was to finish the process of demobilization or entering the FADM 180 days after E-day. In practice, this timetable was not realistic and was extended several times (Berman, 1996: 59-61). Eventually, the cantonment of troops in AAs effectively started in November 1993 (Coelho and Vines, 1994: 1).

The Technical Unit (TU) for demobilization was a civilian team and directly responsible to Aldo Ajello, who was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Mozambique (Synge, 1997: 50). The TU was crucial for the execution of the DDR program. It cooperated with the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) and was responsible for the distribution of basic needs in the AAs such as food, medicines and clothing, coordination of the database and distribution of identity cards that included photograph (Van den Bergh, 2009: 54) to demobilized combatants, and transport of ex-soldiers to their homes (UN, 1995: 39; Synge, 1997: 50).

The reintegration component of the DDR program was implemented during the mission and entailed a monthly subsidy during eighteen months, a ‘kit’, and training. The Reintegration and Support Scheme (RSS) was responsible for the monthly subsidy. The rationale was that this would provide the ex-combatants with a ‘safety net’ that guarantees a standard income over a longer period, which could not be spent at once. The ‘kit’ contained a hoe, bucket and seeds, because the belief was that most combatants used to be peasants and would restart their lives as peasants when they return home (Alden, 2002: 344).

I will now continue with describing and analyzing the evidence for the first of the six mechanisms in Mozambique.

3.4 Evidence

3.4.1 War recurrence and the conflict-development nexus

The first mechanism argues that DDR leads to a lower risk of war recurrence. This mechanism is divided into three subdivisions. I will now analyze the obtained evidence for the three subdivisions.

The first subdivision is to what extent violence is present between the formerly warring combatants or parties. In general the evidence shows that no new violent conflict emerged between FRELIMO and RENAMO after the peace agreements were signed. Walter argues that RENAMO “did not return to war because the Rome Accord had allowed RENAMO to retain sufficient political power

22 FADM is the abbreviation of Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique.
23 CCF is the abbreviation of Comissão de Cessar Fogo.
24 The mechanism of War Recurrence and the Conflict-Development Nexus is explained more in detail on page 15.
to challenge FRELIMO in the next elections” (1999: 149). The presence of UN troops provided the feeling that the UN could use their force to prevent a recurrence of conflict. However, Manning and Malbrough (2009: 84) point to the relatively small number and low level of effectiveness of UN’s military component, which would not have been able to stop a large outbreak of violence between FRELIMO and RENAMO.²⁵ This was never tested in the field, because there was no real threat of an outbreak of a new war (ibid.). Amnesty International (AI) reported several small violent incidents between RENAMO and government troops, such as the arresting and killing of RENAMO members by government troops regarding territory control disputes (1994: 5). Nevertheless, after the peace agreements were signed, the violent conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO ended both on paper and in practice and did not return. Furthermore, according to the Centre for Systemic Peace, no new violent conflict has emerged in Mozambique since 1992.²⁶ Synge confirms this by stating that: “The Mozambican generals and politicians on the whole remained committed to the peace agreement they had negotiated and signed in Rome. Once the soldiers on the two sides of the conflict were successfully and voluntarily demobilized, the risk of a return to war was effectively eliminated” (1997: 10). In Mozambique’s neighboring countries no violent conflict was present in the years after the GPA. Only in South-Africa the anti-apartheids fighting continued until 1996, according to the standards of the Centre of Systemic Peace.²⁷ However, due to the Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact, no Mozambican combatants were fighting in the South-African conflict.

In short, I found no evidence in neither primary nor secondary sources that FRELIMO or RENAMO combatants went to neighboring countries to contribute to violent conflict. Although some minor violent incidents between FRELIMO and RENAMO combatants in Mozambique occurred during the transitional period, in general I can conclude that no violent conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO recurred, nor did a new war emerge in Mozambique.

The second subdivision is to what extent economic opportunities and activities have increased. The Mozambican Civil War had a devastating effect on the economy with an estimated material damage to the economy of over twenty billion USD. When the war ended Mozambique was one of the poorest countries in the world and around sixty percent of the population lived in extreme poverty (Fransisco and Connerley, 2005: 200). Figures show that the Mozambican economy has grown very fast since the war ended. Between 1993 and 2001 it grew annually with an average of 8.4% according to the World Bank figures, which was one of the highest average growth rates in Sub-Sahara Africa (Stern, 2002: 55). Furthermore, the real Gross National Product (GNP) grew with an annual average rate of 4.9% (Ardeni, 1999: 5). The government’s expenditures on education and health increased from 4.09 million USD in 1990, to 13.40 million USD in 1992, to 39.62 million USD in 1994. This resulted in a school enrollment growth from 60 percent in 1993 to 66 percent in 1995 and eventually to more than 100 percent in 2005.²⁸ In more relative terms in 1990 13.8 percent of the total government expenditure went to health and education, while this number was increased to 22.7 percent in 1994 (2005: 202). The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) statistics show the economic progress (ibid.: 200). FDI grew

²⁵ Approximately 6000 UN troops versus an estimated total of 90.000 armed FRELIMO and RENAMO troops.
²⁶ (http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm), visited on 29-12-2012. The Centre for Systemic Peace maintains a list of all countries in the world that went through armed conflict since 1946. They define an armed conflict as a conflict that involves at least 500 directly-related fatalities and reach a level of 100 directly-related deaths per annum. This includes inter- and intrastate, civil, ethnic, communal and warfare violence.
²⁷ See footnote 26 for explanation of used standards.
²⁸ (http://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique), visited on 31-12-2012. This is the primary school gross enrolment ratio (GER). Total is the total enrollment in primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.
from 25.3 million USD in 1992, to 35 million USD in 1994, to even 381 million USD in 1999.\(^{29}\) One of the most important demands of RENAMO during the peace negotiations was that FRELIMO would start the liberalization of the economy. This commenced in the early nineties which is generally perceived as the driving factor of the economic progress (Bertelsen, 2005: 42).

In contrast to these positive figures, hardly any improvements were made in the transport and communication system after the end of the war. For example, between 1990 and 1997 the percentage of paved roads increased only with two percent from seventeen to nineteen percent (Ardenia, 1999: 21). Another crucial point is that the economic growth was uneven, which leads to misleading figures. Ardenia found evidence that the economic growth was mainly a result of the development of the industry and service sector, while the rural sector strongly lagged behind. This means that only a small part of the population was able to profit from the growth because 4/5 of the total and 96% of the female labor force worked in the rural sector (1999: 13). Ardenia argues that in the years after war the “economic growth process looks unbalanced, with a neglected agricultural sector, a penalized distribution sector, and an almost forgotten education sector” (1999: 21). Fransisco and Connerley argue that Mozambique was making progress in the post-war economic situation, but still had a risk of renewed conflict because mainly the political and economic governing elite profited from the economic growth, which “breeds discontent and fosters political intolerance” (2005: 208). Unfortunately, there are hardly any figures available about unemployment and poverty in the years after the peace agreements. However, World Bank figures show that 69.4 percent lived below the national poverty line in 1996, which shows the critical situation in which the largest part of the population in those years.\(^{30}\) In 2002, this was decreased to 54.1 percent (Brück and Van den Broeck, 2006: 14).\(^{31}\)

It is crucial to analyze what kinds of actions were taken to integrate former combatants into the economy and how this worked out. Various programs were set up and funded by different agencies.\(^{32}\) Firstly, the monthly subsidy of the RSS to demobilized ex-soldiers was, although some implementation problems led to delays, a success because it gave the ex-combatants time and money to integrate into society (Alden, 2002: 346). Around seventy percent of the enrolled demobilized combatants were employed when the program ended (McMullin, 2004: 629). Secondly, the Information and Referral Service (IRS) provided job assistance and counseling to demobilized soldiers and received over 40,000 visits (2002: 344, 347). According to GTZ the IRS had a very positive result because it provided “ex-combatants with a realistic idea of their prospects and chances on the labour market” (2004: 78).\(^{33}\) Thirdly, the Occupational Skills Development (OSD) program was less successful due to a lack of information about the market and level of education of demobilized soldiers. It provided vocational training in order to learn skills to find gainful employment. Around 6,000 demobilized soldiers, which is seventy percent of the total combatants that enrolled in this program, secured employment (ibid.: 347). The fourth program is the Provincial Fund, which started in late 1994 when ONUMOZ was ended. It provided ex-combatants with a small grant in support of entrepreneurial activities. The results were mixed with successful and failed examples (ibid.: 347-348).

\(^{29}\) [http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/mozambique/foreign-direct-investment], visited on 29-12-2012.

\(^{30}\) [http://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique], visited on 31-12-2012. National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.

\(^{31}\) The first serious research on poverty in Mozambique was executed in 1996.

\(^{32}\) So not only the UN agencies were involved in training and reintegration programs, but also various NGO’s were active in this field.

\(^{33}\) GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenheit) is an organization with large experience in the field of DDR in Africa since 1990.
In short, the evidence shows that in the transition phase the Mozambican economy made important progress with economic liberalization and growth in GDP, school enrollment, government expenditures in health and education, and FDI. However, important to notice is that the growth was unbalanced and the rural population marginalized. The evidence also shows that the various reintegration programs made a positive contribution to enhance the economic opportunities of former combatants which decreased the overall risk of war recurrence. This corresponds with the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010) which emphasizes the individual opportunity costs. Short-term income assistance to ex-soldiers and longer-term assistance to improve the employment opportunities, reduced the overall risk that ex-combatants would start a new conflict. Together with the general economic growth this was crucial in reducing the risk of civil war because it increased the individual-level opportunity cost to participate in the conflict.

The third subdivision is the potential of (re-)mobilization, which focuses on to what extent combatants were disarmed, the availability of weapons, and to what extent the structure of the armed groups was broken due to demobilization. First, I will analyze the process of demobilization and after that analysis I will discuss disarmament.

Demobilization is essential in reducing the risk of war because it eliminates the ties between ex-combatants and their command structure (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 8). This ‘delinking’ reduces the possibility to (re-)mobilize in the event of a recurrence of war and contributes to peace if it facilitates social reintegration (ibid.: 53). The demobilization process in Mozambique was initially scheduled to be finished on 15 April 1993. This timetable proved to be over-optimistic. The separation and cantonment of troops was more complicated than originally was thought, which resulted in the extension of cantonment and delays in demobilization (Coelho and Vines, 1994: 4). The problems started with the selection of the AAs, which eventually took more than a year. On 10 November 1992 the CCF had identified 49 AAs and it was announced that 61,638 of FRELIMO troops and 21,000 of RENAMO troops were to be cantoned (ibid.). However, the identified AAs were often not suitable for cantonment and demobilization. The sites were chosen by FRELIMO and RENAMO for the wrong purposes: “They had been designated more for their strategic importance in controlling certain areas than for their suitability for cantonment” (UN, 1995: 28). Some sites had no access to water or could only be reached by tracks that were mined (ibid.). The lack of trust between both parties played an important role in giving up strategic advantages to the other party (Bekoe, 2002: 60; 1994: 4). Other factors also played an important role in the delay of demobilization. First of all, the installment of ONUMOZ troops was delayed due to UN budget problems and slow screening of personnel (Synge, 1997: 37-38). Secondly, the delay was caused by negotiations between the UN and Mozambican government to conclude a status-of-forces agreement, which concerned the free movement of UN troops in the country. This was eventually signed in May 1993 (1995: 27). A third problem was that both FRELIMO and RENAMO failed to deliver the complete lists of the troop strength, ammunition and arms (ibid.: 28). In October 1993, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghaly himself went to Mozambique to put pressure on FRELIMO and RENAMO to overcome the problems and proposed a new timetable. This stated that the concentration of troops was to begin in November 1993 and the start of demobilization in January 1994. Demobilization had to be finished in May 1994 and the new date for the post-conflict elections was set on the end of October 1994 (ibid.: 136-37). Nevertheless, the situation on the ground again led to an extension of the time schedule. On 21 February all AAs were finally open for cantonment and in mid-April more than 49,000 soldiers were registered in the AAs and CTNAs. Not every AA or CTNA was prepared to handle large numbers of soldiers, which led to overcrowding and shortages of food in some areas. In some AAs incidents of riots by FRELIMO soldiers, who wanted more payment, were reported (ibid.: 39). On 10 March demobilization officially began (1994: 20). In July 59,000 soldiers were registered in AAs, from
which 28,000 soldiers were demobilized and 4800 soldiers joined the FADM (1997: 100). This meant that still a large number of soldiers was not registered or demobilized while the post-conflict elections quickly approached. In the next weeks many troops were assembled while demobilization went slower. This led to violent problems in many AAs. Various factors contributed to the violence: combatants were tired of waiting\textsuperscript{34}; the desire to be demobilized; need for additional clothing and food; uncertainty about the future (Coelho and Vines, 1994: 17; Synge, 1997: 100). A RENAMO colonel said that “the incidents had shown that the government and RENAMO camp commanders had no control over their troops” (1997: 100). Initially, both RENAMO and FRELIMO commanders had a vote in who of the soldiers had to be integrated into the new army or would be demobilized. This dependency was an important factor in the presence of riots and unrest in the AAs. In order to stop the chaos the parties decided to give the soldiers the freedom to choose either demobilization or integration in FADM for themselves. The decision to implement an additional eighteen months payment for demobilized ex-combatants also proved an important incentive to demobilize (ibid.: 66). Consequently, most combatants chose demobilization and the reintegration package instead of an uncertain life in the new army (ibid.: 103). Demobilization now proceeded very quickly and on 15 August all AAs were closed according to plan, while the last 3713 soldiers were demobilized or recruited for the FADM at the very same day. This also was the case for the 13,000 soldiers at the CTNAs (ibid.). By November 1994 the total number of demobilized soldiers from AAs and CTNAs was 78,078, from which 57,540 were FRELIMO and 20,538 were RENAMO soldiers (UN, 1995: 41). The UN labeled the demobilization process as a success. Although it is hard to be sure that all combatants of FRELIMO and RENAMO were demobilized and how many precisely were not registered, it is certain that more than 98 percent of the former combatants were either demobilized or joined the FADM (1997: 108).

Two factors were important in the successful outcome of demobilization. The first was the will of the combatants themselves to step out of the military command structure. This is shown by the riots, the lack of control of the commanders and the combatants wish to choose personally for civil life. Secondly, the addition of an 18-month payment to the reintegration packages, financed by the international community, was an important incentive for combatants to demobilize and start a new civil life. Furthermore, various problems occurred during the demobilization process, which even resulted in the extension of the elections and threatening of peace. Nevertheless, in the end demobilization succeeded and resulted in the breaking of the command structure of RENAMO and FRELIMO, and transformed combatants into civilians.

Next to demobilization, disarmament is also believed to be an essential process in post-conflict situations because it makes it harder for groups to turn to violence (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 30). The large amount of present weapons after the GPA was problematic. The fighting parties did receive arms in excess during the civil war, and distributed them to both the militia groups as the civilian population (Nkiwane et al., 1999: 14). It is estimated that millions of weapons were spread across the country at the end of the war.

Disarmament was “implicit in the concept of demobilization” (UNIDIR, 1996: 32).\textsuperscript{35} Weapons from ex-combatants were issued when they were demobilized before entering civil life, or after reintegrating in the FADM (ibid.). The linkage of disarmament to demobilization limited the ONUMOZ mandate, in which it was stated that the UN was only allowed to collect weapons from individual soldiers in the AAs. Arms collection also occurred in the CTNAs. However, this was done

\textsuperscript{34} Some waited for 8 months in the AAs before they were demobilized.

\textsuperscript{35} UNIDIR is the abbreviation of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
by the combatants themselves and had hardly any international supervision because it was outside the UN mandate. That means that “in so far as hidden caches and weapons outside the assembly areas were implicitly excluded, it proved impossible to undertake anything approaching a comprehensive disarmament of the warring parties, let alone civilians in a polity which had become deeply militarized and well-armed over the course of the civil war” (1996: 33). In short, the limited mandate to collect arms from soldiers only in AAs and to store and destroy them obstructed the disarmament process in general. For example, many weapon caches of FRELIMO and RENAMO were located outside the assembly area’s which meant that ONUMOZ could not inspect them. In the end, not even this limited UN mandate was achieved due to several reasons. First of all, the UN applied the ‘one soldier-one weapon’ principle which means that every registered combatant had to hand in one weapon (ibid.). However, most soldiers possessed more than one weapon and handed over their weapon in poorest condition, while keeping their best weapons (1999: 21). Secondly, there was no political will of FRELIMO and RENAMO to surrender their weapons completely. Obtained evidence showed that both parties “had established arms caches around the country, possibly for use in the event of a return to war” (Synge, 1997: 109). Both parties obstructed the process of counting and investigation of the presence and availability of weapons. Thirdly, the storage of the collected weapons was unsafe. Initially the weapons were stored in the AAs, where many weapons were stolen and returned in civilian or criminal possession (1999: 22). Due to unrest in various AAs the weapons were transported to three Regional Arms Depot’s (RAD), allocated and protected by the UN (Berman, 1996: 73). However, when the UN left the country, many weapons from the RADs fell into the hands of criminals and arms traffickers (UNIDIR, 1996: 36). An important reason for this was the regional demand, mainly from South-Africa and Zimbabwe, for weapons and “the local market for the rental of weapons on an informal and ad hoc basis” (Pike and Taylor, 2000: 16). It is important to mention that the UN failed to establish an arms embargo on Mozambique, which means in practice that the UN tried to implement disarmament while RENAMO and FRELIMO could easily bring new weapons into the country (Oosthuysen, 1996: 49).

The initial plan was that the FADM would absorb a large part of the collected weapons and the rest would be destroyed. Coelho and Vines argue that delays in the creation of the FADM led to the failure of this plan which eventually resulted in the fact that “hundreds, and possibly thousands, of arms caches remain throughout the country, representing a serious risk to stability” (1994: 58). In the end the number of collected military equipment in both AAs and CTNAs was 111.531, including 157 tanks and 30 artillery weapons. Furthermore, 46.193 weapons were registered during the verification phase (Berman, 1996: 88), which was a mechanism to check (un)declared arms caches and depots (ibid.: 73). The verification phase was planned to take place in the months between the end of demobilization and the elections. However, due to the demobilization delays and the end of the ONUMOZ mandate in December 1994 verification was never finished (UN, 1995: 43). Furthermore, both RENAMO and FRELIMO obstructed the verification of arms caches by ONUMOZ, which resulted in the fact that for example around forty percent of RENAMO’s arms caches were not verified by ONUMOZ when they left (UNIDIR, 1996: 35). Colonel Segala reported on 19 September 1994 that the registered arms were now “posing a military as well as a political problem” as the large quantities “presented a potential for internal and external instability” (Synge, 1997: 110). It is estimated that still 40,000 demobilized soldiers remained armed. The motivation is in general criminal and personal gain (1999: 27). Furthermore, many demobilized soldiers knew where the arm caches were located. This was confirmed by the Association of War Demobilised Soldiers (AMODEG), who stated that “…most of the weapons in illegal supply are in the hands of demobilised soldiers, as they know where the weapons were cached” (Oosthuysen, 1996: 49). Another important argument not to

36 Colonel Segala was the CCF chairman.
disarm is the lack of confidence in the state to protect the citizens, which has been the case for decades during the civil war (Pike and Taylor, 2000: 16).

In short, the disarmament process in Mozambique failed. Synge concludes that “insufficient priority was given to the wider issues of control and collection” (ibid.: 111). The UN mandate was too weak to disarm the combatants and civilians. When the UN left the country, still millions of weapons were spread across the country and many ex-combatants and civilians either had easy access to or already possessed weapons. This remained a serious threat to the peace in Mozambique.

After analyzing the obtained evidence I have come to the conclusion for the first mechanism. Firstly, no civil war or violence was present between the formerly warring combatants or parties after the GPA. Neither were combatants active in neighboring violent conflicts. Secondly, the economic activities and opportunities increased. The evidence shows that the economy significantly grew, as well as the governments expenditures on health and education. Furthermore, the reintegration programs made a positive contribution to enhance the economic opportunities of former combatants. The short-term income assistance to ex-soldiers and longer-term assistance to improve the employment opportunities raised the individual opportunity costs of ex-combatants to restart violent conflict and thereby reduced the risk of war recurrence. Thirdly, evidence shows that on the one hand the risk of (re-)mobilization decreased because of the, in general, successful demobilization of ex-combatants. On the other hand, evidence shows that the risk of (re-)mobilization did not decrease because disarmament failed which meant that many ex-combatants and civilians still possessed or had access to weapons.

Taking all this evidence and the three subdivisions into account I conclude that even though disarmament failed the evidence confirms $H_1$ in the case of Mozambique. This means that in Mozambique DDR led to a lower risk of war recurrence and therefore to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

3.4.2 Post-war violence and crime

The second mechanism argues that DDR programs lead to a lower level of post-war violence and criminal activity. At first, I will look at the criminal activity and secondly at the level of violence in the transitional period in Mozambique.

Criminal activity is strongly linked to the availability of weapons in a country. Evidence shows that disarmament in Mozambique failed and that millions of weapons were in possession of or easy accessible to ex-combatants and civilians during and after the transitional period. It was also problematic that many demobilized combatants possessed knowledge of the location of the arms caches (Oosthuysen, 1996: 49). The weapons that were collected and stored during disarmament were not destroyed. The FADM obstructed the destruction of arms because it hoped to use the weapons for its own armory (ibid.: 44). Nkiwane points to the relation of the failing disarmament and rising violent crime: “That a rise in violent crime was taking place at the time was not taken into consideration: it was beyond the mandate” (1999: 20). The failing disarmament has strongly influenced illegal activity in Mozambique. Mainly the illegal cross-border weapon trade with South-Africa and other countries flourished, which had a negative impact on the level of security and stability in Mozambique as well as the entire region (Syenge, 1997: 112). Mozambique became a free trade area for illicit goods. Knight argues that in the years after the GPA “Mozambique constituted the single largest sources of

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37 $H_1$ (Hypotheses 1): DDR programs lead to a lower risk of war recurrence and therefore to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.
38 Chapter 3.4.1 gives the analysis of evidence regarding disarmament in Mozambique.
39 'Mandate' refers to the mandate of ONUMOZ.
small arms to the South African domestic market” (2004: 501). In order to analyze the criminal activity it is important to look at the statistics. They indicate that in 1994 the total reported crime was 26,063, in 1995 it was 35,160 and in 1996 the number was 37,725. The arms-related crimes grew from 1122 in 1994 to 1445 in 1995 and to 1,679 in 1996. That means that in three years general crime grew with 44 percent and the arms-related crime with 49.6 percent. Chachiua points to the inherent inaccuracy of these statistics. For example, homicide, physical harassment and drug trafficking are excluded in these figures, which suggests that the actual number should be much higher. Nevertheless, it does show the increase in general and arms-related crimes (1999a: 64). The weak institutional security is shown by the fact that between 1990 and 1998 only 37.2 percent of the reported crimes were submitted to the courts and that prisons were largely overcrowded (ibid.). Chachiua argues that “While appreciating that the underlying causes of the violence lie beyond the simple possession of a weapon, it has become clear that the widespread availability of weapons has exacerbated social violence” (1999a: 64). Not only weapons, but also the high levels of poverty and underdevelopment has led to “rising levels of crime and violence, a growing lawlessness and an increase in armed banditry amongst ex-combatants (UNIDIR, 1996: 91). In addition, Bertelsen concludes in his paper that the situation worsened in relation to violence and crime since the GPA (2005: 49). Furthermore, Oosthuysen obtained evidence trough various interviews with in Maputo based diplomats and international aid officials that crime was “definitely on the increase” in the years after the GPA (1996: 46).

Investigating the level of violence is difficult, because there are no clear figures. The increase in violent crime and easy access to weapons suggests an increase in the level of violence since the GPA. The ISS Towards Collaborative Peace (TCP) project team obtained evidence about availability of weapons and increase in crime and violence. One respondent pointed out that "... there were many weapons hidden on the ground but the bandits have taken them and the result is much violence" (Chachiua, 1999b: 28). The rise of violent crime, related to the failed disarmament, shows that violence was still part of life. Also, Amnesty International reported many violent incidents and violations of human rights in and outside the AAs by both FRELIMO and RENAMO troops (1994: 4-6). Violence related to criminal activity increased during the transitional period. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that political violence was widespread due to the ‘culture of violence’ during the civil war. Simply the fact that no new violent conflict broke out after the GPA shows that less people were killed by political motives and therefore the level of political violence decreased during the transitional period. I logically conclude that during the transitional period the level of political violence strongly decreased (Chachiua, 1999). An important factor in this was the demobilization of FRELIMO and RENAMO, because it resulted in the breaking of the links between both armed groups and their combatants, who were trained to use political violence during the decades before the GPA.

To conclude, the obtained evidence shows that criminal activity increased. This is linked to the failed disarmament process and related availability of weapons. Criminal violence, often by RENAMO and FRELIMO, also increased significantly during the transitional period. On the other hand political violence decreased. Taking the evidence together I conclude that in the case of Mozambique the DDR programs did not reduce the level of post-war violence as well as criminal activity, and therefore did not lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. In fact, it

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40 Statistics are obtained from PIC-1. Policia de Investigacao Criminal, Estatisticas de casos criminais, 1994-1996
41 ISS is the abbreviation of International Institute of Social Studies, in The Hague, the Netherlands. The ISS TCP conducted oral surveys in Mozambique to gather evidence about weapons, crime and violence.
42 This is explained more in detail on page 24.
43 Demobilization is explained more in detail on page 26 and 27.
even endangered the peacebuilding and democratization process. It means that the empirical evidence disconfirms the second hypothesis in the case of Mozambique.  

3.4.3 Civic and political participation
The third mechanism is to what extent DDR programs increase civic and political participation of former armed groups and armed combatants. This is divided into three subdivisions. The first relates to political opportunities and incorporation, the second to political engagement and the third to the legitimacy of the government. I will now look at the evidence related to the three subdivisions.

RENAMO was the only real political opposition party which was able to challenge the ruling party FRELIMO during the post-conflict elections. However, also fourteen very small political parties were created before the post-conflict elections, from which most only consisted of a front man together with some assistance (Synge, 1997: 118-119). The UN launched two trust funds together with various major donors, which proved to be very effective and important in increasing political opportunities and incorporation for the political parties and former rebel group RENAMO. One trust fund was used to support the registered political parties, while the other was meant to support the transition of RENAMO into a political party (Manning and Malbrough, 2009: 90).

Synge argues that the electoral education for the general population was a success: “Civic education to inform people of the purpose and procedures of the elections was generally effective, especially where it was targeted at illiterate sectors of the population with no previous experience of voting” (1997: 128). In urban areas, radio, newspapers and television played an important role in illustrating the process of voting. In the rural areas many civic education teams went to villages to explain the process, stimulate voting and convince people, often through popular theatre, that they could influence the outcome (ibid.: 129). Civic and political education was also given to ex-combatants as part of the DDR program. The Commission for Re-integration (CORE) was created to facilitate social reintegration for demobilized soldiers. CORE combined a ‘quick action response’ with ‘longer term developmental programming’. The former was to start in the AAs themselves. This included literacy training, raising public health and environmental awareness, and the provision of information on employment options, cultural and sports activities. More important for this section, it supplied “general information on the peace process and re-integration into civilian life” (Coelho and Vines, 1994: 28-29). This included courses about the rights and duties of ex-combatants and about behavior as peaceful civilian (Van den Bergh, 2009: 57-58). It contributed, according to the theoretical framework, to the transparency regarding the new policies and the post-conflict process as a whole, which increased confidence in the government as well as its legitimacy. In short, both the civilians and the ex-combatants had access to civic and political education which contributed to the political engagement and legitimacy.

Furthermore, poll workers and monitors for the elections were trained. There was a poll-watching program which trained tens of thousands of poll watchers from the various registered political parties to monitor during the elections (Turner et al., 1998: 157). According to Turner et al. this gave “political parties a core of trainers and nationwide monitors that could be the basis for true party development” (ibid.: 173). This also ensured that 50,000 political party monitors were available during the elections, which is 20,000 more than was expected (Synge, 1997: 134; Turner et al., 1998: 173). It shows the strong political engagement of the Mozambican population and political parties, including former rebel party RENAMO.

When we look at the voter’s turnout, which is an important indicator for political engagement, we see impressive numbers at the elections in 1994. More than 5.4 million people, which was more than

44 $H_2$ (Hypotheses 2): DDR programs reduce the level of post-war violence as well as criminal activity and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.
two-thirds of the population older than 18 years, went to the ballots to vote. UN monitors reported that no major voting irregularities took place and that in many polling locations RENAMO monitors were present (1997: 134). This shows that the Mozambican population and members of the political party RENAMO were educated well enough about the election process and their duties, and that they were engaged in the political process. Tollenaere argues that the civic and political participation was successful by stating that “the massive participation and broad acceptance of the results reflected the people’s desire for peace and their perception of the role played by elections in the peace process” (2006: 6).

The transition from RENAMO as military machine of destruction to a credible political organization was a major political success, according to Mariska Beijnum. DDR contributed to this important political process. Turner et al. argue that the trust funds and demobilization process resulted in the transformation of RENAMO in a political party that is “capable of undertaking a national electoral campaign and then serving in the assembly……this transformation was key to the success of the peace process” (1998: 174). Furthermore, Manning points in an article about the success of transforming rebel movements in political parties at the crucial role of the DDR program, and more specifically the demobilization of combatants, in the successful transformation of RENAMO (2008: 68-69). The general trust in RENAMO as legitimate political party is shown by the fact that a large part of the votes, 37.78 percent, went to RENAMO, compared to 44.33 percent to FRELIMO (Bertelsen, 2005: 30).

To conclude, the evidence shows that transformation of the former brutal rebel movement RENAMO into a political party was successful. The DDR program, and especially the civic and political training and the demobilization of combatants, made an important contribution to the increase in political opportunities and incorporation, political engagement, as well as to the legitimacy of the government. This leads to the confirmation of $H3$ and the conclusion that in the case of Mozambique the DDR programs did increase civil and political participation of former armed groups and combatants, and therefore led to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

3.4.4 Healing wartime trauma

The fourth mechanism is the contribution of DDR programs to healing wartime trauma. I will now analyze evidence for the following subdivisions: the process of breaking with the past, the contribution to reconciliation and social integration.

At first, according to the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010), destroying arms could make an important contribution to cognitive breaking with the past. This, however, never happened in Mozambique due to delays in the demobilization process and failure of the disarmament (Berman, 1996: 73). Furthermore, demobilization ceremonies would give ex-combatants the possibility to step away from experienced or committed war abuses. I obtained no evidence that this was a procedure in the AAs or CTNAs. However, there are photo’s of demobilization ceremonies which proves that it did happen in several occasions. Other evidence shows that traditional healing ceremonies and rituals did take place in many communities which contributed to the reconciliation and social reintegration of ex-combatants in community life (Alden, 2002: 352; Lundin, 1998: 111). The educational settings can

45 Interviewed on 13-12-2012. Mariska van Beijnum is Director of the Conflict Research Unit and Senior Researcher at the Clingendael Institute. Clingendael is the Netherlands Institute for International Relations. It is a think tank as well as diplomatic academy and aims to enhance insight in international relations.

46 $H3$ (Hypotheses 3): DDR programs increase civic and political participation of former armed groups as well as combatants and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

47 The demobilization delays and disarmament failure is explained in detail on page 26-29 in chapter 3.4.1.

also be a means of addressing trauma. According to Kumar this was the case in Mozambique where they for example used “increased student-teacher communication, creative activities, and drama” to reintegrate child combatants and contribute to the healing of wartime trauma (1997: 23).

Social reintegration programs could contribute to healing wartime trauma according to the theory. Van den Bergh conducted many interviews with civilians and former combatants who took part in the DDR program.49 One of the interviewed ex-combatants said that the monthly paid money by the RSS was important for the social integration and reconciliation: “It gave us a good position to return. We became respected members of the community, had something to offer to the family, could invest in our lives” (2009: 58).50 By 1996, 87 percent of the demobilized soldiers were accepted by their communities and reintegrated in society (ibid.). Other organizations also concluded from reports and surveys with demobilized soldiers that after the reintegration programs, which also include the programs that focus on economic activity and opportunities, 85-90 percent felt they were fully integrated into society.52 Chris Alden, who did extensive fieldwork in Mozambique, obtained corroborative evidence in his interviews with individuals and focus groups (2002: 346). He interviewed eighteen community leaders about their perception of the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. He discovered that 65 percent believed that the ex-combatants were fully integrated and 35 percent that it remained problematic (2002: 346). Various NGO’s concluded that the ‘problem of the demobilized soldier’ did no longer exist (Allen, 2002: 346). Another indicator of social reintegration is marriage between ex-combatants and civilians (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 33). Alden obtained evidence through interviews that this did take place in Mozambique which “had played a more significant and enduring role in facilitating (re)integration into an alien community” (2002: 352). According to Van den Bergh the conclusion is that “when a regular and unconditional supply of money was provided, men worked with their families and planned how to improve their lives – and many succeeded” (2009: 59). The various programs aimed at developing professional skills for the labor market also had their positive effects on healing trauma. Many ex-combatants completed one of the offered trainings which increased the participant’s social status and social contacts with others (GTZ, 2004: 84).

A particularly problematic group regarding wartime trauma were child soldiers.53 They were a major part of refugee rehabilitation programs by Save the Children Fund and UNICEF, which aimed to reintegrate child soldiers into their communities. The children also received psychological and social guidance under UNICEF supervision (UN, 1995: 51). These programs have been very successful. The UNDP estimates that around 95 percent of the children that were separated during war have been reunited with their families (Chabal, 2001: 18).

In the case of Mozambique it is interesting that the country did not set up truth commissions, which were successful in post-conflict South-Africa, or other transitional justice measures to deal with abuses and crimes from the past. This has been common in most other post-conflict countries (Igreja and Dias-Lambranca, 2008: 61).

49 Van den Bergh is working for AWEPA (Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa) and was for many years active in Mozambique in the years after the GPA.
50 The RSS program is explained more in detail on page 23 and 25.
51 See page 25 for the explanation of reintegration programs that stimulate economic activities and opportunities.
52 The reports are drafted by the organizations Creative Associates International (“Internal Review: The Information and Referral Service and Provincial Fund: Programs for the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers”), Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (“Impact Assessment of GTZ Open Reintegration Fund Program”), and UNDP (“Reintegration for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique”).
53 It was estimated that the number of child soldiers was around 10.000 (Chabal, 2001: 17).
The evidence shows that the reintegration programs have strongly contributed to breaking with the past, reconciliation and social reintegration. Ex-combatants indicated that they felt integrated in society after going through social and economic programs. Especially the monthly payment through RSS seems to have contributed to healing wartime trauma. Other empirical evidence shows that a large part of the civilians also felt that ex-combatants were well integrated. However, more could have been achieved in healing wartime trauma by using the method of destroying arms in public and ceremonies during demobilization in order to break with the past. We should also keep in mind that healing trauma is often a long-term process. However, the process should start during DDR to give the ex-combatants and civilians the confidence that the situation is positively changing and that peace will remain.

Because of the acquired evidence in the three subdivision of the fourth mechanism I can verify $H^4$ in the case of Mozambique. That means that the DDR programs in Mozambique contributed to healing wartime trauma and therefore led to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

### 3.4.5 Sequence

The fifth mechanism looks at the sequence of the implementation of DDR programs. I will first analyze what sequence in the DDR program in Mozambique was implemented and secondly look at the level of confidence between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

As was explained in chapter 3.4.1 disarmament was “implicit in the concept of demobilization” (UNIDIR, 1996: 32). This relation logically means that the idea was that disarmament and demobilization would take place at the same time. Ex-combatants would receive the monthly salary from the RSS and would be able to make use of the various reintegration programs, such as OSD and IRS, after they succeeded cantonment and demobilization in the AAs or CTNAs. Thus the initial plan was that demobilization, and related disarmament, would take place before reintegration. This would fit in the ‘security-first’ logic. Proponents of this logic have the contention that “disarmament and demobilization are critical opportunities for the warring parties to build confidence in each other, allowing the peace process to consolidate and move forward” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 33).

The implementation of the DDR program turned out differently in the field. First of all it is important to mention again that disarmament failed. It was absolutely no priority during the DDR process and the UN mandate was too weak (Synge, 1997: 111). Furthermore, there was no political will and confidence of both FRELIMO and RENAMO to surrender their weapons completely. Both parties obstructed the process of counting and investigating the presence and availability of weapons. That means that both parties lacked mutual confidence and wanted to keep access to weapons in the case conflict would return (ibid.: 109). Another important factor in the failure of disarmament was the lack of confidence in the state to protect their citizens, which was the case for decades during the civil war (Pike and Taylor, 2000: 16). Furthermore, the verification phase of disarmament, which was a mechanism to check (un)declared arms caches and depots in the country (Berman, 1996: 73), was planned to take place between the end of demobilization and the post-conflict elections (ibid.: 88). This phase failed also because both RENAMO and FRELIMO obstructed the verification of arms caches by ONUMOZ. The consequence was that for example around 40 percent of RENAMO’s arms caches were not verified by ONUMOZ when they left the country (UNIDIR, 1996: 35).

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54 This is also emphasized in the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010).
55 $H^4$ (Hypotheses 4): DDR programs contribute to healing wartime trauma and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.
56 See page 27-28 a more detailed analysis of failed disarmament in Mozambique.
These factors show that although the initial planning of the DDR program was that disarmament and demobilization would take place before reintegration, the implementation in practice turned out differently. First of all it was inevitable that demobilization occurred in various steps and not all 90,000 combatants could be demobilized at the same moment. Due to the chaos of the demobilization process many ex-combatants went through demobilization and reintegration programs, while at the same moment a large group of ex-combatants still had to wait several months to be demobilized. Furthermore, the timing of the verification phase, which started after demobilization was finished, shows that reintegration programs took place alongside disarmament. Many combatants even went through the reintegration programs before the verification phase started. In short, the evidence demonstrates that in practice the ‘security-first’ logic was not present because reintegration did take place alongside demobilization and disarmament. The fact that disarmament failed means that disarmament was not a precondition for reintegration. This shows that in the field the logic of ‘development-first’ was taking place. The idea of this logic is that carrying out reintegration next to disarmament and demobilization creates stakes in peace for armed groups and individuals. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis argue that “the claim is that disarmament and demobilization can create conditions of strategic insecurity at the level of the group and economic insecurity for individuals precipitating renewed conflict unless reintegration has created selective incentives for armed groups and ex-combatants to adhere to the peace” (2010: 33). This fits in the case of Mozambique because the reintegration packages of the RSS and other programs such as IRS or OSD were important incentives to adhere to peace, demobilize and reintegrate in civilian life. The fact that ex-combatants in Mozambique kept many weapons in possession corresponds with the idea that they were afraid that handing in weapons would create insecurity. The factor that demobilization was delayed and functionally started when the promise was made that ex-combatants would receive an additional 18-months subsidy, also shows that demobilization only started when reintegration packages created significant incentives to demobilize (Syenge, 1997: 65; Bekoe, 2002: 64). The development-first logic corresponds with the ideas of two experts from the Institute Clingendael. Rosan Smits argues that DDR is used to buy peace and stability. “Rebels, who often do not have good incentives to disarm and demobilize because they need the weapons and armed structure to survive and for their status, could be convinced to participate in the DDR process by, for example, offering training and supervision”.

The second subdivision of this mechanism is the level of trust. This is divided firstly in confidence building, which is “level of trust that principal commanders and politicians linked to the armed groups have in their opponents” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 33-34), and secondly in stakes in peace, which is defined as the “level of trust in relation to politicians and commanders commitment to the peace process” (ibid.). Evidence shows that during the transitional period there was absolutely a lack of trust between RENAMO and FRELIMO. This contributed among others to the extensions of demobilization and failure of the disarmament (Bekoe, 2002: 60; Syenge, 1997: 109; Bertelsen, 2005: 33). Coelho and Vines argue that “The main factor delaying the cantonment process was undoubtedly the lack of trust between the two parties” (1994: 4). A different pattern was seen when we look at the trust in relation to the commitment of peace during the transition phase. The literature shows that both parties were in general committed to peace. Syenge confirms this by stating that: “The Mozambican generals and politicians on the whole remained committed to the peace agreement they had negotiated and signed in Rome” (1997: 10).

57 Interviewed on 13-12-2012. Rosan Smits is Deputy Director of the Conflict Research Unit and Senior Researcher at the Clingendael Institute. The second expert I interviewed is Mariska van Beijnum, Director of the Conflict Research Unit and Senior Researcher. Clingendael is the Netherlands Institute for International Relations. It is a think tank as well as diplomatic academy and aims to enhance insight in international relations.
In short, the initial plan was that the logic of ‘security-first’ would be implemented in Mozambique. However, the real situation in the field turned out differently. The lack of mutual trust resulted in delays in cantonment and demobilization and a failure of disarmament. On the other hand there was still a commitment to peace present from both RENAMO and FRELIMO. Furthermore, the reintegration programs, in particular the RSS, were important incentives to adhere to peace. This shows that in the field the logic of ‘development-first’ was taking place in Mozambique.

To conclude the evidence disconfirms the fifth hypothesis. The case of Mozambique shows that the development-first logic led to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections and that the initial planned security-first logic did not work out in practice. This means that in Mozambique the DDR’s focus on firstly security and secondly on development did not lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

### 3.4.6 Adverse effects

The sixth and last mechanism of the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis is called *Adverse Effects*. I will now analyze the four subdivisions of this mechanism.

The first subdivision is that DDR programs could eliminate the possible positive effects of armed groups regarding the security level and their potential of social capital. Evidence shows that the country became safer after the GPA and DDR process and that violent conflict did not return. This implies that there was less security before the GPA during the time that RENAMO and FRELIMO controlled large areas of the country compared to the transitional period. Furthermore, the social capital of the armed groups was not needed for demobilization and reintegration. In fact, when the combatants finally had the possibility to choose either demobilization or integration in the FADM by their own, instead of by the commanders, the demobilization process accelerated and could be finished before the post-conflict elections took place (Synge, 1997: 66, 103). In other words, the social capital of the armed groups, of which hierarchical ties between commanders and fighters is an important factor (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 24), impeded instead of stimulated the demobilization process. In short, elimination of possible positive effects of the armed groups due to the DDR programs did not occur in Mozambique.

The second subdivision is that DDR programs create instability on the macro-level. This did not happen in Mozambique. Again the evidence that no new violent conflict recurred after the GPA shows that DDR programs did not create instability on the macro-level. Furthermore, the factor that the UN was present in the country during the transitional period played a positive role. The presence of UN troops provided a credible guarantee that the UN could use their force to prevent a recurrence of conflict (Manning and Malbrough, 2009: 84). Furthermore, the completion of demobilization contributed to the macro-stability. Overall, the DDR-program did not create instability on the macro-level.

The third subdivision is that DDR programs lead to tensions between civilians and ex-combatants. In general there were no problems between civilians and ex-combatants. I obtained no evidence about serious threats and confrontations between civilians and former combatants. By 1996 87 percent of the demobilized soldiers were accepted by their communities and reintegrated in society (Van den Bergh, 2009: 58.). Furthermore, the successful social reintegration and interpersonal exchanges between civilians and ex-combatants is shown by the evidence that marriage between ex-combatants and civilians increasingly occurred after the GPA which played an important role in

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58 \( H^5 \) (Hypotheses): DDR programs that focus firstly on security and secondly on development lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

59 See page 24 for the analysis of the evidence of recurrence of civil war.

60 Idem.

61 However, the military effectiveness and capacity of ONUMOZ was never tested.
integrating in community and civilian life (Alden, 2002: 352). Additionally, the fact the civilians did not have to hand in their weapons increased their feeling of security. In short, DDR did not lead to tensions between civilians and ex-combatants.

The fourth subdivision is that DDR programs generate perverse incentives. Ex-combatants or civilians could take advantage of the certain components of the program to enrich themselves, with money or weapons, which could lead to new violence and instability on the short and long term (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 23). I obtained no evidence in neither primary nor secondary sources that the money received through the RSS or the given advantages through the other reintegration programs, such as IRS or OSD, generated perverse incentives for either civilians or ex-combatants. On the other hand I argue that the failure of the disarmament component did generate perverse incentives because both ex-combatants and civilians could enrich themselves due to the easy access to a large amount of weapons. Evidence shows that this did result in a significant growth of violent crime in Mozambique (Chachiua, 1999a: 64). Therefore, I argue that the failure to disarm did generate perverse incentives which could lead to new violence and instability.

To summarize the outcome of this mechanism I argue that first DDR in Mozambique did not eliminate the possible positive effects of the armed groups, secondly it did not lead to instability on the macro-level, and thirdly it did not result in tensions between civilians and ex-combatants. However, DDR in Mozambique, and more specifically the disarmament component, did generate perverse incentives. To conclude, the evidence disconfirms the sixth hypotheses. Although the DDR program, more specifically the failure to disarm, led to some perverse incentives, in general the DDR programs in Mozambique did not have adverse effects which would lower the chance of successful post-conflict elections.

Now I have given the obtained evidence of the six mechanisms and related conclusions I will continue with analyzing the post-conflict elections and the situation regarding peacebuilding and democracy in Mozambique during the five years after the elections.

3.5 Post-conflict elections success or failure
3.5.1 The post-conflict elections
The UNDP was the leader of the organization and funding of the electoral process (Synge, 1997: 115). It provided assistance to the National Election Commission (CNE) which was responsible for the main decisions and process as a whole, and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) which had the responsibility for the execution of the elections (Van den Bergh, 1999: 79). Both organizations were fully run by Mozambicans. The post-conflict elections were initially postponed with one year due to the delays in demobilization. Positive was that this gave more time to build the foundations for the complicated and comprehensive electoral process (1997: 115). The voter registration was planned to start when demobilization was finished. The elections were threatened to be postponed again because of the demobilization delays in 1994. International pressure to hold elections no later than October 1994 meant that the registration started in June 1994, even though demobilization was not yet finished. On 2 September 81 percent of the estimated eligible voters was registered, which was more than expected in the complicated circumstances after the long civil war (ibid.: 122). The electoral campaign started on September 22, largely funded by the international community. Important to mention is that the electoral campaign began when both parties were still discussing issues regarding demobilization and handing over arms (ibid.: 127). This led to fears that

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62 See page 27-29 for a detailed analysis of the evidence regarding the failed disarmament and page 29-30 for the evidence regarding the increase in violent crime.
63 H° (Hypotheses 6): The adverse effects of DDR programs lead to a lower chance of successful post-conflict elections.
Dhlakama would reject the outcome of the elections and return to war. This fear almost came true when he declared a boycott on the evening before the elections on ground of signs of the potential for irregular voting.\textsuperscript{64} Three small parties joined the boycott (1999: 82). Eventually, after international pressure, a generous financial support for RENAMO (Newitt, 2002: 225), and the assurance that all RENAMO’s complaints would be investigated before declaring the elections free and fair, Dhlakama agreed to continue with the elections on the morning of the second polling day (1997: 133). As a reaction to the problems with Dhlakama the CNE extended the elections to a third day to give people more time to vote (ibid.: 134).\textsuperscript{65} The boycott incident did not affect the voting and two-third of the eligible voters casted a ballot in a calm atmosphere (Honwana, 2002: 208). UN monitors reported “a large turnout and no major voting irregularities and had seen RENAMO party monitors at a large number of stations” (1997: 134). On 19 November the CNE declared that Chissano had received 53.30 percent of the votes and Dhlakama 33.73 percent. Furthermore, FRELIMO had acquired 44.33 percent and RENAMO 37.78 percent of the votes. A third party, the UD coalition, reached the five percent threshold and received nine seats in parliament. This was interpreted as a positive sign for democracy (1999: 88). On the same day the UN declared that the elections had been peaceful, well organized, free and fair and that “although problems had occurred, no event or series of events could affect the overall credibility of the elections” (UN, 1995: 64-65). The European Union and Organization of African Unity stated that elections were free and fair (ibid.).\textsuperscript{66} FRELIMO became the ruling party with Chissano as President. RENAMO accepted FRELIMO’s choice to govern alone and to play the role of main opposition party (2002: 208).

The outcome of the elections reflected the will of the people or in other words: “the grass had spoken and the elephants should listen” (Van den Bergh, 1999: 88).

\textbf{3.5.2 The post-elections period}

In this section I will look at to what extent peacebuilding, defined in this thesis as ‘strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’, and the process of democratization, defined as ‘free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees’, took place in the five years after the post-conflict elections.

The ONUMOZ mandate ended fast after the post-conflict elections in December 1994 and the UN troops left the country during January 1995. This meant that the responsibility for security was now fully in the hands of the Mozambican police and understaffed FADM (Synge, 1997: 141). Honwana argues that after the post-conflict elections Mozambique “enjoys a general atmosphere of peace and relative economic recovery” (2002: 211). RENAMO accepted the defeat of the post-conflict elections and tried to improve itself as political party (ibid.). The statistics of the Centre for Systemic Peace show that no violent conflict returned during the five years after the post-conflict elections.\textsuperscript{67} This also made possible that in 1996 all of the approximately 1.5 million Mozambican refugees who wanted to return did so. However, it is important to notice that still many problems had to be dealt with like underdevelopment, psychological trauma of the war, and a beginning democratic political culture with its related start-up problems (Turner et al., 1998: 168). The presence of arms remained a serious problem during the years after the post-conflict elections which was reflected in the rise of the crime rate during these years (Nkiwane, 1998: 28). The government tried to undertake action against the availability of arms and growth of crime by for example destroying arms caches. Nkiwane points out that the Mozambican parliament was almost exclusively dealing with arms and violence during

\textsuperscript{64} This happened in the evening of October 26.
\textsuperscript{65} Initially the elections were planned to take two days.
\textsuperscript{66} Organization of African Unity is the forerunner of the current African Union.
\textsuperscript{67} (http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm), visited on 10-01-2012. In fact, no violent conflict recurred in Mozambique until 2013 (when this thesis is written).
1996 which shows the political concern and seriousness of the problem (1998: 31). This also reveals the problematic consequences of the failed disarmament during the transitional period. The regional impact of the illegal arms trafficking after the post-conflict elections resulted in the launch of the transnational operation *Rachel IV* with neighboring countries South-Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. The operation provided among others for intelligence information on arms-smuggling exchange, transnational police cooperation and joint operations (ibid.). Additionally, the civil society started arms control initiatives with the Christian Council of Mozambique’s Arms Buy Back Project (TAE) as an example (ibid.: 33). This also shows the will of the population to end the norm of weapon possession. Another challenge for Mozambique in peacebuilding and democratization was to establish legitimate armed services. During the civil war RENAMO challenged the legitimacy of the state, while the FRELIMO government used the state’s armed services to politically survive. The armed forces were utilized in the internal struggle and they did not hesitate to utilize violence against its own population. The relation between the civilians on the one side and military, police and intelligence agencies on the other side was broken and the state services lacked the needed legitimacy after the civil war. This legitimacy had to be built up again in order to create a defense force consistent with democratic norms and values (2002: 214-215).

Looking more specifically at the goal and process of democratization I obtained evidence that the country positively developed in the years after the post-conflict elections. The Mozambican constitution was well based on democratic values and principles. There was the broadest form of press freedom and the separation between the Legislative, Judiciary and Executive power of the state was clear (Honwana, 2002: 2012). However, this did not mean that the government always held on to these democratic values and principles. An example was the frequent call of political parties to their regional, religious and ethnic loyalty, which might have led to national division and was an obstacle to peace and democracy (ibid.). Reports from NGO’s and the Mozambican press about human rights violations from the police also show that democratization and complying with the human rights was far from satisfactory. Amnesty International describes in a report various incidents of torture in prisons during the years after the post-conflict elections. On the other hand they also point to the awareness of the problem and the willingness to train the police on human rights issues (1998: 3). Important is that the Mozambican civil-society increasingly became aware of their rights as civilian. The Mozambican Human Rights League (LDH) is an example of this. It organized actions and public campaigning against human rights violations. The conviction of a police officer who tortured an innocent suspect, which led to his death in prison, set a precedent in human rights protection in Mozambique (Turner et al, 1998: 168).

In general the democratization process in Mozambique went in the right direction. Oosthuysen argues that the political parties “have shown greater maturity and willingness to consolidate their fledgling democracy than had been expected” (1996: 48). The democratic multiparty elections were significant for popular acceptance and true legitimacy for FRELIMO as ruling party and for RENAMO as political party (1998: 164). The multiparty legislature increasingly acted independently from former regional or geographic interests. Alliances were regularly formed between the opposition and majority parties (ibid.). Turner et al. argue that “this trend of self-assurance among certain members of the assembly is particularly important, given a constitutional tradition that placed substantial authority in the executive” (1998: 164). Furthermore, the increased freedom of expression was important in the democratization process because it enabled the civil-society to advocate their interests and criticize the government (ibid.: 167). In 1997, a consensus between FRELIMO and

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68 For example, almost the entire report of the Attorney-General to the parliament in 1996 dealt with the issue of violence and weapons.
RENAMO was reached in the assembly to change the constitution and give more local autonomy to municipalities. FRELIMO feared that discontent about poverty in the country would cost the party votes during the next local elections in 1998 and the presidential elections in 1999. The local elections attracted only 15 percent of the electorate, which showed a certain unwillingness or non-dedication of the population to the democratization process. On the other hand the elections for legislature and president in 1999 had a successful turnout of 69.09 percent (Newitt, 2002: 232) lending sufficient legitimacy for the parliament and president (Ostheimer, 2001: 18).69 The FRELIMO government and international community were quite nervous about the coming elections in 1999, the second after the civil war, and feared that a flawed electoral process would give former RENAMO combatant’s an incentive to take up their weapons again. In the end RENAMO did challenge unsuccessfully a number of election results, but the outcome of the elections was similar to the post-conflict elections of 1994, though with a closing gap between RENAMO and FRELIMO. Chissano received 52.29 percent and Dhlakama 47.71 percent of the votes (Newitt, 2002: 232). The international community labeled the elections in 1999 as ‘free and fair’ (Ostheimer, 2001: 18). The Carter Centre, which is an internationally recognized NGO, concluded that the election process in 1999 was very positive.70

In short, the evidence shows that the goal of peacebuilding, defined as ‘strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’, has been achieved in the five years after the post-conflict elections. No violent conflict returned and, although the Mozambican society still had to overcome the legacies of war, peace was consolidated. There were not only positive developments regarding peacebuilding. Very problematic was the increase in arms related crimes due the widespread and easy availability of weapons for both civilians and former combatants. The government and civil-society set up various weapon collection programs to halt the trade and possess of arms. Also democratization, defined as ‘free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees’, was achieved and developed into the right direction in stages. Mozambique knew some start-up problems which is not a surprise because democratization is a long-term process. Both the post-conflict elections and national elections in 1999 were free and fair. In general FRELIMO and RENAMO showed dedication to the process of democratization and were perceived by the population as the legitimate ruling party and legitimate political party in the opposition. Furthermore, minimal civil rights were guaranteed. Add all this evidence together, I conclude that in Mozambique both peacebuilding and democratization was achieved and therefore the post-conflict elections in 1994 were successful.

3.6 Conclusion

The civil war in Mozambique had a devastating effect on the country. When the GPA was signed more than 80,000 armed combatants form FRELIMO and RENAMO were present in the country which threatened the fragile peace agreement. The DDR programs executed in Mozambique during the transitional period proved to be essential to increase the chance of successful post-conflict elections and related processes of peacebuilding and democratization. The evidence shows that DDR in Mozambique led to a lower chance of war recurrence through the successful demobilization and enhancement of economic opportunities of former combatants. Furthermore, it did increase the civic and political participation of ex-combatants and contributed to healing wartime trauma. On the other hand, the failed disarmament led to an increase in post-war criminal violence and activity. Mozambique also showed that the development-first logic did work better in practice than the initial

69 The second parliamentary and presidential elections after the civil war.
70 http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc923.html, visited on 20-01-2012. The Carter Centre was founded by Peace Nobel Prize winner and former US President Jimmy Carter. The organization is internationally renowned for its contribution to elections monitoring in post-conflict countries since the 80’s.
planned security-first logic. Furthermore, besides of the perverse incentives due to the failed disarmament, no other adverse effects appeared in Mozambique.

This full picture shows that DDR had an important positive effect on the chance of success of the post-conflict elections in 1994. Fortunately, the elections indeed were a success without serious incidents and labeled as ‘free and fair’. FRELIMO became the legitimate ruling party with Chissano as President and RENAMO became the legitimate political opposition party. The post-conflict elections were also successful because the five years after the elections showed that both the goals of peacebuilding and democratization have been reached.

I will now continue with analyzing the evidence for the case of Angola and thereafter compare it with the case of Mozambique.
4. Angola

4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will analyze the second case-study of this thesis: Angola. I will begin by giving a general background of Angola, including the period of violent war since independence. Secondly, I will briefly describe the role of the UN mission UNAVEM II and the DDR component. Next, I will analyze the evidence for the six mechanisms of the theoretical framework which will lead to the verification or falsification of the hypotheses. In the last section I will analyze the post-conflict elections and the period five years thereafter in order to measure to what extent the post-conflict elections failed or succeeded. The chapter ends with the conclusions of this case-study.

4.2 Background Angola
4.2.1 General background
Angola is located in the West of Southern-Africa. The Portuguese were present since the 16th century and colonized the country at the end of the 19th century (Ottaway, 1998: 134). The colonists had an important influence on the Angolan society because of two main factors. The first was the policy of forced movements of large population groups because of the slave trade, and later because of forced labor and forced migration. The second was the intense economic concentration on specific export products like slaves, rubber, diamonds, coffee and later also oil (Tvedten, 1997: 16-17). These factors were important in the emergence of three liberation movements since the fifties, each based on different ethnicity, class and region (Spears, 2010: 180). The first movement, the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), was set up in 1956 by left-wing, urban elites in the capital Luanda. The second movement, the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), had a rural background from the North and was founded in 1960. The third group, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), emerged in 1966 with Jonas Savimbi as leader and had its background in the South and Central highlands (Roque, 2005: 215). The relation between the three movements was tense which remained during the following decades. Angola became independent in 1975, more due to the coupe d’état in Portugal than through the efforts of the three liberation movements (2010: 181). The MPLA, FNLA and UNITA agreed in January 1975 to form a transitional government and hold elections. However, the three movements did not come to terms which eventually resulted in the Angolan Civil War (1997: 33).

4.2.2 Angolan civil war
The MPLA controlled the cities at the beginning of the civil war and established itself as the new legal government with Agostinho Neto as first President who was succeeded by José Eduardo dos Santos in 1979. The party also gained diplomatic recognition from many countries, however, not from the US. The FNLA faded away, while UNITA built a strong opposition party with the assistance of the US and South-Africa (Ottaway, 1998: 134). Both countries feared the Marxist-oriented MPLA, which was strongly supported by the Soviet-Union and Cuba. The latter country even sent troops to assist the MPLA. South-Africa intervened in the civil war with military units because they suspected Soviet support to anti-apartheid movements from Angolan territory. The external support from various countries complicated the civil war and contributed to the level of fighting and duration (ibid.: 134-135). UNITA established a ‘state-within-a-state’ in the South with the town Jamba as main city and provided housing, schools and health centers. This challenged the MPLA as government party (Spears, 2010: 186). Until early 1980 the war took place mainly in the country’s South. Thereafter the South-African and Namibian anti-apartheids movement became more and more active from Angolan
territory, which led to intensified South-African involvement in the conflict. UNITA increased their fighting magnitude and now created basic insecurity in 80 percent of the country (Tvedten, 1997: 38). The war escalated even further when the US Reagan administration publicly announced military and economic aid to UNITA (ibid.: 39). On the other side, the government’s armed wing, also known as Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), was assisted by 50,000 Cuban troops (Sinjela, 1994: 51). First peace talks between the US, Cuba, South-Africa and the Angolan government in 1988 resulted in the signing of the New York accords which required the withdrawal of South-African and Cuban troops in the next two years and terminate their support to Angolan movements. The agreement was monitored by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) and both South-Africa and Cuba indeed did pull out their troops. In contrast, the US intensified their support to UNITA which led to a stronger UNITA army than ever before. The three extra years of war after the New York accords had put Angola in an even worse situation in socio- and macroeconomic terms (1997: 40-41). In 1991, after 16 years of intense war, the number of deaths directly related to war was 300,000 (Kundsen et al., 2000: 12), while 500,000 to 600,000 died due to secondary effects of the war (1997: 111). Furthermore, the country had more than a million internal and external refugees and the highest number of limbless people in the world due to the widespread presence of mines (Pycroft, 1994: 241).

In 1991, when a military victory for both UNITA and MPLA was elusive, Portugal invited, with the assistance of the US and the Soviet-Union, both parties to start peace negotiations. These so called Bicesse negotiations occurred at the time when the Soviet-Union collapsed and the former Cold War influence diminished. A peace agreement between both parties was reached after several rounds and the Bicesse Peace Accords were signed in May 1991 (Turner, 2002: 227). It foresaw a timetable for the demobilization and disarmament of UNITA as well as the government forces and settled the date September 1992 for the multiparty post-conflict elections under supervision of the UN. Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the existing forces would be disbanded and unified in a new national army before the elections were held. Next, both the US and Soviet-Union promised to stop their assistance to the Angolan parties (1997: 41; 2010: 197) and UNITA would hand over their control over the country to the MPLA government (1994: 249). The last point of the agreement was the formation of a joint UNITA-MPLA commission, which was called the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC), to supervise the overall peace agreement with both its political and military aspects. A second joint commission, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (JVMC), was established to observe the cease-fire and oversee the movement of troops to assembly areas and demobilization. Both commissions were observed by the US, Soviet-Union and Portugal (2010: 197). The UN was important in verifying whether the JVMC took its responsibilities in accordance with the agreement (1994: 54).

4.3 UNAVEM II
4.3.1 The mission
On 30 May 1991 the UNSC adopted Resolution 696 which gave UNAVEM II a mandate for 17 months until the post-conflict elections (Krška, 1997: 84). The mandate was “to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the ceasefire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the ceasefire period”. In practice this meant that the UN would monitor the ceasefire, the movement of troops to assembly areas, the disarmament and demobilization of the
armed groups, and the Angolan police (1997: 84; Sinjela, 1994: 56). Miss Margaret Anstee was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola and chief of UNAVEM II (1994: 56). In March 1992 the UNSC enlarged the mandate through Resolution 747 with the observation and verification of the post-conflict elections.\(^5\) The strength of the mission was 350 unarmed military observers, 126 police observers, 14 military medical personnel, 155 local and 87 international civilian staff. Resolution 747 added 400 electoral observers to the mission.\(^6\)

4.3.2 DDR component

The DDR component consisted of several stages: troop assembly, disarmament, demobilization of the troops not joining the new army, and formation of the new army (Krkška, 1997: 87). The plan was to form a new unified army, called Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), consisting of 50.00 combatants, half from UNITA and half from MPLA. This should have been finished before the post-conflict elections. Furthermore, the intention was that "no combatants would be demobilized until the encampment process was complete, and all combatants would be either demobilized or integrated into the new national army before the September 1992 elections" (WB, 1993: 26). The whole process started formally on 31 May 1991 and should have been completed at the day before the post-conflict elections (1997: 87). The assembling of the 150,000 armed combatants was planned to be finished on the 1st of August in 1991 (Bekoe, 2002: 112). Combatants of both armed forces were to be stationed at 50 AAs, each meant for either MPLA or UNITA soldiers (Pycroft, 1994: 249). According to Spear it is important to mention that the primary responsibility for the disarmament and demobilization lay with MPLA and UNITA, and that UNAVEM II was mainly responsible for observing and monitoring the implementation (Spear, 2002: 159). The division of tasks regarding disarmament and reintegration programs was in essence as follows: "The JPMC was responsible for the implementation of all aspects of the Bicesse Accords. UNAVEM II to monitor the collection and storage of weapons by the parties. Parties themselves reached agreement on the regulations and procedures to be followed for the collection and storage of weapons. The UN was not involved, but offered technical advice on the classification and storage of weapons. NGO’s planned reintegration programs, as did the EU" (2002: 160). However, in practice the UN military observers were also engaged in the counting of weapons and troops in the AAs and monitoring the assembled troops, demobilized troops and troops that were selected to join the FAA (Vines, 1993: 12). Furthermore, in November 1991 a new body, the Interministerial Office to Support the Demobilized Military of Angola (GIAMDA) was created on presidential command to establish a broad program for the integration of ex-combatants (Porto et al., 2007: 41).

I will now continue with describing and analyzing the evidence for the first of the six mechanisms in Angola.

4.4 Evidence

4.4.1 War recurrence and the conflict-development nexus

The first mechanism of the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis states that DDR leads to a lower risk of war recurrence. This mechanism is divided into three subdivisions.\(^7\) I will now analyze the obtained evidence for the three subdivisions.

The first subdivision is to what extent violence was present between the formerly warring combatants or parties. In general the evidence shows that during the transitional period of eighteen

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\(^7\) The mechanism of War Recurrence and the Conflict-Development Nexus is explained more in detail on page 11.
months the country was peaceful. The UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghaly stated 3 months before the elections that the process of maintaining peace since May 1991 was encouraging. Birmingham emphasizes that “Burden some through the legacies of war may have been, the eighteen months from May 1991 to September 1992 was the most spectacular period of optimism and freedom that Angola had ever witnessed” (2002: 171). He also writes about “a year of blissful peace” (ibid.: 172). Komprobst labeled the eighteen months as “a brief period of negative peace” (2002: 57). However, the peace was not free of problems. Both MPLA and UNITA used hostile political rhetoric and most challenges were responded by the threat of violence. Nevertheless, these threats were never really executed during the transitional period. Spear argues that “peace was, however, maintained during the pre-election period in spite of the animosity and bellicose rhetoric between the two movements” (2010: 202). Pycroft calls the transitional period a ‘phony peace’ which implies that the full-scale conflict was ended but people were not free of the social and economic consequences of the civil war (1994: 250). The negative peace did not mean that the transitional period was without any conflict. There are reports of various violent confrontations, often during UNITA demonstrations, between supporters of UNITA and MPLA soldiers or police, which resulted in the arbitrary killing of at least 8 people (AI, 1991: 1; Pycroft, 2010: 252). Reports of Amnesty International show many cases of human rights violations, often with political motives from both UNITA and MPLA. The problem was that the decisions of the JPMC, which had the task to prevent, verify and investigate possible violations of human rights, was based on consensus between UNITA and MPLA. The large influence of both parties meant that each party could block any decision which might damage their political interests (AI, 1992a: 2). SRSG Margaret Anstee noted that “the ceasefire held – even if sometimes by a hairline – simply because, when push came to shove, neither side wanted to imperil the elections, which each expected to win (at least in the latter stages)” (in Spear, 2010: 202). Next to the evidence about peace and conflict within Angola, I obtained no evidence in primary or secondary sources that combatants of UNITA or MPLA were fighting in neighboring countries during the transitional period. Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that this thesis focuses only on evidence of the mechanisms in the transitional period between the peace agreement and post-conflict elections. That means that this section does not deal with evidence for the period after the post-conflict when full-scale war actually did return.

In short, during the transitional period in Angola the same conflict did not recur. Negative peace was present in the country and no new violent conflict broke out. Furthermore, there is no evidence of participation of UNITA or MPLA combatants in violent conflicts in neighboring countries. However, there were various violent incidents between the former fighting parties and combatants within the borders of Angola. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that in general Angola was in negative peace during the transitional period.

The second subdivision is to what extent economic opportunities and activities have increased. The civil war cost Angola an estimated 120 billion USD in material damage between 1975 and 1986 (Pycroft, 1994: 242). Ottaway emphasizes that “the 1992 elections took place in an extremely unfavorable social and economic context” (1998: 137). The population was largely illiterate and poor. The Human Development Report of 1994 ranked Angola 155th out of 173 countries based on figures from 1991 and 1992 (UNDP, 1994: 131). The extreme poverty was the result of the colonial period, socialist policies of the MPLA and the civil war (1998: 138). The MPLA ruled the country in a Marxist style. Together with the effects of the war and low oil prices this led to the breakdown of most

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79 Anstee was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola and chief of UNAVEM II.
sectors in the economy. In 1987, the government announced economic reconstruction plans to shift towards a free-market economy (McCormick, 1994: 3-4). The prospects of the end of war and liberalization measures prompted some foreign investors to invest in Angola. However, McCormick points out that “without a comprehensive overhaul of the economy and a revised investment code, most foreign corporations remained wary of making substantial investments” (1994: 5). Amongst others, the widespread corruption, inefficiency and the worthlessness of the Angolan currency remained large obstacles for investment and trade (Pycroft, 1994: 251). In 1991, the World Bank concluded that in general the promised economic reforms in Angola have not been implemented (McCormick, 1994: 6). The approaching post-conflict elections played an important role in this. The international community put pressure on the government to implement measures for economic development. However, the MPLA feared that these economic policy measures would be highly unpopular with the electorate and would lead to political repercussions of the voters during the elections (Pycroft, 1994: 251). This resulted in the government’s decision to halt the reform process until after the post-conflict elections which was an obstacle to real economic development, decreasing unemployment and increasing income (Tvedten, 1997: 75). Pycroft underlines that “the hope of an immediate ‘peace dividend’ was forlorn” (1994: 250). An important factor was that there was a general absence of jobs or schemes to create them (Pereira, 1994: 15).

The real GDP grew with 3.3 percent in 1992. However, the inflation rate was extremely high with numbers of 176 percent in 1991 and 496 percent in 1992. The agricultural and manufacturing production was totally destroyed due to the civil war. Only the oil industry flourished because of its offshore location and Angola became the most important Sub-Saharan oil producer after Nigeria. This also resulted in the total Angolan dependency on oil export earnings and government revenues (Adams, 1996: 8-9). Adams argues that against the Angolan background of social and economic destruction “the ending of a prolonged civil war may not produce a rapid peace dividend for either the economy or the government budget deficit” (ibid.: 11).

The Angolan government spent 20 percent of the GDP to the military apparatus in 1991. This was almost four times the amount spent on health and education combined (Pereira, 1994: 10). During the transitional period, school enrolment rose again because the negative peace allowed the schools to reopen. However, the rise in school enrolment did not occur due to any increasing investment or focus on education by the government. The savings from the defense budget in the transitional period went directly into demobilization and the creation of the FAA (Pycroft, 1994: 250). The reopening of schools was a necessity because school enrollment was only 30 percent in 1990 (Adams, 1996). Furthermore, the country needed billions of dollars to repair the roads, railways, bridges, schools, industry, farms and houses, in order to rebuild the economic infrastructure. However, this barely happened during the transitional period. The level of infrastructure was still dramatic and mainly out of use at the time that the elections approached (Pereira, 1994: 15).

It is also important to look at the planned and implemented reintegration programs aiming to integrate combatants into civil life and the economy. The idea of GIAMDA, the body installed to establish a broad program for the reintegration of former combatants (Porto et al., 2007: 41), was that only MPLA soldiers would receive a package after demobilization because UNITA soldiers were never paid a salary in the past (Bekoe, 2002: 121). It is argued that popular protests of demobilized soldiers over the lack of benefits demonstrated that the demobilization process was disconnected from the reintegration needs. Soldiers were often simply sent home without any package (Verhey, 2001: 11). The soldiers who did receive the package were given money to the value of about 100 USD and a clothing kit. Former officers were given extra money and pension benefits. The government wanted

80 In 1993 the inflation even grew to 1838 percent.
81 100 USD is equal to five months salary.
to soften their potential discontent and also give them “a stake in the survival of a government which grants them such generous privileges” (WB, 1993: 60). Next to this, GIAMDA was meant to create a multi-sectoral social and economic reintegration program, including financial support, professional and vocational training. However, the schemes and programs, which were approved by the CCPM and would cost 447 million USD, were never implemented (Porto and Parsons, 2003: 25-26). Although for example the EEC was willing to financially support the reintegration programs, in general there was a lack of money and political will to implement them. The shortage, or almost absence, of well-planned reintegration programs regarding financial security and a certain professional and vocational training decreased the incentives for combatants to assemble and stay in the camps in anticipation of the promised benefits (1993: 38). Furthermore, it led to rising levels of violence and crime.

In short, the evidence shows that during the transitional period the economic situation in Angola was not becoming better after the peace agreements. It even became worse due to the enormous inflation rates in 1991 and 1992. The lack of political will to implement serious economic reforms or invest in education, health and infrastructure instead of in the military apparatus contributed to this. Furthermore, the evidence shows that apart from the small payment to certain former MPLA soldiers no reintegration programs were implemented before the post-conflict elections. That meant that ex-combatants were not given good incentives to reintegrate into the Angolan economy. To conclude, in general economic opportunities did not increase during the transitional period and DDR programs did not raise the individual opportunity cost to participate in a conflict which means that it did not reduce the chance of war recurrence.

The third subdivision is the potential of (re-)mobilization, which focuses on to what extent combatants were disarmed, the availability of weapons and to what extent the structure of the armed groups was broken due to demobilization. I will first analyze the process of demobilization and next disarmament. Demobilization is essential in reducing the risk of war because it eliminates the ties between ex-combatants and their command structure (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 8). This ‘delinking’ reduces the possibility to (re-)mobilize in the event of a return to war and contributes to peace if it facilitates social reintegration (ibid.: 53). The demobilization process in Angola encountered many difficulties and soon lay far behind schedule. The problems started with the cantonment of troops, which was initially planned to be finished in August 1991. However, 10 months later in June 1992 only 37 percent of the government troops and 85 percent of UNITA troops were encamped (WB, 1993: 26). The demobilization of troops officially started on 1 April 1992, a half year later than planned, and was supposed to be finished on 31 August 1992. However, only 20,000 combatants or 13 percent of the 150,000 troops from UNITA and MPLA were demobilized in 46 assembly camps on 20 June 1992, the day that the election campaigns officially started. On 2 September 1992, when demobilization was planned to be finished and one month before the elections, the total number of demobilized troops was only 41 percent, which was 45 percent of the MPLA and 24 percent of the UNITA troops (Sinjela, 1994: 57).

Various factors contributed to the delays and problems during the demobilization process. Firstly, there was a lack of transport opportunities which complicated the movement of demobilized combatants from the AAs to civilian communities (ibid.). Secondly, the extremely bad living conditions in the various camps, including shortage of medicines and food, lack of productive and recreational activities for combatants, and inadequate housing and sanitation facilities, exacerbated the discontent with the whole process. Reports show that in several AAs, mainly in MPLA AAs, the situation was so fraught that combatants were close to starvation (WB, 1993: 22; Bekoe, 2002: 114).

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82 EEC: European Economic Community
83 See chapter 4.4.2 for the detailed analysis of criminality and violence.
There was also a lack of civilian clothes which meant that the soldiers, who often had spent most of their lives in the military, could not return home (1994: 57). Furthermore, UNAVEM II was poorly equipped and funded, which made the supervision of the demobilization and disarmament impossible (Dzinesa, 2007: 76; Gomes and Parsons, 2003: 24).\(^\text{84}\) Margaret Anstee pointed to the enormous lack of resources and complained that the given mandate extremely underestimated the complexity and enormity of the situation (2003: 25).\(^\text{85}\) Besides, the lack of financial instruments and reintegration plans was an important disincentive for combatants to demobilize and disarm (2007: 76). Next to that, the combatant’s impatience of waiting for many months in the AAs was an important cause for tensions and resulted for example in soldier’s attacks in regional capitals to demand demobilization papers (1993: 26). These problematic factors together resulted in the widespread desertion, often with arms, of troops from the poorly secured AAs, which exacerbated the security situation (1993: 22; Dzinesa, 2007: 76). In many camps the desertion resulted in the decrease of the number of assembled troops without being demobilized or reintegrated in the FAA. This was especially the case in AAs with MPLA combatants where figures show a decrease in MPLA encampment from 60 percent in October 1991, to 54 percent in February 1992 and even to 37 percent in June 1992 (2002: 114).

The ultimate and maybe most important factor was the general mistrust between the MPLA and UNITA. Sinjela argues that the delays of demobilization were the result of “a general lack of willingness for each party to demobilize its troops” (1994: 57). This led to a high level of mutual suspicion and accusations (Krska, 1997: 88). On 27 September 1992, a few days before the elections, only 65 percent of MPLA and 26 percent of UNITA troops were demobilized and had returned to civilian life. This meant that UNITA had more troops in the AAs spread across the country compared to the MPLA and could also quite easily reorganize these troops (2002: 121). Observers reported that government troops did not remain organized once present in the AAs, while on contrary UNITA troops still obeyed to their officers (ibid.: 122). The government accused UNITA of maintaining and using 20,000 of its best troops in the South-East of Angola. Although the JVMC observers flew over the area, it was not possible to confirm the accusation. However, the JVMC did discover in various locations several hundred of UNITA troops that had not been registered in the AAs (1994: 57-58). On the other hand, UNITA expressed great concern about the governments ‘anti-riot’ or emergency police. In April 1992, the MPLA transferred 20,000 of their best troops to this force, taking advantage of a statement in the peace agreement that the government had control over the police (Ottaway, 1998: 138). The request of UNITA to add 8000 of their troops to the anti-riot police was rejected by the government (2002: 119).

Another problem was the creation of the new unified army, the FAA, which would consist of volunteers from UNITA and MPLA. This was a condition for the holding of elections (1997: 88). In September 1992 only a few hundred officers had been trained and integrated in the FAA. However, a symbolic creation of the new army took place on 27 September when 8800 soldiers were quickly integrated in the FAA, which was only a fraction of the planned 50,000 soldiers (1998: 139).

Problematic was that the Bicesse Accords provided inflexible dates for the elections, which meant that the elections were held when demobilization was far from achieved and no serious national army did exist (2002:103).

In short, the demobilization process failed due to various reasons. Firstly, it failed because of the poor conditions in AAs due to the shortage of resources. Secondly, it failed because of the lack of

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\(^{84}\) To what extent the resources were limited could be shown by comparing Angola with Namibia. The UN Mission in Angola cost three times the amount of money for the period of 12 months, while Namibia has a significantly smaller population.

\(^{85}\) Margaret Anstee was appointed as the Secretaries General Special Representative to Angola.

\(^{86}\) See also UNSC S/23671, para 11 and UNSC S/24145, para 16, wherein the UN Secretary General points to the strong decrease of troops in the AAs due to the poor conditions.
serious reintegration plans which took away important incentives to demobilize. Thirdly, it failed because of the mutual distrust between UNITA and MPLA which led to the deliberate withholding of troops. Also, the inflexible timetable of the elections meant that the elections took place when demobilization was incomplete and ten thousands of troops were still gathered in AAs scattered across the country. Furthermore, at the time of the elections the FAA consisted of approximately 10,000 soldiers, which is only 20 percent of the initially scheduled number of 50,000 soldiers. To conclude, demobilization was not far enough achieved to take away the dangers of mobilized troops. It failed to break the structure of the armed groups and transform them into civilians. Especially UNITA was easily able to remobilize its troops if war would return (Bekoe, 2002: 103), while the MPLA controlled its 20,000 soldiers strong anti-riot police.

Next to demobilization, also disarmament is believed to be an essential process in post-conflict situations because it makes it harder for groups to turn to violence (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 30).

The Bicesse Accords contained provisions with respect to weapon control. UNITA and MPLA themselves reached an agreement about the procedures and regulations on the collection and storage of weapons. The UN only gave practical suggestions regarding classification and storage of the arms, and monitored the implementation (UNIDIR, 1996: 69-70). Thus, the Angolans themselves were responsible for the collection and storage of the arms in the AAs. The combatants were required to hand over their weapons upon registration in the AAs. Thereafter, the arms would be stored and later either transferred to the FAA or destroyed in the case of damaged weapons (ibid.: 74).

Due to the limited mandate and lack of resources the UN observers were not able to effectively monitor the disarmament process. Furthermore, the earlier described movement of combatants in and out the camps hindered the monitoring (WB, 1993: 30). The lack of resources for infrastructure development also contributed to the failure of the ‘double-key system’. This plan could have guaranteed the safety of the arms stores, because one key would remain in the hands of the locals and the other with the UN. However, the plan was never implemented, which made the verification of disarmament more difficult (Gomes and Parsons, 2003: 26). UN sources show that “the collected weapons were poorly guarded and stored in unsecured location in the camps” (1993: 30). There are also reports of assembled troops who were given back their weapons in the AAs so that they could hunt for food for themselves. This had to do with the fear that ten thousands of hungry combatants would turn to violent crime if they were not given some food (ibid.). Next to that, the tens of thousands of troops who deserted from the AAs took their weapons with them (2003: 26). UN reports also reveal that the weapons, that were stored at the AAs, were low in quality and quantity, which indicates that both parties were hiding weapons for a potential outbreak of a new violent conflict (1996: 71). This was also shown by the fact that a significant number of combatants, mainly from UNITA, reported to the AAs unarmed. Many troops were reluctant to hand over their weapons because there was a lack of employment opportunities and the arms could be sold for a good price on the black market (2003: 26). This indicates that there was a lively weapon trade in the country and ex-combatants could easily acquire arms. Both UNITA and MPLA also maintained their access to weapons through external supply chains. This was in contradiction with the established arms embargo between both sides and the Troika (1996: 71), and with the agreement, the so-called Triple-Zero clause, to restrain from acquiring arms (HRW, 1999: 14). Furthermore, UNITA not only kept troops in the bush, but also a large amount of heavy weapons (Ottaway, 1998: 138). The over-arching

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87 This movement took place because of the poor conditions and the long waiting for demobilization in various AAs.

88 The Troika is the name for the US, Soviet-Union and Portugal together.
problem with the disarmament, just as with demobilization, was related to mutual suspicion and mistrust, and a general lack of commitment to the disarmament process by both parties. UNIDIR emphasizes that this also resulted in that “the CCPM in Angola was totally ineffective in ensuring the collection and storage of weapons” (1996: 72). An estimated 2 million weapons were still in circulation at the end of the transition period according to the World Bank (1993: 7).

In short, the disarmament process during the transitional period was a total failure. The UN and CCPM were not able to effectively monitor and verify the execution of the agreements. Furthermore, both parties were not committed to full disarmament and subsequently deliberately withheld arms. The presence of hidden arms caches, illegal arms trade, low quality and quantity of collected arms and lack of security of the arms depots resulted in the failure of the disarmament and a continuing widespread availability of weapons to combatants, former soldiers and civilians. This consequently meant that the opposing parties were able to quickly rearm if necessary, which would escalate a starting violent conflict (1996: 71).

After analyzing the obtained evidence I have come to the conclusion of the first mechanism. Firstly, negative peace was present in the country and no new violent conflict broke out. However, there were various violent incidents between UNITA and MPLA soldiers. Secondly, the economic opportunities and activities in Angola did not increase. The macro-economic situation was unstable and there was no political will to press on real economic reform or invest in health, education and infrastructure. Furthermore, there were no job opportunities for soldiers and no reintegration programs to stimulate the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Thirdly, demobilization failed and was not able to take away the dangers of mobilized troops. Still a large number of troops were present in the AAs when the post-conflict elections started. Especially UNITA was able to easily remobilize its troops, scattered across the whole country, if war would return, while the MPLA controlled its 20,000 men strong anti-riot police. Disarmament failed desperately and many combatants and ex-combatants still possessed or had easy access to weapons at the time that the post-conflict elections took place. The poor conditions in the AAs and lack of mutual trust and reintegration programs were important factors in the failure of demobilization and disarmament. In general, the DDR programs were not able to decrease the availability of weapons and failed to break the structure of armed groups and to transform former combatants into civilians. To conclude, DDR programs in Angola did not raise the individual opportunity cost to participate in a conflict and thereby did not reduce the risk of war recurrence. A major obstacle was that the Bicesse Accords provided inflexible dates for the elections, which meant that the elections were held when demobilization and disarmament were far from achieved.

Taking all this evidence and the three subdivisions into account, I conclude that the evidence disconfirms $H^1$ in the case of Angola. This means that in Angola DDR did not lead to a lower risk of war recurrence and therefore did not increase the chance of a successful post-conflict elections.

### 4.4.2 Post-war violence and crime

The second mechanism argues that DDR programs lead to a lower level of post-war violence and criminal activity. I will first look at the criminal activity and, secondly, at the level of violence in the transitional period in Mozambique.

The availability of weapons is an important factor for the presence and rise of criminal activity. In the case of Angola the process of disarmament failed and weapons were still easily available to or

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89 $H^1$ (Hypotheses 1): DDR programs lead to a lower risk of war recurrence and therefore to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.
already in possession of combatants, ex-combatants or civilians.\textsuperscript{90} The initial plan was that the collected arms would be stored and later either transferred to the FAA or destroyed in the case of damaged weapons (UNIDIR, 1996: 74). However, the destruction of arms never took place during the transitional period, while the weapons were stored in unsecured arms depots. That means that the psychological effect of moving away from a culture of weapons by destroying them did not take place. Neither did the number of weapons reduce while the collected arms could easily be brought back into society.

Angola has not published crime rates or figures. Only the police authorities publicly announced that the crime rate in the capital Luanda increased extremely with approximately 600\% from 1990 to 1991 (Finkel, 1992: 63). Furthermore, reports from researchers and observers show a significant rising criminality during the transitional period. The fact that thousands of UNITA and MPLA combatants deserted from the AAs due to the poor conditions and long waiting strongly contributed to this increase. This group was believed to be largely responsible for the rising level of criminality (Dias, 1995: 31). The concerns were heightened when in January 1992 four British tourists were murdered by deserted UNITA combatants close to an UNITA camp (1995: 31; 1992: 63).\textsuperscript{91} Problematic was also that demobilized soldiers often left the camps with weapons leading to banditry (WB, 1993: 7). Amnesty International warned in an alarming report in August 1992 that there was an “unprecedented rise in violent crime” (1992a: 2). Another indicator for this mechanism is the number of imprisoned persons. There is no quantitative data available about this. I only obtained evidence that observers were able to tell that approximately 50,000 prisoners were still held against their will in the southern area of the country during the transitional period, which shows that the situation in the prisons was critical regarding the prison conditions and the high number of prisoners in the country (Finkel, 1992: 54).

When we look at the level of violence I discovered two different trends in the evidence. On the one hand political violence decreased because of the ceasefire. Negative peace was present during the transitional period which means that less people were killed and the level of political violence was much lower than the years before the peace agreements.\textsuperscript{92} This decrease is mainly due to the peace agreements, and not necessarily a result of the DDR programs. On the other hand, evidence shows that violence related to crime was on the rise and that in the run up to the post-conflict elections also politically related violent confrontations increasingly occurred. Criminality is often related to violence. Malaquias, who wrote extensively on violence in post-colonial Angola, describes various violent confrontations between gangs, often linked to either UNITA or MPLA, and points to the clear rise of ‘pre-electoral violence’. An important factor was that the MPLA government did not fully succeed in establishing authority in regions where previously UNITA was in power (2007: 152). Dias noticed in his fieldwork that “increased tension and outbreaks of violence in the period preceding the general election seriously threatened to disrupt the electoral process” (1995: 35). More than 30 people died in clashes between UNITA and MPLA supporters. Furthermore, 3 airports were taken by rioting soldiers (Meldrum, 1992: 26). Amnesty International warned for the rise of criminal violence by stating that “Killings are occurring on an almost daily basis in Luanda and elsewhere. Most are carried out by criminals from the ranks of unemployed with easy access to weapons, but some are reported to be politically motivated. The police are unable to control the spiraling violence and few killings have been investigated” (1992b: 4). The large number of violent attacks in for example Luanda led to a new description of Angola’s capital as the “Wild West of Africa” (Finkel, 1992: 52). Malaquias argues that

\textsuperscript{90} See chapter 4.4.1 for a detailed analysis of disarmament in Angola.

\textsuperscript{91} Author Joffre Dias, originally from Angola, has written extensively about Angola and examined the political events during 1991 and 1994.

\textsuperscript{92} A more detailed analysis of the negative peace can be found on page 46.
the failure of demobilization and disarmament was an important factor in the rise of violence and crime. For example, many of the deserted and demobilized soldiers had no opportunities to generate an income which made them turn to crime as a strategy to survive. Furthermore, he emphasizes that “since there was little distinction between the economic and political elites, many common crimes acquired a political connotation during the explosive pre-electoral period” (2007: 153). Finkel points to the negative economic spiral during the transitional period as an important factor of the rising criminality (Finkel, 1992: 54). The failure to implement reintegration packages, which would have given combatants important incentives to reintegrate in the legal economy and civil life, contributed to the problem. Pycroft emphasizes that “the crime wave was attributed to banditry by demobilised soldiers, and seen as a consequence of the economic crisis with which Angola was confronted (1994: 251).

To conclude, the level of criminality, largely by demobilized or deserted combatants, by no doubt increased significantly. This is confirmed by Finkel who stated that “A year after the signing of this southern African country’s historic peace accord, Angolans still live in fear, as the crime rate has soared to an unprecedented level” (1992: 52). Furthermore, violence related to criminality increased during the transitional period. The widespread availability of weapons was an important factor in this growth. Political violence was of a low level compared to the years prior to the ceasefire. However, it started to increase in the months preceding the post-conflict elections. Important factors in the rise of criminality and related violence was the failure of demobilization and disarmament, and the absence of reintegration packages, which gave thousands of demobilized and deserted soldiers no other opportunity than turning to violence and criminality as survival strategy in a period of economic crisis.

Looking at the second hypotheses I conclude that in the case of Angola the DDR programs did not reduce the level of post-war violence as well as criminal activity and therefore did not lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. It means that the empirical evidence disconfirms the second hypothesis in the case of Angola.93

4.4.3 Civic and political participation

The third mechanism is to what extent DDR programs increase civic and political participation of former armed groups and armed combatants. It is divided in three subdivisions. The first is political opportunities and incorporation, the second political engagement and the third the legitimacy of the government. I will now analyze the obtained evidence for the three subdivisions in order to confirm or disconfirm H3.

On 11 May 1991 the law on political parties was signed which stated that parties must have a minimum of 3000 members nationally and at least 150 supporters in 14 of the 18 provinces (Tvedten, 1992: 134). In the end 18 parties were officially recognized as legal and were allowed to participate in the post-conflict elections. Few of them had a well organized program and clear ideology. Only three parties could count on a constant public recognition: UNITA, MPLA and FNLA (Dias, 1995: 23). Many small parties appealed for equal treatment under the law with the ruling party. The MPLA and UNITA had a large advantage in terms of access to cars, telecommunication, offices, diplomatic passports etc. For example, the MPLA controlled the only daily newspaper and UNITA published a weekly newspaper during the election campaign which was flown over from Portugal. Furthermore, MPLA had four radio channels, UNITA one and the other political parties none (Sinjela, 1994: 62). In short, “there was no free access to the media for all political parties” (Ottaway, 1998: 141). The new parties also lacked funding to execute a national campaign (ibid.). Furthermore, the role of MPLA and UNITA in the various joint commissions like JPMC and JVMC meant in practice that only these two

93 H2 (Hypotheses 2): DDR programs reduce the level of post-war violence as well as criminal activity and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.
political parties were guaranteed to play an important role in politics, while the others were not given a chance of succeeding in the elections (1995: 28). In short, although many new political parties were allowed to participate in the elections, the unequal access to resources and treatment of the various political parties show that the political opportunities in the political spectrum were limited.

An important problem surrounding the elections was the lack of knowledge by the population regarding the political system rules, the elections and democracy in general. I obtained hardly any evidence of civic or voting education programs prior to the elections, neither in the AAs for the assembled soldiers, nor for demobilized soldiers, nor for the civilians in rest of the country. Only some of the political parties tried to run voter-education programs on their own (Tvedten, 1997: 56). Once again, the lack of implemented reintegration programs was a great miss, in this case for civic and voting education. Three months prior to the elections CEAST, the main organization of the Catholic Church in Angola, confirmed the absence of voter education. People were not informed about the electoral law and procedures and political programs of the various parties. This meant that a large part of the population had no idea who they could choose and what the political ideas and their democratic civil rights were. CEAST also indicated six weeks before the elections that still no improvements were made (Comerford, 2005: 37). The lack of knowledge about the voting procedures contributed to the large confusion during and after the elections (Ottaway, 1998: 142). The fact that 10-12 percent of the votes were blank ballot papers “only confirms the failure of voter education” (Maier, 1996: 75).

Tvedten emphasizes the problem and argues that there was no well informed and conscious electorate, no responsible government, and no representative non-governmental or civic institutions, including political parties, present in Angola prior to the elections (1992: 138). There was a general lack of knowledge about the existence of political parties and their ideals. The remoteness of the rural population and the absence of programs of the political parties contributed to the problem. In short, the absence of civic and voters education related to reintegration programs was a great miss for the population who barely had any experience with the rights and duties in a democracy and the procedures of the elections. This contributed to the confusion surrounding the elections and to the lack of political engagement and legitimacy.

The voter registration and other activities related to the elections were headed by the National Electoral Council (NEC). The registration process seemed initially problematic due to the lack of infrastructure and access to remote areas. The fear that eligible voters would not have the opportunity to register led to the decision to extend the registration period with 10 days (Sinjela, 1994: 61). Only due to UN’s increased logistical support with, amongst others, helicopters the voter registration NEC was able to execute the voter registration properly. In the end between 20 May and 10 August 1992 around 4.8 million voters, which was 92 percent of the electorate, signed up to vote. Political party agents and electoral officials received training to run the 5800 polling stations (Tvedten, 1997: 56). 90 percent of the registered voters showed up at the polling stations to participate in the elections, which showed that the population was politically engaged concerning the process of voting (Ottaway, 1998: 142).

The transition from military organization to political party is important in this mechanism. UNITA formally transformed into a political party during its congress in 1990 (Tvedten, 1997: 68). It established a Political Commission to draft an election manifesto and an Executive Committee (Tvedten, 1992: 135). However, events from the past followed the new political party and more specifically Savimbi, leader of UNITA, which damaged the image as democratic party. In February 1992, two seniors defected from UNITA and revealed the extreme authoritarian nature of Savimbi and his role in several murders within the high ranks of UNITA (Spears, 2010: 200). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch noticed that the arrogant behavior of UNITA, such as setting up roadblocks with impunity, cost UNITA many votes because the people lost trust in UNITA as credible political party (1994: 12). On the side of MPLA, the establishment of the anti-riot police damaged the reputation of
the party (ibid.: 11). Bekoe argues that “the appearance of the anti-riot police undid the credibility of
the government’s commitment of demobilization and subsequent political reform, especially since the
government itself confirmed their existence” (2002: 118). Party demobilization and disarmament are
essential processes in the transition from military organization to political party. In the case of both
UNITA and MPLA demobilization and disarmament failed which meant that they did not abandon
their military structure and therefore not fully transformed into a political party. The popular graffiti
slogan in Angola’s urban centers “MPLA are thieves, UNITA are murderers” is an indication that both
parties were not perceived fully as credible political parties (Coulson, 1991: 52).

To conclude, evidence shows that the transformation of UNITA to a political party was not
completed. Although it managed to start a national election campaign and received widespread support
from voters, it was not able to leave behind the military aspirations and capacities from the past. The
failure of demobilization and disarmament played an important role herein. MPLA also failed to leave
the military party structures behind. Furthermore, although 18 legal political parties participated in the
elections, the political competition was unequal with only MPLA and UNITA as serious candidates.
This shows the limited political opportunities. The high voter turnout indicates that many people were
engaged to the elections. However, the lack of reintegration programs and civic and voters education
led to troubles during the elections because many people had no knowledge about the political choices
and rules. This shows that DDR programs failed to increase the political engagement. Furthermore, the
various incidents with UNITA and MPLA were problematic for the legitimacy of both organizations
as political party. These conclusions lead to the disconfirmation of H3 and the general conclusion that
in the case of Angola DDR did not increase civil and political participation of former armed groups
and combatants, and therefore did not lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.95

4.4.4 Healing wartime trauma

The contribution of DDR programs to healing wartime trauma is the fourth mechanism. I will now
analyze evidence for the three subdivisions: the process of breaking with the past, the contribution to
reconciliation and social integration.

The success of breaking with the past depends largely on the success of demobilization and
disarmament. As argued in chapter 4.4.1 both processes failed. The destroying of arms did not take
place at all and I obtained no evidence of demobilization ceremonies in the AAs. This means that the
DDR goal of cognitive breaking with the past was not achieved. DDR failed to give the ex-combatants
the opportunity to step away from committed or experienced war abuses. However, I did find evidence
that traditional healing ceremonies occurred in rural communities. These ceremonies were believed to
heal the returned ex-combatants and distance them from the past. This would enable the ex-
combatants to rehabilitate and return into civil life (Comerford, 2005: 192). Nevertheless, community
mechanisms of healing and social reintegration are important, but they cannot solve the wartime
trauma on their own (Honwana, 2002: 7).

I could also not find evidence regarding a contribution of DDR to reconciliation, nor reports
about interaction between UNITA and MPLA ex-combatants, and acceptance of the former enemies.
Thus, it remains unclear how and whether acceptance and interaction took place. On the other hand, I
did notice in the sources that no real attention was paid to reconciliation. No truth commission or other
reconciliation mechanisms were set up to deal with the war trauma. The peripheral role of the UN and

94 See also chapter 4.4.1.
95 H3 (Hypotheses 3): DDR programs increase civic and political participation of former armed groups as well as
combatants and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.
96 (http://sicher.medico.de/download/report26/ps_honwana_en.pdf), visited on 05-02-2012. Article abridged
from: Honwana, Alcinda (2002) “Negotiating Postwar Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola”. In

55
the unwillingness of UNITA and MPLA to imply fully the agreements regarding DDR “contributed to a conceptual failure to the extent that there was no notion of national reconciliation and there was no atonement for the deep mistrust between the opponents” (Krska, 1997: 92). Krska argues that the mutual distrust and lack of national reconciliation was also a consequence of the absence of broad confidence-building measures (1997: 93).

Furthermore, the absence of social reintegration programs means that no contribution was made to social reintegration, reconciliation or breaking with the past at any way at all. This was a great shortcoming because Angola was desperate for reintegration programs to overcome the war traumas. The absence of reintegration programs focusing on economic opportunities was also problematic for the reintegration of ex-combatants because they often returned home with no education or money, which meant that they could hardly regain confidence of the family or community. Furthermore, many soldiers knew no other life than military life, which made it even harder to reintegrate into social life. Especially the thousands of children who served in the armies or the children, who experienced the terrible consequences of the civil war, were a problematic group. Half of the population was below 18 years, which means that most of them never had experienced peace before, while they all had to deal with the wartime traumas. As Honwana explains: “thus for these children trauma is not past, but rather current and very much part of the everyday life” (2002: 5).

In short, because of the failed demobilization and disarmament, and absence of social and economic reintegration programs it is obvious that healing wartime trauma failed. DDR did not support processes of breaking with the past, it did not contribute to reconciliation and did not lead to social reintegration. The DDR programs were not even capable of making the first steps to overcome the trauma and give confidence to ex-combatants and civilians that peace will remain in the country. These conclusions lead to the disconfirmation of \( H^4 \) in the case of Angola. That means that the DDR programs in Angola did not contribute to healing wartime trauma, and therefore did not lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

### 4.4.5 Sequence

The fifth mechanism looks at the implementation sequence of DDR programs. I will first look at what sequence in Angola was planned and implemented and, secondly, analyze the level of confidence between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

As is explained in chapter 4.4.1 demobilization and disarmament were strongly linked to each other and were planned to take place at the same time. The combatants were required to hand over their weapons upon registration in the AAs. Thereafter, the arms would be stored and later either transferred to the FAA or destroyed in the case of damaged weapons. Next, combatants would be demobilized and sent home (UNIDIR, 1996: 74). Initially there were no plans for reintegration packages or programs at all. In November 1991, a half year after the signing of the peace agreements, GIAMDA was created on presidential command to establish a broad program for the integration of ex-combatants (Porto et al., 2007: 41). When GIAMDA was set up only MPLA soldiers were eligible to receive a reintegration package after demobilization, while no packages were provided for demobilized UNITA-soldiers (Bekoe, 2002: 121). In other words, in first instance the concerned parties focused primarily on demobilization and disarmament. During the first year increasing attention was paid to the issue of reintegration. However, it was still very limited and the reintegration packages that were implemented were given only to a limited amount of MPLA soldiers after completion of demobilization. The demobilization process was disconnected from the reintegration needs. Soldiers were often simply sent home without any package (Verhey, 2001: 11). Furthermore, next to the simple MPLA packages GIAMDA proposed various reintegration schemes and programs,
including financial support, as well as professional and vocational training. The proposals were approved by the CCPM and would cost 447 million USD. However, they were never implemented (Porto and Parsons, 2003: 25-26; UNIDIR, 1996: 91). The actual implementation of the reintegration programs was postponed until after the elections (WB, 1993: 47). This shows that in Angola reintegration programs, in contrary to demobilization and disarmament, were never seen as a priority and were planned to take place after demobilization, disarmament and the post-conflict elections. Proponents of the ‘security-first’ logic have the contention that “disarmament and demobilization are critical opportunities for the warring parties to build confidence in each other, allowing the peace process to consolidate and move forward” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 33). Although both processes failed, Angola’s main focus lay on demobilization and disarmament, while lacking interest in reintegration programs. This fits in the ‘security-first’ logic. The opposite logic, the ‘development-first’ logic, argues that carrying out reintegration next to disarmament and demobilization creates stakes in peace for armed groups and individuals. This was certainly not the case in Angola. On contrary, the shortage, or almost absence, of well-planned reintegration programs decreased the incentives for combatants to assemble and stay in the camps in anticipation of the promised benefits (WB, 1993: 38). The failure of demobilization and disarmament in Angola shows that the ‘security-first’ logic did not succeed in this case. Bekoe explains this by arguing that for UNITA full demobilization meant the complete surrender of threat to the government. It would take away the incentives for the government to negotiate with UNITA. MPLA also saw the negative effects of demobilization and disarmament, because it would reduce its ability to control the rebels. Bekoe argues that therefore, “demobilization in Angola had the potential to produce the most vulnerability between the parties” (2002: 113). This problem could have been solved when demobilization would have been accomplished bilaterally and with the same pace in both MPLA and UNITA (ibid.). Demobilization became even more unattractive for UNITA when the government created the ‘anti-riot police’ (ibid.: 118). In short, the implemented ‘security-first’ logic in Angola failed.

The level of trust is the second subdivision of this mechanism. It is divided firstly in confidence building, which is the “level of trust that principal commanders and politicians linked to the armed groups have in their opponents” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 33-34), and secondly in stakes in peace, which is defined as the “level of trust in relation to politicians and commanders commitment to the peace process” (ibid.). First of all, Angola is a clear case where trust in the opponent was absent. The deep mistrust between MPLA and UNITA was an important cause of the failure of demobilization and disarmament (Sinjela, 1994: 57; UNIDIR, 1996: 72). The country lacked any measure to build confidence (Krska, 1997: 93). The continuing mutual suspicion and accusations during the transitional period confirm the low level of trust in the opponents (ibid.: 88). Both parties deliberately kept a large amount of heavy armory and troops out of the demobilization process “in order to prepare for future contingencies” (1996: 90). MPLA stalled 20.000 of its best troops in a paramilitary police group, the so called ‘anti-riot’ police, while UNITA withheld heavy weapons and thousands of its best fighters in the bush (ibid.). This occurred because both parties did not trust each other in fully complying with the demobilization and disarmament process. This is also related to the low level of trust of commanders and politicians concerning the commitment of peace during the transition phase. Bekoe argues that the government openly showed their lack of trust in the peace process: “The appearance of the anti-riot police undid the credibility of the government’s commitment of demobilization and subsequent political reform, especially since the government itself confirmed their existence” (2002: 118). Furthermore, verbal threats of Savimbi show the lack of confidence in peace on the UNITA side. Savimbi, for example, stated a few weeks before the elections that due to the spread of the AAs and encamped UNITA troops across the whole country they did not have to obtain power through elections. He also warned that they “still [had] the capacity for war” (Bekoe, 2002: 120). Although Savimbi did assure that he was committed to the peace process (Cohen, 2000: 116), he
also warned in contrast that if UNITA would lose the elections, it would be due to electoral fraud (Anstee, 1996: 151). The fact that the delays of demobilization were the result of “a general lack of willingness for each party to demobilize its troops” show the shortage of trust in peace and the will to deliberately delay the peace process (Sinjela, 1994: 57). On 27 September 1992, a few days before the elections, only 65 percent of MPLA and 26 percent of UNITA troops were demobilized and had returned to civilian life. In short, the UNITA and MPLA leaders were more committed to achieve power and controlling the country than to peace (Bekoe, 2002: 121; Spears, 2010: 202).

To conclude, in Angola the priority was demobilization and disarmament over reintegration. Apart from the small packages for some MPLA soldiers, no reintegration programs were implemented before the post-conflict elections took place. It means that the ‘security-first’ logic was implemented. This approach failed to build the necessary mutual confidence, which was on a very low level, or even absent, between UNITA and MPLA. The level of trust of commanders and politicians concerning the commitment of peace was also very low. These conclusions disconfirm the fifth hypotheses. The case of Angola shows that the security-first logic did not lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections. Furthermore, the lack of reintegration programs was a disincentive to demobilize for UNITA and MPLA soldiers. This means that in Angola the DDR’s focus on firstly security and secondly on development did not lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.

4.4.6 Adverse effects

The final mechanism is called Adverse Effects. I will now analyze the four subdivisions of this mechanism.

The first subdivision is that DDR programs could eliminate the possible positive effects of armed groups regarding the security level and their potential of social capital. In the case of UNITA social capital was still present and also played an important role in remobilization after the post-conflict elections. Observers reported that UNITA soldiers still obeyed their officers in the AAs and that their social capital remained intact. In contrast, government troops did not remain organized once present in the camps (Bekoe, 2002: 121-122). The mechanism of Adverse Effects argues that the social capital of armed groups might help to reintegrate soldiers into civil life and that the breakdown of social capital due to disarmament and demobilization might take away this positive effect. I argue that this was not the case in Angola because first of all evidence shows that social capital of UNITA was still present when elections took place, and secondly the social capital did not contribute to social reintegration of soldiers but on contrary to the remobilization of UNITA troops when civil war returned (ibid.). The first subdivision also states that demobilization and reintegration might lead to more insecurity because armed groups took care of security before DDR started. In the years before the peace agreement fierce fighting took place in 80 percent of the country, which means that most parts of the country knew insecurity (Tvedten, 1997: 38). During the transitional period the situation was different. Although the rise of violent crime was related to the failure of demobilization and disarmament (Malaquias, 2007: 153; Pycroft, 1994: 251), the period was still characterized as relatively peaceful (Birmingham, 2002: 171; Kornprobst, 2002: 57). The negative peace implies that demobilization and reintegration did not lead to more insecurity during the transitional period. Overall, I argue that the DDR programs in Angola did not eliminate the positive effects of armed groups regarding the security level and their potential of social capital.

The second subdivision concerns the relation between DDR programs and the creation of instability on the macro-level. The level of trust is important herein, because abandoning weapons leads to a security threat. In Angola the level of mutual trust and trust in the commitment to peace was

98 H⁵ (Hypotheses): DDR programs that focus firstly on security and secondly on development lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections.
very low.\textsuperscript{99} Both parties believed that full demobilization and disarmament would result in a security threat to themselves. This led to the deliberately keeping away of soldiers and arms from the DDR process by both organizations (Bekoe, 2002: 113). The presence of a third party could give the credible guarantee for preventing renewed violence. However, the UN presence in Angola did not have the capacity or the mandate to provide this guarantee (Dzinesa, 2007: 76). Although negative peace was present during the transitional period, the DDR programs were not completed before the post-conflict elections took place and negatively contributed to the recurrence of conflict. UNITA soldiers remained armed and concentrated in the AAs across the whole country. Furthermore, they still obeyed their commanders which meant that they could easily be remobilized. In short, although there was a negative peace present during the transitional period, the lack of trust, the incomplete demobilization and disarmament, and the lack of UN support to the process show that the macro stability was very fragile and could easily collapse.

The third subdivision is that DDR programs lead to tensions between civilians and ex-combatants. I obtained little evidence regarding this subdivision. I discovered no reports about abuse of civilians by ex-soldiers, acceptance of ex-combatants by civilians or lack of marriages between both groups, which are all indicators for this subdivision. However, evidence illustrates that violent crime increased significantly during the transitional period. This was related to the failure of demobilization and disarmament (Malaquias, 2007: 153).\textsuperscript{100} Many ex-combatants stepped into criminality because of a lack of other economic opportunities and civilians were increasingly the victims. However, I did not find any evidence that explicitly mentions the presence of increasing tensions between ex-combatants and civilians due to the rising criminality. It remains speculative. The fact that no disarmament program for civilians was implemented meant that they could keep their weapons which increased their feeling of security. In short, I obtained no significant evidence that DDR programs led to tensions between civilians and ex-combatants. However, there was probably a rising tension present due to the strong increase in violent crime by ex-combatants.

The fourth subdivision is that DDR programs generate perverse incentives. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis argue that ex-soldiers or civilians could take advantage of certain components of the program to enrich themselves with money or weapons, which could lead to new violence and instability on the short and long term (2010: 23). The failure of the disarmament definitely did generate perverse incentives. Thousands of assembled soldiers deserted because of the failing demobilization procedures and they left the AAs with weapons (Gomes and Parsons, 2003: 26). An estimated 2 million weapons were still in circulation at the end of the transition period according to the World Bank (1993: 7). Furthermore, the weapon depots were poorly secured. Combatants, ex-soldiers and civilians had easy access to weapons due to the failing demobilization and disarmament. It did generate perverse incentives and resulted in a significant increase in violent crime during the transitional period. It also contributed to the quick escalation of violence after the post-conflict elections. I have obtained no evidence of taking advantage of other components of the DDR programs. Combatants and civilians did not enrich themselves with money. There was a general lack of reintegration programs for financial security and a minimal cash payment to demobilized MPLA soldiers, which also meant that there was hardly any opportunity to take advantage and enrich with money.

In short, in this section I have argued that DDR programs in Angola did not eliminate the positive effects of armed groups regarding the security level and their potential of social capital. In fact, the social capital contributed to the easy remobilization of troops. Secondly, I claimed that although there was a negative peace present during the transitional period, the lack of trust, the incomplete

\textsuperscript{99} See chapter 4.4.5 for the analysis of mutual trust.

\textsuperscript{100} See chapter 4.4.2 for a more detailed explanation of the increasing violent crime.
demobilization and disarmament, and the lack of UN support to the process show that the macro stability was very fragile and could easily collapse. Furthermore, I obtained no hard evidence that DDR programs led to tensions between civilians and ex-combatants. However, the rising violent crime, due to the failing disarmament and demobilization, by ex-combatants suggests that the relation between civilians and ex-combatants was still volatile. Finally, the failed disarmament and demobilization did generate perverse incentives which led to new violence and instability on the short and long term. To conclude, although the DDR programs did not eliminate the social capital of the groups, evidence shows that the failure to disarm and demobilize led to perverse incentives, to a very fragile macro stability and volatile relation between ex-combatants and civilians. The evidence confirms the sixth hypotheses.\(^{101}\) I will now continue with analyzing the post-conflict elections and the situation regarding peacebuilding and democracy in Mozambique during the five years after the elections.

4.5 Post-conflict elections success or failure

4.5.1 The post-conflict elections

The preparation for the post-conflict elections started slowly. In April 1992, it seemed doubtful that elections could take place in September. In practice the elections were organized in five instead of the agreed 18 months. On 28 April, the Election Law was approved and after that the National Election Council (CNE) was established (Ottaway, 1998: 140). Between 20 May and 10 August 1992 around 4.8 million voters, which was 92 percent of the electorate, signed up to vote. Only due to UN’s increased logistical support with, amongst others, helicopters voter registration was executed properly. Political party agents and electoral officials received training to run the 5800 polling stations (Tvedten, 1997: 56). In mid-August, candidate registration took place and 18 parties registered for the parliamentary and 13 candidates for the presidential elections. The election campaign was characterized by unequal access to resources and an atmosphere of tense with various small violent incidents (1998: 141).

The elections were held on 29 and 30 September when the new FAA consisted of only 10,000 soldiers, demobilization was still incomplete, and Savimbi warned that he would not accept an electoral defeat because it could only happen as a result of widespread fraud by the MPLA. The situation on the ground was that “it was highly dangerous to allow the elections to take place under such circumstances” (1998: 141). However, the date was determined in the peace agreement and no mechanisms for postponing the elections were agreed upon (ibid.). The election days went remarkably well. People were waiting in long queues patiently and peacefully. “In general, the voting process on the election days was carried out with impressive earnestness both by the electoral personnel and the voters themselves, which was no mean feat in a war-torn, underdeveloped country with an adult literacy rate of just 36 percent” (1997: 58). The high voter turnout of 92 percent showed the will of many Angolans to contribute to democracy (Turner, 2002: 228).

MPLA leader Eduardo dos Santos received 49.6 percent of the votes and UNITA leader Savimbi 40.1 percent. In the parliamentary elections the results gave 34 percent to UNITA and 54 percent to MPLA. The smaller parties played as expected a marginal role and the electoral battle was only between MPLA and UNITA. A second round was needed between the two main parties because none of the candidates received an absolute majority (Turner, 2002: 228). Based on reports of 800 international observers, the UNSC declared the first round of the elections “free and fair”. The OAU,\(^{102}\)

\(^{101}\) \(H^6\) (Hypotheses 6): The adverse effects of DDR programs lead to a lower chance of successful post-conflict elections.

\(^{102}\) See chapter for a detailed analysis 4.4.3.
European Community and individual states agreed with this judgment.\textsuperscript{103} The various minor incidents were explained by inexperience and honest error (Tvedten, 1997: 58).

The positive development of the elections ended on 3 October when Savimbi started to raise charges of fraud and threatened to take up arms again. He demanded an inquiry into the alleged fraud and irregularities as well as the suspension of the official electoral results. The promise was made by the UN that fraud and irregularities would be inspected. Anstee declared on 17 October that “there was no conclusive evidence of major systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 October”\textsuperscript{104}. However, before this statement, on 5 October, former UNITA troops withdrew from the FAA and violence broke out in various cities. Quick negotiations between UNITA and MPLA took place. Savimbi agreed to participate in a second round if it would be conducted by the UN, while MPLA demanded the return of UNITA troops to the FAA and AAs before the second round could take place. Unfortunately, the negotiations failed and a new violent period began (Dias, 1995: 35-36). The failed demobilization of UNITA and infiltration of UNITA members into towns where previously MPLA was in control gave a powerful advantage to UNITA after the rejection of the electoral results. UNITA forces quickly gained territory before the MPLA was able to respond. The second round of the elections never took place anymore and Angola slipped back into a new civil war, the so-called ‘Third War’ (Pycroft, 1994: 252).

\textbf{4.5.2 The post-elections period}

In this final section I will look at to what extent peacebuilding, defined as ‘strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’, and the process of democratization, defined as ‘free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees’, took place in the five years after the post-conflict elections.

The rejection of the electoral outcome by Savimbi increased the tensions in the country. UNITA started to remobilize troops from the AAs in strategic cities in the country, which was perceived as threatening by the government. The presence of arms and large number of UNITA soldiers spread across the country in the AAs simplified the quick remobilization of troops. Bekoe states that “the failure of demobilization, it is acknowledged, facilitated the return to war” (2002: 116). On the other hand, MPLA distributed weapons to MPLA supporters and the anti-riot police had organized attacks which led to the death of hundreds of UNITA supporters in Luanda in the weeks after the elections (Turner, 2002: 228). This was likewise perceived as threatening by UNITA (Spears, 2010: 205) and justified the renewal of a military campaign according to UNITA (2002: 228). Savimbi gained territory in the months after the elections and conquered important cities such as Huambo and Soyo. This cut off the connection of the government to the oil- and diamond-rich regions of Angola which was important for the limitation of the government’s military efforts. The battlefield was now in the countries urban centers instead of in the rural areas (2010: 206). UNITA controlled 70 percent of the country in 1993 (HRW, 1999: 15) and was in a stronger position than before the Bicesse Accords (Pycroft, 1994: 254). This changed in mid-1993 when MPLA received the formal recognition of the US as legitimate government. The US changed their policy and started to support the MPLA, because they condemned UNITA’s actions and ran out of patience. This resulted in the removal of the international arms embargo and the start of a rearmament program by the MPLA. The government started to recapture territory and in November 1993 new peace negotiations started (Spears, 2010: 207-208). It lasted until late 1994 that the new UN peacemaker Alioune Beye established a peace

\textsuperscript{103} OAU is the abbreviation of Organization of African Unity. This is the predecessor of the current African Union.

\textsuperscript{104} (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm), visited on 02-03-2013
agreement in Lusaka, the so-called Lusaka Peace Agreement (Birmingham, 2002: 174). Human Rights Watch reports that the ‘Third War’ was notable for the systemic violations of laws of war by both the government and UNITA. Indiscriminate killing and destruction of the besieged cities by UNITA, indiscriminate bombing by the government, landmines and starvation led to an estimated 300,000 deaths during this war (1999: 15). Furthermore, at least 600,000 people were driven from their homes, inflation rates were 1300 percent, measles and cholera were epidemic, all showing the consequences of the 2 years war after the post-conflict elections (Ciment, 1997: 214). The Lusaka Peace Agreement provided for a ceasefire, integration of UNITA in the government’s armed forces, demobilization, reintegration, incorporation of UNITA troops into the police. During 1995 and 1997 many violations of the peace agreement by both MPLA and UNITA occurred and full scale war returned in 1998 (HRW, 1999: 17-29; Birmingham, 2002: 181).

In short, the five years after the post-conflict elections were characterized by a new brutal civil war, which led to even more human suffering and deaths than in the 16 years before the Bicesse Accords. This clearly shows that the goal of peacebuilding was not achieved.

The process of democratization underwent a difficult time during the five years after the post-conflict elections. The democratic institutions were formally in place, and the new constitution provided the establishment of a democratic state with a multiparty parliamentary system. However, the system did not function as it should be. Power was still centralized around the MPLA, while UNITA continued to obstruct the process of democratization (Tvedten, 1997: 61). The unfinished post-conflict elections ensured that the country had no constitutionally elected Parliament and President. To find a solution MPLA leader Dos Santos called for a meeting with all parties who participated in the post-conflict elections. He aimed to come to terms regarding the change of the constitution in order to establish a National Assembly and transitional government. UNITA declined to attend the meeting (Pycroft, 1994: 252). On 2 December 1992 a new government was announced. UNITA was offered four deputy ministerial posts and the Ministry of Culture. However, UNITA officials never accepted the positions. The creation of the new government was in accordance with the Bicesse Accords and election results which “gave the MPLA both international and domestic legitimacy” (ibid.: 254). Two cabinet posts and 20 percent of subcabinet posts were given to other parties than the MPLA (1997: 61). The National Assembly first gathered in November 1992 without the 70 UNITA members. The judiciary included the Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, and provincial criminal, civil and military courts. Judicial independence was not effectively implemented during the five years after the elections because of the lack of political will, security and qualified judges. The insecurity and control of UNITA over large parts of the country, also when the Lusaka Peace Agreements were agreed upon, meant that the democratic institutions could not function as intended (ibid.: 62). Another important negative development was “the increasing lack of confidence in the very notion of democracy that has developed in large parts of the Angolan population” (Tvedten, 1997: 62). Savimbi remained the person in charge of UNITA. However, internal opposition grew and they wanted a faster implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement and political transparency was demanded (ibid.: 63). The Lusaka Peace Agreement offered various political diplomatic and military posts, and created a new vice-president post for Savimbi. However, he still refused to take up the offered political positions during 1996. Tvedten argued that “without a settlement, the political system in Angola continues to deteriorate” (1997: 64).

Minimal civil rights were definitely not guaranteed in the five years after the post-conflict elections. MPLA forces were responsible for widespread violations of civil rights including “direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate attack, summary executions, torture, forced displacement, and

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105 Lusaka is the capital of Zambia.
recruitment of child soldiers” (HRW, 1995: 61). Furthermore, indiscriminate bombing of UNITA-controlled areas as well as indiscriminate torture and killing of suspected UNITA-supporters, often civilian non-combatants, led to thousands of deaths (HRW, 1999: 67-79). Also, UNITA forces committed a great number of violations of civil rights including: “direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate shelling, summary executions, mutilation of corpses, starvation of civilians, hostage-taking, forced portering, recruitment of child soldiers, denial of the freedom of movement, and blockage of relief aid” (HRW, 1995: 88). In 1998, Human Rights Watch found out that the majority of violent incidents during the years of the Lusaka peace process were coordinated and organized by either the MPLA or UNITA forces (1999: 44).

In short, the process of democratization failed. A new constitution was established and MPLA implemented a government which received national and international legitimacy because it complied with the agreements from the Bicesse Accords. However, the democratic institutions were not able to function as they should, the political system deteriorated, and the confidence in democracy by the population disappeared in the years after the elections. Large parts of the country were still under control of UNITA who refused to be part of the political process. The recurrence of civil war after the post-conflict elections and the continuing widespread violence committed by both MPLA and UNITA during the years of the Lusaka Peace Agreement show that minimal civil rights were certainly not guaranteed.

To conclude, the evidence shows that the post-conflict elections failed to achieve the goals of peacebuilding and democratization. During the five years after the post-conflict elections a new violent conflict broke out and even during the Lusaka Peace Agreement widespread violence continued to take place. Eventually also these peace accords failed and again full scale civil war started. This obstructed the democratization process further. The fact that half the country was occupied by UNITA, that Savimbi continued to refuse any position in the government, and that both MPLA and UNITA violated civil and human rights on large scale show that no free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees was possible during the five years after the post-conflict elections.

4.6 Conclusion
The 16 years of civil war left Angola in a ravaged state. The signed Bicesse Accords between MPLA and UNITA gave some hope and opportunities to turn the tide. The planned DDR programs were given the essential task to demobilize and disarm the in total 150,000 combatants spread over the whole country and reintegrate them in civil life or in the new unified army, the FAA. UNAVEM II played an important observing and monitoring role, but had to operate within a limited mandate. Most of the efforts to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate the soldiers within the agreed 18 months had to come from the two warring parties themselves. Unfortunately, the DDR process in Angola failed during the transitional period and reduced the chance of successful post-conflict elections and related process of peacebuilding and democratization. The analyzed evidence of the six mechanisms in Angola shows that first of all the DDR programs were not able to decrease the availability of weapons and failed to break the structure of armed groups and transform former combatants into civilians. The programs did not raise the individual opportunity cost to participate in a conflict and thereby did not reduce the risk of war recurrence. Secondly, the DDR programs did not reduce the level of post-war violence and criminal activity. In contrast, criminality and related violence significantly increased due the failure of demobilization and disarmament, as well as the absence of reintegration packages. This gave thousands of demobilized and deserted soldiers no other opportunity than turning to violence and criminality as survival strategy in a period of economic crisis. Thirdly, DDR did not increase civil and political participation of former armed groups and combatants. The transformation of UNITA to a
A political party was not completed and MPLA failed to leave behind the military structures. Political opportunities and competition were limited and unequal. Furthermore, DDR programs were not able to increase political engagement. In the fourth place, DDR programs were not capable of making the first steps to overcome the trauma and give confidence to ex-combatants and civilians that peace will remain in the country. In other words, DDR did not contribute to healing wartime trauma. Furthermore, the implemented ‘security-first’ logic failed in Angola. Reintegration programs were planned to be implemented after the elections which was an important disincentive for the combatants from both parties to demobilize. Finally, evidence shows that in general the DDR programs, mainly due to the failure of disarmament and demobilization, did have adverse effects in Angola.

To conclude, the six mechanisms together show that DDR in Angola failed to increase the chance of a successful outcome of the post-conflict elections. A major obstacle was that the Bicesse Accords provided inflexible dates for the elections, which meant that the post-conflict elections were held when demobilization and disarmament were not yet achieved. The two main factors that appeared to be the common theme in the failure of demobilization and disarmament was the lack of reintegration packages and mutual trust. The first round of the elections was labeled as “free and fair” by the international community and a second round was needed. However, a few days after the first round Savimbi started to raise charges of fraud. The consequence was that the MPLA started to distribute weapons among its supporters, while UNITA was able to easily remobilize its troops from the AAs across the whole country where thousands of combatants were still not demobilized. It resulted in the return to full scale civil war. This also meant that the democratization process was put a few steps back. The DDR programs in Angola failed to increase the chance of successful post-conflict elections. The failure of the post-conflict elections, as well as related goals of peacebuilding and democratization led to the continuation of the civil war, which ended officially in 2002, ten years after the post-conflict elections.

I will now continue with the comparison of Mozambique and Angola regarding the analysis and outcomes for the six mechanisms.
5. Comparison

5.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters the cases of both Mozambique and Angola were analyzed in detail. This chapter will compare both cases in order to draw general conclusions from the research. I will start by briefly giving the general similarities between both cases. Next, I will look more specifically at DDR during the transitional period and will focus on noteworthy dissimilarities between the cases for each of the six mechanisms separately in order to capture the elements that led to the differences in the outcomes of the post-conflict elections and related peacebuilding and democratization processes. I will finish with the comparison of the outcome of the post-conflict election and the related processes of peacebuilding and democratization. I will now continue with the similarities.

5.2 Similarities
It is important to elaborate on the similarities between the cases in a comparative research. In the case of Mozambique and Angola various important resemblances can be distinguished.

At first, both countries followed a similar path towards independence. They were colonized by the Portuguese and became independent in 1975 after the coup d’état in Lisbon. Inge Brinkman emphasizes that this similarity is important for both cases and that it differs largely from most other countries in Africa. She argues that “an important parallel element is that both countries are located in Southern Africa……. Southern Africa went in a different direction compared to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa and knew a consolidation of the colonial systems until the seventies. Angola and Mozambique belong to this group”. Inge Brinkman also points to the large influence of South-Africa in both countries by saying that “the changes in South-Africa were important because it fought in Mozambique and Angola”. South-Africa actively participated in the conflict with financial and logical support to both RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. It feared the Marxist-Leninist oriented FRELIMO and MPLA, and South Africa’s support was part of their apartheid regime’s strategy to destabilize the black ruled neighboring countries (Manning and Malbrough, 2009: 79). The Cold War also had a great influence on the conflicts. Brinkman explained that “Mozambique and Angola were a stake in the game of power in the Cold War which influenced both conflicts during a long time”. The opposing parties were supported by either the US or Soviet-Union. Only when the Soviet-Union collapsed and external support faded away peace talks could be started in Mozambique and Angola. The breakdown paved the way for the peace agreements in 1991 (Angola) and 1992 (Mozambique). Brinkman also points to the importance of the similar liberalization of the economy and increasing abandonment of a state controlled economy. However, important to mention here is that in the case of Mozambique the liberalization largely succeeded while in Angola MPLA failed to fully liberalize the economy as it promised to do. Next, both countries obviously share a same historical path from independence in 1975, to 15 or 16 years of brutal civil war between the ruling party and a rebel movement, to peace talks under pressure of the international community after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and to a transitional period with DDR leading to the post-conflict elections.

Looking more specifically at the transitional phase, I could distinguish several similarities between Mozambique and Angola. First of all in both cases demobilization was the main focus in the DDR programs. Assembly Areas (AAs) were set up through the countries where troops could be registered and go through the demobilization process. Furthermore, the widespread problems that occurred in the AAs show a similar pattern. There was a general shortage of food, medicines and

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106 Interviewed on 13-12-2012. Inge Brinkman is Senior Researcher at the African Studies Centre in Leiden, the Netherlands. She has executed extensive fieldwork in Southern Africa and is specialized in social relations in Angola.
clothing, and a lack of funds to provide the combatants with the minimum and necessary needs. Furthermore, because of the delays in the demobilization process many soldiers were tired of waiting in the AAs and uncertain about the future. These factors contributed to unrest and violence in the AAs in both countries.

Another striking similarity is that the main focus on demobilization led to the marginalization of the disarmament process. The idea of handing over one weapon per person in the AAs failed. Soldiers arrived without weapon or with a weapon of bad quality while keeping the best weapons out of the disarmament process. Furthermore, the submitted armory was stored in unsecured locations and poorly guarded. During the transitional period weapons were often stolen or deliberately redistributed. The fact that eventually no weapons were destroyed also contributed to the failure of disarmament. At the time that the post-conflict elections took place many ex-combatants and civilians still possessed or had easy access to weapons in both countries. The failure of disarmament also led to perverse incentives in Mozambique and Angola because (ex-)combatants and civilians could enrich themselves with weapons due to the easy access to a large amount of weapons. This strongly contributed to the rise in criminality and related violence, which has remained problematic in the years after the post-conflict elections. However, political violence decreased because overall the warring parties remained committed to their promise of a ceasefire during the transitional period. Both countries knew a negative peace and no violent conflict broke out before the post-conflict elections took place.

The last important similarity is the lack of trust in the opposing parties. It was one of the most important factors of the failure of disarmament and delays in demobilization in Mozambique. In Angola the deep mistrust between MPLA and UNITA was an important cause of the failing disarmament and demobilization too. Both cases show that, especially after a long devastating war, the building of trust in the opposition is a difficult process which needs time. It is important to take the distrust seriously and keep it discussable between both parties because it could endanger the peacebuilding and democratization process.

As explained above some similarities can be distinguished in both cases. More interesting is which outstanding dissimilarities could be obtained in the evidence. This could tell us more about why the outcome of the DDR programs and post-conflict elections differ in both countries. In the next section I will first look at the general differences between Mozambique and Angola and thereafter more specifically to the transitional period and describe it per mechanism.

5.3 Dissimilarities

5.3.1 General dissimilarities

The cases of Mozambique and Angola have some general differences, apart from the dissimilarities obtained in the analysis of the DDR programs during the transitional period. The first general difference is an ethnographic one. Angola had important historical links with the Atlantic (slave) trade to Brazil and inevitably with colonizer Portugal. This resulted in a strong dichotomy in the country. On the one side were the Creole people who were often Portuguese speaking, Catholic and urban-based. On the other side were the Africans of the ‘interior’, who were poor, uneducated and “neglected at the bottom of a fairly rigidly stratified social order” (Chabal, 2002: 110). Mozambique shows a different ethnography. It was more linked to Portuguese India and had little to do with the slave trade to Brazil. The regions in the north and south had less in common than they had with neighboring regions in the west. Trade had always followed the path from east to west instead of north to south. Mozambique was also racially more complex than Angola. Next to the Africans, white settlers and Creole people, there was a large number of Chinese and Indians (ibid.: 111-112).

107 Creole people had mixed Portuguese and African ancestry.
A second general difference was the influence of Cuba in the conflict in Angola. As is explained in previous chapters, foreign assistance in both conflicts played an important role. However, the influence of Cuba in Angola was on such a large scale that it is important to be mentioned here. Approximately 50,000 Cuban soldiers assisted the army of the MPLA in Angola during the eighties, while in Mozambique Cuba only assisted FRELIMO with around 800 military advisors (Sinjela, 1994: 51). The difference here is that Cuba was of great importance for the strength of the MPLA during the civil war and was also decisive in finishing the war by pulling back its troops in 1988-1989 (Knudsen et al, 2000: 12).

The last general difference was the operation of the UN in both conflicts. In Angola the UN was present with around 1100 persons, mainly observers, while in Mozambique it was operational with a 6800-strong military peacekeeping force and hundreds of additional observers. The UNSC had given the mission in Angola a limited monitoring mandate and additionally enlarged it with the observation and verification of the post-conflict elections. In contrast, the UN-mission in Mozambique was much more extensive and entailed a large military component next to the monitoring and observation of the peace process and post-conflict elections.

In the next section I will elaborate on the noteworthy differences between the six mechanisms.

5.3.2 Noteworthy dissimilarities

In the two case-study chapters of Mozambique and Angola I have systematically given an analysis of the evidence for the six mechanisms of the theoretical framework. In this section I will compare the two cases for each separate mechanism in order to find noteworthy dissimilarities. Table 2 schematically shows the outcomes of the analyses per mechanism in each case. I will elaborate on the noteworthy dissimilarities based on the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Dissimilarities between Mozambique and Angola</th>
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<td><strong>Mozambique</strong></td>
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<td><strong>1. War recurrence and Conflict-Development Nexus</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2. Violence and Crime Prevention</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3. Civic and Political Participation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>4. Healing Wartime Trauma</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5. Sequencing</strong></td>
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<td><strong>6. Adverse Effects</strong></td>
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The comparison of the first mechanism of both countries shows some remarkable differences. First of all, in Mozambique economic opportunities and activities for ex-combatants increased during the transitional period, while in Angola this did not happen. The first important difference herein was that in Mozambique the government focused on improving the economic situation of the country by investing in health and education, and liberalizing the economy. The result was a growth of GDP, school enrollment, government expenditures in health and education, and FDI’s. In Angola the government did promise to liberalize the economy. Although the state released its tight control on the economy, it was only liberalized to a limited extent. Real economic reforms were not sufficiently implemented, which led to a collapse of the currency and economy in general. Another striking difference between both cases was that in Mozambique various economic reintegration programs for ex-combatants were implemented which strongly contributed to the enhancement of the economic opportunities of former combatants, while in Angola, apart from small payments to certain MPLA soldiers, no reintegration programs were realized. The lack of reintegration programs resulted in a general lack of incentives for (ex-)combatants to integrate into the Angolan economy as civilians. In short, the general economic improvement and economic reintegration programs increased the economic opportunity costs of participating in war in Mozambique and thereby reduced the risk of recurrence of civil war. In contrast, in Angola the economy worsened and no economic reintegration programs were implemented for ex-combatants which meant that the economic opportunity costs of war did not increase or even decreased and therefore led to a high chance of war recurrence.

A second striking dissimilarity in the first mechanism is that the demobilization process in Mozambique succeeded and was finished before the post-conflict elections took place, while in Angola the demobilization process was not finished before the post-conflict elections took place. Although many problems arose during the demobilization process in both cases, the most important difference was that in Mozambique the post-conflict elections were postponed because demobilization of all troops could not be realized on time. The postponement of the elections gave enough time to execute the cantonment and demobilization before the post-conflict elections took place. In contrast, in Angola post-conflict elections took place on the fixed date while demobilization was far from achieved. A greater flexibility in planning the elections could have given the ex-combatants the essential additional time to demobilize before the post-conflict elections. Another significant factor in the success of demobilization in Mozambique was the presence of reintegration programs for all ex-combatants. The additional 18-month payment gave the extra needed incentive for combatants to demobilize and reintegrate into civil life. In Angola the opposite was going on. The lack of serious reintegration programs played an essential role in the failure of the demobilization process. It took away very important incentives for (ex-)combatants to demobilize and start new lives as civilians. A third factor was that both the Mozambican government and MPLA had hardly any control over their troops when they went into the demobilization camps. This could be linked to the will to be demobilized due to the increased economic opportunities and extensive reintegration packages for demobilized soldiers. In Angola the situation was different. The government had a decreasing influence on their troops that registered at the AAs. However, the UNITA troops still obeyed their commanders even though they went through the demobilization process.

Overall, there are two important differences that stand out in the in the first mechanism. The first is the flexibility of the timetable of the demobilization process and post-conflict elections in Mozambique while in Angola the timetable was inflexible and fixed. Secondly, the availability of economic and social reintegration packages offered the (ex-)combatants important incentives to demobilize and eliminate the ties between ex-combatants and their command structure in Mozambique. In Angola, the lack of economic opportunities due to the absence of economic
reintegration programs and shortage of reintegration programs in general gave important disincentives to demobilize and reintegrate.

I already discussed the similarity of the second mechanism regarding violence and crime. The failed disarmament led to a rise in criminality and criminal violence. However, I want to emphasize one important difference in this mechanism. In the case of Angola evidence shows that the failure of demobilization and absence of reintegration packages contributed to the problem of rising criminality and criminal violence. It left thousands of demobilized or deserted soldiers no other choice but to turn to violence and criminality as a survival strategy. In Mozambique the rise of criminality and related violence was mainly the result of the failed disarmament process and not of a failing demobilization or lack of reintegration packages. Evidence from the case of Mozambique does not point particularly to the group of demobilized soldiers as driving forces of the rising criminality. However, as was the case in Angola, also in Mozambique rising criminality and criminal violence endangered the peacebuilding and democratization process.

The third mechanism, which regards civic and political participation, shows a clear difference in the outcome. In Mozambique RENAMO changed successfully into a political party. Furthermore, political engagement, opportunities and incorporation, and the legitimacy of the government increased during the transitional period. In Angola the opposite occurred. UNITA was not transformed into a political party, while the MPLA also failed to leave the military structures behind, which was problematic for the legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, political opportunities were very limited and political engagement did not increase. Why did civic and political participation fail to increase in Angola, while this mechanism was successful in Mozambique? The evidence shows that the first important reason and also one of the noteworthy differences is that successful demobilization proves to be of significant importance for the transformation of rebel or militarized organizations into credible and legitimate political parties. The failure to eliminate the link between the combatants and command structure made it impossible to remove the military structure of UNITA and also of the MPLA. The second noteworthy difference concerns the civil and political education of the civilians and ex-combatants through reintegration programs. The evidence illustrates that this factor is essential in building political opportunities and engagement, and increase confidence in the government and the political process. Civic and political education took place in Mozambique and greatly contributed to the awareness of the civic as well as political duties and rights in a democracy. The growing awareness and transparency regarding policies and the post-conflict process as a whole strongly increased the legitimacy of the government and political parties, which contributed to the success of the post-conflict elections in Mozambique. In Angola no such reintegration programs existed. The absence did not necessarily result in a lower voter turnout compared to Mozambique. However, it did lead to misunderstandings regarding the political and democratic process among civilians, combatants and ex-combatants and did not lead to an increase in political opportunities, incorporation, engagement and legitimacy. The absence of civic and political education definitely contributed to the failure of the post-conflict elections.

In short, demobilization was not achieved which resulted in the failure to dismantle the military structures of UNITA and MPLA in Angola, while in Mozambique demobilization proved to be a necessary factor in order to leave the military structure of RENAMO behind and transform into a credible political party. Secondly, reintegration packages with civic and political education programs were significant in the growth of political opportunities, incorporation, engagement, and the legitimacy of the government, which strongly contributed to the success of the post-conflict elections.  

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108 See page 66 for the discussion of crime and violence in Angola and Mozambique.
in Mozambique. In Angola, the lack of reintegration programs contributed to the misunderstanding of the political and democratic process and to the failure of the post-conflict elections.

Healing wartime trauma is the fourth mechanism. Evidence from both cases shows that demobilization did not manage to start a process of healing wartime trauma. No demobilization ceremonies, which theoretically would help to step away from experienced or committed war abuses, took place in both countries. Nevertheless, Mozambique was able to start a process of breaking with the past, contributing to reconciliation and stimulating social reintegration while in Angola this mechanism failed. The noteworthy difference here was the presence of social and economic reintegration programs in Mozambique. Especially the monthly payments through the RSS were an important factor. They made the ex-combatants more valuable to the families, villages or neighborhoods to which they returned, which increased the social acceptance for the ex-combatants. Furthermore, the economic reintegration programs increased the ex-combatants social status and social contact with others. The process of breaking with the past is a long-term process and only a simple start could be made in the transitional period. Mozambique succeeded to make this start. The various reintegration packages were a necessary condition for the process of healing wartime trauma. The lack of reintegration packages in Angola and the subsequent failure to initiate the process underlines that reintegration programs are necessary in the success of healing wartime trauma.

The fifth mechanism concerns the sequence of the DDR programs. Mozambique and Angola both implemented a different logic of sequence and both also saw a different outcome of the post-conflict elections. Angola carried out the security-first logic while Mozambique initially planned to implement the security-first logic as well but switched to a development-first logic during the process. This shift proved to be essential in pushing the demobilization process in the right direction which in the end resulted in the success of the post-conflict elections in Mozambique. The presence of reintegration programs alongside demobilization, in particular the monthly payments during 18 months, turned out to be necessary for combatants to go through the demobilization process and reintegrate into civil life. It created the necessary incentives to adhere to peace. The comparison between Angola and Mozambique shows that disarmament and demobilization create conditions of strategic insecurity on the group level and economic insecurity on the individual level, unless selective incentives for armed groups and individuals are created through reintegration program. Reintegration programs were a necessary element in the success of the demobilization process and subsequent post-conflict elections in Mozambique. The fact that in Angola the security-first logic was implemented, and because of that armed groups and individuals were not given incentives to stay in the AAs, demobilize and adhere to peace, which eventually led to the failure of post-conflict elections and the peacebuilding and democratization process in general, underlines the statement that the development-first logic should be implemented in post-conflict countries during the transitional period.

The factor of mutual confidence and commitment to peace is also important. Proponents of the security-first logic argue that “disarmament and demobilization are critical opportunities for the warring parties to build confidence in each other, allowing the peace process to consolidate and move forward” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010: 33). The case of Angola shows that the security-first logic failed to build mutual confidence. It seems to be a long term process which cannot be achieved during the transitional period. Mozambique was also unsuccessful in building mutual trust. The idea that disarmament and demobilization are essential to build mutual confidence fails in practice. Actually the evidence of both cases shows the reverse, by which I mean that disarmament and demobilization failed due to the lack of mutual confidence. Only the presence of reintegration

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109 This is an important argument by proponents of the development-first logic against the security-first logic.
packages saved the troubled demobilization process in Mozambique because it resulted in the fulfillment of this process before post-conflict elections took place.

Another difference in this mechanism was that the commanders and politicians in Mozambique were more committed to peace than in Angola. The lack of commitment to peace in Angola was related to the failing demobilization and disarmament process. Commanders and politicians still controlled a large number of armed combatants with whom they could threaten the peace process. In contrast, in Mozambique commanders and politicians had no control anymore over their troops after the promise was made to the combatants that they would receive extra monthly payments next to the existing reintegration programs. This accelerated the demobilization process and broke the link between commanders and combatants. It meant that commanders and politicians were less able to threaten the peace process.

In short, the comparison shows that the security-first logic does not work, while the development-first logic proves to be the best strategy during the transitional period. Reintegration programs give the essential positive incentives to armed groups and individuals to disconnect from military life, reintegrate into society and adhere to peace.

The adverse effects of DDR programs is the sixth and last mechanism. An important element herein is whether DDR programs lead to perverse incentives, which occurred with weapons in both countries due to the failing disarmament. Other subdivisions of this mechanism are the elimination of the possible positive effects of social capital of armed groups and increasing tensions between ex-combatants and civilians due to DDR. I obtained no supporting evidence for these elements in Mozambique or Angola. Only one difference stands out in the sixth mechanism. The dissimilarity is that in Mozambique DDR did not create instability on the macro-level while in Angola DDR did do so. The failing demobilization played an important role in the macro instability in Angola. Furthermore, the UN was not able to give a credible guarantee for preventing renewed conflict in Angola, while in Mozambique the UN managed to provide security to former armed groups. Next, the DDR programs in Angola failed to build trust in the commitment to peace, which is important for the feeling of security from (ex-)combatants. The combatants believed that disarmament and demobilization would lead to a security threat to them. Again the lack of reintegration packages which could have given every armed group or individual the same incentive to adhere to peace and demobilize proved to be a great miss.

In the following section of this chapter I will briefly give a comparison of the post-conflict elections and following years in Mozambique and Angola.

5.4 Comparing the post-conflict elections

The first noteworthy similarity in the comparison of the post-conflict elections of Mozambique and Angola is the important influence of the UN on the electoral process in both countries. The UNDP played a leading role in the organization and funding of the process in Mozambique, while the logistical support of the UN was decisive in the voter registration, mainly in the remote areas, in Angola. The voter registration and turnout was high in both countries. Furthermore, the voting on the election days went remarkably well. In both countries some minor incidents occurred, but in general the election days went by calmly. The UN and other international observers declared that the elections were “free and fair”.

More interesting for this research are the dissimilarities between Mozambique and Angola. The first noteworthy difference is the fixed time schedule for the elections in Angola and the flexible time schedule in Mozambique. The delays in demobilization led to the postponement of the elections for

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See Chapter 5.2 for the analysis of the similarity regarding perverse incentives.
one year in Mozambique. This gave the necessary additional time to demobilize combatants. In Angola the date of the elections was established in the peace agreement and no mechanism to postpone it existed. This meant that elections took place when demobilization was far from completed. The second difference is the way the countries dealt with dissatisfaction and threats by the former rebel movements. In Mozambique Dhlakama declared a boycott on the evening before the elections on the basis of signs of potential voter’s fraud. The fear was that he wanted to take up arms again. However, Dhlakama agreed to continue with the elections on the second polling day after international political pressure, financial support for RENAMO and Dhlakama personally, and the assurance that all complaints would be investigated before declaring the elections free and fair. The completion of the demobilization process meant that Dhlakama had no military capacity left, which meant that more incentives were present for him to accept the propositions. In Angola Savimbi raised charges of fraud after the first round of the elections and threatened to restart armed attacks. Although he was promised that the alleged fraud and irregularities would be investigated, he withdrew all former UNITA soldiers from the FAA and easily remobilized his combatants from the AAs throughout the whole country. It led to the outbreak of new violence in various cities a few days after the first round of the elections. The easy remobilization of UNITA troops and restart of violence shows that the incompleteness of demobilization created major problems for the execution of the post-conflict elections. It even gave UNITA a strategic advantage compared to the period before the peace agreements, because many more combatants of the MPLA were demobilized. Furthermore, the UNITA AAs were located throughout the whole country and still full of soldiers, while also many deserted and heavy armed grouped UNITA-combatants were present in the country. Savimbi still had military power during the post-conflict elections, which was an important incentive to take up arms at the moment of dissatisfaction with the developments in the elections. Also, the lack of solutions offered, such as financial support for commanders or Savimbi himself which proved to work in Mozambique, created incentives to abandon the election process and restart violent conflict. An explanation for the lack of offered financial support could be the disinterest of the international community in the peace process, compared to the interest in Mozambique, or the presence of oil in Angola, which could be related to the theory of the ‘resource curse’. The second round of the elections never took place.

The outcome of the post-conflict elections shows an obvious difference between Mozambique and Angola. Analysis of the evidence demonstrates that the post-conflict election in Mozambique was a success, while in Angola it failed. In Mozambique both RENAMO and FRELIMO accepted the outcome of the elections which made FRELIMA the legitimate ruling party and RENAMO the legitimate opposition party. The transformation from brutal rebel movement to political party, in which complete demobilization played an essential role, was important. Clingendael expert Rosan Smits emphasizes that it was very important that the government and opposition party were being perceived as legitimate. It makes it possible for the international community to start a new relationship with the post-conflict country and helps them further to rebuild the state. Of course, the development of the democracy had some starter problems in Mozambique. However, in general democratization was on the right track. The civic and political education programs were an important factor for the start of this process. Free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees took place in Mozambique in the five years after the post-conflict elections. The goal of peacebuilding was also achieved. No civil war returned in the five years after the elections. Demobilization of RENAMO and FRELIMO and the reintegration programs contributed largely to

111 Interviewed on 13-12-2012. Rosan Smits is Deputy Director of the Conflict Research Unit and Senior Researcher at the Clingendael Institute. Clingendael is the Netherlands Institute for International Relations. It is a think tank as well as diplomatic academy and aims to enhance insight in international relations.
this success. However, the presence of arms due to the failed disarmament remained problematic for many years, which was reflected in the rise of violent crime.

In Angola peacebuilding failed on every front. The failure of disarmament and demobilization facilitated the return to war. MPLA combatants took up arms again, while the MPLA distributed weapons to pro-MPLA persons and organized attacks on UNITA supporters and civilians with help of the anti-riot police. This justified a full scale return to war according to the MPLA. The result was an even more brutal war than the decades before the transitional period. Democratization failed as well. Although the MPLA government gained international legitimacy as ruling party, a well-functioning democracy was not possible due to the insecurity in the whole country. Democratic institutions were not able to function properly and the political system deteriorated. Additionally, an increasing lack of confidence in the notion of democracy developed in large parts of the country. Civic and political education to civilians and combatants could have made a contribution to eliminate this problem. Furthermore, there was no guarantee of minimal civil rights at all. Both the MPLA and UNITA were responsible for systematic human rights violations on large scale. The failure of demobilization and disarmament contributed to the possibility of both groups to execute brutal actions.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have given a comparison of the case studies of Mozambique and Angola. First the similarities were given, such as the influence of the Cold War, South-Africa and the parallel history with the Portuguese colonizers and independence. Other resemblances were the main focus on demobilization and subsequent marginalization and failure of the disarmament process. The failure of disarmament and widespread presence of weapons generated perverse incentives, which led to a significant rise in criminality and criminal violence in both countries. Furthermore, in both countries the opposing parties lacked mutual trust, which was an important factor in the failure of disarmament and widespread troubles in the demobilization process.

Next, the general dissimilarities were given like the influence of Cuba, ethnographic differences and the limited UN mandate in Angola compared to its extended mandate in Mozambique. More important was the analysis of the noteworthy differences in the transitional period based on table 2. Important was the difference in flexibility of the time schedule of demobilization and the post-conflict elections, and the availability of economic- and social reintegration programs that offered the necessary incentives to demobilize, reintegrate and adhere to peace. Furthermore, deserted or ex-combatants played an important role in the rising criminality in Angola. The achievement of demobilization led to the successful transformation of RENAMO into a credible political party, while this did not happen with UNITA due the failed demobilization. Additionally, in Mozambique civic and political education was important in the rise of political opportunities, incorporation, engagement and legitimacy of the government, while the lack of education contributed to the failure of the post-conflict elections in Angola. The presence of reintegration packages also played an essential role in the start of the process of healing wartime trauma in Mozambique. Another important finding from the comparison was that the development-first logic has a better outcome than the security-first logic. Last, the demobilization and disarmament led to a threat to security in Angola because the UN was not able to give a credible guarantee for preventing renewed conflict. Furthermore, the DDR programs were not able to build trust in the peace process in Angola.

I will now continue with the general conclusions and finish with recommendations for future research and policy.
6. Conclusions

Building peace after civil war has been one of the greatest challenges of the last decades. The transitional period plays a vital role in the outcome of the post-conflict elections, related to the processes of peacebuilding and democratization. Due to time and space constraints, in this research I have focused more specifically on the mechanisms of DDR programs during the transitional period, as well as on the outcome of the post-conflict elections. DDR has emerged as a crucial mechanism in the peace process since the nineties. I have investigated the impact of DDR on the peace process and more specifically the effect of DDR on the post-conflict elections. The cases Mozambique and Angola have been analyzed and compared in order to understand the impact of DDR. This research was carried out in order to answer the following research question: To what extent have disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs led to successful post-conflict elections in Mozambique and Angola?

To answer the research question I have analyzed empirical evidence for the various arguments of two different approaches. The first is the theory of Lyons (2002a; 2004; 2005a; 2004b), which focuses on the influence of ‘demobilization’ on post-conflict elections. The author argues that specific processes and policies that support the twin goals of peacebuilding and democratization are essential in the success of post-conflict elections. Furthermore, in order to investigate Lyons’ argument, I have used the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010), which contains six mechanisms to analyze the impact of DDR programs on the peace process. The hypotheses of this research are related to the six mechanisms. The analysis of the empirical evidence I have obtained in the two cases and the comparison resulted in the following conclusions for the hypotheses:

The first hypothesis, DDR programs lead to a lower risk of war recurrence and therefore to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections, is confirmed in the case of Mozambique and disconfirmed in the case of Angola. A strong focus from the transitional government and international community on the recovery of the economy is important in this mechanism. It is essential for DDR programs to incorporate economic reintegration packages to increase the economic opportunity costs of civil war for ex-combatants. Furthermore, the evidence shows the necessity to finish the demobilization process before post-conflict elections take place. A flexible time schedule for the DDR programs and post-conflict elections could be an important tool to complete the process. Also, a strong focus on reintegration packages, including payments during a longer period, is necessary to give the combatants the incentives to demobilize and reintegrate into civil life.

The second hypothesis, DDR programs reduce the level of post-war violence as well as criminal activity and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections, is disconfirmed by both cases. DDR programs resulted into higher levels of post-war criminal violence and criminal activity, which was caused by the lack of attention for the disarmament process and subsequent failure of the disarmament. The outcome of the second hypothesis suggests that reducing post-war criminal violence and criminality is not a necessary condition for successful post-conflict elections. The case of Mozambique shows that post-conflict elections could succeed, even if disarmament fails and criminality as well as related violence increase. However, it is important to mention that the outcome of this hypothesis does not mean that the failure to disarm as well as to reduce post-war violence and criminality does not have a negative influence on the chance of success of post-conflict elections.

The third hypothesis, DDR programs increase civic and political participation of former armed groups as well as combatants and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections, is confirmed in Mozambique and disconfirmed in Angola. The completion of demobilization was a necessary condition for transforming RENAMO into a credible political party. Civic and political education for civilians and ex-combatants, as part of the reintegration programs, proves to be a significant factor in the success of post-conflict elections. Furthermore, the increase in civic and political participation of former armed groups and combatants is essential for the political legitimacy
of the ruling and opposition party on national and international level. Political legitimacy proves to be important for the success of the post-conflict elections and more specifically for the democratization process.

The fourth hypothesis, **DDR programs contribute to healing wartime trauma and therefore lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections**, is confirmed by the case of Mozambique and disconfirmed in the case of Angola. The case of Mozambique shows that the presence of social and economic reintegration packages results into the start of a process of breaking with the past and contributes to reconciliation and social reintegration. Especially the monthly payments until 18 months after demobilization proved to be functional in Mozambique, because they made ex-combatants more valuable to the families and communities to which they returned. It increased the incentives for adhering to peace as well as democracy and thus contributed to the success of the post-conflict elections. In Angola the fourth mechanism failed due to the lack of social and economic reintegration packages.

The fifth hypothesis, **DDR programs that focus firstly on security and secondly on development, lead to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections**, is disconfirmed by both cases. In Angola the security-first logic was implemented and failed in all aspects. In contrast, in Mozambique the development-first logic was implemented which proved to work and positively contributed to the success of the post-conflict elections. The presence of reintegration programs, and especially the 18 months payment, proved to be a necessary incentive for combatants to finish the demobilization process, reintegrate into civil life and adhere to peace. Disarmament and demobilization create strategic and economic insecurity, unless selective incentives are created through reintegration programs. Creating these selective incentives is an important aspect of the development-first logic. In Angola, the security-first logic resulted in the total failure of the post-conflict elections. In Mozambique, the development-first logic led to successful post-conflict elections.

The sixth hypothesis, **the negative unintended consequences of DDR programs lead to a lower chance of successful post-conflict elections**, is disconfirmed by the case of Mozambique and confirmed in the case of Angola. In both cases DDR led to perverse incentives related to the widespread availability of weapons due to the failed disarmament. The main difference between both cases in this mechanism is that DDR did not create instability on the macro-level in Mozambique while it did do so in Angola. Disarmament and demobilization contribute to a feeling of insecurity among (ex-)combatants. The presence of the UN provided a credible guarantee for preventing renewed conflict in Mozambique, while this did not occur in Angola. Furthermore, the comparison between Mozambique and Angola shows that reintegration programs contribute to building confidence in the peace process and could give every armed group or individual the same incentive to adhere to peace and demobilize. In short, a lack of reintegration packages leads to a higher chance of macro instability. This shows that reintegration programs are necessary to avoid negative unintended consequences of DDR programs.

Next to the six mechanisms, I also measured the success of the post-conflict elections. The empirical evidence shows that the level of success was different in Mozambique and Angola. In Mozambique, both RENAMO and FRELIMO accepted the results of the elections. Democratization was on the right track and the goals of peacebuilding were achieved during the five years after the elections. In other words, the post-conflict elections were successful in Mozambique. In contrast, in Angola democratization as well as peacebuilding failed and brutal civil war returned. In short, post-conflict elections failed in Angola.

The investigation of the empirical evidence, relating to the theory of Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, leads to the conclusion that DDR has strongly influenced the level of success of the post-conflict elections in Mozambique and Angola. The completion of demobilization, before the post-conflict
elections took place, and the presence of various reintegration programs proved to be necessary conditions for the result of successful post-conflict elections in Mozambique. In contrast, the failure to demobilize the armed groups and the lack of reintegration programs resulted into the failure of the post-conflict elections in Angola. The two cases show that the completion of demobilization, before the post-conflict elections take place, is imperative. Demobilization breaks the military structures, takes away the military power of commanders and is a significant factor in the transformation of a rebel movement into a credible political party. Furthermore, economic and social reintegration programs are a requisite for the successful completion of demobilization, for civic and political education, for healing wartime trauma, and for building confidence in the peace process. Next, economic reintegration packages increase the economic opportunity costs of civil war for (ex-)combatants. The economic and social reintegration programs give the necessary incentives to ex-combatants to demobilize and reintegrate, as well as to adhere to peace and democracy. Moreover, both demobilization and reintegration packages are essential for the ruling and opposition party to receive political legitimacy from the population and international community. Next, extra financial support to the military leaders seems to be an important incentive for the leaders to adhere to peace. The analyses of the two cases also show that the development-first logic should be implemented, because disarmament and demobilization create strategic and economic insecurity among ex-combatants and ex-leaders, unless selective incentives are created through reintegration programs. Furthermore, although failing disarmament leads to perverse incentives, the evidence suggests that completing disarmament as well as reducing post-war criminal violence and criminality is not a necessary condition for the success of post-conflict elections.

A flexible time schedule for the DDR programs and post-conflict elections contributes to the chance of completing demobilization and successful post-conflict elections. It is better to postpone the post-conflict elections and give more time to complete DDR, than execute post-conflict elections while DDR has not yet been finished. The latter could push a country back into a situation which might even be worse than before the peace agreement.

To conclude, this research shows that DDR programs have a large impact on the outcome of post-conflict elections in Sub-Sahara Africa. DDR-programs should be given priority over post-conflict elections. The failure to demobilize combatants and to take away the military capacity of commanders during the transitional period strongly increases the chance of failing post-conflict elections. Furthermore, reintegration programs are necessary tools for giving ex-combatants the incentives to demobilize and reintegrate, as well as to adhere to peace and democracy.

This research has contributed to the lack of comparative case-studies on post-conflict elections in Sub-Sahara Africa and explained why some post-conflict elections succeed whilst others fail. Secondly, it has contributed to fill the empirical gap in the literature by focusing on the impact of DDR on the peace process. Furthermore, this study has attempted to explain the dualistic nature of post-conflict elections and the processes that support the demilitarization of politics in order to achieve the goals of peacebuilding and democratization. Finally, this research has tried to deliver a contribution to making the right policy decisions for policy makers.

Because this thesis was constrained by time and space, it is important to continue scientific research on the impact of DDR on peace processes and in particular on the outcome of post-conflict elections. More cases, preferable through a comparative case-study, should be investigated in the future to understand the dynamics at play. In addition, quantitative research should be conducted, which could give valuable additional information about the impact of DDR on peace processes. Furthermore, in the future it is important to carry out extensive fieldwork on the local level in order to understand the way disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration packages have worked out for the ex-combatants and their community members in the years after post-conflict elections.
This research has significant societal relevance. It shows, for example, that policy makers should adapt a flexible time schedule for DDR-programs and post-conflict elections. Furthermore, reintegration programs should be implemented in order to complete demobilization before post-conflict elections take place and to increase the political legitimacy of the competing parties as well as to increase the political knowledge of the civilians and ex-combatants. Looking, for example, at the current situation in Mali, I would argue that the post-conflict elections are scheduled too early, which increases the chance of failing post-conflict elections.\footnote{MINUSMA (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali), established on 25 April 2013, is the UN mission in Mali. It must among others reestablish security and assist in implementing DDR-programs. Post-conflict elections are scheduled on 28 July 2013.} Taking into consideration that the context in Mali is different than in Mozambique or Angola, I still would advise the government of Mali and the UN, and specifically the SRSG Bert Koenders, to postpone the post-conflict elections in order to first complete demobilization of the warring factions as well as implement reintegration programs. The latter would increase the opportunity costs of civil war. Furthermore, it increases the incentives of ex-combatants to demobilize, reintegrate and adhere to peace. Finally, it would be important for the civic and political education of civilians and ex-combatants. These factors would contribute to a higher chance of successful post-conflict elections and consequently to a higher chance of durable democracy and peace.
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