The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia started operating in Uganda in 2010 with the goal of strengthening the Somali security forces through training. The overall purpose was to contribute to stability and development in Somalia.

The aim of this report, a translated and adapted version of an original report published in Swedish in December 2012, is to assess to what extent EUTM Somalia was achieving its objectives and to follow up on Sweden’s contribution to the mission. The assessment was also intended to develop knowledge of capacity-building missions, which have become an increasingly important tool for intervention in countries affected by conflict.
Claes Nilsson
Johan Norberg

European Union Training Mission Somalia

A Mission Assessment

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European Union Training Mission Somalia – A Mission Assessment

European Union Training Mission Somalia – en insatsanalys

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## Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BTC</td>
<td>Bihanga Training Camp</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-operation</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>(EU’s) Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<td>FIBUA</td>
<td>Fighting In Built-Up Areas</td>
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<td>FOI</td>
<td>Swedish Defence Research Agency</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEGAD</td>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
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<td>MHQ</td>
<td>Mission Headquarters</td>
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<td>MTWG</td>
<td>Military Technical Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Advisor</td>
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<td>SNSF</td>
<td>Somalia National Security Forces</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>(Somalia’s) Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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Sammanfattning

EUTM Somalia startades 2010 i Uganda tillsammans med den ugandiska armén med målsättningen att stärka de somaliska säkerhetsstyrkorna genom utbildning. Syftet var att bidra till stabilitet och utveckling i det krigshärjade Somalia.

I denna rapport, som är en översatt och anpassad version av den ursprungliga rapporten som trycktes i december 2012, är syftet att analysera huruvida EUTM uppnått sina målsättningar samt att följa upp det svenska bidraget till EUTM. Analysen av EUTM bidrar också till att stärka kunskapen om kapacitetsbyggnadsinsatser, vilka har blivit ett allt viktigare instrument i konfliktländer.

Studien visar att EUTM hade nått viktiga delmål avseende exempelvis utbildningen av specialister och underbefäl, vilket bidragit till att stärka de somaliska säkerhetsstyrkorna. I relation till befintliga somaliska förband höll de enheter som EUTM utbildat hög klass. De förband som utbildats av EUTM hade också spelat en viktig roll i striderna mot motståndsgrupper i Somalia.

Analysen pekar på att andra delmål, som att stärka den somaliska utbildningsförmågan, ännu inte var uppnådda. Det fanns svårigheter i att utbilda instruktörer på den relativt begränsade tid som EUTM hade till förfogande. De somaliska strukturerna för utbildning var dessutom så pass underutvecklade att det ännu inte gått att se någon effekt av instruktörerna på plats i Somalia.


Nyckelord: EU, EUTM, Somalia, Uganda, Kapacitetsbyggnad, Säkerhetssektorreform
Summary

The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia started operating in Uganda in 2010 in partnership with the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) with the goal of strengthening the Somali security forces through training. The overall purpose was to contribute to stability and development in Somalia.

The aim of this report, a translated and adapted version of an original report published in Swedish in December 2012, is to assess to what extent EUTM Somalia was achieving its objectives and to follow up on Sweden’s contribution to the mission. The assessment was also intended to develop knowledge of capacity-building missions, which have become an increasingly important tool for intervention in countries affected by conflict.

The study concludes that EUTM Somalia in 2010-2012 achieved important objectives, such as training of specialists and non-commissioned officers, which have helped to strengthen the Somali security forces. Compared with existing Somali units, those trained by EUTM maintained a high standard. The units trained by EUTM have also played an important role in combat with armed insurgent groups in Somalia such as the Islamist Al-Shabaab movement.

Other objectives, such as strengthening Somalia’s structures for training Somali instructors, were not fully achieved since it was difficult to train trainers in the relatively short time the EUTM had at its disposal. In addition, the Somali structures for training were underdeveloped, making it impossible to assess any effect in Somalia of the train-the-trainers programme.

At the end of 2012, EUTM Somalia faced major changes. A new mandate was required, which would result in a change of ambition. The international community viewed with optimism the change in Somalia since the presidential election in 2012, and there was an ambition to expand its presence in the country. This would mean that EUTM’s mission area (Area of Operations) could be extended to include both Uganda and Somalia. A higher ambition in line with the EU’s Strategic Review of EUTM Somalia in 2012 would also mean wider-ranging support for the Somali security sector, including advisory functions at the highest levels of the security structures. For EUTM Somalia, such a development would both be a chance to increase influence in shaping Somalia’s future security structures, but also raise the missions’ complexity and responsibility. It would also create a need for a complementary civilian expertise in administrative and supervisory functions.

Key words: EU, EUTM, Somalia, Uganda, Capacity building, Security Sector Reform
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1 Introduction

The EU has conducted its European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Uganda since 2010, with the aim of contributing to stabilising Somalia. The mission supports the development of the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) through training. For security reasons, EUTM Somalia mainly takes place in western Uganda at the Bihanga Training Camp (BTC), in collaboration with the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF).

The Swedish Ministry of Defence regularly commissions from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) assessments of peace operations in which Sweden participates, to enable the adaptation of on-going operations and gather experience for the planning of future missions. In 2011, the Peace Operations Project at FOI’s Division for Defence Analysis carried out an assessment of EUTM Somalia with focus on the Swedish contribution. The 2011 assessment highlighted the following challenges for EUTM:

- EUTM Somalia had almost no influence over the processes before and after the actual military training at BTC. Shortcomings in the recruitment process in Somalia meant that some 10% of the recruits were not suitable for military training, a challenge which EUTM had to handle locally in Bihanga.

- The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia was unable to command the trained soldiers when they returned to Somalia. The SNSF command and control system and infrastructure were underdeveloped. In practice, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) handled the integration and command of the EUTM-trained units.

- EUTM’s organisation required extensive international co-ordination with the United States (US), UPDF, United Nations (UN) and other EU bodies. Weaknesses in this co-ordination, such as a lack of formalisation and challenges in synchronisation of decision-making and budget cycles, created major problems for EUTM on the ground. Regular delays complicated planning both for the mission and contributing Member States as well as other actors involved.

- The poor conditions for the Somali soldiers at the BTC adversely affected the possibilities for effective learning during the relatively short period available for training.
1.1 Purpose

At the outset of 2012, the Swedish Ministry of Defence and FOI jointly recognised the need for a fresh assessment of EUTM Somalia, partly to follow up on experiences gained in 2011. Furthermore, EUTM's objectives had been amended and the Swedish involvement had grown since the first intakes. Finally, the mandate for the mission was to expire at the end of 2012. Decisions on both a new mandate for EUTM and Sweden’s participation were to be taken at that time. The purpose of the study, which was originally published in Swedish in December 2012, was to assess to what extent EUTM was achieving its objectives and to follow up Sweden’s expanded contribution to EUTM. This translated and adapted version also discusses the future of the mission and the needs then faced by the Somali security sector against the backdrop of the situation in Somalia. The analysis does not cover the mission’s new mandate of January 2013. All references to EUTM concerns EUTM Somalia, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

1.2 Methodology

This is a translation and adaptation of the original report which was published in Swedish in December 2012. This analysis is thus based on information collected prior to EUTM’s new mandate of January 2013. The analysis is based mainly on interviews, supplemented by direct observations of EUTM Somalia during a visit to the BTC, plus secondary sources. Written background material includes selected EU documents and planning documentation for EUTM Somalia, research reports as well as notes and minutes from workshops. Approximately 40 semi-structured interviews were carried out in Sweden in spring-autumn 2012, in Brussels in April 2012, in Nairobi in May and October 2012, and in Uganda in October 2012. Material from interviews in Uganda and Kenya in April 2011 was also used. The interviews were the primary material for assessing the achievement of EUTM's goals, the Swedish team’s engagement, and for identifying areas for future Swedish contributions. The interviewees were granted anonymity in order to ensure that they would feel comfortable to freely express their views and opinions.

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1 In 2012, the FOI Peace Operations Project also produced a report entitled “Land i sikte – EU:s samlade ansats gentemot Somalia” (Land in Sight – EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Somalia), by Eva Hagström Frisell, Magdalena Tham Lindell and Emma Skeppsström, http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir3462.pdf. The purpose of the study was to describe and assess the EU’s Comprehensive Approach towards Somalia. In particular, the development and co-ordination of the civil and military initiatives within the framework of the EU’s Common Security & Defence Policy were studied, together with the development of the EU’s strategic framework and the Union’s special representative for the Horn of Africa.

2 See References for a comprehensive list of the interviews.
The security situation in Somalia made travelling to Mogadishu impossible. This limited the scope of the material, especially Somali perspectives. To address this, a wide range of external actors and Somali stakeholders were interviewed in Kenya and Uganda.

FOI held a seminar in October 2012, presenting an initial assessment of EUTM and its future. The seminar was attended by key actors for the Swedish contributions to the EUTM Somalia, including representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Armed Forces. The assessment of goal achievement for EUTM Somalia was based on both the overall level (political/strategic objectives) and the operational/tactical level (military objectives). Issues were addressed against the background of possible long-term effects of EUTM, i.e. what effect the trained soldiers could have on the security situation in Somalia. Finally, the work of the Swedish training team was assessed to provide a more comprehensive picture of Sweden’s contributions.

Since EUTM’s mandate was to expire in late 2012 the report also includes reflections about future opportunities and challenges that could arise in an extended and/or amended mission. The Strategic Review that was presented to the Member States in October 2012 had indicated a series of changes for any new mandate.3

1.3 Structure of the Report

Section 2 presents an assessment of the goal achievement for EUTM Somalia and an analysis of the Swedish contribution. Section 3 discusses the future of EUTM Somalia as perceived in the autumn 2012, including various options for future Swedish contributions. Finally, a number of generic conclusions regarding capacity-building initiatives are discussed against the background of EUTM Somalia, given that this type of intervention has become increasingly important in peace operations.

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3 Council of the European Union, 14760/12, EU Training Mission Somalia – Strategic Review
2 EUTM Somalia

2.1 Background

In 2009, EU High Representative Javier Solana addressed EU defence and foreign ministers about the organisation’s approach to Somalia, including EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta. He listed six new areas where the EU could support the development in Somalia, including capacity-building in the security sector.\(^4\) In the same year, the UN Security Council called attention to the importance of supporting the build-up of the Somali security sector\(^5\) and the EU started to prepare to step up its involvement in Somalia.

At around the same time, the EU, the UN and the US jointly assessed the security situation in Somalia and the possibilities for helping to increase stability. In the resulting allocation of functions, the EU was to contribute to a training programme, the US would via contractors contribute to recruitment and integration of the force and improve the infrastructure, while the UN would be responsible for international co-ordination.\(^6\) In partnership with the US, UN, AMISOM and UPDF, the EU was to train up to 2,000 Somali soldiers in Uganda. The mission was also intended to enable AMISOM to decrease the resources it was diverting from on-going operations to the training of Somali soldiers in Somalia.\(^7\)

On 15 February 2010, the EU decided to create a military mission within the scope of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - EUTM Somalia. The aim of the mission was to strengthen the TFG and to contribute to a sustainable development of the Somali security sector through training of Somali soldiers. In partnership with UPDF, 2,000 recruits were to be trained up to platoon level, including in specialist functions. The mandate also included co-operation with the UN, AMISOM and the US.\(^8\)

Initially, the mandate stipulated for the training of two cohorts in two intakes, with a six-month training period for each intake. In July 2011, the mandate was extended for two additional six-month periods up to the end of 2012.\(^9\) Under the new mandate, training was also to include command and train the trainers, i.e. training Somali soldiers who would in turn become trainers (instructors) in the

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\(^4\) ESDP Newsletter No. 8, p. 15, 2009
\(^6\) Interviews, Kenya, October 2012.
\(^8\) Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, 2010
Somali security forces.\textsuperscript{10} By the end of 2012, approximately 3,000 Somali soldiers were to have been trained.\textsuperscript{11}

\section*{2.2 Organisation and Implementation}

In 2012, EUTM Somalia consisted of some 130 people, divided between a small Mission Headquarters (MHQ) in Kampala and the BTC where the training took place. The mission had a liaison office in Nairobi and a “support cell” in Brussels. The Mission Commander reported to the Chairman of the EU Military Committee.\textsuperscript{12} In October 2012, the BTC had a staff of 14 persons and 12 training teams. Training at the BTC was conducted in partnership with the UPDF. The division of labour meant the EUTM trained specialists and commanders up to platoon level while the UPDF trained Somali riflemen. EUTM and UPDF training programmes were conducted separately, although in the same training location (BTC). The UPDF was also responsible for the cohesion training phase. In the cohesion phase soldiers, specialist and officers were integrated into units up to company level and underwent joint training and exercises.\textsuperscript{13}

Prior to training, AMISOM and the Somali government, working with \textit{inter alia} the US (through contractor Bancroft International), handled the recruitment and selection of soldiers in Somalia. The US also arranged the transport of soldiers to Uganda and back to Somalia after the training had been completed.

The recruitment of soldiers was challenging. There were difficulties in bringing together, testing and security vetting nearly 1,000 individuals and keeping them in one place in Mogadishu before transporting them to Uganda.\textsuperscript{14} For the first two intakes of Somali soldiers, there were additional problems such as poor sleeping quarters and food. Difficulties in planning and co-ordinating air transport caused long waiting periods and many recruits decided to leave. The resulting vacancies were filled with people who were quickly recruited, sometimes with insufficient testing and vetting.\textsuperscript{15} Plans to broaden the recruitment base by including soldiers from western Somalia had to be abandoned after Ethiopia pointed out that it was handling training of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP, 2011
\item \textsuperscript{11} EUTM Magazine, July 2012, p. 2: \url{http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1728530/eutm_magazine_2012_july_final2.pdf}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Interviews, Uganda, October 2012 and Belgium, April, 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Interviews, Uganda, October 2012 and Belgium, April, 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Interview, Kenya, April 2011.
\end{itemize}
Somali soldiers there. Co-ordination challenges between the actors involved remained for the 2012 intakes.\(^{16}\)

After training at BTC, the soldiers were sent back to Mogadishu, where they underwent integration training for 1-2 months at the Jazeera Camp under the auspices of AMISOM and SNSF, to enable them to operate under the command of AMISOM and to strengthen their sense of national identity.\(^{17}\)

Additional training for certain units and individuals was conducted by AMISOM and Bancroft International on behalf of the US. Due to the limited capabilities of SNSF’s command and control structure,\(^{18}\) the Somali units were in practice under the command of AMISOM.\(^{19}\)

## 2.3 Achievement of Goals

EUTM’s achievement of goals is here measured against the four sub-objectives expressed in the Council Decision of July 2011.\(^{20}\)

1. Continue contributing towards strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving all Somali citizens.

Did EUTM contribute to strengthening the Somali government to serve all of its citizens?\(^{21}\) The EU 2012 Strategic Review asserted that this goal had been achieved, but did not explain in detail how.\(^{22}\) The EUTM and its partners were to have trained approximately 3,000 Somali soldiers by around year-end 2012. The newly trained Somali soldiers without doubt enabled AMISOM to drive Al Shabaab back from several areas, in particular Mogadishu. This contributed to

\(^{16}\) Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
\(^{17}\) Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
\(^{18}\) EUTM Magazine, July 2012, p. 3.
\(^{19}\) Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
\(^{20}\) Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP, 28 July 2011: “1. In order to continue contributing towards strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving all Somali citizens, an EU military training mission (EUTM Somalia) shall contribute to the development of the Somali security sector through the provision of military training to the National Security Forces (NSF). Training will focus on developing Command and Control and specialized capabilities and on self-training capacities of the Somali NSF, with a view to transferring EU training expertise to local actors. EUTM Somalia will continue operating in close co-operation and co-ordination with other actors in the International Community, in particular the United Nations, AMISOM, and the United States of America and Uganda in line with agreed TFG requirements. 2. The EU military training carried out to that end shall continue to take place mainly in Uganda, in accordance with the political objective of the EU mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, as defined in the revised Crisis Management Concept approved by the Council on 20 July 2011. Elements of EUTM Somalia will also be based in Kenya and Brussels.”
\(^{21}\) The mandate refers to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In August 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia was inaugurated, ending the transition period.
\(^{22}\) Council of the European Union, 14760/12, EU Training Mission Somalia – Strategic Review, p. 4, 2012
strengthening security in Somalia. At the same time, other factors contributed to weakening Al Shabaab. AMISOM increased its troop deployment in 2011-2012 and Kenya and Ethiopia provided additional pressure. Al Shabaab had to fight on many fronts, leading to its degradation as a military force and forcing it to become more of an underground insurgent movement.\(^{23}\)

In addition to their military value, the EUTM-trained units and their explicit connection to the Somali government contributed to a sense of national identity. How they will serve the Somali people other than in the fight against Al Shabaab – especially in the long term – however, remains to be seen. If the units are not maintained in the long term (above all through pay), there is a risk that they may fall prey to crime or defect to armed resistance groups.\(^{24}\) This would endanger the long-term objectives of EUTM Somalia. Even worse, the build-up of military capability could then even become a conflict-driving factor.

2. An EU military training mission (EUTM Somalia) shall contribute to the development of the Somali security sector through the provision of military training to the National Security Forces (NSF).

In 2010-2012, EUTM Somalia and its partners trained some 3,000 Somali soldiers, specialists, commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers. Since 2011, the mission also trained some 120 Somali trainers to enable them, in turn, to provide training in Somalia.\(^{25}\) Training at BTC was considered by many to turn out soldiers of good quality by Somali standards.\(^{26}\) EUTM Somalia had, in terms of quantity and quality, contributed to strengthening the Somali security sector in line with the objectives of the mission. In the autumn of 2012, several international and Somali actors were of the view that the number of SNSF troops was appropriate for the time being and that the focus should be shifted to further training of existing SNSF troops and pro-government militia forces.\(^{27}\)

In order to assess the results achieved by EUTM Somalia, it was also necessary to gauge the effects in Somalia after the training. The long-term results of EUTM would be affected by the effectiveness and command and control of the Somali security sector. The development of the security sector in Somalia had been focused on the fight against Al Shabaab. EUTM therefore had to be assessed on the basis of the effect that the trained units had had on the conflict in Somalia. This meant obtaining an understanding of

\(^{23}\) Interview, Kenya, October 2012.
\(^{24}\) Interview, Kenya, October 2012.
\(^{26}\) Interviews, Kenya, October 2012, and Uganda, October 2012
\(^{27}\) Interviews, Kenya, October 2012
how the soldiers had been integrated into the Somali security forces and how they operated in the conflict.

There were varying assessments on SNSF’s combat capability. According to interlocutors with good insight, this capability had been strengthened by international support in, for example, leadership (up to company level) and planning. This was partly the result of further training and partly because the troops had had more combat experience. Co-ordination with AMISOM had improved. Successful SNSF operations under overall AMISOM command in 2012 in Afgoye and Afmadow demonstrated an improved SNSF capability in operations with AMISOM.28

One worry was that the EUTM-trained troops would leave the SNSF after having completed training in Uganda. There was also seen to be a risk that deserting soldiers would engage in criminal activity or defect to resistance groups. However, this did not materialise to any major extent and it seemed as if the vast majority of the soldiers trained by EUTM continued to serve with their units after returning to Somalia. The EU reported an approximately 10 per cent post-training drop-out rate.29 However, other reports indicated a much larger unrecorded figure.30

Units trained at BTC seemed to stay intact after their return to Somalia, despite reports that command may have been affected by clan dynamics.31 The EUTM-trained units were included in the core of SNSF’s combat units (the fifth and sixth brigades), which played a key role in the fight against Al Shabaab, for example in Mogadishu and Afgoye.32 The standard of the EUTM-trained soldiers was generally described as high compared with the rest of the SNSF. Although Somali units began to assume more responsibility in combat operations, which reduced the burden on AMISOM, the SNSF, including the EUTM units, still depended on AMISOM for overall command, intelligence and maintenance support.33

SNSF’s challenges included a lack of competent commanders and a system for identifying prospective commanders.34 The clan mentality made the task of creating a national Somali spirit more difficult and affected leadership in the

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28 Interview, Kenya, October 2012
30 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012. According to the respondent, the soldiers turn up when it is time to be paid, then disappear again, making attendance levels seem higher in the statistics than they are in reality.
34 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
units. EUTM can hardly affect this, and any external actor who becomes involved in Somalia must deal with clan dynamics.

The effectiveness of the training at BTC was hampered by the sometimes overly harsh conditions for the Somali recruits. During the first intakes, instances of excessive lack of sleep and food occurred. In addition, EUTM and UPDF attitudes towards physical punishment as a part of military training differed. Taken together, this caused tensions between UPDF soldiers and the Somalis. During the fourth intake, EUTM personnel made clear that such treatment of the Somali recruits would not be tolerated. EUTM personnel also increased their presence in the Ugandan and Somali parts of BTC (the EUTM camp was separate from where UPDF personnel and the Somalis lived). Conditions at BTC were reported to have improved since then.

Overall, EUTM Somalia contributed to building up SNSF by training soldiers and officers in Uganda. The units trained by EUTM came to form a valuable part of SNSF. The units participated in the fighting against Al Shabaab and became an important additional resource to AMISOM. However, both EUTM-trained units and the SNSF in general remained heavily dependent on AMISOM and it would probably take a long time before SNSF had the capability to conduct own operations without support from international partners.

3. Training will focus on developing Command and Control and specialised capabilities and on self-training capacities of the Somali NSF, with a view to transferring EU training expertise to local actors.

Since July 2011, EUTM had, in addition to providing specialist training, focused on strengthening Somalia’s capability for training soldiers itself and on strengthening the SNSF command capability. Its ambition has been to provide training up to and including company level at BTC.

With regard to the development of command capability, EUTM has approached this from section, platoon and up to company level. EUTM-trained officers have in the cohesion-training phase commanded units consisting of soldiers trained by the UPDF. As noted above, the UPDF was responsible for the cohesion-training phase, over which EUTM had only limited influence. Some EUTM personnel felt that the standard at the cohesion-training phase did not develop the Somali soldiers and units beyond the skills acquired in the previous training. Interlocutors with good insight into the training programme noted that the soldiers in the earlier training intakes at BTC consequently had found combat training at platoon level difficult.

35 Interview, Belgium, April 2012.
36 Interviews Kenya and Uganda, October 2012.
37 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
The training programme should also be viewed in the light that the SNSF command capability between political стратегический level and company level was being formed from scratch. Irrespective of any progress by EUTM, it was likely that there would be a lack of effective national military command structures in Somalia for years. This would affect the ability of the EUTM-trained companies to operate in an optimal way. Furthermore, weak command structures meant a higher risk of desertion and disciplinary problems.

As for specialist training, EUTM Somalia trained soldiers in skills such as combat lifesaving, communications, staff duties (up to company level), mine clearance, and Fighting In Built-Up Areas (FIBUA), for one week per intake (more for FIBUA-specialists) and was assessed to considerably increase the capability of the Somali units. More specialist skills were needed, for example civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), intelligence and military police.

The train-the-trainers programme, i.e. training Somali soldiers to be instructors that would train soldiers in Somalia, was introduced through the decision of the Council in July 2011 to extend EUTM. It stipulated that EUTM Somalia was to train some 120 trainers. Training instructors in only a few months is challenging, particularly given the conditions at BTC. Becoming an effective trainer takes a long time and requires continuous practice. EUTM had three to four months to train instructors, which was unlikely to be adequate. The instructors therefore needed further training after returning to Somalia.

EUTM personnel noted that the Somali trainers had only basic skills to pass on after having completed their training at BTC. Moreover, training in Somalia had not yet started in the autumn of 2012 and there was information that EUTM-trained instructors had been assigned temporarily to combat units, rather than to units training new soldiers. AMISOM provided the bulk of the additional training given to the Somalis upon their return.

To sum up, EUTM faced challenges in reaching the ambition of training 2 x 60 Somali trainers up to a sufficient standard. It was difficult to assess the standard of these instructors, particularly as the training programme in Somalia had not yet started. The need for international support to build a sustainable Somali training system was likely to remain for years. The specialist training programme worked fairly well and continued to be much in demand from

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38 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
39 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
40 Interviews, Kenya, October 2012.
42 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
43 Interview, Kenya, October 2012.
44 Interview, Kenya, October 2012.
SNSF. Development of the command capability was making progress, although challenges remained.

4. **EUTM Somalia will continue operating in close co-operation and co-ordination with other actors in the international community, in particular the United Nations, AMISOM, and the United States of America and Uganda in line with agreed TFG requirements.**

The EU was in 2010–2012 one of several regional and international actors involved in strengthening SNSF. The co-operation between the Somali government, the US, AMISOM, Uganda and the UN was vital to the success of the EUTM. In the mission area, a *Joint Security Committee* (JSC), consisting of representatives of all major actors involved, formally handled overall co-ordination of support to the Somali security sector, while a *Military Technical Working Group* (MTWG) co-ordinated more practical issues such as training support. EUTM Somalia participated in MTWG and its subcommittees in which training was discussed. There was consensus among central actors in these groups as to what needed to be developed.45

At the same time, many countries were providing bilateral support to the Somali security sector. Neighbouring Ethiopia, for example, had a training programme in western Somalia and Turkey had plans to initiate a support programme for the SNSF. Without adequate co-ordination, multiple efforts could lead to duplication, competition and poorly co-ordinated initiatives being offered to the new Somali government.46 Some interlocutors also noted that it was challenging for the UN to co-ordinate the many initiatives in the security sector.47

As far as EUTM Somalia and the training programme in Uganda were concerned, opinions differed as to how effectively co-ordination was working. But overall, the work of EUTM Somalia had been conducted in close co-operation with relevant partners and such collaboration, for example with Uganda and the US, was vital to the success of EUTM Somalia.48 Analyst Kseniya Oksamytna noted that EUTM’s biggest achievement was perhaps to have found an effective way for the US, UN and AU to collaborate in the training of Somali soldiers.49 Several interlocutors in Brussels were also of the view that the international co-ordination largely worked well.50 At the same time, EUTM’s co-operation with external actors (apart from Uganda) was not

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46 Interviews, Kenya, October 2012.
50 Interviews, Belgium, April 2012.
governed by any official agreements. FOI’s EUTM assessment in 2011 concluded that a lack of co-ordination represented a major risk to the mission.\textsuperscript{51} For example, there was a lack of communication between the various stages in the process (selection – training – integration), leading to delays.

A concrete recruitment challenge that affected EUTM’s work in BTC was clan balance. The trained units showed an over-representation of soldiers from the Mogadishu area and from the Hawiye clan.\textsuperscript{52} EUTM addressed such problems by creating mixed clan units during the training at BTC. In the autumn of 2012, it was still too early to say what the longer-term impact of this would be. Another recruitment challenge that affected EUTM’s daily work in BTC was insufficient screening and vetting of some recruits in Somalia prior to being transported to BTC. EUTM therefore had to conduct its own extra screening of the recruits on arrival at BTC. In the second intake, some 90 recruits were deemed unsuitable for military training as they were under-age, in ill-health or injured.\textsuperscript{53} Although co-operation seemed to improve steadily, this illustrates how EUTM remained fairly isolated in its part of the process, with little or no control over what happened before and after the training at BTC.

All in all, EUTM co-operated with many actors on different aspects of the training at BTC. The collaboration primarily with Uganda, the US and AMISOM was vital for the achievement of EUTM’s overall objectives and enabled the mission to carry out its programmes despite many challenges. However, EUTM’s lack of insight into and control over the processes before and after the training were problematic. If the integration processes in Somalia for some reason were to fail causing soldiers to leave or, worse, to desert to armed insurgent groups, this could lead to highly adverse consequences for the legitimacy of the mission (and therefore also of the EU as a whole) in Somalia and the region.

### 2.4 The Swedish Training Team

During the first two intakes, the Swedish contribution to EUTM consisted of around four trainers. Sweden and Finland had a joint training team at BTC. For the fourth intake, the Swedish contribution had grown to a training team (six officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)) and two staff officers at BTC. During the fourth intake, Sweden also temporarily provided a gender advisor.

\textsuperscript{51} EUTM assessment 2011, Presentation at the Swedish Ministry of Defence, April 2011.  
\textsuperscript{52} EUTM Magazine, July 2012, p. 3.  
\textsuperscript{53} Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
It was not possible to assess the effects of the Swedish training team in isolation since it was a part of a wider effort. However, some interesting lessons from the Swedish contribution were available.

ETUM's Mission Commander rated the performance of the Swedish personnel highly, emphasizing their previous training experience as crucial. Several EUTM Somalia personnel considered the Swedish gender advisor to have made a positive contribution to the mission. Practical exercises were an essential part of his training programme and he was able to convey his knowledge through day-to-day examples that the Somali recruits could relate to.

The Swedish trainers themselves underlined the importance of a flexible and open-minded approach. The Swedish Armed Forces also identified good language- and social skills, innovation and patience as important qualities for EUTM trainers.

From a military training perspective, the quality of the Somali recruits was often low when they arrived at BTC. Many lacked previous formal military training, although many had combat experience. Up to 80 per cent of the recruits were illiterate which presented big challenges for the training teams. The EUTM trainers had to concentrate on the most fundamental skills. The Swedish trainers used training aids, for example basic terrain models (for up to platoon level) and plastic toy soldiers (see image on the report cover) to illustrate basic skills and tactics. Explanatory pictures, diagrams and order templates were used when appropriate.

EUTM’s Somali-speaking interpreters (mostly former Kenyan officers and NCOs from northern Kenya’s Somali speaking minority) played a crucial role in the training. Many of them had been with EUTM Somalia since its start. Their experience made it easier for them to understand and convey the information. Nevertheless, instructing through an interpreter is never ideal from a training perspective. Some trainers assessed that half of the information was lost in translation between the Swedish trainer and the Somali soldiers. Language problems also arose among EUTM personnel, some of whom had limited knowledge of English.

54 Interviews, Belgium, April 2012, and Uganda, October 2012.
55 Interview, Uganda, October 2012.
56 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
57 FOI Seminar, EUTM Somalia at Swedish MoD October 2012.
58 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
59 EUTM Magazine, July 2012, p. 3.
60 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
62 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
63 Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.
2.5 Summary

Despite all the challenges there was generally a positive image of EUTM and its achievements since its start-up in 2010. The Somali government, accordingly, asked for the mission to be extended.\(^{64}\) Several EU Member States described the mission in positive terms and expressed a wish to participate in EUTM.\(^{65}\) Among the EU institutions, EUTM was presented as a model for future capacity-building missions.\(^{66}\) The mission had also been successful in that it had contributed to strengthen the SNSF.

It was clear that there was a continued need to train and strengthen the SNSF, which reinforced the relevance of EUTM. It was crucial to develop systems for further training, command, civilian oversight and control to consolidate EUTM’s contribution to a stronger and more stable Somalia in the long term. If not, there was a risk that what had been achieved so far would be lost.

The Swedish team was described in positive terms, not least for its ability to flexibly adapt the training programme to the needs of Somali recruits. Sweden and the Swedish Armed Forces gained experience from a capacity-building mission, which is an operational approach deemed likely to grow in coming years. Acquired experience in training methods, in managing cultural differences and practical limitations in the mission area, and in co-operating with the host country are all valuable for the Swedish Armed Forces in planning any future participation in training missions.

In the autumn of 2012, a number of challenges remained for EUTM. The training programme for trainers had yet to generate visible effects in Somalia. There were question marks concerning the command capability of the EUTM-trained units. International co-ordination had been challenging and EUTM still had limited influence over important stages of the training process, such as recruitment and integration.

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\(^{64}\) Council of the European Union, 14760/12, EU Training Mission Somalia – Strategic Review, pp. 3, 12, October 2012.

\(^{65}\) Interviews, Belgium, April 2012.

\(^{66}\) Interviews, Belgium, April 2012.
3 The Future for EUTM Somalia

Hopes for political progress in Somalia in 2012 were high. In August, the UN’s Special Representative for Somalia said it was time to move “… from selection to election, from transition to transformation.” On 5 November 2012, the new Somali Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, presented his government.

In the same spirit, many of those who were interviewed for this study hoped that the new government would assume a clearer ownership and responsibility for the political development in Somalia, including for security. It was also felt that a new government would be able to operate more consistently and clearly with the international community, in contrast to the tendency of the former TFG to act with little internal co-ordination, a problem made worse by corruption.

In 2011-2012, AMISOM and SNSF gradually drove back the Islamist and terrorist-branded Al Shabaab movement. As result, the security situation, primarily in Mogadishu, improved, although the situation remained unstable. An increasing number of countries and international organisations seemed to want to take advantage of the new situation and try to influence developments in Somalia through an increased involvement. As a result, countries such as Turkey and China, and international organisations such as the UN and the EU, established, or were seeking to establish, a presence in Somalia. Competition for influence in Somalia emerged, which could have a detrimental effect on the willingness and ability of the international community to co-ordinate its activities.

3.1 Future Development of SNSF

In practice, Somalia’s army was disbanded in 1991. After that, armed militias, often controlled by clans and warlords, emerged in the country. Throughout its period of government, the TFG lacked a national army. In 2009, the international community began to support the building of the SNSF, with the support of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). Over the 2011-2012 period, needs gradually changed.

Initially, a quantitative bottom-up perspective had been established to create a sufficiently large and well-trained force, primarily for fighting Al Shabaab. During 2012, as Al Shabaab was driven back, discussions about the nature of

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support increasingly came to focus on a more qualitative top-down approach. The number of soldiers was no longer the primary problem for SNSF. Moreover, it was unclear whether sustainable funding existed to pay more soldiers (the absence of which could mean that unpaid units would disintegrate as soldiers sought other means of earning a living). On the other hand, military capacity can be improved in several ways. The weak command structures had to be developed from political level down to unit level.\(^{68}\)

There was a need for effective civil and military institutions able to command and control the growing security forces. Both the Somali Ministry of Defence and SNSF Headquarters needed to be built up and consolidated. Existing units needed to be strengthened through further training of officers, NCOs, specialists and soldiers. In addition, the militias supporting the government could be provided with proper military training which would facilitate their integration into SNSF.

In June 2012, UNPOS and the Somali Ministry of Defence together identified basic training needs for SNSF in 2012-2013: command training primarily for tactical levels, training of specialists,\(^{69}\) leadership development, and training for individual soldiers (mainly refresher training). The aspiration was that training should be conducted as far as possible in Somalia, however, so far the security situation had not been considered stable enough. It was also judged important to distribute training to several locations in the country as part of the process of making SNSF a national concern for all Somalis.\(^{70}\)

There was a desire to improve co-ordination of efforts between the training of just over 2,000 soldiers by Ethiopia in western Somalia with other training initiatives.\(^{71}\) Ultimately, all training was to be balanced with SNSF’s needs in current operations.

Carrying out training in Somalia was seen to have advantages. It would facilitate increased Somali ownership of the process. In addition, it would reduce logistics costs and facilitate international co-ordination, which had been complicated. The US did not wish to continue under the existing structure for longer than necessary. The US was paying nearly USD 3 million annually in

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68 Interviews, Kenya, October 2012 and April 2011.
69 These include medical care personnel, radio operators, drivers, logistics personnel, intelligence personnel, military police, administrative personnel and CIMIC personnel.
70 Building up a national army may also be part of a national political agenda in what is still a divided Somalia. At the same time, others maintain that the creation of a national army may become a conflict-driving issue, if the regions perceive that Mogadishu is seeking to centralise the security forces, since trust in centralised power is generally low outside the capital. Interviews, Kenya, October 2012, and Uganda, October 2012.
71 Interview, Kenya, October 2012.
logistics costs and salaries, and US officials were said to be concerned that the EU was not bearing its share of the financial burden for the operation.\textsuperscript{72}

To summarise, the emphasis after 2012 was a shift to institution-building, developing political control and military command and improving the quality of the forces available, rather than training additional soldiers. The EUTM model, of training soldiers in partnership with UPDF, had thus partly outlived its usefulness. But if more soldiers were not needed, what role could EU play? How could it contribute to building institutions and developing leadership capability? How could the EU contribute to strengthening existing Somali forces?

### 3.2 EUTM Somalia After 2012

In the course of interviews, a representative from UNPOS suggested that in the future, EUTM Somalia should provide guidance to staff and management in the Somali Ministry of Defence and SNSF Headquarters and to unit commanders in SNSF and Somali unit trainers. In addition, officials from UNPOS considered it suitable for EUTM to train: battalion commanders (and above) in leadership and specialist capabilities such as planning and conducting operations; company commanders in leadership and tactics; as well as intelligence personnel; military police and military CIMIC-personnel at BTC.\textsuperscript{73}

Suggestions in the EU 2012 Strategic Review of EUTM were in line with UNPOS ideas. It stated that any new EUTM mandate should enable the mission to:

- Train commissioned and non-commissioned officers, as well as specialists at BTC and in Somalia when the security situation permits.
- Mentor Somali trainers and support cohesion training for new units established in Somalia.
- Guide and advise the Somali Ministry of Defence and SNSF Headquarters regarding the future structure for SNSF, for example in bridging the gap in leadership between the political/higher military level and the unit level.
- Support SNSF in the development of programmes, structures and centres for military training.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} Interview, Kenya, October 2012.

\textsuperscript{73} Interview, Kenya, October 2012.

\textsuperscript{74} Council of the European Union, 14760/12, EU Training Mission Somalia – Strategic Review, p. 3, October 2012.
These proposals indicated that new issues would have to be addressed, including:

**Security for EU Personnel in Somalia**

One decisive factor in the mission would be how to guarantee the physical security of personnel stationed in Somalia. A Swedish presence in Mogadishu would for example create a need for fresh security assessments focusing on risks in Somalia and, in the long term, possibly in Sweden as well.\(^{75}\) At the same time, a presence would signal a genuine commitment which could inspire increased trust from the Somalis, something which was noted about Turkey’s growing presence in Mogadishu.

In general, Mogadishu airport was regarded as safe, but the proposed activities would require mission personnel to move outside that area, resulting in considerably higher risks.\(^{76}\) Camp Jazeera, where much of the training was intended to take place, was adjacent to the airport but was in the autumn 2012 still lacking important infrastructure, including a proper fence.\(^{77}\) The strategic review did not address this issue,\(^{78}\) but implicitly left it to the judgement of each individual member state.

**International Co-ordination**

UNPOS was tasked with co-ordinating initiatives connected with security sector reform, but many of those involved in both Somalia and the international community expressed doubt in whether UNPOS had been given the adequate preconditions.\(^{79}\) In addition, several bilateral capacity-building initiatives were conducted in parallel to those of EUTM Somalia and outside the scope of UNPOS. This weakened both the consistency and effectiveness of the support to SNSF. Other co-ordination issues to consider were the division of labour between Member States and how the collaboration with UPDF should be structured for continued operations at BTC. To both Sweden and EUTM Somalia, co-ordination was essential to prevent duplication and ensure that efforts complemented each other.

**A Possible Swedish Contribution**

Interlocutors in Nairobi indicated that a future EUTM Somalia could focus on two issues.\(^{80}\) The first was the continuation of training at BTC, although mainly of commanders and specialists. The second would be to, in Somalia, contribute

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\(^{75}\) Discussions about any lead responsibility would have to consider new security aspects such as security responsibilities for an entire mission in Mogadishu, “green on blue” attacks, visibility and resulting threat scenarios in contributing EU member states.

\(^{76}\) Interview, Kenya, October 2012.

\(^{77}\) Interviews, Uganda, October 2012.

\(^{78}\) Council of the European Union, 14760/12, EU Training Mission Somalia – Strategic Review, October 2012.

\(^{79}\) Interviews, Kenya, October 2012.

\(^{80}\) Interview, Kenya, October 2012.
to institution-building and the strengthening of SNSF. EUTM would also be widely involved in international co-ordination.

A broadened approach for EUTM Somalia would require Sweden to consider a number of new questions. Supporting Somalia’s security sector locally in Somalia would create opportunities to influence the development of both policy and values. Swedish priorities could for example focus on civilian oversight of SNSF, accountability and human rights. A strong Swedish involvement would ensure that such issues were not overlooked.

Sweden should consider a broader resource base if contributing to a future EUTM Somalia. Any initiative with a perspective on wider security sector reform (SSR) would require contributions from other agencies than the Swedish Armed Forces. The work of institution-building would need non-military expertise, for example from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA).

A qualitatively new EUTM Somalia mission with more emphasis on institution-building was also expected to create a demand for other capabilities from the Swedish Armed Forces. As for training at BTC, it was seen to be likely that the previously infantry-focused training would be replaced by training of specialists. Training personnel for CIMIC, intelligence and medics is something the Swedish Armed Forces have a lot of experience from. Institution-building in Somalia could require complementary civilian expertise in areas such as defence planning, mission planning and policy.

### 3.3 Overall Conclusions from EUTM Regarding Capacity-Building Missions

Capacity-building missions are becoming more common. In the course of this project, EUTM Somalia was referred to as a model for future CSDP initiatives in Africa. Within the EU institutions, EUTM Somalia was generally seen as a low cost intervention that delivered tangible results – trained soldiers. EUTM Somalia was also working together with a number of partners, resulting in substantial cost sharing. All in all, it was seen likely that this type of missions would be conducted elsewhere.

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82 Interviews, Belgium, April 2012, and Uganda, October 2012.
Capacity-building is sometimes considered as part of an exit strategy for on-going military engagements. However, capacity-building initiatives should be seen as equally complex as traditional peace operations with military forces. Effects of a capacity-building mission, especially with regards to institution-building, are likely to take time, making an early termination of the mission difficult. Indeed, experience has shown that in order to be effective and sustainable, capacity-building requires long-term commitment. EUTM Somalia was initially conceived partly as an exit strategy from Operation Atalanta. In 2013, Operation Atalanta was, however, still on-going.

Another conclusion is the importance of having influence throughout the capacity-building process. EUTM Somalia had to address various problems that arose in processes before and after the training programme in Uganda. The mission was at the end of 2012 built on informal collaboration between several actors – regional and international – in Somalia, Uganda and Kenya. To get a better understanding of needs and local conditions, and to ensure that missions are consistently monitored, representation is required in all stages of the process.

Capacity-building missions also have to be financially sustainable. It is vital for the forces created not to become larger than that they can be sustained by the beneficiary country over time. In the same way, it is essential that institutions are in place to manage and monitor the new forces.

If the soldiers are not paid, equipped or looked after, or if effective leadership (civil and military) to control them from the political level down is weak, there is a risk that they will put their recently acquired military skills into practice elsewhere. In the case of EUTM Somalia, these tasks were partly outside the responsibility of the mission and were managed by international partners, primarily AMISOM. At the same time, the EU had a political responsibility for the soldiers it had helped to train. Training missions can go wrong, as highlighted for example by the debate on the US support with training and weapons to the Afghan mujahedin in the 1980s. Focusing actively on issues such as civilian democratic control and military ethics and leadership, is a way to ensure appropriate use of the trained forces in the future. The EU was working with the aim that Somalia should, in the long term, be able to handle its own security using its own forces. As for post-2012, the EU could play an important role in shaping the Somali security sector by approaching the capacity-building processes broadly, making sure that key issues are being addressed.

Another conclusion was the importance of effective collaboration with partners. Capacity-building measures are dependent on the host country, in the

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case of EUTM Somalia 2010-2012 – Uganda. In the long run it could be Somalia. International organisation work on capacity-building missions in partnership with countries, many of which have different values and in some cases a different view of human rights and democracy. An external actor can actively attempt to influence such attitudes, but may also have to adapt ambitions and ways of working according to local conditions.

Training environments may also differ considerably and it may not always be possible to maintain standards and observe regulations that apply in the assisting country. The individual trainer needs an adequate balance of expertise, flexibility and inner moral compass, which underlines the importance of careful selection by the seconding agency. An analysis of training conditions and locally held values should precede any capacity-building mission. Issues relating to civilian control, the build-up of democratic institutions and sustainability of reforms would all need to be dealt with in any future mission and would likely be at least as complex as in EUTM Somalia.

Overall, this assessment of EUTM Somalia has demonstrated that capacity-building initiatives can contribute to strengthening the security sector in countries affected by conflict. It also showed that change through capacity-building takes time and depends on effective collaboration with partners. As far as the EU and Sweden are concerned, training missions such as EUTM are likely to be an important tool in future peace operations.
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The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia started operating in Uganda in 2010 with the goal of strengthening the Somali security forces through training. The overall purpose was to contribute to stability and development in Somalia.

The aim of this report, a translated and adapted version of an original report published in Swedish in December 2012, is to assess to what extent EUTM Somalia was achieving its objectives and to follow up on Sweden’s contribution to the mission. The assessment was also intended to develop knowledge of capacity-building missions, which have become an increasingly important tool for intervention in countries affected by conflict.

European Union Training Mission Somalia

A Mission Assessment

Claes Nilsson, Johan Norberg